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CROSS-CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF MULTILATERAL NON-PROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL DIALOGUES

Edited by

Professor Keith Krause

Research Report Prepared for the

**Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Division
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Ottawa, Canada**



December 1997


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Preface and Acknowledgements

Do underlying cultural differences have an impact on non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament (NACD) processes? By this is meant not simply differences on specific policy issues, but more fundamental divergence of view about motivations, events and their contexts that result from disparate philosophical, ethical or cultural traditions. Culturally derived conceptual lenses often seem to matter because the way in which a problem is "framed" can have an effect on how it is tackled and resolved. If true, then reaching agreement across such cultural divides may involve a process of dialogue and ultimately the transformation of perceptions and *weltanschauungen*.

Clearly, however, the significance of cultural factors will vary considerably depending on the specific issues, forums, governments and individuals involved. Moreover, defining what is meant by "culture" and ascertaining the diffuse nature of its impact on attitudes and behaviour are challenging endeavours.

Many, if not most, of today's NACD processes, concepts and areas of interest evolved primarily in the context of the Cold War and, are in large measure, Western in origin. They have not necessarily taken root easily when efforts have been made to export them to different regional contexts or to new multilateral forums. Gaining a better understanding of the role that culture may play in NACD dialogues will never provide an explanatory panacea, but might provide some insight into a neglected dimension of the non-proliferation and arms control agenda as well as some helpful insight for policy-makers and negotiators in their practical efforts in various NACD contexts. From a Canadian perspective, this could be especially important, given Canada's active participation in a wide range of multilateral forums including regional ones, and its traditional pursuit of compromise between East and West, North and South.

With these aims in mind, Professor Keith Krause of the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland was invited under the Department of Foreign Affairs' Verification Research Program to undertake a study to explore the cross-cultural dimensions to the NACD dialogue and the impact this may have on multilateral negotiations. With the organizational assistance of York University's Centre for International and Security Studies, Dr. Krause assembled a study team of experts on regional security affairs, including:

- Dr. Amitav Acharya, Centre for International and Security Studies, York University, Toronto, Canada;
- Dr. Gabriel Ben-Dor, Department of Political Science, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel;
- Major-General (ret.) Ahmed Fakhr, National Centre for Middle East Studies, Cairo, Egypt;
- Dr. Hal Klepak, Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, Canada;
- Dr. Andrew Latham, Centre for International and Security Studies, York University, Toronto, Canada; and
- Dr. Jing-dong Yuan, Institute of International Relations, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada.

The team's expertise provided a range of regional perspectives, thus permitting an eclectic mix of case studies. Participants came together in November 1996 in Ottawa, Canada to agree on a working definition of "security culture" and on the parameters of the study. Individual contributions were prepared, commented upon and refined through the skilful leadership and editing of Dr. Krause, and they

appear in the following report. Although each chapter is the responsibility of its author, all benefitted from comments and discussion during and after the November workshop. In addition to sharing ideas among themselves, the authors, and in particular Dr. Krause, received invaluable advice and input from (and would like to thank) Alan Crawford, Ron Cleminson, Peggy Mason, Jill Sinclair, Rene Unger and Gord Vachon.

It is perhaps not surprising to find the study conclude that culture (in the sense of widely-shared beliefs, traditions, attitudes and symbols) presents an inescapable backdrop or framework of meaning for political actors, policy-makers and ordinary citizens that can have a significant impact upon NACD processes. The team's voyage of discovery in defining "culture" and the scope of the study are as illuminating as its findings and recommendations. The report is recommended to policy makers, practitioners and academics who share in the challenges and rewards inherent in such a quest embracing the goals of non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament.

The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade wishes to express its appreciation to Dr. Keith Krause and the individual contributors as well as to Steven Mataija and the staff of the Centre for International and Security Studies for their work in organizing and coordinating this project.

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade or the Canadian Government. This report is being published as part of an on-going commitment to share selected research conducted under the aegis of the Department's Verification Research Program.

Executive Summary

The multilateralization and regionalization of the security-building process has meant that the cross-cultural aspects of contemporary security dialogues have assumed a much more prominent place in policy debates. Cultural factors have been cited to explain persistent miscommunication and misperceptions on issues of war and peace, or the origins of (and different reactions to) various weapons taboos and the importance of ideas such as transparency and verification. Deeper cultural considerations have also been advanced to illustrate how security issues are framed (for example, a preference for hierarchical versus egalitarian regional security architectures). At the most general level, the clash of cultures or "civilizations" is sometimes invoked as the most important future challenge for global security.

But *exactly* what role cultural elements play in national and international security policies is not clear. Material or objective conflicts of interest are often (if not usually) the greatest obstacles to security-building. But beliefs and attitudes play a crucial role in both the exacerbation and resolution of these disagreements, and behind so-called "objective" *interests* lie culturally-informed sets of *ideas* that shape how states define and act upon these interests. Of course, it is difficult to demonstrate that cultural factors are responsible for a particular position or outcome, and cultural elements are always entangled with other factors operating simultaneously. Nevertheless, how decision makers define their security interests is undoubtedly derived from their collective historical/social/cultural experiences and understandings.

With these considerations in mind, the case studies in this report attempt to determine under what conditions and to what extent cultural factors make a difference in the elaboration and execution of non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament (NACD) policies. They seek to clarify a concept of *security cultures* that draws upon the diplomatic, political, strategic and social elements that go into security policy-making. Thus culture, as it refers to NACD issues:

consists of those enduring and widely-shared beliefs, traditions, attitudes, and symbols that inform the ways in which a state's/society's interests and values with respect to security, stability and peace are perceived, articulated and advanced by political actors and elites.

The case studies cover a range of states and regions: the legacy of the East-West (or Western experience), Southeast Asia, China, India, Latin America, and the Middle East. Each examines a range of concrete issues and cases connected with NACD issues, and orientations towards security more generally. They examine (among other things):

- the role of culture "writ large" (historical, religious, communal or normative influences on orientations towards war and peace);
- the impact of the region's historical legacy of conflict, colonialism and/or state-building;
- orientations towards regional and multilateral relations, in particular unilateral or mutual concepts of security;
- specific cultural practices or styles of diplomacy and negotiation;
- the nature of civil-military relations and its impact on NACD issues; and
- societal attitudes towards authority (hierarchical versus egalitarian), violence, rule of law, and domestic conflict management.

Together the analysis in these studies points towards four general recommendations for efforts to advance the NACD agenda in different regions. The first is that *the potential for progress is enhanced when one finds "points of resonance" or indigenous cultural expressions or experiences on which to build policy initiatives*. Proposals that situate policy departures within a traditional practice or understanding that all states within a region share enjoy a greater chance of success than those that appear to be attempts to "import" (or "impose") an alien Western experience.

A second conclusion is that *security-building processes ought to be made as multilateral as possible*, while usually remaining within a regional context. Moving from bilateral to regional processes can minimize the ability of states to magnify differences that exist among them, can help catalyze the development of a shared regional diplomatic/security culture (ie: arms control experts, etc.), and can bring a larger set of interests (economic, civil society) to bear on a security-building process. Moving from the global to the regional level mutes the "inter-civilizational" and North-South rhetoric that has crippled many global forums, and allows regional participants to focus on their security concerns without feeling forced to deal with an imposed agenda.

A third conclusion is that policy-makers should *seek out regional entrepreneurial leaders* as linchpins for efforts to break out of established relationships and patterns and to move forward on a concrete security-building agenda. Entrepreneurial leaders are those individuals who understand that cultural factors shape decision-makers' perceptions of a situation and limit their freedom of action, while at the same time these factors can also be used by creative leaders to justify or explain new policy departures.

A final recommendation is that policies should *encourage a normative transformation in domestic politics and policies*, via a two-pronged strategy. The first element is promotion of a transnational policy community whose interaction can crystallize and shape agreement around various norms (thus making possible policy changes); the second element is a direct engagement with domestic "forces of change," such as non-governmental or civic groups within society, military establishments, alternative political formations, religious elites, and so forth. The former aims at strengthening the shared "diplomatic culture" of security-building norms; the latter, because it reaches into society, requires a great deal of cultural awareness to overcome the cultural "baggage" that is brought to these issues by domestic political actors.

Overall, well-framed policy initiatives will not rest upon crude assessments of the alleged "real interests" or "bottom lines" of particular states and parties, but will attempt to see how these are arrived at, and how interests and bottom lines are embedded in a broader socio-cultural context that can be used to facilitate (or impede) progress.

All of these case studies demonstrate that cultural factors make a difference in the articulation of national interests and the formulation of policies towards non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament. Although the influence of cultural elements is often elusive, there is little doubt that they can (and will) exercise a powerful influence on the prospects for security-building in various states and regions. Nevertheless, analysts are far from having a coherent framework that links positions on NACD issues with particular diplomatic, historical, strategic or political cultural orientations. Further research on security cultures could thus concentrate on the following issues:

- tracing different cultural influences on the development (and implementation) of global NACD norms in areas such as transparency, verification or confidence-building;

- focusing on the different cultural mainsprings of national security policies in specific regional environments (such as Southeast Asia or the Middle East) in order to catalyze regional "track-two" dialogues on these issues;
- analysing the security cultures of regional "outlier" states (such as South Korea, France, Israel or South Africa) to determine how and why they share or diverge from regional norms; and
- studying the role of transnational actors and forces as "transmission mechanisms" for domestic norm change in particular states or issue areas.

I. Cross-Cultural Dimensions of Multilateral Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Dialogues: An Overview

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Introduction

"Cultural" aspects of national and international security policies and practices have recently become the focus of attention in several different strands of analysis.¹ Of course, cultural explanations, from the most trivial to the most essential, have long been woven into the fabric of international security politics. As far back as François de Callières' eighteenth century diplomatic "handbook," the impact of the national differences that negotiators brought to the table was remarked upon.² But the "multilateralization" and regionalization of security (in the Middle East and Asia-Pacific regions, throughout the Americas, and even in post-Cold War Europe), the rapidity of global change, and the interdependence of states and regions, has meant that the cross-cultural aspects of contemporary security dialogues have assumed a much more prominent place in policy debates.

Examples abound, from the specific to the general. At the most concrete level, differences between, for example, *awase* ("adaptive") and *erabi* ("manipulative, can-do, or choosing") cultures can be used as a means of explaining different approaches to bilateral or multilateral negotiations on a variety of international issues.³ One step up the ladder of generality, cultural factors can be used to explain persistent miscommunications and misperceptions on issues of war and peace between, for example, the Israelis and Egyptians.⁴ At a somewhat more general level, cultural factors can be used to explain the origins of (and different reactions to) the chemical and nuclear weapons taboos of non-use, or to the

¹ Among other major works, see Peter Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), Raymond Cohen, *Negotiating Across Cultures: Communication Obstacles in International Diplomacy* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1990); Robert A. Rubinstein, "Cultural Aspects of Peacekeeping: Notes on the Substance of Symbols," *Millennium*, 22:3 (Winter 1993), 547-562. Other relevant contributions will be cited below. One should also note that the United States Institute for Peace has just launched a series of projects on "cross-cultural negotiation: country studies," and that the Ford Foundation supported a regional project organized by Ken Booth and Russell Troad.

² "The last quality is an advantage that the Spanish nation has over ours; which is naturally lively, restless, and which has no sooner begun an affair, but would willingly see the end of it...commonly a Spanish minister is not much in haste." François de Callières, *The Art of Diplomacy* [1716] (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1983), 87.

³ Cohen, *Negotiation across Cultures*, 30-31, who in turn takes the distinction from Kinhide Mushakoji, "The Cultural Premises of Japanese Diplomacy," in Japan Center for International Exchange, ed., *The Silent Power* (Tokyo: The Simul Press, 1976).

⁴ Raymond Cohen, *Culture and Conflict in Egyptian-Israeli Relations: A Dialogue of the Deaf* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990). Some examples will be offered below.

importance of such concepts as "transparency" in security matters.⁵ One step further up the ladder of generality, deep cultural considerations (such as the so-called "Asian way") can be used to explain the framing of security issues and a preference for hierarchical versus egalitarian ideas of regional security architectures, or can be invoked to explain the different interpretations of such concepts as a "common European home."⁶ At the most general level, cultures or "civilizations" can be invoked as the basic units of interaction in world politics, and the "clash of civilizations" as the most important future challenge for global security.⁷

The dominant assumption is that cross-cultural differences not only reflect differences on specific policy issues (although that is part of it), but also often reflect more fundamental differences concerning motivations, events and their contexts that result from different philosophical, ethical or cultural traditions. Reaching security-building agreements across the cultural divides in international relations may thus involve a process of mutual education and dialogue, and ultimately of transformation of perceptions and *weltanschauungen*. But *exactly* what role cultural elements play in national and international security policies is not clear. It is often impossible to demonstrate that cultural factors, and not some other "variables," were responsible for a particular position or outcome; neither is it the case that cultural elements operate in a vacuum, as they are usually entangled with a host of other factors operating simultaneously.⁸

These analyses result in conflicting and contradictory conclusions about the role of cultural elements in national and international security. On the one hand, people such as Raymond Cohen or Elizabeth Kier argue "that cross-cultural antimonies between the parties may affect the course and outcome of negotiations," or that "culture is important in explaining choices [for example] between offensive and defensive military doctrines."⁹ On the other hand, people such as Desmond Ball or William Zartman conclude that "cultural factors will be less important than economic, technological and strategic

⁵ Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, "Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboos," in Katzenstein, *Culture of National Security*, 114-152. See also Richard Price, "A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo," *International Organization*, 49:1 (Winter 1995), 73-103. On transparency, see Shannon Selin's observations in *Asia Pacific Arms Buildups Part Two: Prospects for Control*, working paper no. 7 (Vancouver: Institute of International Relations, UBC, 1994), 25.

⁶ On the "common European home," see Paul Chilton, *Security Metaphors: Cold War Discourses from Containment to the Common House* (New York: Peter Lang, 1996); Chilton and M. Ilyin, "Metaphor in Political Discourse: The Case of the 'Common European House,'" *Discourse and Society*, 4:1 (1993), 7-31. For an overview of the debate on the Asian way, see Alan Dupont, "Is There an Asian Way?," *Survival*, 38:2 (Summer 1996), 13-33; Amitav Acharya, "Multilateralism: Is There an Asia Pacific Way?" paper prepared for the conference on National Strategies in the Asia-Pacific, 28-29 March 1996.

⁷ Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," *Foreign Affairs*, 72:3 (Summer 1993), 22-49.

⁸ Michael Mazaar, "Culture and International Relations: A Review Essay," *Washington Quarterly*, 19:2 (1996), 188.

⁹ Raymond Cohen, "An Advocate's View," in Guy Olivier Faure and Jeffrey Rubin, eds., *Culture and Negotiation: The Resolution of Water Disputes* (London: Sage, 1993), 22; Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and French Military Doctrine Before World War II," in Katzenstein, *Culture and National Security*, 187.

developments in determining the new architecture of regional security."¹⁰ Most analysts agree, however, on the importance of at least coming to terms with the cultural dimension of international politics, and in particular security policies.

But between the poles of "culture is everything" and "culture is irrelevant" lies a wide middle ground in which a whole host of "cultural" factors may be at work, in both a negative and a positive way. For this analysis, "the simple question 'does culture matter?' should be replaced by a more fruitful line of enquiry, 'under what special conditions and to what extent does culture matter?'"¹¹ Hence the scope of this analysis is both broader and narrower than that of most of the authors mentioned above. On the one hand, its goal is to consider all of the dimensions on which cultural elements can be important to multilateral dialogues on international peace and security, ranging from the broadest impact of political and historical cultures, to the most specific manifestations in negotiating practices and procedures. On the other hand, its goal is to focus all of these elements onto one specific topic area, which could be called "security culture": the cultural dimension of multilateral security-building and arms control (broadly defined) dialogues. The overall purpose is to develop a coherent and policy-relevant framework that would help to link positions concerning issues of non-proliferation and arms control with particular diplomatic, historical, strategic or political cultural orientations that could have an impact on the development of the arms control and security-building dialogue in particular regional contexts or issue areas.

The purpose (and structure) of this introductory chapter is two-fold. First, drawing upon the various literatures that examine the cultural dimensions of international politics, it will elaborate the various concepts of "culture" (diplomatic, political, and strategic) that are relevant to multilateral security issues. Secondly, it will bring these elements together in a template that serves to define more clearly the concept of a "security culture," and outlines the possible cultural dimensions of arms control, non-proliferation and confidence-building efforts, as a basis for the more focused explorations in the case studies that follow. The first case study, which is a sort of "backdrop" study for the subsequent cases, examines the contemporary *acquis* of arms control and non-proliferation instruments and concepts. Its goal is to demonstrate how some of the achievements and methods of the East-West arms control legacy were (and were not) affected by what could be considered "cultural" factors. It thus sets the stage for the non-Western cases, and provides the rationale for why these somewhat nebulous factors must be taken into consideration in other contexts, either when obstacles emerge to the "translation" of the East-West experience, or when multilateral dialogues cut across important cultural and historical divides.

Some Conceptual Caveats

Before tackling this, however, some clarifications and caveats must be offered. First, none of the contributors claims that a focus on cultural elements will provide a Holy Grail (to use a culturally-bound reference) or a panacea to the difficulties that are encountered in multilateral dialogues on international

¹⁰ Desmond Ball, "Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region," *Security Studies*, 3:1 (1993), 44. Zartman echoes this when he claims that "culture is indeed relevant to the understanding of the negotiation process--every bit as relevant as breakfast and to much the same extent...even the best understanding of any such effect is tautological, its measure vague, and its role in the process basically epiphenomenal." I. William Zartman, "A Skeptic's View," in Faure and Rubin, 17.

¹¹ Ole Elgström, "National Culture and International Negotiations," *Cooperation and Conflict*, 29:3 (1994), 295.

security. Material or "objective" issues of disagreement and clashes of interests are often (if not usually) the greatest obstacles to security-building. But to stop at this point is to ignore both the role that inter-subjective and perceptual elements can play in the unfolding (and often exacerbation) of these disagreements, and the fact that behind so-called "objective" clashes of *interests* lie sets of *ideas*, which give practical content to states' (and regimes') definitions of their interests. There is no separate relationship between two distinct things -- "cultural ideas" versus "material interests" -- the point is rather that the way in which decision makers define their security interests is derived from their collective historical/social/cultural experiences and understandings. As Price and Tannenwald point out with respect to nuclear and chemical weapons, for example:

in order to understand the anomalous status and patterns of non-use of chemical and nuclear weapons, it is necessary to understand how particular social and cultural meanings become attached to certain kinds of weapons, how these normative understandings arise historically...and how they shape actors' conceptions of their interests and identities.¹²

Second, it is extremely easy to reify different political and strategic cultures, and to treat them as somehow insulated from criticism, or from outside influences. Broad and fuzzy notions of "American insensitivity," "Arab deceitfulness," "Asian avoidance of saying 'no'" may all have some kernel of truth, or relevance to the issue at hand, but cannot simply be carted out as explanations or justifications of particular policies. In fact, the history of cross-cultural exchanges and borrowing, the globalization of many "cultural" influences, and the rapidity of social change in the contemporary world, all make such ossified notions of culture irrelevant. One must see culture not as some fixed pattern of "learned behaviour" that imprisons participants in security-building dialogues, but rather think of "culture in context" in order to see how particular influences may become important in certain regions, or with respect to certain issues, or in certain negotiating contexts.

Third, the problem of an ethnocentric standpoint is difficult to overcome, especially given that most analysts of arms control and disarmament issues are people who are steeped in the East-West or European history of arms control and security-building, and who wish to make the best use of this expertise in other regional or multilateral security-building projects. At a minimum, this project must not only attempt to draw out the central concepts of the East-West arms control discourse (such ideas as transparency, verification, confidence-building, balance, stability) and ask how these are defined in different regional contexts, but to ask the more difficult question: "what sorts of concepts or experiences shape ideas of peace and security in different regional and cultural contexts, and how might these be useful or relevant to the non-proliferation and arms control dialogue?" This is a more difficult task, which requires a fairly broad understanding of (or sensitivity to) the experience of war and peace, security and insecurity, in different regions.

Finally, one must avoid accepting at face-value the occasionally self-serving language of "culturism" that has emerged out of different regional contexts. Just as rejection of Western notions of human rights has been a convenient shield behind which dictators and oppressors have hidden, rejection of well-established and potentially successful Western (or East-West) processes of confidence-building and measures of non-

¹² Price and Tannenwald, in Katzenstein, *Culture of National Security*, 115.

proliferation could act as a convenient shield for arms buildups and weapons proliferation.¹³ Thus analysts must always be sensitive to the realities of power politics that are at work in the various multilateral non-proliferation and arms control dialogues.

Different "Cultures" of International Relations: Diplomatic, Political and Strategic

Culture Writ Large

Definitions of "culture" are not hard to find. Perhaps the most broad, which I will call "culture writ large" treats it as "relatively stable patterns of behaviour, actions and customs," or as "the outward expression of a unifying and consistent vision brought by a particular community to its confrontation with such core issues as the origins of the cosmos, the harsh unpredictability of the natural environment, the nature of society, and humankind's place in the order of things."¹⁴ Culture writ large doubtless exists, but as Raymond Cohen points out, any simple definition of it can be misleading and not useful. What is more important is to emphasize that a "culture" is a quality of groups not of individuals (and that individuals may be a member of different "cultures" simultaneously), that it is acquired by people through socialization, and that each culture is a "unique complex of attributes" that changes and evolves over time.¹⁵ Hence one must try (as the authors of the case studies below do) to go beyond the broad invocation of a "Islamic" or "Confucian" idea of the world, or an Asian practice of "consensus-building" or "macho" culture of honour in Latin America, to show how such ideas and practices could manifest themselves in particular arenas of international relations and security policy.

Culture writ large is, however, also not a particularly useful tool with which to approach our problem, since international relations is not some sort of unmediated interaction of different cultures, randomly encountering and clashing with each other.¹⁶ Instead, it is made up of encounters of individuals, groups and states, brought together in cooperation or conflict, over particular issues or problems. Given this, it makes sense to specify more precisely which groups are engaged in an encounter, what role (if any) their socialization might play, and what sets of cultural attributes are relevant for the particular encounter. Simplistic notions of culture as a bundle of attributes or customs (eg. all Japanese avoid social conflict; one should never refuse refreshments in Nigeria; Indians are defensive with respect to the West) may provide grist for a "how-to" handbook to avoid diplomatic or social incidents, but they tend to be banal (or contradictory), neglect the ability of individuals to move "fluently" among different cultures (and to

¹³ On the way in which the Asian values debate on human rights might be seen in this light, see the response by South Korean dissident, Kim Dae Jung, "Is Culture Destiny?" *Foreign Affairs*, 73:6 (Nov./Dec. 1994), 189-194; Christopher Lingle, "The Propaganda Way," *Foreign Affairs*, 74:3 (May/June 1995), 193-196; Aryeh Neier, "Asia's Unacceptable Standard," *Foreign Policy*, 92 (Autumn 1993), 43-51.

¹⁴ The first definition is from Robert A. Rubinstein, "Cultural Aspects of Peacekeeping: Notes on the Substance of Symbols," *Millennium*, 22:3 (Winter 1993), 550; the second from Cohen, *Negotiating Across Cultures*, 8.

¹⁵ Cohen, *Negotiating Across Cultures*, 8-9.

¹⁶ Although for one statement that veers towards this view, see Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations."

reject elements of their own), and underplay the real issues at stake that have brought individuals, groups or states to a negotiation or a dialogue.¹⁷

One way to get beyond culture writ large is to look at more focused manifestations of cultural factors. In this respect, the idea of "culture" has been modified by at least three adjectives that provide good entry points for International Relations and security studies analysts: diplomatic culture, political culture and strategic culture. Elements of all three of these could be relevant for grasping the potential and pitfalls of processes of arms control, non-proliferation and confidence and security-building, but each must be carefully distinguished.

Diplomatic Culture

"Diplomatic culture" generally refers to the rules of conduct that govern the interactions of state representatives in formal and informal contexts. These include specific procedures and protocols, the use of a particular terminology in agreements and more general "signals" between states.¹⁸ To an outsider, these procedures, terms or signals can appear incomprehensible or pointless; to insiders, they perform a critical function in smoothing the operation of the multilateral system and reducing the possibility of misunderstanding and misperception. For example, the various code phrases of UN Security Council Resolutions ("concerned that," "deeply regretting," "gravely alarmed," "strongly condemns"; "requests," "urges," "demands") offer a precise set of escalated distinctions for the seriousness with which an action is viewed by the Security Council. Likewise, withdrawing an ambassador for "consultations" is no small matter, when done in a public fashion in response to a particular event. Finally, debates about the shape of conference tables, the order of agendas, and the procedures for decision-making are all crucial to the smooth and predictable functioning of the international diplomatic culture.

Some authors (including some in this collection) have concluded from the existence of a nearly-universally shared diplomatic culture that cultural elements (writ large) play almost no role in international relations. Diplomats learn the same "language, often have attended the same schools, travel in a fairly tight international circle, and repeatedly encounter each other in different context. To anyone who has observed the unfolding of a multilateral meeting or conference, or read the traffic associated with it, the steps taken appear fairly precise and even predictable, without regard for differing socio-cultural backgrounds. As I. William Zartman and Maureen Berman put it, "by now the world has established an international diplomatic culture that soon socializes its members into similar behavior."¹⁹

¹⁷ The first two examples are from Kevin Avruch and Peter W. Black, "The Culture Question and Conflict Resolution," *Peace and Change*, 16 (1991), 29, the third from Cohen, *Negotiating Across Cultures*, 13. As Avruch and Black (30) point out, this uniform view of culture "can lead to the attempt to pigeonhole behavior into a pattern assumed to be standard for all members of the social group. Cohen also usefully points out that a set of attributes may differ radically from context to context: the way Indians deal with Westerners is not the way they deal with their smaller neighbours.

¹⁸ For some details see Raymond Cohen, *International Politics: The Rules of the Game* (London: Longman, 1981); Harold Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, 3rd ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969); R.C. Feltham, *Diplomatic Handbook*, 2nd ed. (London: Longman, 1977).

¹⁹ I. William Zartman and Maureen Berman, *The Practical Negotiator* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 226.

But to conclude from this that culture does not matter is misleading in three senses. First, the acceptance by almost all players of the need for a smoothly operating diplomatic culture (witness the reaction when it breaks down, as when Iran held American embassy officials hostage, or when during the Cold War Romania refused to permit a UN official who was a Romanian national to leave the country), attests to its importance. Culture need not be exclusively a *negative* factor that impedes security-building or multilateral agreements, and it may be important to recognize when the lack of a shared diplomatic culture may be creating obstacles to dialogue that could be relatively easily resolved. Second, the existence of a shared diplomatic culture may in fact allow other, deeper, cross-cultural disagreements to be more clearly expressed. Large-scale, carefully orchestrated, diplomatically correct United Nations conferences (the Beijing conference on women, for example, or the Cairo conference on population, or the Vienna conference on human rights) became forums in which, for example, Asian resistance to "Western" norms of human rights, or Islamic resistance to expansive notions of the role of women in public life, or Catholic opposition to birth control, could be more freely articulated, and perhaps understood.

Third, and most importantly, while the participants in diplomacy are members of this diplomatic culture, they *at the same time* carry other cultural identities, must assume other roles, and answer to other masters. The existence of a shared but thin or weak global diplomatic culture does not prevent contrasting cultural styles (of negotiation, for example) from creating an obstacle to progress or agreement. American and Soviet negotiators usually observed proper diplomatic form, but this did not prevent the Soviet participants from following certain culturally influenced patterns (risk avoidance, preoccupation with authority, assertions of control) that shaped the progress of arms control negotiations.²⁰ Similarly, American and Japanese trade negotiators not only follow certain cultural practices, but are acutely conscious of the public presentation of these "back home" and of the limits to what they can be seen to be agreeing to, even in cases where they have a shared interest in an outcome. Even on a small-scale level this can be consequential: as Gabriel Ben-Dor points out below, when the Israeli Prime Minister Begin called the Egyptian Foreign Minister "a young man," he intended this a compliment, but it was instead perceived as a mortal insult that did not ease the building of trust in the peace process.

Likewise, agreement among diplomats over the meaning of a particular term, practice, or broader understanding need not "translate" into passive acceptance of this by the domestic political audience (who may be ignorant of it entirely). Telling examples for a different issue area appeared in the discussions of the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo. Despite the enthusiasm of some Western proponents, key concepts did not "translate" well at all in the conference results:

The Arabic translation of "family leave" describes spouses leaving each other after a birth and the Russian text suggests that the whole family is going on vacation. In Russian, "reproductive health" means health that reproduces itself again and again...Female empowerment, perhaps the key concept of the conference, has no meaning to the Chinese

²⁰ These three characteristics come from Raymond Smith, *Negotiating with the Soviets* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), 5-6. See also, more generally, Daniel Druckman, A.A. Benton, F. Ali, and J.S. Bagur, "Cultural Differences in Bargaining Behavior: India, Argentina and the United States," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 3 (September 1975), 413-452.

without knowing which kind of power is being discussed--personal, political, or physical.²¹

Obviously, pure translation problems can often be clarified, although even here, as the case of Security Council Resolution 242 on the Arab-Israeli conflict makes clear, matters are not always straightforward.²² But more importantly, the whole nexus of meanings behind concepts such as "family leave" or "female empowerment" make little or no sense outside of the particular (and in this case Western) cultural matrix from which they emerged (a certain concept of the family, of equality, of the role of women, and so forth), despite the existence of a shared diplomatic culture through which they were expressed. The same might turn out to be true for such ideas as "transparency," "verification," and "confidence-building," so dear to the arms control community.

Political Culture

The point that diplomats and negotiators find themselves operating in multiple and overlapping "cultures" leads directly to the "political cultural" dimension of international politics. The notion of political culture was elaborated primarily to explain differences in domestic political institutions and arrangements, and to uncover the societal underpinnings of particular political debates.²³ In the United States, for example, the influence of the Bill of Rights on norms of free speech, the debate over social issues such as abortion, or the constitutional underpinnings of the debate over gun control, all illustrate elements of political culture. As a more fuzzy level, ideas of "can-do," "straight talk," the "frontier mentality," or "the self-made man" all exercise some, albeit ill-defined, impact on American political life. Obviously, similar points could be made about the impact of Ghandianism and colonialism on Indian political life, the "mandate from heaven" in Confucian rule, the "two solitudes" in Canadian politics, or the "caudillo" legacy of Spanish rule in Latin America.

Of course, one must be cautious in deploying such fuzzy notions to explain actual political outcomes. Often, so-called political cultural variables are used to explain everything about a nation's political life, in which case they actually explain nothing. Likewise, an undue focus on such aspects can lead to a neglect of the impact of the interests and power of different actors (such as the National Rifle Association, or conservative religious groups in America) on outcomes. What is important to note here is that political cultural influences are not confined to these vague ideas (which in any case find very different expressions at different historical periods), and are actually mediated through the filter of political institutions and

²¹ Karen Mingst and Craig Warkentin, "What Difference Does Culture Make in Multilateral Negotiations?" *Global Governance*, 2 (1996), 171, from Peter Waldman, "Lost in Translation: How to 'Empower Women' in Chinese, *Wall Street Journal*, 13 September 1994.

²² The French text of that resolution calls for withdrawal from "des territoires occupés," which connotes "all of the occupied territories (as does apparently also the Russian and Arabic text), while the English text, which reads "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict," does not connote necessarily all of them. United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, article 1.

²³ As one author defines it, political culture refers to "that complex of attitudes and practices...which reflects both the historical evolution of society and the psychological reactions to social change of the society's political actors." Lucian Pye, cited in Ball, "Strategic Culture," 45. See also Ronald Inglehart, "The Renaissance of Political Culture," *American Political Science Review*, 82 (1988), 1203-1230; Harry Eckstein, "A Culturalist Theory of Political Change," *The American Political Science Review*, 82:3 (September, 1988).

forces. Ideas about peace (in the Arab Middle East, for example) can range from notions of cease-fires, to temporary cessations of hostilities, to non-belligerency, to "real peace" and so on.²⁴ This implies that it is more useful to analyze the impact of political culture through two other lenses that are both more concrete, and more pertinent to this analysis.

The first concrete manifestation of political cultural influences is the impact of particular institutional and legal arrangements on political outcomes. The legalist and contractual bent of American politics (reflecting the importance of the Supreme Court, and the court system as a means of conflict resolution); the incorporation of factional and ideological differences within a ruling "consensus" in Japan, the role of a professional and "non-partisan" civil service in Westminster parliamentary systems, or the colonial heritage of imposed political systems that efface traditional patterns of accommodation and conflict resolution can all have real consequences in the security arena. For example, in the early 1980s, the Reagan Administration's deliberate intransigence on arms control produced a Congressional revolt that succeeded in imposing several changes on the American position in the INF and START negotiations. This reflected the relative balance of Congress and the president in foreign policy making and treaty-signing. It served, however, to confuse completely the Soviet negotiators, who were uncertain about which voice spoke for the American government, and about the value of any negotiating statements or positions.²⁵ Likewise, throughout the 1970s the Egyptian government, with a different tradition of rule, "tended to underestimate the limits on presidential power," and perhaps "exaggerated [their] American interlocutors' freedom of action" in various negotiating forums.²⁶ On the other hand, an awareness of the factional nature of Japanese politics allowed Chinese negotiators in the early 1970s to "test" the extent to which Japanese (and Liberal Democratic Party) policy had really changed as a result of its normalization of relations with China.²⁷

The second manifestation of political cultural elements are the external expressions or projections of these domestic political arrangements and traditions. At a trivial level, this can lead to diplomatic gaffes and embarrassments: it was often noted, for example, that President Lyndon Johnson, schooled in senatorial log-rolling "treated Third World leaders like Senators...[and] presumed that they were all reasonable men who could be persuaded to compromise on almost any issue if the right combination of threats and incentives was employed."²⁸ At a more important level, multilateral practice, and indeed much behaviour in the international arena, can reflect domestic political experiences and innovations. The entire architecture and institutional arrangements of the post-World War II multilateral order, for example, was the outward projection of the New Deal state, and reflected closely the Rooseveltian regulatory revolution in American political life, in such areas as the Food and Agriculture or World Health Organizations, or

²⁴ See details in the chapter by Gabriel Ben-Dor in this collection.

²⁵ Details are discussed in Strobe Talbott, *Deadly Gambits*, (London: Pan Books, 1985), 330-342.

²⁶ Cohen, *Negotiating Across Cultures*, 97.

²⁷ Ogura Kazuo, "How the 'Inscrutables' Negotiate with the 'Inscrutables,': Chinese Negotiating Tactics vis-à-vis the Japanese," *China Quarterly*, 79 (September 1979), 530-532.

²⁸ Former National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, quoted in Cohen, *Negotiating Across Cultures*, 34.

the scope and responsibilities of the GATT and the World Bank.²⁹ Examples abound from other states as well. The Chilean (and perhaps South American) preference for bilateralism in foreign affairs throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s was an extension of the pattern of rule established by the military government.³⁰ The Canadian commitment to multilateral institutions and to measures to enhance the apparatus of "international peace and security," or its repeated attempt to act as an "honest broker" between competing claims reflects not only Canada's relative international power position, but its domestic political tradition, with its emphasis on pragmatic non-ideological compromise, pluralism and accommodation, and "peace, order and good government."³¹

It is not easy to trace these links between domestic and international political praxis, but by narrowing the focus of "political culture" to these two elements -- the impact of domestic political institutions and structures, and the outward projection of domestic political traditions and arrangements -- one can at least gain a better grasp of the possible influences on policy and behaviour in the multilateral security arena.

Strategic Culture

The literature on "strategic culture" draws upon the tradition of political culture, but turns it towards a specific set of issues concerning war and the military. The most narrow (and classic) descriptions define it as "set of attitudes and beliefs held within a military establishment concerning the political objective of war and the most effective strategy and operational method of achieving it."³² Somewhat more broadly, Desmond Ball has argued that:

²⁹ Anne-Marie Burley, "Regulating the World: Multilateralism, International Law, and the Projection of the New Deal Regulatory State," in John Ruggie, ed., *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 125-156; John Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," in Stephen Krasner, ed., *International Regimes* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 195-232.

³⁰ Roberto Duran, "Chilean Multilateralism and the United Nations System," in Keith Krause and W. Andy Knight, eds., *State, Society and the UN System: Changing Perspectives on Multilateralism* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1995), 173.

³¹ As Thomas Hockin notes, Canada's "tendency to put organization viability before purposes of organizations, our penchant to put ambiguity and peacekeeping in place of clear declaratory policy, [our] naive faith in the magic of negotiations: all these behaviour patterns flow genuinely from our domestic experience." Thomas Hockin, "Federalist Style in International Politics," in Stephen Clarkson, ed., *An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada?* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1968), 129. See also Dennis Stairs, "The Political Culture of Canadian Foreign Policy," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 15:4 (December 1982), 667-690. John Meisel, "The Relationship Between Foreign Policy and the Domestic Political Culture in a Post-Meech, Post-Cold War, Canada," paper presented to the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Vancouver, March 1991.

³² Yitzhak Klein, "A Theory of Strategic Culture," *Comparative Strategy* 10:2 (January-March 1991), 5. As Stephen Peter Rosen put it, strategic culture argued that the beliefs and assumptions of political-military decision makers "framed their choices about international military behavior, in particular the choices concerning decisions to go to war; preferences for offensive, expansionist, or defensive modes of warfare; and levels of wartime casualties that would be acceptable." Stephen Peter Rosen, *Societies and Military Power: India and its Armies* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 17.

different countries and regions approach the key issues of war, peace and strategy from perspectives which are both quite distinctive and deeply rooted, reflecting their different geostrategic situations, resources, history, military experience and political beliefs. These factors profoundly influence how a country perceives, protects, and promotes its interests and values with respect to the threat or use of force.³³

Amplifying this by drawing on the work of anthropologist Clifford Geertz, Alastair Johnston defines strategic culture as:

an integrated 'system of symbols (e.g., argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors) which acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficiency of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious.'³⁴

Johnston's definition draws attention to two important elements that are not emphasized in the previous definitions. First, he indicates *where* strategic cultural elements are "lodged" -- in the symbol systems used by policy-makers in their debates and discussions. Second, he notes that a strategic culture is a form of power, that could be used to occlude other perspectives (on how security could be achieved, for example) or to preserve the institutional power of particular groups (such as the armed forces). Both of these elements are important in the cases below. It is also worth noting, however, that this understanding of culture can be used in either a nuanced or a crude way. As Johnston points out, "done well, the careful analysis of strategic culture could help policymakers establish more accurate and empathetic understandings of how different actors perceive the game being played...Done badly, [it] could reinforce stereotypes about the strategic predispositions of other states and close off policy alternatives."³⁵

Strategic culture has both a "societal" or domestic and an international or externally-oriented dimension. The societal aspect is concerned with historical experiences and attitudes that shape attitudes towards war, the impact of dominant social structures (such as class, caste, or ethnic divisions) on civil-military relations and military organizations, the role of the armed forces in society (large or small, well integrated or isolated), and the choice of strategic doctrines and the accompanying weapons systems. In some respects, this element of "strategic culture" is simply the historical and social dimension of security policies, and the use of the term "culture" only suggests that these influences cannot be reduced to crude "material interests" or rational calculations.³⁶

³³ Ball, "Strategic Culture," 44-45. See also Ken Booth, "The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed," in Carl Jacobsen, ed., *Strategic Power: USA/USSR* (New York: St. Martin's, 1990), 121, who argues that "The concept of strategic culture refers to a nation's traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behaviour, habits, symbols, achievements and particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving problems with respect to the threat or use of force."

³⁴ Alastair Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," *International Security*, 19:4 (Spring 1995), 46.

³⁵ Johnston, "Thinking about Strategic Culture," 63-64.

³⁶ These points are made by Stephen Peter Rosen, in "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," *International Security*, 19 (Spring 1995), 5-31, and in *Societies and Military Power*, 1-32. Regrettably, he does not address the implications of his argument for security doctrines and security-building policies.

Well-documented examples of historico-societal influences on strategic choices abound. Several scholars, for example, have examined the cultural and institutional influences on pre-1914 military doctrines, when many European forces adopted offensive postures (such as *guerre à l'outrance*) that cost them dearly in blood and treasure, and that were shockingly inflexible in light of the early battlefield experience. The reasons for these doctrines can be found in the organizational or institutional interests of professional military organizations that were not under civilian control or in the social stratification of European societies and social orders (both of which are "social structural" explanations).³⁷ This literature has been generalized beyond Europe, with excellent recent studies of Chinese strategic culture, of Indian society and military power, and of Japanese political/military culture, but in almost none of these cases have analysts stepped beyond limited conceptions of military doctrine and strategy to address broader issues of a society's or state's orientation towards how best to achieve its security, including the arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament dimensions of security-building measures that are the direct concern of this study.³⁸

The second, external, face of strategy also has cultural aspects. These are simultaneously more problematic and more germane to this study, and they can be grouped under the headings of "strategy and ethnocentrism" or "strategy and identity." The ethnocentric biases of strategy, which include a tendency to adopt crude images of the enemy, to polarize disputes, to misunderstand the impact of one's own actions, and to assume a posture of superiority, all represent "important sources of mistakes in the theory and practice of strategy."³⁹ Of course, how potential allies and opponents are regarded is connected to deeper questions of "identity" in a strong sense -- is your potential opponent considered an equal, an inferior, a "brother enemy," or a barely human barbarian? Few of the simplistic generalizations stand up to scrutiny here, and the ability of groups who "understand" each other perfectly well in historical, cultural, social and linguistic terms to kill each other appear no less than that of groups living across wide gulfs of mutual incomprehension. In fact, it might be that the most bitter struggles take place between peoples who understand perfectly the nature of their adversaries.

Nevertheless, despite the slipperiness of concepts such as an "enemy image" or ethnocentrism, it is still important to assess the degree to which concepts of security and strategic culture might be affected by the existence (or not) of regional affinity communities (linguistic, ethnic, religious, racial). It seems intuitively plausible that the spreading of the notion of a common "European identity" played some role in ensuring the success of confidence and security-building measures in Europe over the last two decades. Similar effects may be at work in other regions, such as Latin America, or Southeast Asia, while their opposite might be unfolding in the Middle East.

³⁷ Stephen van Evera, "Why Cooperation Failed in 1914," *World Politics* 38 (1986), 80-117; Jack Snyder, "Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984," *International Security* 9 (1984), 108-146; Jack Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984). On French doctrine in the interwar period, see Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and French Military Doctrine Before World War II," in Katzenstein, *Culture and National Security*, 186-215.

³⁸ In addition to the works by Stephen Peter Rosen and Elizabeth Kier cited above, see also Thomas U. Berger, "Norms, Identity and National Security in Germany and Japan," in Katzenstein, *Culture and National Security*, 317-356; Alastair Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

³⁹ Ken Booth, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism* (London: Croom Helm, 1979), 18, 20-62.

Cross-cultural Dimensions of Multilateral Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Security-Building Dialogues

These different ways of analysing the potential impact of cross-cultural differences on international politics can now be brought together and focused specifically on multilateral non-proliferation, arms control and security-building dialogues. But how precisely to draw upon these different ideas of diplomatic, political and strategic culture remains to be clarified. A good starting point is Ball's definition of strategic culture offered above. It is close to a conception that is useful for our purposes, but in order to draw in elements from political and diplomatic culture, the crucial requirement is to take one further step away from thinking in narrow "strategic" terms, towards thinking in terms of a "security culture."⁴⁰ Since policies towards arms control, non-proliferation and confidence and security-building measures, or broader attitudes towards peace-making and how to achieve security (unilaterally, mutually, etc.) are extensions of fundamental strategic positions and decisions, what applies to "strategy" in the narrow military sense is also directly relevant to the security-building realm.

The consensus definition of **security culture** that this group of scholars arrived at argues that:

Culture, as it refers to non-proliferation, arms control, disarmament and security-building issues, consists of those enduring and widely-shared beliefs, traditions, attitudes, and symbols that inform the ways in which a state's/society's interests and values with respect to security, stability and peace are perceived, articulated and advanced by political actors and elites.

This definition builds upon the work on strategic culture but moves away from its more or less strict emphasis on military affairs and the use of force to broader issues of "security, stability and peace." It also evokes the specific issues associated with the non-proliferation, arms control and confidence- and security-building agenda, highlights the importance of political actors and elites, and emphasises the enduring character of the cultural elements that analysts are looking for.

Figure 1 expands upon this definition, by illustrating in a schematic form how various cultural influences could play a role in the determination of state policies towards security-building, and how they could shape the complex calculations of material capabilities or interests that lie behind policy-making. Conceptually, the diagram treats the various aspects of diplomatic, political and strategic culture as general manifestations of "culture writ large" (which is not shown on the figure). Similarly, the three sets of concepts overlap and share many characteristics, and the boundaries between them are not sharp. At the center, however, are those elements that concern us, and that can be considered as part of "security culture" (as defined above). Security culture is in a sense a subset of political, diplomatic and strategic/military culture: it draws upon the same wellsprings as, and shares some characteristics of, political, diplomatic and strategic cultures, while being distinct from each of them.

It only remains to specify more clearly some of the *content* of the different parts of this diagram. For the purposes of providing some sort of general framework for the case studies that follow, Figure II offers a set of questions that various contributions to this study have sought to answer. Although the questions

⁴⁰ This of course parallels calls for the entire discipline to be reoriented from strategy to security studies. See Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, second edition (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 23-25.

in Figure II are cast broadly, the goal is to capture all the elements that could bear directly or indirectly on policies towards non-proliferation, arms control and confidence and security-building, through an examination of such issues as the importance of domestic political traditions of openness and transparency (ie: do citizens have access to information), the relevance of concepts such as "face" or "status" in negotiating contexts, the existence of new and old security threats and challenges (terrorism, drugs, resources, border incursions, etc.), or the acceptance of the conceptual baggage of confidence and security-building processes.

Hence, under the heading of "culture writ large," for example, one should look *inter alia* for those historical, ethnic, religious, normative or linguistic elements that might influence a state's (or leader's, or regime's) orientation towards issues of war and peace. A strong belief in the "democratic peace" or in the promotion of human rights, for example, might predispose state leaders to seek accommodation with like-minded states, and to build security architectures around such shared values.⁴¹ Conversely, a manichean world view could contribute to a strongly antagonist relationship with the rest of the outside world; while a perspective of "hegemonic superiority" could lead either to benign neglect or to aggressive expansionist behaviour. Usually, however, such broad cultural orientations will need to be mediated through other more specific elements of political, diplomatic or strategic culture.

Diplomatic culture is the heading that least taps into domestic "sources," drawing as it does upon shared international or Westphalian norms. Nevertheless, under this heading one can still look for unique or distinctive orientations towards diplomatic practice, such as negotiation strategies, international standing (non-aligned, great power, former colony), or for whether or not a state participates fully in the global diplomatic network or accepts the "rules of the game." Obviously, the policies and interests of states such as Iran, India, Egypt, Canada, or the United States are to some extent shaped in different ways by such subjective factors.

Political cultural elements represent the external projection of domestic political arrangements. Specific domestic political institutions and traditions can facilitate or impede participation in security-building processes. Similarly, societal attitudes toward the use of force and violence, or the historical experience of state-building, can also play a role in influencing a state's stance towards diplomacy (a preference for unilateralism, bilateralism or multilateralism) or its preferences for specific kinds of arms control and confidence and security-building arrangements. For example, one need only note that efforts to control or restrict the flow of light weapons is crucially affected by attitudes towards gun control in the United States. Political cultural elements could also include the external projection of specific socio-cultural patterns of authority, hierarchy and decision-making that are reproduced in a society, such as egalitarian versus hierarchical structures; consensual versus majoritarian decision-making; and clan, caste, or religious authority.

⁴¹ See, from a voluminous literature, Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993); Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Democratic Peace--Warlike Democracies? A Social Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Argument," *European Journal of International Relations*, 1:4 (1995), 491-517, and the remaining articles in that special issue.

Figure 1:
**A Schema of Cultural Influences on Multilateral Arms Control,
 Non-Proliferation and Security-Building Dialogues**




Figure II

Cross-Cultural Dimensions of Multilateral Non-Proliferation Arms Control and Security-Building Dialogues

Culture Writ Large

- What religious, linguistic, ethnic or historical influences might have a direct bearing on a state's or society's orientation towards issues of war and peace?
- Are there normative elements (human rights or religious factors, conceptions of peace) that play a role in foreign and security policy orientations?

Diplomatic Culture

- What is the state's (or region's) "standing" in the international security order, does it participate fully in the international diplomatic network or challenge existing rules and practices, and does this affect its orientation towards security-building measures?
- Are particular cultural practices or styles of negotiation important to a region?

Political Culture

- Do domestic political institutions and arrangements facilitate participation in and acceptance of bilateral or multilateral security-building processes and measures, or in choosing regional versus global approaches?
- Is there a colonial or historical legacy of state-formation or state-building that creates particular political orientations towards security?
- What is the dominant attitude towards societal violence, and are there any preferred domestic political and social arrangements to deal with conflict, dispute resolution and insecurity that might be projected externally?
- Are there particular patterns of social relations and public authority (eg: hierarchical versus egalitarian) that affect the way in which international diplomacy is conducted?

Strategic Culture

- What are the historical experiences and outlooks that shape attitudes towards war and peace?
- Does the role of the armed forces in society and the nature of civil-military relations affect orientations towards arms control issues, and what are the societal influences on the armed forces and security doctrines?
- Is the state/society part of a broader regional affinity community (linguistic, ethnic, religious, racial, etc.) that affects its perception of threats and how to cope with them? Does this exacerbate or ameliorate conflicts?
- Is a state's strategic culture laden with ethnocentric influences (crude enemy images, polarized disputes, a posture of superiority, an insensitivity to the impact of one's actions)?
- Does current doctrine and policy recognize the mutuality and interdependence of security, or is it committed to unilateral "solutions?"

Finally, strategic cultural influences can perhaps have the largest impact on how a state chooses to pursue its security. Again, this has an internal and external dimension. From the domestic side, recent experiences of war can affect the orientation towards unilateral or mutual, forceful or peaceful, means to achieve greater security. From a more structural perspective, the particular social weight and role of the armed forces can shape both security policies themselves, and the influence of other actors on security policy-making. Externally, the existence of a regional affinity community (ethnic or other) that shapes perceptions of living in a basically hostile or friendly world, or images of potential enemies and threats, can crucially circumscribe the scope of security-building efforts. The question of whether or not a state's/society's strategic culture is laden with ethnocentric influences (crude images of the enemy, polarized disputes, a posture of superiority, an insensitivity to the impact of one's actions), and whether or not current doctrine and policy recognize the mutuality and interdependence of security, may also be crucial to the way in which it defines and pursues its security interests.

Not all questions proved to be relevant to each of the case studies that follow, and individual cases are cast often towards exploring different elements in greater detail. For example, J.D. Yuan's and Andrew Latham's respective explorations of Chinese and Indian security cultures draw more extensively on strategic cultural elements that have deep historical roots (Confucian versus Mencian; and Kautilyan versus Gandhian traditions), while Amitav Acharya's study of "the ASEAN way" focuses on the way in which relatively "new" states have created and promoted a distinctive identity that draws upon some traditions, but is (more importantly) a conscious project of political elites. Hal Klepak's study of Latin America by contrast, emphasizes political cultural elements, in particular patterns of civil-military relations and the legalist/authoritarian heritage. Finally, Gabriel Ben-Dor's and Ahmed Fakhri's studies of the Middle East place a strong accent on patterns of conflict and enmity between neighbours, and the way in which cultural elements, although present for all to see, are overshadowed by the impact of the legacy of fifty years of war on contemporary efforts to find common ground.

Conclusion

There is an emerging consensus that "culture," however defined, plays an important role in shaping international political behaviour and the prospects for security-building in the post-Cold War era. Culture is, however, only one element in the complex of interests and ideas that affect multilateral regional and global negotiations, and the cooperation and competition between states, and perhaps only seldom is it the most important one. But despite the fact that the cultural elements of international relations are particularly difficult to pin down, the widely shared perception among policy makers in different regions that they have assumed a larger role in multilateral dialogues makes some attempt to come to grips with the cultural dimension of the multilateral non-proliferation, arms control and security-building processes essential. The case studies that follow are an important step towards this goal.

II. Culture and the Construction of Western Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Practice

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Introduction¹

The attempt by Western states to construct a global non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament (NACD) regime since the end of the Cold War is typically understood to be a more or less rational response to changes in the nature of the international security order since 1989. On this view, the main threat to the West is no longer posed by an inherently "expansionist" Soviet Union, but arises instead from a more diffuse and generalized risk of "proliferation," understood as the "destabilizing" spread of various types of military technology (especially weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and certain categories of conventional weapons).² In much of the Western (and particularly American) policy and policy-relevant academic discourse, threats to the individual and collective interests of Western states are assumed to be self-evident. Moreover, it is assumed that Western NACD policies are "rational" and "benign," and Western policy-makers and diplomats often present their security policies as providing the global "public good" of international peace and security. Of course, a corollary is that policies of states that do not support Western NACD initiatives are understood to be irrational and dangerous.

Such analyses pay little attention to the role of ideas, culture or practices in either defining interests or constructing and coping with threats, nor are they sensitive to the ethnocentricity of their underlying assumptions. "Western" or "Northern" approaches to NACD and security-building issues have been informed by a specific constellation of enduring and widely-shared beliefs, traditions, attitudes and symbols that form part of what can be called the "Western security culture." Elements of this cultural "backdrop" or horizon of meaning would include a progressive delegitimization of the use of force to resolve disputes (between certain states or peoples), a commitment to rule of law and governmental (and individual) accountability; a contractual and negotiated conception of relationships (interpersonal and inter-state); an ambiguous (and non-hierarchical) relationship to authority; a scientific and rationalist orientation towards problem-solving; and a religious/ethical heritage emphasizing an individualistic conception of human rights and an often polarized world view. Separately and together, elements of this cultural baggage were invoked or drawn upon to construct the contemporary Western approach to NACD issues, which was mostly concerned with the American-Soviet (and later NATO-Warsaw Pact) arms

¹ Thanks to Alan Crawford for his detailed and insightful comments on earlier drafts of this chapter.

² See, for example, Brad Roberts, "From Nonproliferation to Antiproliferation," *International Security*, 18:1 (Summer 1993), 139-179, and for a discussion of this policy shift, see David Mutimer, "Reimagining Security: The Metaphors of Proliferation," in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, eds., *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 187-222; Michael Klare, *Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws: America's Search for a New Foreign Policy* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995); and Andrew Latham, "Re-Imagining Warfare: The Pentagon's 'Revolution in Military Affairs'," in Craig Snyder, ed. *Contemporary Security Studies* (London: Macmillan, forthcoming 1998).

control process (although it built upon and reacted to the legacy of pre-1945 attempts to limit or control armaments).³ Together these experiences, and the range of cultural (historical, political, strategic and diplomatic) influences that informed them, created a distinct matrix of beliefs and dispositions towards NACD issues.

In this chapter, we seek to highlight the ways in which a specific Western and American understanding of how to deal with external threats has shaped the NACD policies and practices of states, and helped to define the Western "security culture." We argue that the security-building practices of the West are rooted in powerfully resonating beliefs, or basic mental images, regarding threat and danger as well as appropriate responses. These images resonate not so much because they accurately describe reality, make predictions, or prescribe effective action, but because they "fit" within existing cultural and social understandings. In turn, these culturally-inflected images determine not only how the world is understood and interpreted, but how "interests" are defined and pursued. Significant policy shifts are thus connected to significant shifts in interpretive frameworks. To the extent that this is true, a research focus on "objective" interests and threats will provide only a limited insight into the logic of contemporary Western NACD policy. What is needed as well is a research programme that highlights how shared images provided the structures of meaning within which Western diplomats and policy-makers operate.

More specifically, this chapter develops the following three propositions. First, that Western approaches to NACD issues (including both threat perceptions and policy prescriptions) are shaped by (and drew upon) a constellation of enduring and widely-shared beliefs, traditions, attitudes and symbols. Second, that these beliefs and traditions were made concrete and explicit in attempts to cope with the dilemmas and risks of the nuclear era, producing several central "norms" of East-West NACD practice:

- a belief in the necessity of "rational" nuclear deterrence coupled with an acknowledgement of the non-utility of major war and the mutuality of security;
- a commitment to an ongoing step-by-step negotiating process that put a premium on technocratic, and managerial negotiating strategies and evaluations of security;
- an emphasis on formal negotiated "contractual" arms control agreements that incorporated such ideas as "balance" or "parity";
- a conviction that transparency and robust verification or compliance-monitoring measures were needed;
- a willingness to engage in confidence- and security-building processes that might transform threat perceptions and indeed political relations.

Third, that in the aftermath of the Cold War the transformation of the dominant Western discourses of threat has altered the broader context within which Western NACD culture is located. As a result, contemporary Western NACD culture has partially evolved to encompass the following norms as "amendments" of those enumerated above:

- a greater focus on proliferation as the principal threat to global security, and a commitment to non-proliferation rather than global disarmament;

³ For details on pre-1945 arms control, see the section on "Historical Dimensions to 1945" of Richard Dean Burns, ed., *Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament*, vol. II (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993).

- a more explicit belief that Western preponderance is the key to international peace and stability; and,
- a renewed (and greater) attention to regulating "inhumane" and "uncivilized" conventional weapons.

There are, however, a few important limitations to this chapter that should be noted at the outset. First, since the main thrust of the study as a whole is to explore the cross-cultural dimensions of attempts to "globalize" or "universalize" the Western experience, this chapter spends less time exploring how the Western historical and cultural inheritance influenced the evolution of key NACD concepts, and more time detailing what these key concepts are. In this respect, it differs from other case studies in this volume in asserting, rather than demonstrating, the complex "genealogy" behind Western NACD norms and concepts. Second, since the driving force behind the *idea* of arms control was the American foreign and security policy establishment, this chapter concentrates on the American experience and the "cultural baggage" that influenced it, and often equates the "Western" position with it. Insofar as the United States is still the driving force behind NACD ideas and practices, this is not problematic, but obviously, there are significant differences in national security cultures within the "West" (Canada is different from France, for example). Third, we do not argue that the pursuit of interests is unimportant to understanding contemporary Western security and NACD policy. But instead of focusing exclusively on "objective" interests and preferences, we draw attention to the backdrop of "norms, accounts and social definitions" that have helped to define Western interests, shape perceptions of threat and inform policy prescriptions in the arms control and non-proliferation arena.⁴ Finally, the arguments made in this chapter are offered as what one scholar has labelled "aids to a sluggish imagination"--as spurs to greater reflection on the "constructedness" and cultural-specificity of Western NACD-related perceptions and practices.⁵

Core Elements of Western Security and NACD Culture

The cultural and social origins of Western security culture stretch back to the early modern era, and arguably even further. Rational deterrence theory, for example, stands as the last in a long line of attempts to systematize approaches to war and strategy. As Azar Gat clearly demonstrates, "the military thinkers of the Enlightenment maintained that the art of war was [also] susceptible to systematic formulation, based on rules and principles of universal validity."⁶ This way of approaching policy problems was not confined to strategic studies, but has influenced virtually all realms of public policy and management. It "has become, during almost two centuries, so deeply embedded in Western consciousness

⁴ Mark C. Suchman and Dana P. Eyre, "Military Procurement as Rational Myth: Notes on the Social Construction of Weapons Proliferation," *Sociological Forum*, 7:1 (1992), 148; Suchman and Eyre, "Status, Norms and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach," in Peter Katzenstein, ed, *The Culture of National Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 79-113.

⁵ Harold Garfinkel, *Studies in Ethnomethodology* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1967), 38.

⁶ Azar Gat, *The Origins of Military Thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 29, 25-53. See also Azar Gat, "Positivism, Romanticism and Military Theory, 1815-1870," in Azar Gat, *The Development of Military Thought: The Nineteenth Century* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 1-45.

that many adherents refuse to accept it as a 'mode' of thinking at all."⁷ Of course, an acknowledgement that one's way of seeing the world is only one among many possible ways is a necessary step in any account of cultural influences.

As it is impossible to do justice to even a fraction of the West's historical and cultural inheritance of war and peace in a single chapter, the more modest goal of this analysis is to explore the evolution of key concepts within the Western strategic tradition that have a bearing on non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament issues. This section begins with a discussion of the "invention" of arms control during the Cold War era, tracing its roots to the failure of interwar disarmament initiatives, the nuclear revolution and the attempt to come to grips with the requirements of nuclear deterrence and the need to co-exist with a state that was seen as the principal source of threat and danger to global security. It then sketches the emergence of the set of ideas listed above relating to arms control negotiation, balance and parity, verification and compliance-monitoring, and confidence-building. This lays the groundwork for the final section, which examines the way in which changes in prevailing Western representations of "threat" in the aftermath of the Cold War have modified, but not fundamentally changed, the context within which key NACD concepts are understood, initiating a partial evolution in Western NACD culture.

Inventing "Arms Control"

The dominant contemporary Western understandings of "arms control" were invented during the Cold War. To be sure, within the Western experience, numerous efforts to limit armaments can be found in previous periods, but prior to the twentieth century, most of these were *ad hoc*, imposed by victors in war, and limited in scope. Participants at the time were not consciously engaging in a process that they thought of as "arms control." The first serious concerted efforts towards multilateral restraint were only launched at the turn of the century, in the Hague Conferences (1899 and 1907), and this work (which did have some achievements) was consciously carried over into the more ambitious post-World War I disarmament efforts of the 1920s and 1930s. The experience of World War I and the pressure from peace movements, convinced (or forced) diplomats of the need to undertake comprehensive disarmament negotiations.

These negotiations reflecting the coming together of three sets of ideas that shaped Western politics throughout the nineteenth century. First, the broadening of voting rights and representative government increased the role of public opinion or non-governmental groups on state policy, and effectively terminated the nineteenth century practice of "secret diplomacy" that insulated foreign policy from public or legislative scrutiny.⁸ A parallel influence on this was the rise of "open" or "free" media coverage of wars and conflicts: the "CNN effect" began in earnest during the Crimean war!⁹ Second, the progressive "institutionalization" of European international relations through the Concert of Europe to the League of Nations meant that security and armaments were seen as appropriate (and necessary) subjects for multilateral negotiation and regulation, presaging such ideas as "common" or "cooperative security."

⁷ John Shy, "Jomini," in Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 184-185.

⁸ Of course, it is true that the American constitution required the advice and consent of the Senate for treaties the President might sign, but this was not a serious factor in international politics until World War I.

⁹ See Phillip Knightly, *The First Casualty* (London: Quartet, 1978).

Third, the belief that war was an accident, or the result of misunderstandings, or a vice of non-democratic or non-"national" states, meant that efforts at disarmament were wrapped up in broader initiatives to reshape European (and world) politics.¹⁰ Coupled with this was a belief that *arms races* (and arms producers) contributed to exacerbating (and perhaps even triggering) conflicts, although there was at that time little systematic evidence to support this.¹¹

Few of these interwar efforts bore any fruit.¹² Hence the concept of "arms control" was born against this backdrop of interwar failure, the carnage of World War II, the nuclear revolution, and the absence of any serious disarmament efforts between 1945 and 1955. The term "arms control" first came into wide use in the late 1950s, and its classic definitions carefully distinguished it from *disarmament*, which aimed at the reduction or elimination of particular classes of weapons. Arms control was a broader concept, and it attempted to break out of the fruitless security-disarmament circle by focusing on the *regulation or stabilization* of the East-West conflict. One of the earliest discussions of East-West arms control summarized its goals as follows:

- to reduce the risk of war;
- to reduce the destructiveness of war should it break out;
- to redirect the resources devoted to armaments to other ends.¹³

In practice, most attention concentrated on the first goal, as a consensus emerged in both East and West (especially after the Cuban missile crisis) that crisis stability needed to be ensured, and the reciprocal fear of surprise attack reduced.

Arms control was built on these two concepts, and hence was a *management* tool for the Cold War: it was not a strategy of the peace movement, it was not designed to achieve disarmament (which was seen as a politically unrealistic goal), and it was not meant (at the outset) to overcome the divisions of the Cold War. Not surprisingly, most attention during this time was devoted to the nuclear issue, and the first

¹⁰ President Wilson's emphasis on self-determination and the dismantlement of European empires reflected the belief that "nation-states" were less aggressive; the "war as misperception" thesis was powerfully fuelled by the lock-step way in which World War I began; the war as "accident" thesis was supported by the pre-war arguments of people such as Ivan Bloch and Norman Angell, who "proved" that war was economically too costly for modern states (and hence could not be a rational instrument of state policy).

¹¹ In fact, the scholarly study of the phenomenon of arms races was started by the British peace activist and mathematician, Lewis Richardson, in the interwar period. See Lewis Richardson, *Arms and Insecurity* (Pacific Grove, California: Boxwood Press, 1960).

¹² One exception to the general pattern of failure was the Washington Naval Treaty. For specific details see the contributions by James Barros, Thomas H. Buckley and Neal H. Petersen in Burns, *Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament*, vol. II. See also Robert G. Kaufman, "The United States and Naval Arms Control Between the Two World Wars: Implications for Contemporary and Future Arms Control," *Millennium*, 21:1 (1992), 29-52.

¹³ Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin, *Strategy and Arms Control* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1961), 2. See also Hedley Bull, *The Control of the Arms Race* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1961); *Daedalus*, special issue on arms control, 89:4 (Fall 1960); Donald Brennan, ed., *Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security* (New York: Braziller, 1961).

agreements (the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 and the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963) were designed to address growing environmental concerns, rather than to change the course of the East-West conflict.¹⁴

The Nuclear Dimension: Rational Deterrence and Mutual Assured Destruction

Nevertheless, the Western approach to arms control did not long rest at the level of such modest measures. In the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis, a series of agreements (the "Hot Line" Agreement of 1963, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, the Seabed Treaty of 1971, SALT I and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972) resulted in a genuine reduction of East-West tension, and (for our purposes, more importantly) in the creation of a recognized "arms control community" on both sides of the iron curtain. As former Secretary of State Dean Rusk once predicted, the SALT process became perhaps "history's longest permanent floating crap game." The details of the emergence and achievements of this community have been well told by several first and second-hand participants.¹⁵ What is important to focus on here are the norms that emerged from this process, and to indicate how some of these had deep socio-cultural roots, rather than just being "rational" responses to circumstances.

First, the East-West arms control community was able to develop and agree on some essential conceptual building-blocs for the security-building and arms control effort. The most basic of these concerned the nature of nuclear deterrence and mutual assured destruction (as opposed to nuclear "defense" or war-fighting). The paradoxical nature of nuclear deterrence and mutual assured destruction was not intuitively obvious, since for all previous weapons the threat of possible retaliation was inextricably connected with defensive preparations that would make aggression more costly. The attempt to resolve the paradoxes of deterrence led to the development of "rational deterrence theory," which assumed that deterrence was secured only by presenting an opponent with a clear balance sheet that would make nuclear war too costly to be contemplated. Exactly *how* this was to be achieved was treated as a technical question, which led to debates over "acceptable" levels of destruction, alleged windows of vulnerability, and complex nuclear

¹⁴ For the best short account that emphasizes the themes developed here, see Emanuel Adler, "The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control," *International Organization*, 46:1 (Winter 1992), 101-46. As he points out (121), this shift from *disarmament* to *arms control* was not universally welcomed: Thomas Schelling reports that he was almost expelled from a 1960 Pugwash conference because of the belief that anyone interested in arms control was not interested in disarmament.

¹⁵ Rusk is cited in Strobe Talbott, *Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II* (New York: Harper and Row, 1980), 19. Among the many other works, see also Gerard C. Smith (chief of the U.S. delegation at SALT I), *Doubletalk: The Story of the First Strategic Arms Limitation Talks* (New York: Holt, 1980); John Newhouse, *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973); Strobe Talbott, *Deadly Gambits*, (London: Pan Books, 1985), Raymond Smith, *Negotiating with the Soviets* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989). Materials from the Russian side are obviously much less accessible, but see Georgi Arbatov, *The System: An Insider's Life in Soviet Politics* (New York: Times Books, 1992). For an overview of more recent thinking from Gorbachev to today, see Robert G. Herman, "Identity, Norms and National Security: The Soviet Foreign Policy Revolution and the End of the Cold War," in Katzenstein, *Culture of National Security*, 271-316.

escalation and war-fighting scenarios.¹⁶ This interpretation of nuclear deterrence as a precisely calculated rational policy reflected a peculiar American "technocratic" conception of the use of force that was not necessarily shared by all NATO allies, or even by all American policy-makers.¹⁷ As Lawrence Freedman put it, "little could be known about the likely responses of human beings to any of the situations that they were liable to find themselves in during a nuclear war -- either in deciding whether to launch a nuclear attack, or in implementing this decision, or in anticipating and suffering the results."¹⁸

In the nuclear age, however, the doctrine of rational deterrence meant foregoing the use of nuclear weapons as "defensive" war-fighting instruments, and limiting the deployment of anti-ballistic missile defenses to protect populations.¹⁹ The development of a coherent concept of deterrence as mutual vulnerability was not a trivial achievement. The struggle to distinguish "deterrence" from "defence" that occupied so much energy in the American arms control community had no straightforward parallel in the Russian discourse, since the words used to describe the deterrence relationship shared overlapping meanings. The fact that "no contradiction [was] seen between the prevention of war and the preparation for war," the first of which depended on a sound foreign policy, the latter of which was the province of the military, created serious obstacles to clarity and trust (ie: "did the Russians *really* accept mutual assured destruction, or were they pursuing war-fighting and winning strategies?")²⁰ Likewise, leaders on

¹⁶ Works are too numerous to be cited in detail. For overviews, see Keith Krause with Michael C. Williams, "Rationality and the Practices of Nuclear Deterrence," paper presented at the annual conference of the International Studies Association, San Diego, 17-20 April 1996; Keith Krause, "Rationality and Deterrence in Theory and Practice," in Craig Snyder, ed., *Contemporary Security Studies* (London: Macmillan, forthcoming 1998).

¹⁷ The list of former officials who expressed scepticism includes Robert McNamara, Henry Kissinger, and McGeorge Bundy. For an interesting study of more "intuitive" approaches to deterrence (which has much less severe requirements for deterrence success), see James DeNardo, *The Amateur Strategist: Intuitive Deterrence Theories and the Politics of the Nuclear Arms Race* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

¹⁸ Lawrence Freedman, *Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), 180.

¹⁹ Obviously, matters are more complicated, and the distinction between assured destruction and war-fighting strategies was always contested. The literature on this is also enormous. For a readable overview, see Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (London: Macmillan, 1981). For a contribution by participants, see Spurgeon Keeny and Wolfgang Panofsky, Spurgeon Keeny and Wolfgang Panofsky, "MAD vs NUTS," *Foreign Affairs*, 60:2 (Winter 1981/82), 287-304. For a discussion of the psychological conflicts of decision-makers over this issue, see Steven Kull, *Minds at War: Nuclear Reality and the Inner Conflicts of Defense Policymakers* (New York: Basic Books, 1988).

²⁰ Two Russian terms were used for "deterrence." One, *sderzhivanie*, meant roughly "keeping out"; the other, *ustrashenie*, meant "intimidation." The confusion was heightened because *sderzhivanie* was also used to describe "containment" as well as deterrence, underscoring the political emphasis of deterrence policy. Not surprisingly, Soviet policy was described as *sderzhivanie*, while American policy was described as *ustrashenie*. David Holloway, *The Soviet Union and the Arms Race*, second edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 32-35. See also Dimitri Simes, "Deterrence and Coercion in Soviet Policy," *International Security*, 5:3 (Winter 1980/81), 80-103; Fritz Ermarth, "Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought," *International Security*, 3:2 (Fall 1978), 138-155; Roman Kolkowicz and Ellen Mickiewicz, *The Soviet Calculus of Nuclear War* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1986), Raymond Garthoff, "Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitation in Soviet Policy," *International Security*, 3:1 (Summer 1978), 112-147.

both sides found the logic of MAD and the foreswearing of ABM defenses difficult to accept; it was only after persistent clarification and "education" on the part of the arms control community that these ideas won over policy-makers on both sides, culminating in the 1972 ABM treaty.²¹

Conflict Management and Negotiation Processes

Second, these joint efforts to deal with the nuclear dilemma drew upon established patterns of conflict management and negotiation in American culture, and turned them to the resolution of new problems. The imperative of "making a deal," the standard Western (or American) "can-do" or manipulative approach to negotiation, and a commitment to a step-by-step process that was in some sense supposed to be "technical" or "apolitical" (ie: bipartisan, and above politics) were all brought into play. Some analysts trace the roots of this to a belief, common to very few cultures, that "man can freely manipulate his environment for his own purposes...set[s] his objective, develop[s] a plan designed to reach that objective, and then act[s] to change the environment in accordance with that plan."²² Others have echoed this, tracing it to a pioneer or frontier experience imprinted on American politics, which had the result that:

political issues tend, first, to be fragmented into components each of which will be susceptible to expert techniques and, second, to be reduced to a set of technical problems that will be handled by instruments which are equipped to deal with material obstacles but much less so to cope with social ones.²³

The most concrete manifestation of this was in the academic flourishing of the "science" of negotiation, codified in such books as *Getting to Yes*, or in the widely-used concept of "Batna" (best alternative to no agreement). These ideas, essentially produced by Americans, and derived from American negotiating experiences (domestic and international), were applied to a wide range of conflict-management situations and simulations.²⁴ The results were presented as the outcome of a technocratic and managerial process

²¹ Adler, "Emergence of Cooperation," 129-132, 135-137 explains this in detail. The American debate over ABM was first fought in 1964 (over deployment of an early system). The reaction of Soviet academicians to the first presentation of the idea of limiting defensive weapons (in 1964) was that there must have been something wrong with the translation! As late as 1968, Soviet Premier Alexis Kosygin still rejected the proposal to limit defenses, but by the late 1960s, matters had changed on both sides.

²² Kinhide Mushakoji calls this the *erabi* (manipulative or can-do) style. "The Cultural Premises of Japanese Diplomacy," in Japan Center for International Exchange, ed., *The Silent Power* (Tokyo: The Simul Press, 1976), cited in Raymond Cohen, *Negotiating Across Cultures: Communication Obstacles in International Diplomacy* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 1990), 31.

²³ Stanley Hoffmann, *Gulliver's Troubles, Or the Setting of American Foreign Policy* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), 148, cited in Cohen, 32.

²⁴ For representative contributions to negotiation studies, see Roger Fisher, William L. Ury, and Bruce Patton, *Getting To Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In* (New York: Penguin Books, 1991); I. William Zartman and Maureen Berman, *The Practical Negotiator* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); Howard Raiffa, *The Art and Science of Negotiation* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982). On "Batna" see the arms control simulation by P. Terrance Hopmann, *Arms Control on Cobia: An Eight-party, Multi-issue Arms Control Negotiation*, Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, n.d. ("Batna" figures in 64 of the

based on rational "expert" evaluations of interests and needs. In the arms control arena, both the evaluation of security threats and the arcane science of nuclear deterrence were presented as the domain of "experts."²⁵ Of course, American negotiators were quickly confronted by cross-cultural differences, with the result that a host of studies appeared attempting to uncover the secrets of the negotiating behaviour of the Chinese, Japanese, Soviets and others.²⁶ Ultimately, the commitment to an ongoing step-by-step negotiating process was so strong that it ensnared even those American administrations (such as the first Reagan Administration) that tried to re-inject an ideological element into the Cold War confrontation.²⁷

In the end, the *process* or dialogue mattered as much as the product. A trans-Atlantic arms control community emerged and grew, even in the face of a profound reservoir of mistrust and suspicion between the two superpowers. As Strobe Talbott, the chronicler of the SALT II and INF Treaties noted:

The talks went on and on, producing, if they went well, agreements along the way, but even if they went badly, they provided a forum in which Soviet and American officials sat across from each other...and discussed military matters that used to be the stuff that spies were paid and shot for....The process...served as a kind of deep-water anchor in Soviet-American relations.²⁸

The institutional "cultural gap" between the two sides was initially wide. At one of the first negotiating sessions, for example, the Soviet military attache blanched when his American counterpart presented a set of detailed figures on American and Soviet nuclear weapons arsenals and deployments to the assembled negotiating teams (with members from various branches of government) that included information not distributed outside of the military or within the Soviet government.²⁹ But over time, such deep distrust and rivalry proved not to be an insurmountable obstacle, when the stakes were high enough. As well documented by Matthew Evangelista, "the transnational community of scientists and others involved in international discussions on disarmament had remarkable success in influencing Soviet security policy in the 1980s, once it was able to gain access to the top leaders." Influence was manifest not only in technical areas, but on such issues as halting nuclear testing, restructuring conventional forces

Program's 92 simulations).

²⁵ For good discussions of the role of experts in nuclear strategy (and arms control) see Fred Kaplan, *Wizards of Armageddon* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983); Steve Kull, *Minds at War: Nuclear Reality and the Inner Conflicts of Defense Policymakers* (New York: Basic Books, 1988), both of which trace in particular the influence of the RAND Corporation.

²⁶ The best summary of this is Cohen, *Negotiating Across Cultures*. With respect to arms control, see Raymond Smith, *Negotiating with the Soviets*; J. Whelan, *Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior*, vols. 1 and 2 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1988 and 1991).

²⁷ Talbott, *Deadly Gambits*, *passim*.

²⁸ Talbott, *Endgame*, 19-20. He also notes that the "T" in SALT stood equally for Talks as for Treaty.

²⁹ Newhouse, *Cold Dawn*, 238.

and restricting strategic defenses.³⁰ This transnational community not only served as a transmission belt for norms, but also contributed to their development, through such forums as academic and policy-relevant conferences, advocacy by groups such as the Union of Concerned Scientists or the Federation of American Scientists, or the work of a wide range of academics, former officials, and consultants.

The Western arms control community was also able to mobilize and change the perceptions of decision-makers at the highest level, and to win some battles of "public opinion" domestically and abroad. Its reach thus went beyond the members of its own community, and deep into the "political cultures" of the respective states involved. The importance of convincing the military, Congress, the executive branch, and even the public that cities should not be defended against the threat of nuclear missiles has already been noted as an example. What was also important, however, was the ability of arms control advocates to count on a great deal of public support (although this varied widely from time to time) for the *goal* of arms control, in part because of deeply-held public concerns about nuclear war and vulnerability. This backdrop of public debate was absolutely indispensable to overcome the maximalist security claims that came from, for example, traditional military quarters.³¹ On the other hand, some analysts have argued that the open and democratic process of foreign policy making in the United States also narrowed the scope of American negotiators, and made them less flexible.³² This was particularly evident in the emergence of the third norm, which focused on "balance" and parity as the basis for arms control agreements.

"Balance" as the Key to Stability

Although the specific content of various arms control treaties varied widely, the norm of "equality" emerged relatively early in the nuclear weapons negotiations. Western NACD thinking placed a heavy emphasis on "balance," "essential equivalence," "rough parity," or "equal aggregates," as the key to military-strategic stability. Parity was not embedded in SALT I (and it was in part for this reason that no numbers were in the treaty), but this triggered a strong reaction in the American Senate, which insisted on its inclusion in future agreements.³³ Conventional weapons were dealt with (or not) in the negotiations

³⁰ Matthew Evangelista, "The Paradox of State Strength: Transnational Relations, Domestic Structures, and Security Policy in Russia and the Soviet Union," *International Organization*, 49:1 (Winter 1995), 1-2.

³¹ Of course, there was also a debate within the armed forces about the utility of nuclear weapons, and a deep unease in some quarters about reliance on nuclear deterrence without arms control. Several prominent American generals publicly expressed their unease at various times.

³² Steven Miller, "Politics over Promise: Domestic Impediments to Arms Control," *International Security*, 8:4 (Spring 1984), 67; Michael Krepon, *Strategic Stalemate: Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in American Politics* (New York: St. Martin's, 1984), 108-145. The theoretical basis for this argument is provided by Robert Putnam's idea of "two-level games" in which negotiators have to find a "win-set" with both international and domestic partners. Peter Evans, Harold Jacobson and Robert Putnam, eds., *Double-Edged Diplomacy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). This theme of domestic constraints is echoed by Evangelista, who points out that policy change might be paradoxically more difficult to effect in Russian than it was in the Soviet Union. Evangelista, 25-38.

³³ Talbott, *Endgame*, 24. This led to some intricate counting contortions to balance what were very different force structures, to the point that Talbott could conclude that "one purpose of START was to get the Soviet Union to adopt roughly the same sort of strategic arsenal as the U.S." Talbott, *Deadly Gambits*, 315.

on "Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions." Likewise, ideas such as the "zero-option" or "double-zero," which came to define the INF treaty, were in part selected because of their easy public resonance. From the Russian perspective, equivalence--being seen as equal to the United States -- was central to their belief systems. But balance was hardly a necessary element of deterrence strategies, since both British and French nuclear forces were nowhere near the size of the Soviet force, but were deemed (especially in the French case) sufficient.

All of this rested on a cultural predisposition to see "balance" as being inherently good, as well as the (sometimes implicit, sometimes explicit) belief that peace and stability naturally result when neither party has the capability to "win" a military conflict (this is an important component of "mutual deterrence").³⁴ The roots of this belief are not clear, but may be an echo or reflection of the earlier European experience with "balance of power" politics. But this culturally-conditioned assumption is hardly universal--Indian (or Chinese) strategic thinking, for example, appears to be derived from the opposite premise that peace is best realised through military *preponderance*, not essential *equivalence*.³⁵

The Development of Verification and Compliance-Monitoring Norms

One of the more striking norms the arms control community was able to develop (albeit more slowly) was the idea that detailed (and later intrusive) measures of "verification" were nearly-indispensable elements of arms control agreements, and useful as confidence-building measures. Again, it must be recognized that verification (whether intrusive or not) runs up against the almost-universal (and plausible) "strategic cultural" penchant for military secrecy, and the obvious risk that verification could be "legalized espionage." Of course, it was also connected with a belief that agreements not involving "gentlemen" (translation: other Western states) needed to be checked to ensure that they were being honoured.³⁶

From the outset, most post-1945 arms control agreements contained some verification measures, reflecting the relatively low levels of trust on both sides in the Cold War. The 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) included a complex set of "safeguards" under the International Atomic Energy Agency that involved a restricted form of verification and compliance monitoring that did not affect sensitive military installations or programs. Among nuclear powers, while the SALT I Treaty did not include the numbers of missile launchers that it limited (since the Russians refused to divulge this information publicly), it did, however, permit verification via "national technical means" (satellite surveillance and other intelligence). Without formal acceptance of NTM verification, it is likely the Treaty would not have been signed. SALT

³⁴ Parenthetically, the obsession with "parity" also implied that relatively small differences could be militarily significant, which was assuredly not true for nuclear weapons. For a discussion of the metaphor of "balance" see David Mutimer, "Reimagining Security: The Metaphors of Proliferation," in Krause and Williams, eds., *Critical Security Studies*, 187-221.

³⁵ See Andrew Latham, "Culture and Identity in Indian Arms Control and Disarmament Policy," 118-119.

³⁶ In fact, historically these two factors seem to be interrelated in that Western notions of "reliable scientific knowledge" were bound up with Western construction of masculinity and "gentility" (that is, with the construction and representation of the "Gentleman") in the seventeenth century. See, for example, Steven Shapin, *A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); and Evelyn Fox Keller, *Reflections on Gender and Science* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).

II contained the numbers, but no additional verification measures, and both treaties contained agreements not to use concealment measures to block NTM.³⁷ The INF Treaty, on the other hand, (building on the breakthrough of the 1986 Stockholm Document) contained an array of more intrusive "on-site" verification measures that gave both sides unprecedented access to each other's military installations. It should be noted, however, that this was not accepted without qualms by either side, and there were still restrictions on on-site access.³⁸ In any case, the verification lessons of the INF Treaty were put to extensive use in the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) Treaty, and were even generalized to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Effective verification is now considered a near-indispensable element of any arms control discussions.³⁹

The *idea* of verification, however, implies a possibility of cheating, and the omnipresence of suspicion. Both American and Soviet (and later NATO and Warsaw Pact) negotiators had to overcome the obvious tension this idea contained: if the possibility of cheating was constant, how could both sides develop enough trust to sign an arms control agreement? Conversely, did not verification provisions reflect a lack of trust in the other side, which undermined negotiation and the confidence-building that the process was meant to achieve? This tension (which continues to be prominent in NACD negotiations) was overcome in the East-West context in three inter-related ways. The first was by gradual acceptance of the first norm of the Western (or at this time, East-West) security culture: a belief in the necessity of nuclear deterrence and the mutuality of nuclear security, even under an acute security dilemma. The second was the placing of ideas of verification and compliance in the Enlightenment scientific tradition (which both East and West shared), with its emphasis on observation, replication and empirical validation. In arms control verification regimes, great attention was devoted to proper sampling design (since no verification regime could be 100-percent accurate), and to the scientific assessment of the reliability of particular verification regimes. This helped turn verification into a technical problem. The third was a "legalization" of the process, whereby successive agreements came under the aegis of international treaty law, and cohered to its evolving norm of "compliance."⁴⁰ This literature emphasized that a central element of compliance

³⁷ This was not a trivial issue, and it concerned mostly encryption of data from missile flight tests, which occupied much negotiation time, and was debated at the highest levels.

³⁸ The Americans were almost certainly caught by their own proposals for "anytime, anywhere" inspections, which forced a somewhat difficult retreat to a more restrictive verification regime when the Soviet Union accepted the principle of wide verification. On-site inspections still permitted missile re-entry vehicles to be shrouded, and details of warhead construction to be kept secret. See, for details, Janne Nolan, "The INF Treaty," in Richard Dean Burns, *Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament*, vol. II, especially 961-964.

³⁹ One clear example of this is the debate surrounding current efforts to develop an additional Protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. For a comprehensive statement of the verification "norm," see the report of the expert group entitled *Verification in All its Aspects, Including the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Verification*, A/50/377, United Nations General Assembly, 22 September 1995, especially paragraphs 9-21.

⁴⁰ On the development of compliance from a legal perspective, see Abram and Antonia Chayes, "On Compliance," *International Organization*, 47 (1993), 175-205; Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, *The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995); Edwin M. Smith, "Understanding Dynamic Obligations: Arms Control Agreements," *Southern California Law Review*, 64 (1991). On the International Relations and arms control aspects, see George Downs, David Rocke and Peter Barsoom, "Is the Good News about Compliance Good News about Cooperation?"

provisions is not simply "enforcement," but the creation and use of dispute settlement mechanisms that can serve as forums in which to build trust and codify norms. To some extent, the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) of the SALT Treaties served this purpose, thus reinforcing the architecture of East-West NACD culture.

Not surprisingly (and despite, for example, the existence of such things as a consensus UN "statement" of the verification norm), the idea of verification has not been easy to export, given the importance of military secrecy in other "strategic cultures," the broader role of different ideas of "trust" and "face" in various cultural contexts, and the absence of a scientific or technical approach to solving political problems. As Acharya points out, for example, "from the perspective of some Asian policy-makers, formal and direct measures of transparency and mutual restraint may offend local cultural sensibilities by assuming that an adversarial relationship already exists among them."⁴¹ The absence of a general commitment to the first two norms of the Western security culture (in nuclear or non-nuclear variants), or to the culture of openness and technical rationality that underpin Western security policy, makes it difficult to overcome these otherwise powerful sensibilities, and thus to encourage the view that compliance-monitoring can itself serve to reinforce the implicit norms of the NACD regime.⁴²

Confidence-Building and Transparency in the East-West Security Architecture

Parallel to and beyond the nuclear realm, the most important achievement of the Cold War (and which was related to the verification norm) was the acceptance of a shared norm of transparency in military activities, and the concomitant development of the concept of confidence (and security) building measures (CSBMs). It is worth underlining how dramatic this change was: as Ann Florini notes, "treaty after treaty now requires states to report information about their capabilities and activities and often to host inspections by other states...secretive behavior that was once taken for granted has come to be seen as a signal of nefarious intentions."⁴³ Again, the cultural roots of a commitment to transparency are complex, but indisputably linked to the twin norms of subordination of the military to civilian authority and accountability in an open, democratic society that emerged in the West (not without struggle) over the past two centuries.⁴⁴ Other regions have not had the same experiences: as Charles Tilly notes, "states

International Organization 50:3 (Summer 1996), 379-406; Gloria Duffy, "Conditions that Affect Arms Control Compliance," in Alexander George, Philip Farley, and Alexander Dallin, eds., *U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).

⁴¹ Amitav Acharya, "Multilateralism: Is There an Asia Pacific Way?" paper prepared for the conference on National Strategies in the Asia-Pacific, 28-29 March 1996, 13.

⁴² For an example of how compliance monitoring can work in this non-reinforcing fashion, see A. Walter Dorn and Andrew Fulton, "Securing Compliance with Disarmament Treaties: Carrots, Sticks and the Case of North Korea," *Global Governance*, 3:1 (January-April 1997), 17-40.

⁴³ Ann Florini, "The Evolution of International Norms," *International Studies Quarterly*, 40 (1996), 381.

⁴⁴ The Western pattern of civil-military relations emerged both as the armed forces were subordinated to parliamentary or civilian control, and as internal and external security functions were separated. It is worth noting that this subordination was also a key element of Soviet ideology. For overviews, see Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 900-1900* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990); Amos Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); Samuel Huntington, *The*

that have come into being recently...have acquired their military organization from the outside, without the same internal forging of mutual constraints between rulers and ruled."⁴⁵ As a result, within these cultures, transparency is often viewed as a tool that favours strong, not weak, parties, and military organizations are seldom pushed to follow essentially "civilian" norms.

Although the term confidence-building emerged in the 1950s, and was used to describe certain aspects of the early U.S.-Soviet arms control effort (such as the "Hot Line" agreement of 1963), it was really only with the advent of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, now OSCE) and the "Helsinki process" in 1972 that the CSBM idea took off.⁴⁶ But the concept has been used with widely different meanings. The first, and more narrow, conception focuses on the military aspect, and denotes "the communication of credible evidence of the absence of feared threats" or "measures that tend to make military intentions explicit...to help separate unambiguous signals of hostile intent from the random noise of continuous military activity."⁴⁷ Not surprisingly given the Cold War context, the first CSBMs were devoted to obligatory and voluntary military manoeuvre notifications, the invitation of outside observers to military activities, and reciprocal personnel visits. As James Macintosh points out, almost all of the first set of CSBMs were *voluntary*, and "they barely imposed any limits on the CSCE states and made only the most perfunctory progress toward the genuine development of confidence. In some eyes, they even bred suspicion."⁴⁸ Obviously, viewing CSBMs as an instant panacea for regional conflicts and tensions requires a wilful ignorance of Cold War history.

But what began as a narrow set of measures designed to stabilize the conventional military confrontation on the European continent grew throughout the 1980s and early 1990s into a comprehensive series of "cooperative security" measures designed to "regulate the size, technical composition, investment patterns, and operational practices of all military forces by mutual consent for mutual benefit."⁴⁹ Most of these merely expanded and made compulsory the military information and personnel exchanges

Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (New York: Vintage, 1957).

⁴⁵ Charles Tilly, "War-Making and State-Making as Organized Crime," in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 185-186.

⁴⁶ We use the term CSBM to encompass confidence and security-building measures, rather than just CBM.

⁴⁷ Andrew Richter, *Reconsidering Confidence and Security Building Measures: A Critical Analysis* (Toronto: Centre for International and Strategic Studies, 1994), 2, citing the definitions of Johan Jorgen Holst and Karen Melander, "European Security and Confidence-Building Measures," *Survival*, 19:4 (July/August 1977), 147, and Jonathan Alford, "The Usefulness and the Limitations of CBMs," in William Epstein and Bernard Felder, eds., *New Directions in Disarmament* (New York: Praeger, 1981), 134. See also, for a readable overview, James Macintosh, "Confidence-Building Measures in Europe: 1975 to the Present," in *Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament*, vol. II, 929-945, and for a detailed survey, James Macintosh, *Confidence (and Security) Building Measures and the Arms Control Process: A Canadian Perspective*, revised ed., (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs and International Trade, 1992).

⁴⁸ Macintosh, "Confidence-Building Measures in Europe," 932.

⁴⁹ Ashton Carter, William Perry and John Steinbrunner, *A New Concept of Cooperative Security*, (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1992). 6.

contained in the earliest efforts, and were ultimately embedded in the 1992 Vienna Document of the CSCE. Along the way, however, as the European conflict theatre began to transform itself into a "zone of peace," analysts began to ask *how* CSBMs and cooperative security measures worked, what contribution they made to this transformation, and whether or not they could be "exported" to different conflict zones.⁵⁰

Why this occurred is a complicated question that need not concern us here.⁵¹ What is important to note, however, is that opinion bifurcated between "traditional" and "transformational" views. "Traditionalists" see the main benefit of CSBMs purely in military and strategic terms: reducing the threat of surprise attack (and hence lessening crisis instability), the risk of inadvertent escalation, and the degree of suspicion associated with potentially ambiguous activities. "Transformationalists" argue that such a restricted focus on the *ends* of confidence building (particular measures) confuses "the raw content of a confidence-building agreement's typical measures with the process of developing and implementing them," and that under the right conditions, "the confidence-building process can facilitate, focus, and amplify the potential for a significant positive transformation in the security relations of participating states."⁵² Obviously, the question of what the "right conditions" are becomes important, and although Macintosh provides a list of seven conditions, he does not explore in detail how we might identify these in a particular context.⁵³

⁵⁰ See, for example, *Confidence and Security-Building Measures: From Europe to Other Regions*, Disarmament Topical Paper 7 (New York: United Nations, 1991); David Dewitt and Gabriel Ben-Dor, eds., *Confidence-Building in the Middle East* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994); James Macintosh, "Confidence-Building: Looking to the Future," in J. Marshall Beier and Steven Mataija, eds., *Verification, Compliance and Confidence-Building: The Global and Regional Interface* (Toronto: Centre for International and Security Studies, 1996), 21-36.

⁵¹ According to Florini, "Evolution of Norms," 381-386, transparency (and by implication confidence-building) was pushed by the United States (which needed military information on Soviet activities), but was accepted because it cohered with other emerging norms (democratic openness, multilateralism, and non-use of weapons of mass destruction), and was reinforced by technological advances in surveillance techniques that made transparency the codification of existing realities.

⁵² Both quotes from Macintosh, "Confidence-Building: Looking to the Future," 22-23. See also James Macintosh, *Confidence Building in the Arms Control Process: A Transformation View* (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1996). At this point, an expansive view of CSBMs becomes difficult to demarcate from a whole host of diplomatic activities, many of which may have no military connection whatsoever.

⁵³ The conditions are worth listing:

- the emergence of "security management fatigue"
- a focused sense of unease with status quo security policies
- a concern with the costs (economic, political, social and moral) of maintaining the status quo
- the existence of a prototypical "epistemic community"
- the emergence of a new generation of policy-makers
- the existence of a semi-sanctioned forum for discussion and exploration
- a "leap of faith" initiative by at least one senior key decision-maker.

Macintosh, "Confidence-Building: Looking to the Future," 25-26.

In any case, over time a positive "feedback" was created: the emergence and broad acceptance of CSBMs was fed by a basic Western (or more clearly American) predisposition to treat security relations as a "problem-solving" exercise; in turn, the evolution of CSBMs inclined Western policy-makers to believe that conflicts could be managed (if not resolved) through dialogues and other confidence-building processes.⁵⁴ Perhaps the most important legacy of the East-West CSBM experience was a modification of the Western *realpolitik* tradition. At least partly as a result of the process of negotiating a range of CSBMs with the Soviet Union, the Western policy-community came to believe that security is "mutual" -- i.e. that unilateral approaches to peace and security are self-defeating (or at least sub-optimal) and that cooperative or multilateral approaches are therefore to be preferred. In the post Cold War era, this would translate into a pervasive Western belief that regional security was mutual and could therefore best be realised through cooperative means.

The final crucial element of the East-West arms control process was the remarkable absorption, acceptance and implementation of predominantly Western ideas of security and doctrine by the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev, and the transition to a more diffuse post-Cold War security order. Again, the details of these stories have been well documented; what is important to underline here is that ideas related to arms control could be transmitted across the Cold War divide.⁵⁵ Obviously, many elements influenced Gorbachev's "New Thinking" on security. The crisis in the Soviet state, however, gave reformist elements, especially based in research institutes, the opportunity to "promot[e] a new political order based in part on principles governing relations among the Western democracies and within those societies...principles [that] were transmitted to Soviet reformers through transnational contacts with liberal-Left counterparts in the West that flourished in the 1970s."⁵⁶ These ideas, which accepted the interdependence and mutuality of security and the need to reduce the military presence in Europe, and which incorporated a nuanced and sophisticated view of trans-Atlantic relations, were crucial to ending the Cold War. In short, complex ideas that may have strong cultural or social roots mattered, and could be shared or learned -- a lesson that should not be lost on those locked in seemingly intractable confrontations in other regional contexts. Of course, another lesson to be learned would be that acceptance of broad Western norms of inter-state security relations might trigger (or require) radical transformations of government and society: this is not a lesson that would necessarily find favour in many parts of the world!

⁵⁴ Indeed, CSBMs are now widely believed in the West to be "intrinsically valuable" (and potentially profoundly *transformative*). Once again, however, such culturally-conditioned norms are not universal, but have a specific genealogy. The South Asian case is instructive since the so-called 'stake holders' view CSBMs as having relatively little intrinsic value--and they are certainly not viewed as being (even potentially) *transformative* in nature. See Latham, "The Role of Culture and Identity in Indian Arms Control and Disarmament Policy," 120.

⁵⁵ See among others Stephen Meyer, "Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev's New Political Thinking on Security," *International Security*, 13:2 (Fall 1988), 124-163; Coit Blacker, *Hostage to Revolution: Gorbachev and Soviet Security Policy* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993), Jeff Checkel, "Ideas, Institutions and the Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution," *World Politics*, 45 (January 1993), 271-300; Evangelista, "The Paradox of State Strength."

⁵⁶ Herman, "Identity, Norms and National Security," 275.

Change and Evolution in Western NACD Culture in the 1990s

By the end of the 1980s, Western NACD culture had assumed a fairly specific form, as a series of underlying beliefs about war (war as irrational or accidental, or caused by misperception or miscalculation), about government and society (the need for openness and accountability, the peaceability of democratic nation-states), and about policy-making (technocratic, legalistic, incremental, scientific and rational), were projected through the prism of the Cold War to "solve" the problem of stabilizing the East-West strategic balance in conditions of mutual vulnerability. Over the course of the Cold War these underlying cultural orientations had crystallized in a number of concrete "norms" related to the logic, nature and purposes of security-building. These included a belief in the necessity of nuclear deterrence, an acknowledgement of the mutuality of security, an emphasis on formal negotiated arms control agreements, a commitment to "balance" or "parity," an acceptance of the need for transparency and verification, and a willingness to engage in confidence- and security-building processes that might transform threat perceptions and political relations. Behind this constellation of interpretive predispositions was a broader security discourse that centred on the Soviet threat, and the dynamics and logic of the East-West conflict.

Given the extent to which Western NACD policies were moulded by the Cold War, it is perhaps not surprising to find that, as that conflict came to an end, the constellation of shared beliefs and predispositions that had structured Western approaches to NACD issues during the postwar era began to reshaped to deal with emerging concerns. With the terminal decline of the Soviet Union, the consensus forged during the Cold War did not persist into the 1990s. As the main threat that structured Western security policies around the world for forty years started to disappear (in part because of the success of NACD policies) a quest to frame a new conceptualisation of (and approach to) security began. Concepts such as "cooperative," "common," "comprehensive" or "human" security jostled for prominence;⁵⁷ institutions such as NATO, the WEU, the OSCE and the UN struggled to define appropriate roles (not always successfully); and new issues such as drug trafficking, terrorism, intra-state conflict or the environment rose and fell in the foreign policy agendas of states. For our purposes, the most interesting aspect of this process was the articulation a new Western "discourse of national security" to replace the Cold War interpretive framework discarded in the waning days of the Cold War.⁵⁸ This new discourse emphasises the threat posed by certain Third World nations (so-called "rogue states") and by their pursuit of weapons of mass destruction ("proliferation"). While there are differences within the West regarding the dynamics of proliferation, the relative importance of specific proliferation threats, and the appropriate means of countering proliferation, there is little dispute that a broad consensus now exists regarding the basic contours of the post-Cold War international security environment and the threats posed by rogue

⁵⁷ Regarding "comprehensive security" see J.W.M. Chapman, R. Drifte and I.T.M. Gow, *Japan's Quest for Comprehensive Security* (London: Frances Pinter, 1983); for a discussion of "common security" see Olaf Palme, *et al.*, *Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982); and on "cooperative security" see Carter, Perry and Steinbrunner, *A New Concept of Cooperative Security*. For an overview, see David Dewitt, "Common, Comprehensive and Cooperative Security," *Pacific Review*, 7:1 (1994), 1-15.

⁵⁸ For a discussion of the concept of "national security discourse" and its content and function in the U.S. during the Cold War, see Emily Rosenberg, "The Cold War and the Discourse of National Security," *Diplomatic History*, 17 (Spring 1993).

states and proliferation.⁵⁹ As this new threat discourse has emerged, it has been "fitted to" the broader security culture context within which Western NACD policies are embedded. As a result, the overall Western NACD culture has also evolved in recent years as policy-makers, diplomats and academics have adapted prevailing NACD-related concepts and practices to the perceived "realities" of the new international security environment.

Western Representations of Threat and Danger

During the Cold War the central Western image defining the global security order was a particular representation of the "Soviet threat."⁶⁰ According to this representation, the Soviet Union was "aggressive," "militaristic," "expansionist," and implacably hostile to the West. Throughout the Cold War, this image exercised a powerful influence on Western NACD policy and military statecraft. First, representations of the "Soviet threat" governed the technical, doctrinal and organisational development of Western military forces. From the end of World War II on, Western military forces were trained, structured and equipped for the primary mission of prosecuting and winning a high-intensity war against Soviet-led Warsaw Pact forces in Europe. Second, the representation of the Soviet Union as a nuclear-armed "empire that had worldwide ambitions, a worldwide strategy, and the ability to project power around the world,"⁶¹ served to condition the ends and objectives of Western NACD policy. Doctrines such as containment, deterrence, limited war, and AirLand Battle were artifacts of this framing, serving as a backdrop against which SALT I, SALT II, the ABM Treaty, the INF Treaty, and the MBFR/CFE negotiations took place. In other words, Western military doctrines and strategic policies (including NACD policies) were responses to a specific discourse of threat in which Western interests had to be secured against the specific types of military threats posed by the Soviet Union and its proxies.

But this polarized, almost manichean, representation of threat has much deeper roots than the Cold War rivalry between East and West. Confrontations or clashes with an alien (and assumed antagonistic) "Other" have been part of the representational politics of Western European history since the Middle

⁵⁹ On the shift towards counter-proliferation see Brad Roberts, "From Nonproliferation to Anti-Proliferation,"; and David Mussington, "The Shape of U.S. Counter-Proliferation Policy," in David Mutimer, ed., *Control but Verify* (Toronto: York University Centre for International and Strategic Studies, 1994), 117-129. On the debate as a whole, see Mutimer, "Reimagining Security: The Metaphors of Proliferation." For the two "sides" of the issue, Shahram Chubin, "The South and the New World Order," *The Washington Quarterly*, 16:4 (Autumn 1993), 87-107; Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs*, 70:1 (1990/91).

⁶⁰ See, for example, Bradley Klein, "How the West was One: Representational Politics of NATO," *International Studies Quarterly* 34:3 (September 1990), 311-325; Jennifer Milliken, "Identity an Intervention: Reconstructing the West in Korea and the Balkans," in Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey and Raymond Duvall, eds., *Culture and the Production of Insecurity*, forthcoming; Charles Nathanson, "The Social Construction of the Soviet Threat: A Study in the Politics of Representation," *Alternatives*, 13:4 (October 1988), 443-484; and Simon Dalby, *Creating the Second Cold War: The Discourse of Politics* (London: Guilford and Pinter, 1990).

⁶¹ Colin Powell, comments at a press conference at the U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., 1 September 1993. Cited in Klare, *Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws*, 7.

Ages, whether the other was "the Turk," "the Slav," the "Oriental" or the Other within (Jews, gypsies).⁶² At times this has assumed xenophobic and racist proportions (slavery, the Holocaust), while at other times it operated as the backdrop to imperialistic policies ("the white man's burden" or "mission civilisatrice"). In all cases, it reflected a discomfort with ambiguity or uncertainty. And this vision was not confined to Europe, since one of the central components of the identity of the new American republic was a contrast between the corrupt politics of the "old world" and the "beacon for humanity" that the United States was to represent.⁶³ Obviously, one can overstate or caricature such representations, but there is little doubt that the more extreme portrayals of the Cold War confrontation resonated with and amplified such tendencies.⁶⁴

With the end of the Cold War, Western military planners and foreign policy makers were left in the uncomfortable position of having no embodied enemy and no clear conceptual framework to guide strategic conduct. Faced with a "threat blank" and the anxiety it induced, Western (and especially American) policy makers struggled to define the threats they faced in ways that would provide a clear guide to military affairs and furnish a justification for maintaining the large, high-technology military forces that had been developed to fight Soviet armed forces.⁶⁵ Given the absence of any clear and present danger on a scale similar to that posed by the former Soviet Union, American officials redefined previously neglected or under-emphasised potential sources of concern as "threats." The real interests of various actors (such as the armed forces or various interests behind weapons production) were channelled by a politico-strategic culture that abhorred a threat vacuum and that pre-disposed policy-makers to impose a familiar, polarized, vision of order (comprising "the West" and threatening/dangerous Other) on a "turbulent" post-Cold War world characterised by fragmentation, ambiguity, nuance, flux, and openness.⁶⁶

⁶² For a classic discussion of traditional Western views of the non-Western world see Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Random House, 1979). See also Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization and the Mind of the Enlightenment* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996); Iver Neumann, *Russia and the Idea of Europe: A Study in Identity and International Relations* (London: Routledge, 1996); Daniel Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners* (New York: Knopf, 1996).

⁶³ Such rhetoric was especially prominent around World Wars I and II. For good overviews of this see David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992); Anders Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny: American Expansionism and the Empire of Right* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995).

⁶⁴ Among the cultural sources of this threat discourse may be a strand in Western culture preoccupied with what might be called "millennial apocalypticism." See Daniel Wojcik, *The End of the World as We Know it: Faith, Fatalism and Apocalypse in America* (New York: New York University Press, 1997).

⁶⁵ Simple evidence for this would be the fact that while military spending declined in Eastern Europe (including Russia) by **78 percent** between 1985 and 1995; and by 48 percent in the Middle East, it only declined by 21 percent in the United States. The result is that the United States spends as much as the next top five states combined, and almost six times as much as all states in the Middle East combined. Figures in constant 1995 dollars, and from United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1996* (Washington: ACDA, 1997).

⁶⁶ For one clear example of this see Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, *The Real World Order: Zones of Peace, Zones of Turmoil* (London: Chatham House, 1993).

This led naturally to the identification of new adversaries. Hence post-Cold War Western approaches to NACD issues have been partly reshaped by a threat discourse that emphasizes the dangers posed by a range of actually or potentially hostile Third World states. Invoking the idiom of the Cold War, American officials began to speak of the need to contain inherently aggressive (and potentially "irrational") Third World states armed with large conventional forces and WMDs. In this new vision (which has been only partly accepted by America's allies), deterrence and containment of global communism have been replaced with what Michael Klare has labelled the *rogue doctrine*: "the characterization of hostile (or seemingly hostile) Third World states with large military forces and nascent WMD capabilities as 'rogue states' or 'nuclear outlaws' bent on sabotaging the prevailing world order."⁶⁷ The use of the "rogue" metaphor is particularly important. It operates by likening certain Third World states to a type of character that first emerged in English literature, but that has subsequently come to figure prominently in Western culture more generally. Whatever its origins, the term now has a specific set of connotations. In the late twentieth-century West, the term "rogue" invokes a set of images that include "dishonest," "irresponsible," "unprincipled," "unscrupulous," "immoral," and "dangerous."⁶⁸ Similarly, "rogue state" conjures up images of a state that is beyond the pale of "civilized" international relations (that does not respect generally accepted global norms regarding state conduct) and that is therefore a danger to international peace and security. This process of threat codification was underpinned, channelled and amplified by centuries-old Western cultural representations of non-Western societies as "irrational," "dangerous," impervious to the logic of reason, and ultimately respectful only of superior military force.⁶⁹

Two elements of this new representation of threat are particularly important. First, these Third World states are often described in language that had previously been applied to the Soviet Union: in the both the popular and professional literatures dealing with international security issues, these states are routinely represented as "totalitarian," "expansionist," and "implacably hostile" to their neighbours or to Western interests; as opposing Western values such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law; and as bent

⁶⁷ Klare, *Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws*, 26. See, for classic statements of this, Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment"; and *Radical Responses to Radical Regimes: Evaluating Preemptive Counter-Proliferation*, McNair Paper number 41 (Washington: National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, May 1995). For discussions of resistance from American allies, see "Allies Balk at Rogue Nation Penalties," *Defense News*, 19-25 August 1996.

⁶⁸ On this account, metaphors are intimately connected to security cultures, since they are powerful devices for mediating and structuring a shared understanding of the world, and for rendering strange and unfamiliar phenomena more intelligible by likening them to something mundane and better known. Metaphors are more than rhetorical devices: they "structure and support our understanding of a problem, and therefore our response to" it. Hence they are crucial to understanding discourses in general and the evolving post-Cold War threat discourse in particular. For a more detailed discussion of metaphors see Mutimer, "Reimagining Security: The Metaphors of Proliferation," 194, 187-221.

⁶⁹ Of course, there is no official listing of rogue states; in Western policy circles, however, it is generally understood to include states such as North Korea and Libya, as well as Iran, Cuba, Syria, Serbia and Iraq. See, among many examples, Terry Atlas, "U.S. Looking to Contain Renegade Nations: Pentagon Focusing on Regional Threats," *Chicago Tribune*, 10 April 1995. A recent National Defense University report notes that "irrational leaders do appear on the world scene from time to time," and describes Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea as "extremely hostile and dangerously radical regimes," *Radical Responses to Radical Regimes: Evaluating Preemptive Counter-Proliferation*.

on violating global norms regarding nuclear, biological and chemical weapons proliferation.⁷⁰ Second, the type of threat they posed was typically expressed in terms that tapped into both the Cold War experience and deeper Western cultural currents. In this respect, the representation of "aggressive" and "irrational" Third World states armed with nuclear weapons as constituting the principal source of danger and insecurity in the international system parallels Cold War interpretations of the nature of the Soviet threat.⁷¹ Likewise, the danger posed by chemical and biological weapons in possession of such states clearly taps into Western cultural conceptions (that are definitely not shared universally) of the "illegitimate" nature of such weapons, especially in the hands of "irresponsible," Third World powers.⁷²

The important point here is that this reading of the politico-strategic objectives and purposes of Third World states is informed by Western fears and attitudes as much as by the realities of politics in these states. A prominent example of this is Samuel Huntington's description of an emerging "Confucian-Islamic connection" of opposition to the West, which is "designed to promote acquisition by its members of the weapons and weapons technologies needed to counter the military power of the West."⁷³ He bases this in part on the pattern of Chinese arms sales to Iran and Pakistan, yet fails to note that, from the Chinese perspective, it might make equal sense to talk of a "Christian-Islamic axis" based on massive American arms sales to Saudi Arabia and other American allies in the Persian Gulf. Likewise, a global ban on chemical or biological weapons that prevents states from attempting to acquire the "poor man's nuclear weapon" in the face of overwhelming Western nuclear and conventional power appears one-sided or hypocritical to many in other parts of the world. In historical terms, the acquisition by second tier or rising states of the most advanced weapons and related technologies that exist (often from Western suppliers!) is completely unsurprising.

Hence the proliferation threat posed by rogue states has become the foundation of Western security culture in the post-Cold War era *not* simply because of any radical change in the behaviour of these states

⁷⁰ For a sense of the way in which rogue states are portrayed in ways that mirror representations of the Soviet Union see Anthony Lake, "Confronting Backlash States," *Foreign Affairs*, 73:2 (March/April 1994), 45-46; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, *Global spread of Chemical and Biological Weapons* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), especially 1-10, 119-126; and Stephen Zunes, "The Function of Rogue States in U.S. Middle East Policy," document available on the WWW at www.mepc.org/zunes56.htm. This discourse also draws heavily on an earlier discourse of "terrorist states" that is itself heavily imbued with Western cultural norms regarding appropriate forms of politics, distinctions between combatants and non-combatants, and the proper nature of organised violence. See Klare, *Rogue States*, 26-27.

⁷¹ See Jim George, *Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations* (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1994), 84-86.

⁷² For two widely divergent views on the construction of Western cultural norms regarding the "proper" nature and purposes of warfare see Richard Price, *The Chemical Weapons Taboo* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), especially chapter two; and John Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1993), especially Chapter One.

⁷³ Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," *Foreign Affairs*, 72:3 (Summer 1993), 47, 45-48. He also notes (46) that arms control is being redefined, from its previous goal of maintaining East-West stability to its current goal of "prevent[ing] the development by non-Western societies of military capabilities that could threaten Western interests."

(changes in the "real world") but also to some extent because Western policy makers adapted their Cold War conceptual template for making sense of the international security environment, and used the "rogue metaphor" to invest certain Third World states--such as North Korea, Syria and Libya--with a degree of menace that they might not otherwise enjoy.⁷⁴ As a result, since the mid-1990s Western policy-makers have possessed a way of reading the global security order that has transformed complex and contestable *interpretations* of danger ("how serious is the global proliferation threat, relative to other threats, and what kinds of responses might be appropriate?") into "objective" and incontestable *facts* regarding the sources of threat and insecurity in the international system (rogue states possessing WMDs) and the appropriate response (counter-proliferation). Of course, these states can pose a real threat to their neighbours, or to Western interests (as in the Iraqi case); the problem is that when generalized, the "rogue doctrine" tends to reduce complex regional and national security problems (and proliferation problems) in different parts of the world to simple formulas.

Against this backdrop, it is possible to identify a somewhat altered matrix of beliefs and dispositions towards non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament issues. It is important to note, however, that while the end of the Cold War and the evolution of a new discourse of danger has modified aspects of Western NACD culture, this transformation has not marked a radical break with the past. Rather, the new interpretive matrix is marked by elements of both change *and* continuity. This highlights the fact that NACD cultures change only slowly, and even when shocked adapt in ways consistent with established interpretive patterns.

Elements Of Contemporary Western NACD Culture

Contemporary Western NACD culture -- comprising a specific set of widely shared beliefs, traditions, attitudes and symbols that inform approaches to non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament -- has been shaped largely by the convergence of a Cold War arms control culture embedded in deeper Western beliefs and traditions, and a new discourse of threat and danger. The key supplementary elements of this culture are (as noted above):

- a greater focus on proliferation as the principal threat to global security, and a commitment to non-proliferation rather than global disarmament;
- a more explicit belief that Western preponderance is the key to international peace and stability; and,
- a renewed (and greater) attention to regulating "inhumane" and "uncivilized" conventional weapons.

In each of these cases, what is "new" is not the issue (proliferation, preponderance, and inhumanity have been long-standing but subordinate themes in NACD discourses), but the way in which these issues have been moved to centre stage, in the process taking up new directions and themes.

⁷⁴ The United States was unsuccessful in its efforts to direct the Wassenaar Arrangement against these states (among others), and the information-sharing elements of the regime are weaker than many would desire. See "The Wassenaar Arrangement," *Strategic Comments* 2:7 (August 1996), International Institute for Strategic Studies, London; "The Wassenaar Arrangement," Press Statement, July 1996.

Proliferation is the Threat, Non-Proliferation is the Solution

Efforts to stem the horizontal (but not necessarily the vertical) proliferation of weapons of mass destruction were part of Western NACD policies from the 1960s, if not earlier. But at the end of the Cold War, there was considerable openness in the West regarding the evolving nature of the global security order, and the future role of arms control or non-proliferation efforts within it.⁷⁵ This was paralleled by a marked ambiguity regarding the sources of future threats.⁷⁶ The Gulf War, however, swept this interpretive ambiguity aside. In its place evolved a (sometimes) hyperbolized threat discourse framed almost exclusively in terms of rogue states bent on acquiring weapons of mass destruction. One can track the emergence of this discourse in the pages of prominent security journals: as David Mutimer has noted, from only seven articles on proliferation between 1985 and 1989, the literature grew to nine articles between 1989 and 1991, and exploded to include 56 articles between 1991 and 1994.⁷⁷ Of course, this literature reflected a similar shift at the policy level, in UN Security Council declarations, NATO communiques, and American policy statements.⁷⁸ Perhaps the clearest expression of the view was the 1993 declaration of "counter-proliferation policy" by American Secretary of Defense Les Aspin.⁷⁹ In addition to a number of specific military and intelligence initiatives, Aspin also noted "that diplomacy, treaty restrictions, security assurances, export controls, non-military sanctions, and economic cooperation would remain the primary U.S. means of preventing, and coping with, the proliferation of WMD."⁸⁰

By 1995-96, then, Western policy-makers had come to share a basic understanding of the sources and nature of danger in the international system, and had moved on to begin discussing the appropriate *means* by which the West could deal with what was increasingly presented as the pressing threat of

⁷⁵ For articles reflecting this openness, and adopting optimistic and pessimistic positions, see Ivo Daalder, "The Future of Arms Control," *Survival*, 34:1 (Spring 1992), 50-73; Geoffrey Kemp, "Regional Security, Arms Control and the End of the Cold War," *Washington Quarterly*, 13:4 (Autumn 1990), 33-51.

⁷⁶ See Klare, *Rogue States*, 1-11.

⁷⁷ Mutimer, "Reimagining Security," 191-192. The journals surveyed were: *Foreign Affairs*, *Foreign Policy*, *Orbis*, *International Security*, and the *Washington Quarterly*. Similar patterns are evident in the pages of the journal of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Survival*.

⁷⁸ The UN Security Council Summit statement (January 1992) declared that "the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security." The North Atlantic Council announced an "Alliance Policy Framework on Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction" in June 1994.

⁷⁹ Aspin's speech was given at the National Academy of Science, 7 December 1993. It built on public contributions such as Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment"; Roberts, "From Nonproliferation to Antiproliferation"; and Kathleen C. Bailey, *Doomsday Weapons in the Hands of Many--The Arms Control Challenge of the '90s* (Chicago: Illinois University Press, 1991). For details see *Radical Responses to Radical Regimes: Evaluating Preemptive Counter-Proliferation*.

⁸⁰ *Radical Responses to Radical Regimes*, 1.

proliferation.⁸¹ Drawing to some extent on the pre-existing Cold War policy repertory, four principal strategies for countering proliferation have subsequently been discussed and elaborated. These are:

- *Denial*: focuses on preventing rogue states from acquiring WMDs, their delivery systems or enabling technologies. It is centred on the construction of export control regimes (such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Australia Group, Wassenaar Arrangement and the Nuclear Suppliers Group) as well as more universal agreements such as the CWC and the NPT, but does not deal with conventional weapons.
- *Disarmament*: focuses on the forcible disarmament of rogue states. It involves internationally-supervised destruction of WMD capabilities. It has only been recently employed in the case of Iraq.⁸²
- *Deterrence*: involves the use of nuclear and high-technology conventional weapons to deter rogue states from developing or using WMDs, either against civilian targets or against deployed military forces.
- *Defence*: involves the development of capabilities (such as anti-ballistic missile systems) to defend against the WMDs of rogue states.⁸³

While there is no consensus within the West regarding the appropriate or optimal "mix" of these approaches (some states are unenthusiastic about defence, while others, especially the U.S., feel that the development of defensive capabilities is crucial) there does appear to exist a Western consensus that denial strategies are the most important first line of defence against rogue states, although there is not always agreement over how to implement these.⁸⁴ This underpins what to some non-Western countries often appears to be an overly zealous commitment to "discriminatory" Western export control regimes (such as the MTCR and Australia Group) that seek to prevent technology flows to non-Western states.

Western Preponderance is the Key to International Peace and Security

Underlying and conditioning Western approaches to NACD is the pervasive and long-standing belief that the West (or occasionally the United States) as a *civilization* has a special role to play in global security affairs. This belief--which is deeply embedded in European Enlightenment notions of the progressive, global role of the West--manifests itself most clearly in an inclination among policy-makers to see the

⁸¹ For articles reflecting this new consensus, see Robert Joseph, "Proliferation, Counter-Proliferation and NATO," *Survival*, 38:1 (Spring 1996), 111-130; Joachim Krause, "Proliferation Risks and Their Strategic Relevance: What Role for NATO?" *Survival*, 37:2 (Summer 1995), 135-148.

⁸² Of course, this also included the voluntary disarmament or termination of nuclear programs in South Africa, Argentina and Brazil. For a survey of past forcible disarmament efforts, including U.S. bombing of Japanese atomic labs in 1945 and Israel's attack on Iraq's Osirak reactor, see *Radical Responses to Radical Regimes*. Regarding U.S. "counterforce" non-proliferation policy see "Counterproliferation and Treaty Activities" in U.S. Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, March 1997.

⁸³ See Richard Falkenrath, "Theatre Missile Defence and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty," *Survival*, 36:4 (Winter 1994-95), 140-160.

⁸⁴ See, for example, North Atlantic Council, "Alliance Policy Framework on Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction," communique issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, M-NAC-1(94)45, Istanbul, 9 June 1994.

West as the embodiment (and arbiter) of what Gerrit Gong has called "the standard of civilization."⁸⁵ According to this view, the West is more "responsible," "mature," "developed," "pacific" and "democratic" than all the rest, and can therefore be trusted with nuclear weapons, smart landmines, ballistic missiles, chemical weapons precursors, sophisticated and highly destructive conventional weapons, bio-technologies, and so forth.⁸⁶ The possibility that these might be seen as threats by others (and hence their attempt to procure similar weapons as simply a response, or as part of a longer-term natural diffusion process) is seldom admitted. At the other end of the continuum are so-called "rogue states"--the antithesis of the West -- that cannot be trusted to act responsibly in security affairs. In between these two poles are the vast majority of states (some of which are considered reliable some of the time). This powerful cultural norm underpins (or at least legitimates) many of the NACD regimes considered discriminatory or "neo-imperial" by states such as China and India for whom "equity" is an important value (the NPT and MTCR are examples of so-called discriminatory regimes, as are multilateral export control regimes such as the Australia Group and Wassenaar Arrangement).

There are a number of corollaries to this Western self-representation. First, this self-image inclines many (although admittedly not all) Western policy-makers to view the West as having a natural vocation to act as a "benign hegemon" in global security affairs: to play a lead role in shaping (and enforcing) "global" NACD regimes.⁸⁷ Second, it predisposes representatives of Western states to believe that non-Western states are less well-suited to play a lead role in global security issues. This is evident in a variety of contexts, one of which is contemporary discussions regarding possible expansion of the UN Security Council, where the inability of various contenders to fulfil the role of guarantor of international peace and security is often pointed out.⁸⁸ A third corollary of the belief in Western exceptionalism is the view that, because the West is pursuing rational and benign NACD policies, it can be excused from some of the more onerous restraints that others need to observe if peace and stability are to be maintained. Western states often do not (except in the most abstract way) accept the notion of "equity" in NACD

⁸⁵ Gerrit Gong, *The Standard of Civilization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). In this regard, U.S. "counter-proliferation" policies are perhaps the most obvious manifestation of this cultural shift. But one can also point to impact of a revived "standard of civilization" in recent efforts to negotiate (and American resistance to) a global ban on landmines. See Andrew Latham, "The Politics of Stigmatisation: The 'Landmine Crisis' and the Social Construction of the West," paper presented at the Annual Conference of the York Centre for International and Security Studies, "Culture, Identity and Global Security," 7 February 1997.

⁸⁶ Both the theory of the "democratic peace" and the "clash of civilizations" literature can be read as cultural artifacts of this civilizational hubris.

⁸⁷ Indeed, Western preferences are often equated with global interests. An example of this is the representation of some of NACD regimes (such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which grew out of East-West concerns) as "global" when in fact they are essentially Western in nature. For a clear statement of the view that the U.S. has special responsibilities regarding defence of the liberal order see U.S. Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, March 1997 document available on the WWW at www.dtic.dla.mil/execsec/adr97/index.html.

⁸⁸ Another recent example is the reported position of American negotiators at the Oslo conference to negotiate the Ottawa Treaty banning anti-personnel land mines. The American argument for exceptions was that it had a special mission to protect international peace and security (and global interests) that could not be compromised by accepting a global ban. This position found little favour with delegations. Personal interview, Geneva, 1997.

issues that is advanced by China and India. To offer a concrete example, the linkage between acceptance of the NPT by the "have-nots" (in particular, nuclear-capable Third World states) and the disarmament obligations accepted by nuclear powers under Article VI of that treaty has been ignored in all but rhetorical terms by the nuclear powers.

A final corollary of the West's self-perception as guardian of the liberal order, is that some Western states feel justified in maintaining their nuclear arsenals in order to defend and sustain that order.⁸⁹ This has manifested itself in the lack of enthusiasm for a range of proposals for global nuclear disarmament, including those contained in the Canberra Commission Report, the G-21 proposals, and the NPT. Refusal to give these proposals or undertakings serious consideration is often explained in terms of the need to retain nuclear weapons in order to deter rogue states who might acquire various WMDs, as well as *sotto voce* claims that Western nuclear weapons are not a danger to international peace and security because the U.S., France and Britain are "responsible" actors who retain such weapons exclusively for defensive purposes.⁹⁰ Whatever the specific rationalization, however, it is clear that Western officials can too often see their nuclear weapons as qualitatively different from non-Western nuclear weapons. This underpins both a desire to contain or roll back non-Western efforts to acquire such weapons, and a pervasive indifference (at least at the governmental level) to proposals to move toward global nuclear disarmament.

Renewed Emphasis on "Inhumane Weapons"

During the Cold War, Western NACD perspectives, policies and practices reflected an almost exclusive concern with managing nuclear weapons in conditions of mutual vulnerability. The few exceptions to this, including the pre-1945 Geneva Conventions, and the 1980 convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, operated at the margins of the Cold War and were largely unimportant to its conduct. Since the end of the Cold War, however, this has changed somewhat. In the contemporary era, while nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction continue to dominate Western NACD discourse, renewed emphasis is being placed on so-called "inhumane weapons" -- that is, weapons such as anti-personnel landmines (APMs) which are "indiscriminate," cause "needless human suffering" and are therefore beyond the pale of "civilized" warfare.⁹¹ Indeed, given the success of the campaign to ban APMs, it is likely that "humanitarian" NACD issues may become an increasingly salient aspect of Western security-building practice in the foreseeable future, as in the area of small arms and light weapons, for example.

Attempts to explain this re-focusing of Western NACD policy in terms of a rational response on the part of Western policy makers to the "objectively inhumane" nature of these weapons are not entirely persuasive, for at least two reasons. First, given the cruelty of all instruments of warfare, it is not always

⁸⁹ See Robert Latham, *The Liberal Moment: Modernity, Security and the Making of the Postwar International Order* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).

⁹⁰ For an example of this see "Nuclear Deterrence and Regional Proliferators," *Washington Quarterly*, 20:3 (Summer 1997), 167-178; David Gompert, Kenneth Watman and Dean Wilkening, "Nuclear First Use Revisited," *Survival*, 37:3 (Autumn 1995), 27-44. The latter article argues that U.S. declaratory policy should be "no first use," with possible nuclear retaliation "if American interests are attacked with weapons of mass destruction."

⁹¹ These are the two basic principles of international law concerning the use of weapons. See Protocol I (1977) Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Articles 35 and 51.

clear that such arguments by themselves provide a sufficient explanation for why some weapons are invested with a heightened degree of moral opprobrium (because of their indiscriminate effects, for example) while others (such as the ordnance dropped by bombers) are considered mundane or "conventional." There is nothing intrinsic to landmines or other "inhumane weapons" that renders them (or their use) any more or less humane than many other weapons; in actual battlefield conditions most weapons can be used indiscriminately and all can cause needless human suffering. Second, such arguments ultimately shed little light on *why* inhumane weapons have come to be the focus of Western attention in the 1990s. Weapons such as anti-personnel landmines have been in widespread use throughout most of the twentieth century and during almost all of that time were considered unexceptional (and even militarily irreplaceable) instruments of warfare. They were certainly not the focus of Western NACD, nor was there any shared perception of a "landmine crisis," despite the fact that such weapons had been used more or less indiscriminately for decades.⁹² The question then arises, why have "inhumane weapons" secured a more prominent place on the Western NACD agenda in recent years? The argument developed below is that the contemporary prominence of "inhumane" weapons within Western NACD discourse has much to do with changing Western self-perceptions and the reconstitution of the West around a new "standard of civilization."

The history of "inhumane weapons" stretches back to Europe's pre-modern era, and is intimately bound up with culturally-specific Christian notions of what constitutes a "just war."⁹³ By the late nineteenth century, however, the Western discourse of "civilized warfare" had reached its apotheosis as the direct and indirect experience of battlefield horrors converged with a culturally-inflected European "standard of civilization." At this point, adherence to the laws of war became one of the key criteria for membership in the self-consciously styled and European-centred "society of civilized nations," and Western diplomats consequently invested considerable energy in codifying the standards of civilized warfare and in specifying what constituted an "inhumane" weapon or "uncivilized" conduct in war. Out of this process emerged a number of formal agreements regarding the civilized conduct of warfare including the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 and the Geneva Conventions.

For most of the twentieth century, however, this discourse of civilized warfare has largely operated on the margins of international relations. The reasons for this are complex, and are at least partly attributable to the shock of two total wars (started in Europe) that severely strained Western faith in "civilized" standards of warfare. Perhaps, more importantly, however, the muting of the discourse of civilized

⁹² As one ICRC report found, under actual battlefield conditions APMs are almost always used in contravention of international humanitarian law and national doctrine, whether they are used by Western, Third World or insurgent armies. See ICRC, "Anti-Personnel Landmines--Friend or Foe? A Study of the Military Use and Effectiveness of Anti-Personnel Mines," document available at www.icrc.org/icrcnews/48da.htm, (28 March 1996); and Andrew Latham, "The Military Case Against Anti-Personnel Landmines," *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, 26:3 (Spring 1997), 30-31.

⁹³ For an overview of the history of Western laws of war see Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos and Mark Schulman, eds., *The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994); Geoffrey Best, *War and Law Since 1945* (New York: Clarendon Press, 1994); James Turner Johnson, *Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and Historical Inquiry* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981); and Erik Prokosch, *The Technology of Killing: A Military History of Anti-Personnel Weapons* (London: Zed Books, 1995); Chris Jochnick and Roger Normand, "The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical History of the Laws of War," *Harvard International Law Review*, 35:1 (Winter 1994), 49-95.

warfare was also a function of the partial reconstitution of the idea of "the West" following World War II. "The West," as an imagined community of states, was no longer underpinned primarily by a shared sense of civilizational solidarity. Rather, during the Cold War period "Western" self-images were constructed and articulated by demonstrating the West's difference from and superiority to non-democratic communist states. The West defined itself in terms of a global struggle with an antithetical adversary, and the language used to describe it shifted from the "standard of civilization" to being based on liberal democracy and capitalism. In this context, discussions of "civilized warfare" or "inhumane weapons" failed to resonate as they did at the end of the nineteenth century, with the result that little energy was invested in developing this discourse. This was compounded by the "totality" of the struggle with the Soviet Union, which encouraged Western policy-makers to emphasise the *utility* of weapons (such as napalm or carpet bombing in Vietnam), rather than their putative *humanity* (or lack thereof).⁹⁴

Given this context, little effort was made to develop or give effect to international humanitarian law. Moreover, the efforts that were made were never given much political support and resulted in poorly subscribed and largely ineffective international agreements. The most obvious example of this was the first Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, concluded in 1980. Negotiated during the Cold War, this agreement established that certain categories of weapons (i.e. certain types of APMs and incendiary weapons) were deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, but was never invested with the kind of political energy necessary to make it an effective instrument of international humanitarian law. Few states actually signed or ratified the CCW and it is generally recognised that the convention had little direct effect on the conduct of armed conflict.⁹⁵

With the end of the Cold War and the evolution of the rogue doctrine, however, the standard of civilization appears to have returned to global politics, in the process reinvigorating the West's commitment to the regulation of (certain) weapons on the basis of their perceived "inhumanity." Western self-representations now turn in part on an image of the West as the apotheosis and arbiter of "civilized" international relations, the discourse of "civilized warfare" has moved again to the foreground, and hence weapons are again open to symbolic re-coding from "conventional" and "unexceptional" to "inhumane." This is being done in terms (their portrayal as being "indiscriminate" or as causing "superfluous suffering") that would have been familiar to late nineteenth-century Western diplomats.⁹⁶

While not denying the cruelty of APMs and the important work done by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines to bring this to the attention of the global public, it is clear that the reconstitution of the West (and Western interests) following the end of the Cold War has played a crucial (even decisive) role in the construction of the "landmine crisis" of recent years. The shift in the West's security culture in recent years established the terrain upon which national and international NGOs (and certain states) were able to campaign for tighter regulation of certain types of weapons (such as landmines) in recent years.

⁹⁴ Of course, the portrayal of the Vietnamese in the American mind also fit with a longer tradition of not applying the rules of "civilized" warfare to struggles with non-Western peoples.

⁹⁵ See Louise Doswald-Beck and Peter Herby, "Land Mines: A Critical Examination of Existing Legal Instruments." document available on the WWW at www.icrc.ch/icrcnews, (1 May 1995).

⁹⁶ These are the fundamental principles of contemporary international humanitarian law. They date back to the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868 and the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. See ICRC, "Anti-Personnel Landmines -- Friend or Foe?", 11. For reasons discussed above, nuclear weapons remain insulated from this impulse.

All Western states now accept that APMs are inhumane and need to be regulated in international law, and this has allowed certain "moral entrepreneurs" to press claims for a comprehensive ban with some success.⁹⁷ In the absence of this discursive shift, however, it seems unlikely that Western states would have been any more responsive to calls to ban APMs (or would have exercised any more leadership in this regard) than was the case during the first CCW negotiations.

Concluding Remarks

It took about forty years to build a dense web of NACD agreements and treaties, and to reach the point where European and trans-Atlantic policy-makers could negotiate comprehensive agreements over conventional force deployments, or discuss such complex issues as a "security architecture for the twenty-first century," without being blocked by misunderstanding and mistrust at every turn. As a result, it is not surprising that most of the "models" policy-makers turn to as foundations for contemporary non-proliferation or security-building proposals have been derived from the East-West experience. Prominent examples include the lessons of the CSCE process and the concept of confidence building, the emphasis on formal negotiated agreements with effective verification, the focus on "balance," "parity," openness and crisis stabilizing measures, and the concentration on particular types of weapons and technologies.

There is, however, a tendency to forget how this state of affairs came about, and to leap to the end products of the process (architectures, security-building, broad agreements), without paying attention to the supporting socio-cultural/historical scaffolding upon which such concepts were erected, or to the implicit baggage that such concepts carry. The Western NACD legacy was built upon a slowly-created shared understanding that the East-West security dilemma needed to be addressed cooperatively, and upon a large body of negotiation, analysis and debate that created an "epistemic community" of experts who developed the essential basic concepts (such as arms control, deterrence, mutual assured destruction, parity, confidence-building, transparency, verification) around which substantive agreements were constructed. These experts drew upon a shared political, strategic and diplomatic stock of ideas (concerning the contractual, non-hierarchical and negotiated nature of inter-state relations, the role of rationality and science in war and peace, and the role of openness and accountability), within which they could frame specific policies. A great deal of learning and adaptation took place on both sides in the negotiation and dialogue, and this learning reached beyond the narrow diplomatic circle of negotiators and policy-makers deep into the broader domestic political context, and involved a wide range of relevant actors (bureaucracies, parliaments, interest groups).

Arms control, non-proliferation and confidence-building processes or concepts have not necessarily taken root when they have been exported to different regional contexts, or to more multilateral forums. New cleavages and fissures have appeared, as demonstrated by the acrimony that surrounded the preparatory conferences for the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, the difficulties encountered in the creation of the Wassenaar Arrangement, the dissension concerning a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the complications that have emerged with an expanded membership in the MTCR, and the general weakness of measures to control conventional arms transfers. These examples reflect strongly

⁹⁷ There remain differences with respect to the details of the ban, but all Western states accept principle that these weapons--or at least certain uses of these weapons--are inhumane. Regarding "moral entrepreneurs" see Ethan Nadelmann, "Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society," *International Organization*, 44:4 (Autumn 1990), 479-524.

diverging perceptions of the nature of the problem, the means to its solution, and the appropriate mechanisms to achieve greater regional and global security, but they are also in part a product of different "security culture" orientations towards regional and international peace and security. But perhaps the most important "lesson" of the East-West arms control process -- that it could be done -- is transmissible. A clear acknowledgement of the way in which the central elements of the Western "security culture" are bound by history and deeply-held beliefs can alert policy-makers to the need to look for similar deeply-held beliefs or historical lessons that could be used to shape the evolution of NACD ideas in different regions and contexts.

III. Culture and Security: Achieving Regional Security in the "ASEAN Way"

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The Asia-Pacific region is developing a unique "corporate culture" on regional security: an unusual blend of East and West. It combines both Western concepts (for example, of national sovereignty as well as regional organisation) and Eastern attitudes on managing differences. The best current model is found in South-East Asia (Kishore Mahbubani)¹

Introduction

This paper is an attempt to identify some of the general and enduring characteristics of the ASEAN states' approach to security cooperation which may be characterised as a "regional security culture." The idea of "culture" underlying this paper has two inter-related meanings. The first is *traditional culture*. In this sense, the paper will discuss the extent to which ASEAN security cooperation is conditioned by culturally-determined modes of perception and interaction. The second notion of culture underlying this paper is a synthetic one: it focuses on the processes of interactions and socialisation within ASEAN which have produced long-term attitudes and habits with respect to the management of issues of conflict and peace.

The paper is not an analysis of strategic culture, however. The idea of regional security culture differs from the conventional notion of strategic culture in three important respects. First, the notion of strategic culture revolves around issues of threat perceptions, military doctrine, and war-making (including preparation for, and conduct of, war). As Klein sees it, strategic culture is concerned with "the political objectives of war and the most effective strategy and operational method of achieving it."² Stephen Rosen's definition of strategic culture similarly focuses on "beliefs and assumptions that frame...choices about international military behaviour, particularly those concerning decisions to go to war, preferences for offensive, expansionist or defensive modes of warfare, and levels of wartime casualties that would be acceptable."³ In this sense, the idea of strategic culture is mostly about the maintenance or management of adversarial relationships. The concept is not usually applied to issues of conflict-resolution, institution-building, and cooperation, issues that are at the heart of this paper. Second, while the concept of strategic culture is largely associated with the national security of states, the focus of this paper is on *regional* security interactions. Colin Gray viewed strategic culture as a particular "national style" of thought and action,⁴ while Yitzhak Klein defined strategic culture as "the habits of thought and action...of particular national military establishments."⁵ Such a definition does not leave room for discussing particular modes

¹ Kishore Mahbubani, "The Pacific Impulse," *Survival*, 37:1 (Spring 1995), 116.

² Yitzhak Klein, "A Theory of Strategic Culture," *Comparative Strategy*, 10:2 (January-March 1991), 3-23.

³ Stephen P. Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," *International Security*, 19:4 (Spring 1995), 12.

⁴ Colin S. Gray, *Nuclear Strategy and National Style* (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986), 22.

⁵ Cited in Rosen, "Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters," 13.

of *collective* strategic behaviour, or "habits of thought" of regional institutions with regard to security affairs. Third, the literature on strategic culture focuses largely on the behaviour of Great Powers in the international system. For example, the pioneering work on strategic culture was concerned with Soviet military conduct, while more recent scholarship on the subject has dealt with China. The discourse on strategic culture has rarely been concerned with smaller or weak powers, such as the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, which is the subject-matter of this analysis.

At the outset, two important caveats must be made about the findings of the paper. First, much of the discussion that follows is concerned with the Cold War membership of ASEAN, which consisted of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Thailand, Philippines. In the not-too-distant future, ASEAN will expand to include all ten countries of Southeast Asia (Vietnam joined in 1995, Laos and Burma joined in 1997, and Cambodia is expected to join soon). But the generalisations that are presented in this paper are derived from the experience of ASEAN cooperation before its expansion. The so-called "ASEAN Way" evolved during the Cold War period when Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Burma were not members of the Association. While it is expected that these countries will conform to the ASEAN Way once they are "socialised" into the grouping's unique corporate culture and decision-making procedures, this is by no means assured. Any generalisations about the Southeast Asian approaches to security must therefore depend on whether the ASEAN Way will survive its expansion.

A second caveat regarding the findings of this paper is that it seeks to apply our knowledge of more general and traditional areas of security cooperation in Southeast Asia to more specific and relatively modern issue-areas which are yet to have wider currency in the region. The concepts of confidence-building, arms control, verification etc., are viewed in the region not only as "Western" constructs, but also as "new" concepts that are yet to be seen as an indispensable part of the regional security agenda. Thus, in contrast to Europe, analysing Southeast Asia's approach to these issues is bound to be hypothetical to some extent.

The "ASEAN Way" as Security Culture

The phrase "ASEAN Way" refers to claims about a distinctive multilateral approach to dispute-settlement and security cooperation developed by the members of ASEAN since its formation in 1967 with a view to ensure regional peace and stability. Although the ASEAN Way is a multilateral approach, it is also evident in the management of bilateral relationships among the member states. It reflects the ASEAN members' efforts to manage and overcome intra-mural differences through a process of consultations and compromise without necessarily relying on formal institutional mechanisms.

The ASEAN Way derives from both the indigenous political, strategic and cultural make-up of the member states, and their practical experience in dealing with problems and challenges affecting regional stability. At one level, it reflects deeply-ingrained social relationships and problem-solving attributes of Southeast Asian regimes. At another level, it builds from the lessons of dealing with challenges that the regional organization has faced since its founding in 1967, including inter-state disputes such as the Philippine-Malaysia dispute over Sabah, the effort to counter the common external threat posed by the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia and to find a political settlement to the conflict, and the concern to reduce the recurring danger of Soviet, Chinese and American intervention in the region's affairs.

The primary goal of the ASEAN Way is the management of diversity. It is often described as the search for a common ground that preserves a measure of corporate harmony while allowing individual members to retain and pursue their specific, and sometimes divergent, interests. In the security realm, the ASEAN Way focuses on the prevention and management of intra-regional conflict, although this may involve attention to problems of domestic insurgency and external intervention so as to minimise their potential to exacerbate inter-state tensions. The ASEAN Way is a security framework that not only prevents intra-mural tensions from escalating into armed conflict, but also seeks to prevent the spill-over of domestic disputes as well as to ensure the isolation of Southeast Asian conflicts from Great Power intervention.

The ASEAN Way consists of a code of conduct for inter-state behaviour as well as a decision-making process based on consultations and consensus. The code of conduct incorporates a set of well-known principles (for example: non-interference in the domestic affairs of each other, non-use of force, pacific settlement of disputes, and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states) that can be found in the Charter of the United Nations as well as regional political and security organizations elsewhere in the world. To this extent, the ASEAN Way is not an unusual construct. But where it can claim a certain amount of uniqueness is the manner in which these norms are operationalised into a process of regional interaction. This approach involves a high degree of discretion, informality, pragmatism, expediency, consensus-building, and non-confrontational bargaining styles which are often contrasted with the adversarial posturing and legalistic decision-making procedures in Western multilateral negotiations. The following section analyses some of the key features of the ASEAN process.

Informality

Perhaps the most important feature associated with ASEAN's approach to security cooperation is the preference for informality and the related avoidance of excessive institutionalisation. Some observers have gone to the extent of suggesting that the ASEAN process is "unstructured, with no clear format for decision-making or implementation" and "often lack[ing] a formal agenda." In this process, issues are negotiated on an ad hoc basis "as and when they arise."⁶ This may be overstating the case somewhat, but it captures the recognition among ASEAN policy-makers of the virtues of informality over structured, formalistic and legalistic procedures. A great deal of intra-ASEAN cooperation is based on inter-personal contacts, rather than on the strength of formal institutions. As Carlos Romulo, the former Foreign Secretary of the Philippines, once said: "We often find that private talks over breakfast prove more important than formal meetings."⁷ Such informality is supposed to raise the "level of comfort" among the participants and create a flexible decision-making environment which would allow room for mutual accommodation amongst national bargaining positions.

The ASEAN Way of multilateral negotiations tend to be process-oriented, rather than product-oriented. It implies a commitment to carry on with consultations without any specific formula or modality for achieving a desired outcome. In fact, consultations in the ASEAN framework tend to be open-ended rather than being tied to a specific timetable. The process is always held to be as, if not more, important

⁶ J.N. Mak "The ASEAN Process ('Way') of Multilateral Cooperation and Cooperative Security: The Road to a Regional Arms Register?," Paper Presented to the MIMA-SIPRI Workshop on An ASEAN Arms Register: Developing Transparency, Kuala Lumpur, 2-3 October 1995, 5.

⁷ Cited in Anh Tuan Hoang, "ASEAN Dispute Management: Implications for Vietnam and an Expanded ASEAN," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 18:1 (June 1996), 67.

than the product. The process of cooperation is important in itself and is deemed to be useful irrespective of the final outcome.

The preference for informality is evident in several areas of ASEAN's approach to institution-building in the security arena. "Dialogues" and "consultative mechanisms" are preferred to "institutions" and "conflict-resolution" measures. Instead of elaborate and formal institutional structures, ASEAN countries seem to prefer ad hoc mechanisms. To be sure, ASEAN is not without permanent institutional structures. The ASEAN process includes an annual meeting of foreign ministers, a formal summit of leaders every two years, and an informal summit in the intervening year. In addition, there are numerous ASEAN-related meetings involving ministers, senior officials and parliamentarians. ASEAN coordinating bodies cover a large number of issue-areas, from environment to shipping traffic. Indeed, every year, the grouping holds over 200 meetings under its auspices. These meetings, as Michael Leifer points out, "ha[ve] become part of an institutional culture that helps to avoid and control conflicts."⁸ But the ASEAN bureaucracy remains relatively small. The ASEAN secretariat in Jakarta, though expanding its staff and functions, is considerably smaller than its EU counterpart in Brussels. Moreover, much of its work focuses on non-security issues, especially economic cooperation. Most of the coordinating work in ASEAN is handled by national ASEAN secretariats located within the foreign ministries of each member country, especially the country hosting the annual ministerial meeting.

Thus, while ASEAN is not lacking in regularised ministerial and bureaucratic consultations, it has not embraced the idea of a centralised permanent bureaucracy with decision-making authority. This is not so much a cultural attribute as a conscious rejection by the organization of the EU brand of supranationalism. In the case of ASEAN, institution-building is about developing a regular but flexible framework of coordination and cooperation by national governments without delegating state sovereignty to a regional authority.

The ASEAN countries do not equate institutionalisation with effectiveness. A good example in the security arena is ASEAN's attitude toward the Organisation of Security and Cooperation (formerly known as CSCE). The OSCE was originally touted as a model for Asia Pacific in early Russian, Australian and Canadian proposals for security cooperation. But ASEAN was sceptical. Now the OSCE is viewed in ASEAN circles as an unsuitable model for Asia because it is too institutionalised, promising much more than it could deliver, with mechanisms (such as the Conflict Prevention Centre and the Missions of Long Duration to Yugoslavia) with grand titles but which are under-resourced and unworkable.

The distinction between formal and informal approaches to security cooperation has been highlighted by a senior official in the Indonesian defence ministry, Rear Admiral R.M. Sunardi:

[the] Southeast Asian way of enhancing security is diametrically different from the one adopted by other sub-regions. For them, any approach or process must be framed in a formal structure. Informality is considered improper for the sake of accountability. Discussion on the enhancement of security situation should evolve around "measure" and "mechanism." It entails that to have trust or confidence in other party...It has to be translated into "measure" such as confidence-building measures (CBM)...Eventually "measures" must be tabulated and agreed upon for its implementation.

⁸ Cited in Hoang, "ASEAN Dispute Management," 67.

Sunardi then concludes that:

Measures and mechanisms in confidence/trust building is therefore quite a new concept for Southeast Asian. For Southeast Asian to have confidence in another party does not prescribe any tabulation of what should be done, let alone a fixed schedule for implementation.⁹

It is important to recognise that Sunardi does not think that informal procedures are less accountable than formal ones. Moreover, while he is referring specifically to confidence-building measures, it is clear that he intends his generalisations to be valid for the whole process of security cooperation.

Non-confrontation

Next to informality and aversion to formal institutions, the ASEAN Way of security cooperation is characterised by non-confrontation. ASEAN's policy of non-confrontation has three aspects. The first is the importance of the "comfort level" as an important precondition for success in multilateral consultations and negotiations. Raising the comfort level involves avoiding open and public disagreement among the interlocutors. This is especially important during the early stages of cooperation-building. As Singapore's Prime Minister once observed about the fledgling multilateral institutions in the Asia Pacific, these "institutions created are not yet mature enough for us to have a robust dialogue. For Asians, it's not in our nature to want to disagree with people publicly."¹⁰ In reality, this could simply reflect the fact that multilateralism brings together countries which had for a very long time viewed each other as major adversaries. This is true of ASEAN and Vietnam, Russia and China, Russia and Japan and U.S. and Russia. Thus, the very fact that these states could sit at the same table to discuss a common approach to regional security is in itself a remarkable achievement. In this setting, the comfort level becomes an end in itself, as well as a fundamental requirement of further progress in security cooperation.

A second implication of ASEAN's non-confrontation policy is evident from its approach to defence cooperation. During the Cold War, security issues were excluded from ASEAN's multilateral discussions. This was intended to convey the impression that ASEAN was not a security "alliance" similar to those sponsored by the superpowers as part of their geopolitical rivalry. This in itself was based on a pragmatic recognition that an alliance posture would be provocative to adversaries like Vietnam and the Soviet Union, while ASEAN could claim to have a non-aligned image by emphasising the economic and political aspects of regionalism. But the end of the Cold War led ASEAN to rethink this position. In 1992, ASEAN members decided to bring in security issues into their multilateral agenda. Moreover, ASEAN played a major role in the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum, with the objective of advancing security cooperation in the wider Asia Pacific region. Yet, ASEAN members do not regard this shift as setting the stage for a military alliance among its members. Similarly, the ARF is seen not as a mechanism for conflict resolution but as a "dialogue process." As Singapore's Prime Minister put it, the

⁹ R.M. Sunardi, "Maritime Security and Conflict Resolution: Indonesian Perspective," Paper presented to the Symposium on "The Evolving Security Situation in the Asia Pacific Region: Indonesian and Canadian Perspectives," Jakarta, 26 June 1995, 3-4.

¹⁰ "Goh Stresses Importance of Multilateral Cooperation," *Asian Wall Street Journal*, 24 June 1994, 1,6.

ARF is "a forum where Asia/Pacific countries can talk with one another so as to better understand each other's security concerns."¹¹

A third consequence of ASEAN's non-confrontational posture is the reluctance to publicly identify threats. ASEAN states do not discuss their threat perceptions in defence white papers; indeed few publish such papers anyway. They take strong exception to being identified as a threat. For example, Australian strategic discourses which sometimes identify Indonesia as a threat to Australia's national security are strongly protested by Jakarta, so much so that when Canberra published its latest defence white paper, it took the unusual step of briefing senior Indonesian officials about its contents even before the paper had been released to the Australian public. Nothing illustrates an escalation of tensions between Singapore and Malaysia more dramatically than the use of the term "threat" by the news media of one country to describe the policies of the other. When Singapore offered military facilities to the U.S. in 1990, one of the strongest responses from Malaysia was a newspaper article which alleged the Singapore action confirmed its view of Malaysia as a "threat" to its security.

More recently, the reluctance to publicly designate a "threat" has been evident in the context of China. This is not to say that strategic planners in ASEAN do not take into account the growing military power of China, which has been the basis of strategic planning and arms acquisitions in Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and other ASEAN countries. But while many ASEAN countries harbour deep misgivings about Chinese power and its policy toward the South China Sea dispute, China is almost never described as a "threat" in official policy statements. A policy of "engaging" China is seen as being a much wiser course of action than "containing" it. The talk about the "China threat" is blamed on the West, especially the U.S. ASEAN elites voice fear that viewing China as a threat will become a self-fulfilling prophecy ("if you view China as a threat, it will become one").

Finally, the preference for non-confrontation can be seen in ASEAN's policy of leaving bilateral disputes or other contentious and sensitive issues out of the agenda of multilateral discussions.

Common wisdom has cautioned that disagreements would not be settled without growing trust and mutual understanding and that interests would be best served if they first learnt to co-operate with one another over non-controversial issues and develop a habit of frequent consultation. Therefore efforts to improve relations were focused on issues of common interest, while sensitive and controversial issues were put aside to a later date.¹²

This has led some analysts, such as Michael Leifer, to characterise ASEAN's approach to conflict as one of "conflict avoidance and management" rather than conflict-resolution.¹³ This is not a criticism of the ASEAN approach. Since many conflicts are not easily resolved, "sweeping them under the carpet" might have been crucial in creating a climate of inter-state tranquillity which has allowed the ASEAN member countries to concentrate on economic development pending the gradual muting and settlement of their intra-mural conflicts. An Indonesian scholar, Soedjati Djiwandono, points out that ASEAN:

¹¹ Interview with *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 19 February 1994, 52.

¹² Hoang, "ASEAN Dispute Management," 70.

¹³ Michael Leifer, "ASEAN as a Model of a Security Community?" in Hadi Soesastro, ed., *ASEAN in a Changed Regional and International Political Economy* (Jakarta: CSIS, 1995), 132.

...continues to flourish despite disputes in the bilateral relations of almost any two of its member states...Without ASEAN such disputes would have readily surfaced into the open and some may even have developed into armed conflicts. At all events, ASEAN has succeeded in sweeping such problems under the carpet, at least pending their final settlement by peaceful means. A dispute should not be the focus of relations among nations, nor should it hinder the promotion of such good relations and close cooperation, which would precisely help to find its solution. In any event, regional cooperation may help create a climate that would be favourable or conducive to finding a peaceful solution.¹⁴

Consultations and Consensus

Perhaps the most important element of the ASEAN Way is the concept and practice of "consultations" (*musyawarah*) and "consensus" (*mufakat*). Although consensus is considered to be a common feature of decision-making in many Asian societies, in the ASEAN context, the term is usually traced to a particular style of decision-making within Javanese village society. In its Javanese conception, consensus is a way by which a village leader makes important decisions affecting social life in the village. As Herb Feith points out, the consensus-building process is based on the understanding that "a leader should not act arbitrarily or impose his will, but rather make gentle suggestions of the path a community should follow, being careful always to consult all other participants fully and to take their views and feelings into consideration before delivering his synthesis conclusions."¹⁵

Two aspects of the consensus-building process deserve notice. The first is the psychological setting of consultations, which must be non-hostile. As a former Indonesian Foreign Minister, Subiandro, put it, negotiations in the *musyawarah* and *mufakat* way take place "not as between opponents but as between friends and brothers."¹⁶ One Malaysian analyst notes that in the ASEAN context, consensus means searching for "an amalgamation of the most acceptable views of each and every member" in a socio-psychological setting in which "all parties have power over each other."¹⁷ A second aspect is the distinction between consensus and unanimity. The former must not be confused with the latter. Consensus does not require 100 percent agreement by all parties. Rather, it represents a commitment to finding a "way of moving forward by establishing what seems to have broad support."¹⁸ As a Singaporean

¹⁴ J. Soedjati Djiwandono, "Confidence-Building Measures and Preventive Diplomacy: A Southeast Asian Perspective," Paper presented to the Symposium on: "The Evolving Security Situation in the Asia Pacific Region: Indonesian and Canadian Perspectives," Jakarta, 26 June 1995, 6-7.

¹⁵ Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), 40.

¹⁶ Cited in Arnafin Jorgensen-Dahl, *Regional Organisation and Order in Southeast Asia* (London: Macmillan, 1982), 166.

¹⁷ Mak, "The ASEAN Process ('Way') of Multilateral Cooperation," 5.

¹⁸ Cited in *The Straits Times*, 13 November 1994, 17.

newspaper commentary notes, in a consensus situation, "not everyone would always be comfortable," but they tended to "go along so long as their basic interests were not disregarded."¹⁹

Thus, consensus-building in the ASEAN Way is an attempt to create a common understanding of the problem, without necessarily producing a common approach to problem-solving. It is about agreeing to disagree, rather than allowing disagreements to cloud and undermine the spirit of regionalism.

A major factor in the consensus-building process in ASEAN is the need to present an united front vis-a-vis extra-regional actors. While ASEAN members can debate and disagree on the merit of a particular position behind closed doors, they refrain from airing these differences in public, especially while dealing with the outside world. Even in situations where ASEAN members find it impossible to arrive at a common position, they nonetheless speak and act as though a certain level of unity has been achieved on that particular issue. There is a clear tendency to play down or give a positive spin to intra-mural differences. A great deal of care is always taken not to isolate or embarrass any individual ASEAN member in international fora. Even when an ASEAN member has advanced a position that is not acceptable to other members, the latter will refrain from acting in ways that may make the latter "lose face" internationally. This sensitive handling of intra-mural differences is a hallmark of the ASEAN Way. It comes out of the realisation that regional unity is needed to overcome the weaknesses and limitations of individual ASEAN states. The ASEAN countries perceive themselves as weak states in an international system dominated by strong powers. Acting in their individual capacity, they cannot hope to influence the behaviour of major powers or advance their national interests and objectives. The realisation of the need for collective action and to present an united front vis-a-vis the outside world helps the ASEAN members to achieve consensus on issues over which they might otherwise disagree.

The idea of consensus is not an abstract notion, but has proven useful in fostering regional economic and political cooperation in Southeast Asia. For example, the concept was applied to address the problem of hesitancy and indifference among ASEAN members toward intra-ASEAN economic cooperation, including ASEAN industrial joint ventures and tariff reductions. As Lee Kuan Yew observed in the context of ASEAN economic cooperation, (at a time when ASEAN consisted of only five members: Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines and Singapore): "When four agree [to a certain scheme] and one does not, this can still be considered as consensus and the five-minus-one scheme can benefit the participating four without damaging the remaining one."²⁰ In this context, consensus was seen as a way of moving forward with regional cooperation schemes despite the reluctance of one of the members to participate in it. Lee Kuan Yew described the process in the following terms:

So long as members who are not yet ready to participate are not damaged by non-participation, nor excluded from future participation, the power of veto need not be exercised....when four agree and one does not object, this can still be considered a consensus, and the four should proceed with a new regional scheme.²¹

¹⁹ Cited in *The Straits Times*, 13 November 1994, 17.

²⁰ Cited in Roger Irvine, "The Formative Years of ASEAN: 1967-1975," in Alison Broinowski, ed., *Understanding ASEAN* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), 62.

²¹ Lee Kuan Yew cited in Mary Hogan, *The Development and Role of ASEAN as a Regional Association*, M.Phil Dissertation, University of Hong Kong, 1995, 88.

The emphasis on consultations, a vital element of the consensus-building process, does raise an important question: how a seemingly open and democratic social process like consensus can co-exist with a distinctly authoritarian political systems that many Southeast Asian countries, especially Indonesia, have maintained in much of the post-colonial period. This question is especially interesting since Southeast Asia governments claim that the process of consensus-building goes beyond the village level, characterising decision-making at the national level as well, where in reality, decision-making remains elitist and authoritarian. The answer to this puzzle may be found in the authoritarian nature of consensus-building itself, particularly the role of the leader (the village chief) who guides, controls and dominates the consensus-building process. It is this chief who ultimately defines what the consensus actually is, and it is quite likely that end product may not reflect the views of the majority of those consulted. In this sense, the only obligation of the village chief is to consult, he does not have to accept the views of those consulted. Lucian Pye has pointed out the "authoritarian" nature of the consensus-building process:

...in Indonesian villages the process of consensus is wonderful to watch: young hotbloods will expound their views with dramatic passion, the middle-aged will strive to hit the right note so as to suggest wisdom, and then, without the slightest hint that cloture might be at hand, an elder will calmly define what the consensus is and deliberations will cease.²²

If this view of consensus is accepted, then the problems of moving it beyond the national to the international level become immediately apparent. At the international level, it is not easy to find a leader with the authority and capacity that a chief enjoys in relation to the residents in a village setting. Such leadership is only conceivable in a regional or international order characterised by an extreme form of hegemony, possibly the kind of leadership the superpowers enjoyed vis-a-vis their clients (including the U.S. in relation to its Asian allies) at the height of the Cold War. In today's Asia Pacific region, the prospects for such structural power and leadership are much weaker, notwithstanding the present military supremacy (some would say unipolar position) of the U.S. or the most extreme projections by analysts about future Chinese power. On the other hand, other forms of leadership, such as intellectual or entrepreneurial leadership, have a greater scope in the post-Cold War order.²³ Thus the process of consensus-building in the international arena has to be adapted to a concept of leadership different from that found in Malay village culture.

During the Cold War, Indonesia enjoyed a degree of influence within the ASEAN grouping as a de facto village elder. As the largest and most populous member of ASEAN, Indonesia has always been viewed with certain amount of ambiguity by its smaller neighbours, especially Singapore and Malaysia. But under

²² Lucian Pye, *Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority* (Cambridge: MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), 364-365.

²³ The distinction between structural, intellectual and entrepreneurial leadership is articulated by Oran Young. According to Young, "structural leaders" rely on their ability to translate "power resources into bargaining leverage in an effort to bring pressure to bear on others to assent to the terms of proposed constitutional contracts." Intellectual leaders are those who rely on the power of ideas to shape the thinking of actors in the bargaining process. Entrepreneurial leaders rely on "negotiating skill to frame issues in ways that foster integrative bargaining and to put together deals that would otherwise elude participants endeavouring to form international regimes through institutional bargaining." Oran R. Young, "Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society," *International Organization*, 45:3 (Summer 1991).

Suharto's leadership, the smaller members of ASEAN accepted Indonesia's de facto leadership in return for Jakarta's commitment to exercise restraint in its regional behaviour, a policy in marked contrast to Sukarno's policy of confrontation with Malaysia and Singapore. Indonesia's influence and leadership was evident in the development of ASEAN's policy of qualified non-alignment (Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality or ZOPFAN), its successful mediation in the dispute between Malaysia and the Philippines over Sabah, and its highly publicised diplomacy in search of a political settlement of the Cambodia conflict. In the post-Cold War era, Indonesia's role has somewhat declined, especially vis-a-vis Malaysia's active regional and international diplomacy (which has created frictions between the leaders of Malaysia and Indonesia) and Thailand's aggressive market-driven diplomacy in Indochina and Burma. But the image of a village chief remains useful to describe ASEAN's collective role in promoting Asia Pacific security cooperation. Here, ASEAN has exercised considerable leadership in the launching the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and setting its initial agenda and direction. ASEAN's interest in the ARF was prompted by a realisation that a multilateral forum launched pro-actively under its own sponsorship would enable it to moderate the rivalry among the region's major powers, the U.S., China and Japan, and prevent them from ignoring the security interests of the region's weaker states. The fact that ASEAN has sought, with a good measure of initial success, to transplant the "ASEAN Way" particularly the style of non-confrontational, informal and consensual decision-making system, into a wider regional setting and make it the foundation of an "Asia Pacific Way" of multilateralism, is particularly remarkable given the fact that the membership of the ARF includes the major powers of the contemporary international system. This may be regarded as a form of soft-power leadership which is akin to the concept of leader in the concept of consensus-building.

To be sure, ASEAN's soft-power leadership imposes some limitations to the consensus-building process at the international level. As Jorgensen-Dahl observes, building cooperation at the international level must overcome "problems and opposing interests of...vastly increased intricacy and magnitude,"²⁴ than those that are encountered at the national and community levels. Thus, any consultation process at the international level runs the risk of becoming "a process of determining the realistically achievable objectives given the limits imposed by each member-country's interests."²⁵ In this context, regional or international cooperation remains hostage to the imperative of national interest. Bilson Kurus has drawn attention to the fact that "each and every action taken in the name of ASEAN must either contribute to or be neutral, but not detract from, the perceived national interests of the individual ASEAN member states."²⁶

Nonetheless, an important point about consensus-building is that national interests are in part defined by the need to remain part of the consensus, be considered a good neighbour, not upset the "community," and so forth. In this respect, the very definition of what constitutes national interest may change with the progress of interaction and socialization among actors, and the supposed tension between national and community goals may be significantly reduced. This general point of constructivist international relations theory, that the social identities of actors help constitute their interests, certainly applies to the ASEAN experience.

²⁴ Jorgensen-Dahl, *Regional Organisation and Order in Southeast Asia*, 166.

²⁵ Irvine, "The Formative Years of ASEAN," 50.

²⁶ Bilson Kurus, "The ASEAN Triad: National Interest, Consensus-Seeking, and Economic Cooperation," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 16:4 (March 1995), 405.

The understanding that consensus need not involve unanimity imparts a great degree of flexibility to decision-making at the national and international setting. As Foreign Minister S. Jayakumar of Singapore observes, "when the vital interests of any one ASEAN state [are] not threatened by any ASEAN initiative, it allows the other members to proceed with it."²⁷ At the same time, it is clear that ASEAN-style consensus would be of limited effectiveness in dealing with issues that engage fundamental national interests, including issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity. This includes contemporary problems such as the Spratly Islands dispute, which China and other claimants view as a matter of vital national interest. It is impossible to conceive of a solution to the Spratlys conflict based on the five-minus-one formula. Similarly, the consensus approach may make it difficult to achieve agreement on confidence-building and related military-security measures, especially those which require a good deal of transparency in national security postures.

On the positive side, the consensus approach may facilitate security cooperation by stressing the fundamental importance of consultations in a non-threatening multilateral setting, guided by a shared commitment to moderation and accommodation. Such a process of "stressing the positives" and "sweeping controversial issues under the carpet" may create enough goodwill among the participants as to encourage restrained political and military behaviour. As Jorgensen- Dahl notes: "a residue of goodwill based on feelings of brotherhood and kinship may serve the same purpose as oil on rough sea. They take the edges of the waves and make for smooth sailing." Herman Kraft stresses the element of restraint generated by the consensus-building process:

...the issues that ASEAN gets involved with tend to be those that every member can agree upon. Controversial issues more often than not are shelved rather than confronted for fear of disrupting cohesiveness and unity. At the same time, it has been a factor in *restraining* the actions of ASEAN member-states. In more ways than one, ASEAN consensus has been used as a justification for conservatism on a number of controversial issues.²⁸

Thinking Multilaterally but Acting Bilaterally

A final aspect of the ASEAN Way must be noted. Despite their strong commitment to multilateralism, bilateral modes of security cooperation and conflict management remain an important feature of intra-ASEAN security relations. In some situations, ASEAN countries seem to adopt a policy of "thinking multilaterally but acting bilaterally." This is especially true of situations in which bilateralism is seen as more appropriate, flexible and practical approach to the conduct of regional inter-state relations. As a former Foreign Minister of Malaysia, Tan Sri Mohammed Ghazali Shafie, put it in 1970:

...regional cooperation within a formal framework should not prevent countries of the region from trying to forge the closest possible links on a bilateral basis with one another. It may be, for example, that country X would be willing to establish such links on specific subjects and would be prepared to engage in consultations including exchange of information, etc, with country Y which she might not consider either appropriate or

²⁷ Hoang, "ASEAN Dispute Management," 78.

²⁸ Herman Kraft, "Consensus-building in ASEAN and Constructive Engagement with Burma," unpublished paper, York University, 1996, 6.

necessary to have with some other third country on a multilateral basis. Such bilateral contacts on any subject and at whatever level which may be mutually acceptable should be pursued as far as possible.²⁹

Similarly, there are certain issue areas in which it may be difficult to achieve common ground and where multilateralism may militate against national interests. A case in point is multilateralism in defence cooperation. As a former chief of Malaysia's Defence Forces put it:

Multilateralism may be possible if there is a collective belief that such an arrangement would bring mutual benefit to all members concerned. In other words there must be a convergence of security interest derived from a common perception of threat facing the individual members and the region as a whole. Presently this is unlikely to happen simply because of differing security interests and needs. To a large extent this has been due to the long established security alignment with extra regional powers, domestic instability or fragility of the regime in power and also the uneven political and economic developments within ASEAN states.³⁰

The preference for bilateralism is especially evident in the case of intra-ASEAN defence cooperation. During the Cold War, the ASEAN states rejected multilateral defence cooperation for the fear of provoking their Indochinese adversaries. Now, such cooperation continues to be seen in a negative light for a variety of reasons, especially differing threat perceptions among the ASEAN members and their lack of a requisite degree of defence self-reliance which would make a multilateral arrangement meaningful. Despite periodic proposals to set up committees of ASEAN defence ministers and Chiefs-of-staff (which is already done informally) or organise multilateral military exercises, the ASEAN states continue to view bilateral defence cooperation as the most practical and useful path to an ASEAN "defence community."³¹

Bilateralism also continues to be the preferred mode of conflict-management in ASEAN. Disputes between Malaysia and Singapore (Pedra Branca), Malaysia and Indonesia (Sipadan and Ligitan Islands) and Malaysia and the Philippines (Sabah, Sulu Sea maritime borders) have been handled through ad hoc bilateral contacts or through established bilateral institutions such as the Thai-Malaysia and Indonesia-Malaysia border committees, even though members often urge parties to settle their disputes in the "ASEAN spirit" or "for the sake of ASEAN" to underscore the multilateral context of, and stakes in, preventing any serious escalation of these disputes.

It is important to bear in mind that the bilateralism practiced among the ASEAN states is not "exclusive bilateralism," but one that is compatible with multilateral goals. Bilateral linkages are undertaken within the overarching framework of multilateral norms, including such principles as pacific settlement of disputes and respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Thus, ASEAN officially recognises bilateral

²⁹ M. Ghazali Shafie, *Malaysia: International Relations* (Kuala Lumpur: Creative Enterprises, 1982), 161-62.

³⁰ "Prospects for Defence and Security Cooperation in ASEAN," Paper Presented to the Conference on "ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific Region: Prospects for Security Cooperation," Manila, 5-7 June 1991, 5.

³¹ See Amitav Acharya, "Association of Southeast Asian Nations: Security Community or Defence Community," *Pacific Affairs*, 62:2 (Summer 1991), 159-178.

defence cooperation as an important contributing factor to the spirit of regionalism. Moreover, in the area of dispute-settlement, ASEAN has a tradition of avoiding the discussion of contentious issues in the multilateral agenda. The fact that such disputes are "swept under the carpet" does not mean that they are ignored, but are left to be addressed through bilateral channels which may be more practical and effective.

Comprehensive Security

Although the term comprehensive or "overall" security was coined in Japan during the 1970s as an alternative to the concept of national security, it has also found adherence in other Asian countries, especially Southeast Asia. In its Japanese formulation, the idea of comprehensive security included a strong economic element.

Comprehensive security policy for Japanese decision makers...appears to include not only overt threats from an increasingly menacing Soviet military machine or from major geophysical catastrophes, but also to include major threats to economic livelihood and standard of living of the Japanese people from the denial of access to markets for Japanese goods, the expropriation of Japanese property and exclusion of Japanese investment projects abroad, and from a withholding of vital supplies of goods, materials and services to Japanese enterprises home and abroad."³²

But the concept of comprehensive security in ASEAN has a broader meaning than the official Japanese doctrine. The former is more inward-looking than the Japanese notion, which focuses largely, if not exclusively, on external threats to Japanese security. For ASEAN governments, as is the case with their counterparts in much of the developing world, an important aspect of security has been the issue of regime survival. Comprehensive security originated in ASEAN fundamentally as a framework for coping with the danger of insurgency, subversion, and political unrest. The attainment of performance legitimacy through economic development is a key element of comprehensive security doctrines found in ASEAN. This is different from the Japanese (not to mention the traditional Western concept of national security) context where the chief concern is protection of state interests from external military threats.

The linkage between policy and doctrine is also different in the ASEAN context. Unlike in Japan, a broader notion of security incorporating domestic and essentially nonmilitary threats has been used by ASEAN governments to negate the possibility of alliances with both regional and extra-regional states (on the ground that such an alliance will be irrelevant against internal threats) and to limit the scope for external intervention in the region (as reflected in ZOPFAN). Unlike Japan, the ASEAN states have not used comprehensive security doctrines to justify higher defence spending.

Of the several notions of comprehensive security in ASEAN, two have been especially well-articulated. The first is Indonesia's notion of national resilience, which emerged in the 1960s when President Suharto assumed power, although it was officially proclaimed in 1973. According to the Indonesian constitution,

³² J.W.M. Chapman, R. Drifte and I.T.M. Gow: *Japan's Quest for Comprehensive Security* (London: Frances Pinter, 1983), 149.

National resilience is a dynamic condition of will power, determination and firmness with the ability to develop national strength to face and overcome all manner of threats internal and external, direct or indirect, that may endanger the Indonesian national identity and the total way of life of the nation and its people, and to achieve the objectives of the national struggle.³³

According to one formulation, "National resilience is an inward-looking concept, based on the proposition that national security lies not in military alliances or under the military umbrella of a great power, but in self-reliance deriving from domestic factors such as economic and social development, political stability and a sense of nationalism."³⁴ The political significance of such an inward-looking notion lies in the fact that it signalled the Suharto regime's intention to focus on domestic problems, and on economic development, in contrast to its predecessor, President Sukarno's internationalist and interventionist outlook which had undermined Indonesia's economic health. Nonetheless, the centrality of domestic stability in Indonesia's security thinking leads to a closely-related emphasis on non-military measures, especially economic development and social justice, to achieve overall national and regional security. Muthiah Alagappa has pointed to several factors behind the origin and development of the doctrine of national resilience with its focus on internal threats:

- (1) Indonesia's long national liberation struggle against Dutch colonialism and its difficult experience in nation-building in the immediate aftermath of independence;
- (2) the weakness of the Indonesian state as a conglomeration of a multitude of ethnic groups separated by geography culture and ethnicity;
- (3) Indonesia's weak military power and potential which sets serious limits to security posture based on military self-reliance alone;
- (4) The military-dominated Indonesian regime's quest for legitimacy and survival in the face of domestic competition for political power, especially from the communist insurgency;
- (5) A fear that domestic political and ethnic strife would pave the way for external intervention; hence domestic tranquillity must be ensured as a precondition for security against external threats.³⁵

National resilience is a multi-dimensional concept consisting of ideological, political, economic, socio-cultural and security/defence aspects. It is "promoted through political, economic, military and socio-cultural policies with the highest priority being accorded to economic development..."³⁶ Although the doctrine of national resilience limits itself substantially to the domestic level of security, it has indirect and serious implications for the external/international strategic environment. At its origin, the doctrine of national resilience was reassuring to Indonesia's regional neighbours who saw in Indonesia's commitment to internal stability and prosperity a signal of its intent of good neighbourliness and support

³³ Cited in Muthiah Alagappa, "Comprehensive Security: Interpretations in ASEAN Countries," in Robert A. Scalapino, et al., eds., *Asian Security Issues: Regional and Global* (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of East Asian Studies, 1988), 57-58.

³⁴ David Irvine, "Making Haste Slowly: ASEAN from 1975," in Alison Broinowski, ed., *Understanding ASEAN* (London: Macmillan, 1982), 40.

³⁵ Alagappa, "Comprehensive Security: Interpretations in ASEAN Countries," 58.

³⁶ Alagappa, "Comprehensive Security: Interpretations in ASEAN Countries," 62.

for regional cooperation through ASEAN. Indeed, the Indonesian notion of resilience pays explicit attention to the link between national and regional security in the form of the doctrine of "regional resilience." In this view, "if each member nation [of ASEAN] can accomplish an overall national development and overcome internal threats, regional resilience can result much in the same way as a chain derives its overall strength from the strength of its constituent parts."³⁷ To be sure, the attainment of regional resilience on the basis of domestic consolidation of every regional actor cannot be automatically assumed, apart from such national efforts it required a commitment to regional conflict-avoidance and cooperation through the ASEAN framework. But given the prevalent fear of Indonesia's regional ambitions spurred by the Sukarno presidency, its smaller neighbours were relieved by the shift towards an introverted security posture. Also, by paying attention to long-term conditions for stability at home and peaceful inter-state relations within the region, Indonesia and its neighbours could minimise the risk of external intervention and Great Power rivalry.

Malaysia's concept of comprehensive security places a similar emphasis on non-military threats and policy instruments. In the words of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed of Malaysia:

National security is inseparable from political stability, economic success and social harmony. Without these all the guns in the world cannot prevent a country from being overcome by its enemies, whose ambitions can be fulfilled sometimes without firing a single shot.³⁸

Malaysian leaders and analysts have identified a wide range of factors as constituting threats to national security. These include: communist insurgency and subversion, armed separatism, economic slowdown or recession, religious extremism and racial strife in a multiethnic society, drug addiction, and illegal immigration. In the words of former Prime Minister Hussein Onn, "These problems traverse political, socio-cultural, psychological and economic dimensions - thus emphasizing the total or comprehensive nature of Malaysia's national security."³⁹ Although Malaysia has acknowledged some external security concerns as well, including Great Power rivalry and the Cambodia conflict, in general these are considered to be less immediate and urgent.

It is interesting to note that Malaysian leaders have linked the realisation of comprehensive security to stability in the region. In 1992, the defence minister of Malaysia, Najib Tun Rajak, argued:

Certainly, today, the term security is seen in a very broad manner, which encompasses, both military and non-military elements. Comprehensive security covers political, economic and defence dimensions. Therefore, to us, to achieve security, it has to be comprehensive, i.e. it has to be politically stable, economically strong and resilient, its population, united and strong-willed, and last, but not the least, it has to be militarily sufficient...Therefore, in terms of the region, its members must, first and foremost,

³⁷ Jusuf Wanandi, "Security Issues in the ASEAN Region," in Karl Jackson and M. Hadi Soesatro, eds., *ASEAN Security and Economic Development* (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of East Asian Studies, 1984), 305.

³⁸ cited in Alagappa, "Comprehensive Security: Interpretations in ASEAN Countries," 63.

³⁹ Alagappa, "Comprehensive Security: Interpretations in ASEAN Countries," 67-68.

achieve all these factors at home. Only then can this region be truly secured. In the mean time, the regional environment must be conducive for these to take place. It has to be a stable and trouble-free region.⁴⁰

Arms Control and Related Areas

As a region relatively distant from the main theatre of superpower interaction during the Cold War (although not without its fair share of superpower intervention), Southeast Asia has not developed a familiarity with the mainstream strategic concepts of that period, including the vocabulary of nuclear deterrence, arms control and disarmament. The same can be said of strategic concepts that gained prominence during the long process of East-West rapprochement, such as confidence-building measures, transparency, and verification. Moreover, these concepts are not useful for addressing the internal security threats (as well as comprehensive security issues) which have been the main concern of Southeast Asian states. As such, they have not been viewed by Southeast Asian security planners as an important or even relevant to management of intra-Southeast Asian relations. To this day, these concepts are seen as essentially "Western" constructs, relevant and useful in the European and the central strategic balance context, but not very useful in addressing problems of regional security. Nonetheless, with the decline of communist insurgencies throughout the region and the relatively greater attention being paid by Southeast Asian countries to conventional security threats have increased the relevance of these concepts.

Southeast Asia as a region is a relatively stable part of the post-Cold War world. An overriding concern with economic development and three decades of multilateralism have dampened inter-state rivalries. In stark contrast to South Asia and Northeast Asia, no country in Southeast Asia has been engaged in developing weapons of mass destruction. Although defence spending of the regional countries has registered sizable increases, these remain a small percentage of the national GDP. Increased affluence has led to greater acquisition of modern weapons, but the modernization of armed forces has taken an evolutionary course and is sensitive to budgetary constraints.

Southeast Asian elites are proud of their record in maintaining regional stability and often resent the attempt by Western countries and experts to "sell" arms control and non-proliferation measures as undue and unwarranted interference in their internal and intra-regional affairs. Nonetheless, they have become increasingly aware of the usefulness of such concepts. With ASEAN's growing involvement in Asia Pacific security issues, mainly through the promotion of the ARF, Southeast Asian policy-makers have had to develop a better understanding of multilateral approaches to arms control and non-proliferation and to assess their relevance to the wider region which includes their own.

Transparency

Some Southeast Asian governments and security specialists have dismissed the very idea of transparency as a "Western notion" which does not conform to the strategic culture of Asian states. But in general, Southeast Asians are averse to transparency not because of specific cultural sensitivities, but because of a reason familiar to policy-makers around the world: the fear that transparency (or for that matter constraining measures) has may undermine national military readiness and deterrence. Even the most flexible Southeast Asian governments will accept only those transparency measures that are voluntary and

⁴⁰ Text of Address to the Chief of Staff Conference, Darwin, Australia, April 1992

informal, instead of legally-binding and multilateral measures such as a regional arms register. For example, commenting on the need for transparency measures in the Asia Pacific region, Malaysia's Defence Minister made a distinction between voluntary "public announcements" made by a country to inform others of its arms acquisitions, and "opening up of installations for inspections." The latter, he proclaimed, "goes against the grain of military culture" and is unacceptable.⁴¹

There is very little transparency in the defence budgets and policies of Southeast Asian states. But the situation may be improving somewhat, thanks mainly to the confidence-building process initiated by the ARF. Recently, Thailand and Indonesia have begun to publish defence "white papers." But the true extent of defence spending remains unknown in several countries. The nature of domestic political systems has contributed to this lack of transparency, especially in countries where the military continues to play an influential role in national politics. In Thailand, for example, the armed forces have maintained a "secret fund" which remains outside of parliamentary scrutiny. Stringent "official secrets acts" prevent academics from doing research into national military expenditures. To a large extent, the lack of transparency is not just evident in the military sphere, but also in the realm of economic policy.

Confidence-Building Measures

Insofar as CBMs are concerned, the ASEAN states remain wary of constraining measures, preferring instead to enhance mutual trust through declaratory measures (such as the principles of non-use of force and non-interference enshrined in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation of 1976). There also exists a system of formal and informal contact and communication CBMs (although the term is rarely used by ASEAN policy-makers to describe these arrangements) which grew out of the ASEAN members' earlier efforts to deal with the problem of communist insurgency. There is a long-standing tradition of intelligence-sharing, both at bilateral and at multilateral levels, within ASEAN. Joint border committees established between ASEAN members facilitate close inter-personal relations among regional commanders and even their national headquarters, and this has often helped to avoid serious escalation of border incidents. Regular bilateral military exercises are commonplace among the ASEAN members, and are viewed by regional strategic planners as effective ways of enhancing mutual trust and cooperation. In fact these exercises are valued not so much for their potential to develop a joint response to any commonly-perceived external threat (as is the case with military exercises within Western alliances), but for their contribution to improved security relations between the participants themselves through familiarisation with each other's security concepts, doctrines, operating procedures and weapon systems. Many of the bilateral security relationships within ASEAN are geared not so much to conventional military threats as to such non-military security issues as smuggling, piracy, drug-trafficking and illegal migration. Compared to the high levels of contact and communications, there is no system of constraining measures within ASEAN, primarily because such measures are seen as too formal and a threat to national sovereignty.

It should be noted that while dismissing the relevance of arms control and confidence building in the Southeast Asian context, ASEAN policy-makers acknowledge the need for such measures in the wider regional context. In their view, the situation in the wider Asia Pacific region, including the Korean Peninsula and the relationship among major powers like China and the United States, calls for such measures. In 1989, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir proposed prior notification of joint naval exercises, joint measures to avoid incidents at sea and in the air, and transparency through information

⁴¹ Ismail Kassim, "Malaysia Beefs up Armed Forces for a New Role," *The Straits Times*, 24 July 1994, 7.

exchanges, including a "hot line" between the military establishments of the superpowers and regular dialogues between their military personnel. Although these proposals were clearly aimed at managing the superpower rivalry, they did help to introduce the notion of transparency and confidence-building measures in the intra-regional context. Similarly, in 1992, the then Malaysian Defence Minister Najib Razak suggested that ASEAN and its dialogue partners should encourage greater transparency in weapon acquisitions and create a regional arms register, so that "suspicions among each other could be minimised, and managed."⁴² Indonesia too has been an advocate of limited forms of transparency and confidence-building measures. In 1992, Foreign Minister Ali Alatas called on Asia-Pacific countries to adopt "confidence-building like reducing the frequency and size of their military exercises and inviting representatives from non-participating countries as observers." In addition, he proposed greater "transparency in military arrangements through regular exchange of information among the major powers on their military budgets, doctrines and future projections"⁴³

An important feature of regional security debates in ASEAN is the role of think tanks specialising in international relations and security studies in sponsoring what has been called "second track" dialogues and discussions on regional security issues. While one cannot say that this region invented the concept of second-track dialogues, it is true that it exhibits a particularly well-developed and regularised framework for such discussions, with a higher degree of informality and collegiality, on security issues than most other parts of the world, Europe included. The second track process has two main characteristics. First, the think-tanks involved are, in most cases, closely linked to their respective national governments, and rely on government funding for their academic and policy-relevant activities. Second, all these meetings allow, indeed encourage, participation by government officials alongside academics and other non-official actors, although officials usually participate in their private capacity. Although these officials seldom venture beyond the position of their respective governments, the principle of "private capacity" enables governments to test new ideas without making binding commitments and if necessary, backtrack on positions.

In recent years, there has been a substantial proliferation of second-track processes. ASEAN governments view their activities, particularly those of think-tanks affiliated with the ASEAN Institutes for Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS), as an important "confidence-building" process in itself. While the ASEAN-ISIS played a key role in pushing ASEAN in the direction of a formal process of security dialogue,⁴⁴ the Council on Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP), in which the ASEAN-ISIS plays a major role, has begun providing similar inputs into the ARF.⁴⁵

⁴² Andrew Mack, "Naval Arms Control and Confidence-Building for Northeast Asian Waters," Paper presented to Conference on "Arms Control and Confidence-Building in the Asia-Pacific Region," organized by the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, Ottawa 22-23 May 1992, 4; Najib also offered to host the first of a series of security dialogues involving Asia-Pacific nations involving representatives from military and civilian organisations. "Malaysia Push for Regional Defence," *The Age* 10 April 1992

⁴³ "Indonesia's Alatas on Need for Regional Security Talks," FBIS-EAS-92-210, 29 October 1992, 39.

⁴⁴ See, for example, ASEAN Institutes for Strategic and International Studies, *A Time for Initiative: Proposals for the Consideration of the Fourth ASEAN Summit*, 4 June 1991.

⁴⁵ On the role of CSCAP, see: Paul M. Evans, "The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region: Context and Prospects," paper presented to the conference on Economic and Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific: Agenda for the 1990s, Canberra, 28-0 July 1993; Desmond J. Ball, "A New Era in

Second-track channels have proven to be more pro-active, more open to new ideas and suggestions than strictly inter-governmental channels. They have served as a testing ground for ideas which are too sensitive to be placed on the inter-governmental agenda. More important, they have shown a remarkable ability to refine and tailor concepts and ideas to suit the local security environment. In this sense, apart from generating new ideas concerning CBMs suitable for the Asia Pacific region, second-track processes have served as "filtering mechanisms" for approaches to regional security cooperation developed in other parts of the world as well as in various global fora. On the other hand, second track processes of confidence building have suffered from the failure of participants to completely rise above national concerns and positions, as well as a poor level of domestic inclusiveness. They have tended to draw their membership from a select circle of elites and excluded individuals and groups who hold alternative views to those of the policy elite and the government, such as peace movements and civil rights groups whose views have relevance to debates on security in its broader sense.

Arms Control

Despite substantial increases in defence spending and arms acquisitions in Southeast Asia in recent years, regional governments strongly deny the existence of an "arms race" in the region. Instead, they prefer to use the term "force modernization" to describe their military build-ups. According to this view, the military build-up in Southeast Asia does not pose a threat to regional stability. Some regional commentators have even gone to the extent of saying that the military build-up in the region is not "competitive" but "imitative" and "collaborative" meaning that it contains an element of standardisation which will enhance the ability of regional governments to respond collectively to external threats.⁴⁶ In this context, it is hardly surprising that the concept of arms control has little resonance within defence establishments of Southeast Asia. A former Malaysian Defence Minister described regional "arms control" issues as "non-issues."⁴⁷

In contrast to their reluctance to talk about regional arms control, the ASEAN states are much more receptive to global non-proliferation efforts, especially efforts to check the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. While wary of the West's "supply-side" non-proliferation measures, the ASEAN countries have expressed strong support for such multilateral instruments such as the NPT and the CTBT. On the latter issue, ASEAN countries did try, albeit unsuccessfully, to persuade India to change its opposition to the treaty during the 1996 ARF meeting in Jakarta where New Delhi was admitted as a member. Ajit Singh, Secretary General of the grouping, stated ASEAN's opposition to nuclear testing by any power, including India.⁴⁸ Apart from supporting global measures, the ASEAN states have actively pursued regional non-proliferation mechanisms. Perhaps the most noteworthy development in ASEAN's commitment to non-proliferation is the signing of the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ) in December 1995. ASEAN countries believe that the Treaty will add momentum to

Confidence-Building: The Second Track Process in the Asia-Pacific Region," *Security Dialogue*, 25:2 (June 1994), 157-165.

⁴⁶ Amitav Acharya, *An Arms Race in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia: Prospects for Control* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994)

⁴⁷ "Defence Minister Interviewed on Arms Control," FBIS-EAS-91-151, 6 August 1991, 40.

⁴⁸ "Southeast Asia opposes any Indian nuclear test," Reuters World Service Dispatch, 16 December 1995.

regional approaches to nuclear non-proliferation, having just preceded the establishment of a nuclear weapons free zone in Africa and the ratification of the protocol to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone by all five declared nuclear powers.⁴⁹At the same time, ASEAN members have expressed their strong support for the reduction and eventual elimination of all nuclear arms.

As noted earlier, the acceptance of transparency and confidence-building measures, is likely to increase as a result of the work undertaken by a host of ARF-related fora. In 1995, the ARF released a Concept Paper which proposed the following CSBMs: further exploration of a regional arms register, establishment of a regional security studies centre or coordination of existing security studies activities, development of maritime information data bases; developing cooperative approaches to sea lines of communications, beginning with information exchanges and training in areas such as search and rescue, piracy and drug control; developing a mechanism to mobilize relief assistance in the event of natural disasters; establishing zones of cooperation in areas such as the South China Sea; developing systems of prior notification of major military deployments that have region-wide application; and encouraging arms producers and suppliers to reveal the destination of their arms exports. At the Second ARF meeting held in Brunei in 1995, members adopted the following proposals from the ARF Concept Paper: having the ARF remain a forum for dialogue and discussion of regional security issues, continuing to discuss means of implementing confidence building.

Verification

The idea of formal verification mechanisms remains a sensitive issue in ASEAN. For them, the formal and legalistic verification measures are incompatible with the essentially political nature of arms control and confidence building. Yet, there are indications that this attitude does not entail an absolute opposition to verification and could be subject to change. A major breakthrough in this regard is the advent of the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone. This Treaty is significant not only because it is the first multilateral constraining measures adopted by all Southeast Asian countries (including those not currently members of ASEAN), but also because it contains elaborate and legalistic procedures for monitoring compliance and verification. The Treaty's verification regime relies on (1) the IAEA safeguards system, (2) mutual reporting and exchange of information among the parties to the Treaty, and (3) request for fact-finding missions by Treaty signatories. A Commission, consisting of the foreign ministers from each signatory state, will oversee implementation and ensure compliance. Although the Treaty contains no provision for challenge inspections, it allows loosely-defined fact-finding missions. Every member state has the right to ask for a fact-finding mission to be sent to another state to clarify and resolve doubts about compliance with the Treaty.

Peacekeeping

Moreover, as a result of their increasing economic prosperity and exposure to developments outside the region, ASEAN states have become involved in multilateral security negotiations and processes at the international level. Until recently, the ASEAN states were concerned primarily with security issues in the Southeast Asia region, including their internal stability. But in recent years, their attention has expanded to extra-regional and global issues. This includes greater involvement in UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. Several ASEAN countries, including Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore, have

⁴⁹ Chris Johnson, "Southeast Asia asks world to back nuclear pact," Reuters World Service Dispatch, 15 December 1995.

made major contributions to recent UN peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia and Somalia. All ASEAN states took part in the UN peacebuilding operation in Cambodia. Proposals for an ASEAN peacekeeping force have been mooted, although the idea of a collective force may go against ASEAN's traditional policy of staying away from multilateral military cooperation. A more likely outcome is the development of a regional peacekeeping training centre. Certainly, the ASEAN countries have shown none of the hesitation in adapting to the concepts of peacekeeping and peacebuilding as they have on occasion to ideas concerning transparency and confidence building. The answer to this puzzle may lie in the fact that there is a greater tolerance of security approaches advanced through global multilateral processes as opposed to those which have been developed mainly through the experience of European security cooperation.

Dispute Settlement:

ASEAN's general aversion to formalism extends to dispute settlement mechanisms. This is evident from the working of ASEAN's official multilateral dispute-settlement mechanism, contained in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. The Treaty (under Chapter IV, Articles 13 to 17) provides for an official dispute settlement mechanism, called a High Council, consisting of ministerial level representatives from each members state. This Council, as a continuing body, is supposed "to take cognizance of the existence of disputes and situations likely to disturb regional peace and harmony" and "in the event no solution is reached through direct negotiations," to "recommend to the parties in dispute appropriate means of settlement such as good offices, mediation, inquiry or conciliation." But to this date, ASEAN members have not convened a meeting of the High Council, despite the existence of numerous intra-mural disputes. In this respect, ASEAN's approach to conflict-resolution rests on an assumed capacity to manage disputes within its membership without resorting to formal, multilateral measures. Indeed, direct bilateral negotiations have been the preferred mode of conflict-management in the major cases of inter-state dispute, such as the Philippine-Malaysia, Indonesia-Malaysia and Thailand-Malaysia disputes, with the Sabah dispute providing a rare example of successful informal third-party mediation (by Indonesia in May 1969). It should be noted, however, that the recent decision by Malaysia and Indonesia to refer their territorial dispute to the International Court of Justice suggest a recognition that the ASEAN Way may not be an adequate instrument of conflict-resolution, even in the intra-ASEAN context.

Another significant development is the provision under the SEANWFZ Treaty for a formal dispute settlement mechanism. It provides that disputes regarding interpretation of the Treaty should be settled by peaceful means, including negotiation, mediation, enquiry and conciliation. But if no settlement can be reached within one month, then the dispute may be referred to the International Court of Justice. Despite the availability of this legal mechanism, ASEAN officials have stressed the importance of political dialogue as a means of dispute settlement. Legal procedures are to be used only as a last resort. It will be interesting to see whether ASEAN members will ever invoke this provision, or continue to rely on the informal "ASEAN Way" to settle their differences over sensitive security issues.

Conclusion

While ASEAN policy-makers claim to have developed a "culture" of managing disputes and advancing security cooperation, this claim can be overstated. Several elements of the ASEAN Way are hardly different from the ordinary qualities of pragmatism and flexibility that are found in national decision-making styles in other cultural settings. But what distinguishes the ASEAN Way from other multilateral security frameworks is the robust sense of regionalism that underpins it. It is this regionalism which

enables the ASEAN states to overcome their intra-mural disputes and develop a common approach in dealing with the external security challenges.

The ASEAN Way combines both "cultural" and "rationalistic" approaches to security. For example, one can safely assert that the concepts of "consultations" and "consensus," which have been important to avoidance of conflict and war among the ASEAN members, have a basis in traditional cultural sources in the region. But culture may not necessarily explain why the ASEAN states have been generally reluctant to embrace such elements of a security regime as transparency or confidence building. The foregoing analysis suggests that to some extent, the ASEAN countries may be unreceptive toward confidence-building or transparency measures not necessarily for "cultural" reasons, but because a lack of familiarity with these notions and a general suspicion of "imported" models of security management. Moreover, they see little need for such measures in the present security context. The shared belief that ASEAN's long tradition of conflict-avoidance and the desire of all ASEAN members to sustain their commitment to regionalism will act as a general check on the destabilising consequences of military modernisation has been presented by ASEAN governments and strategic thinkers as a relatively enduring security system, which lessens the necessity of formal mechanisms for arms control, confidence building, and so forth.

The clear implication here is that the ASEAN states' attitude toward such measures is not fixed or static, but is subject to continuous adjustment in response to national, regional and global developments. This is particularly true of security measures, which once viewed with considerable suspicion, are now increasingly accepted as useful tools for enhancing regional stability. Although ASEAN countries retain an aversion to "foreign" models of security cooperation, they are quite willing to learn from them and adapt them into their own security approach. With a greater exposure to global arms control negotiations and closer collaboration with Western countries within the framework of Asia Pacific multilateralism, ASEAN countries are likely to develop a greater understanding and acceptance of more "Western-style" measures.

IV. Culture Matters: Chinese Approaches to Arms Control and Disarmament

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Introduction

Recent years have seen a revival in the study of cultural dimensions in International Relations and security studies. Scholars have sought to examine how culture affects states' understanding of and approaches to a broad range of security issues. It has been suggested that cultural differences affect not just the specific policies states adopt but more importantly reflect a fundamental difference of world views through which states perceive, understand, and define security problems. There is growing consensus that states' national security policies cannot be explained by structural elements alone. In addition to structural opportunities and constraints, deep-rooted cultural and historical elements both inform state elites and affect the national security policies they adopt. Structural realism is not so much wrong as it is incomplete in accounting for states' strategic behaviour and choices of policies.¹ Clearly, a better understanding of how cultural dimensions inform and affect state policies has important policy relevance in a post-Cold War era in which multilateralism has increasingly been adopted as a useful approach to global and regional security issues.

This chapter proposes to examine how, and to what extent, China's rich cultural and historical traditions, legacies, and heritage both affect the way in which the country defines its national security interests, and underlie the non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament (NACD) policies it chooses to adopt. In other words, while one may suggest that China's positions on such specific issues as export controls, nuclear non-proliferation, comprehensive (nuclear weapons) test bans, transparency in arms transfers, and the role of verification in arms control and disarmament reflect and seek to advance its national security interests, the latter in itself can be understood as a function of China's historical, social, and cultural experiences and traditions. My purpose in this chapter is to explore, in a preliminary manner, the linkage between culture, national security interests, and NACD policies in the contemporary Chinese context.

The next three sections examine, respectively, China's strategic culture in historical perspective, its contemporary applications or practices, and some of its more general and observable characteristics. Chinese perceptions of threats and security have over the millenniums been influenced by two distinct yet not completely separable paradigms of strategic culture: the Confucian-Mencian approach to order and governance through morality, exemplars, and non-violent statecraft, and the *parabellum* or realpolitik view of the world that places a strong emphasis on the use of force to maintain peace and order. Both

¹ See Keith Krause's introductory chapter in this volume, "Cross-Cultural Dimensions of Multilateral Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Dialogues: An Overview." The study of strategic culture, of course, is not something new. The now "classic" treatises would include Ken Booth, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism* (London: Croom Helm, 1979); Carl G. Jacobsen, ed., *Strategic Power: USA/USSR* (London: Macmillan, 1990). Recent studies along this line but probably broader than strategic culture in their investigations include Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, eds., *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory* (Boulder, Colo. and London: Lynne Rienner, 1996).

have left indelible marks on contemporary thinking and practice in Chinese security in general and NACD policies in particular.

Against this background follow more detailed discussions of China's NACD principles and specific policies, and the extent to which these are influenced by cultural elements, in particular strategic cultural factors or traits. The balance of the chapter will seek to make the link between China's strategic cultural traditions and the various relevant traits either in tactics or negotiating styles on the one hand, and the post-Cold War Chinese thinking about security and its NACD policies on the other. The findings suggest that the way in which China's national security interests are conceptualized, defined, and constructed has been influenced by its unique cultural/historical experiences (sino-centrism and recent humiliation) thus making it less receptive to the Western advocacy for multilateralism and security through cooperation on arms control and disarmament.

Chinese Strategic Culture: History and Traditions

Strategic culture as a "system of symbols" reflects a state's views on war and peace, threat perceptions, assumptions about the nature of the enemy/conflicts, and about the efficacy of the use of violence/force in resolving interstate conflicts. It draws on accumulated historical, social, and cultural experiences and informs the ways in which "a state's/society's interests and values with respect to security, stability and peace are perceived, articulated and advanced by political actors and elites."² More narrowly, strategic culture can be regarded as a "set of attitudes and beliefs held within a military establishment concerning the political objective of war and the most effective strategy and operational method of achieving it."³

Chinese strategic culture can be traced back to such classics as *The Art of War* by Sun Tze, and the *Seven Military Classics*, which stipulate the relationship between political ends and military strategies, the efficacy of the use of force, and specific military tactics.⁴ Underlying these treatises of stratagems run deeper debates on how the sino-centric order could be promoted, protected, and perpetuated. Within the broader Chinese cultural tradition, these differing approaches have variably been paired into the *yi-yang*, or *ru-fa* dichotomy. These were informed by (and reinforced) China's unique history and experiences in both organizing domestic social and political order and its foreign relations, and in turn competed as the alternative guiding principles for the dynastic rulers. One is the Confucian-Mencian world view that essentially sees the world as harmonious, orderly and hierarchically structured. Conflicts are regarded as largely deviant phenomena rather than the nature of things and should/can be managed through means other than the use of brute force. The other theme is what has come to be called *parabellum* or realpolitik view of the world, which holds that conflicts are perennial and zero-sum, and which regards the use of force as the only effective means to ensure security, stability and peace.

² This is the working definition used in this volume. For an elaboration, see Krause, "Cross-Cultural Dimensions."

³ Yitzhak Klein, "A Theory of Strategic Culture," *Comparative Strategy* 10:2 (January-March 1991), 5.

⁴ The English texts can be found in Ralph Sawyer, trans., *Sun Tze: Art of War* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), and Sawyer, *The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993).

The Confucian-Mencian Perspective

The Confucian-Mencian perspective forms the core of what is called the *yin* approach to China's external relations, which views the world as harmonious rather than conflictual, and which assumes (and promotes) a world order with China the "Middle Kingdom" (*zhongguo*) as the centre.⁵ This sino-centric view was reinforced by the fact that from the Xia Dynasty (21st-16th century B.C.) until the mid-19th century, China virtually dominated and reigned over what is now East and Southeast Asia. China's external relations for the most part could be characterized as one of "a vague pattern of zoning that consisted of the royal domain, subordinate tributaries, and foreign countries."⁶ What followed was over two thousand years of hierarchically structured tribute systems of various kinds, with China as a benevolent hegemonic state in the (largely isolated) East and Southeast Asian international system. The dynasties managed their external relations largely through cultural supremacy (in particular Confucianism) and a range of diplomatic methods: marriages, border trade, envoys, trade concessions, and only occasionally the use of force.⁷

Imperial China's external relations fall neatly into what may be called the "Confucian ethical values on interstate affairs" or a Chinese world order that consists of three categories: "the respect of the superior status of the Chou royal house [i.e.: the royal domain], the observation of legitimacy of authorities at different levels and their mutual relationship thereof, and the distinction between the Chinese and foreigners."⁸ Two distinct features are readily observable. One is the practice of conducting external relations as an extension of managing domestic affairs. The characteristics of such an order were the emphasis on hierarchy and the absence of the recognition of egalitarianism in interstate relations.⁹ The other is that external relations were treated more as intercultural rather than international or interstate relations.¹⁰ This forms the core of the sino-centric interstate order. The maintenance of such an order relied more on moral persuasion and the appeal of cultural superiority than on the use of coercion and outright seizure and annexation of foreign territories.¹¹

Indeed, Chinese rulers regarded themselves as having the mandate of heaven and strongly believed (and admonished others to do so) that as long as they observed certain virtues and morality, their reign should be justified, unchallenged, and long-lasting. Within such contexts, external relations were to be conducted

⁵ Hongying Wang, "Chinese Culture and Multilateralism," unpublished manuscript, 3.

⁶ Cho-yun Hsu, "Applying Confucian Ethics to International Relations," *Ethics & International Affairs* 5 (1991), 15.

⁷ Zheng Yushuo and Shi Zhifu, *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo duiwai guanxi shigao* [History of the Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China], vol.1 (Hong Kong: Cosmos Books Ltd., 1994), chapter 1.

⁸ Hsu, "Applying Confucian Ethics," 20.

⁹ John K. Fairbank, "A Preliminary Framework," in Fairbank, ed., *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), 1-19.

¹⁰ Wang, "Chinese Culture and Multilateralism," 4-5; Akira Iriye, "Culture and Power: International Relations as Intercultural Relations," *Diplomatic History* 3:2 (Spring 1979), 115-128.

¹¹ Hsu, "Applying Confucian Ethics," 30.

in ways in which Chinese cultural superiority would conquer and assimilate the foreign. This self-perceived sino-centric cultural greatness prevented China from treating others as equals, at least in theory. "In the traditional Chinese conception, a country's cultural greatness determined its power in the world, so that a state with superior cultural achievements was entitled to esteem and influence among other states."¹² The Chinese concept of power therefore is closely associated with morality. This belief that morality creates power rather than vice versa stands in sharp contrast to that generally held in the West.¹³ Unilateralism and moralizing were not so much an act of arrogance as they reflected a natural order of things given the Middle Kingdom's opulence in wealth, culturally and materially. Benevolence would be extended; only thus would security for the centre be assured. As the foreign tributary states were assimilated and adopted the Confucian virtue of respecting order and hierarchy, they would no longer pose any challenges to the centre.

In the Confucian-Mencian view, therefore, harmony and order could be maintained through virtuous and exemplar behaviour on the part of ruler. There is a strong aversion to the sole emphasis on, and the immediate application of, purely military means.¹⁴ Since order can be achieved through benevolence, a virtuous exemplar, and happiness of the subjects, the use of force would be largely unnecessary and in any case should be ranked lower in statesmen's inventory of instruments. Indeed, there has been a general understanding that *wu* (warfare or the use of force) and *bing* (soldiers and weaponry) should be strictly subjected to the control of *wen* (civilian rule) and seldom lavishly expended. "The resort to warfare (*wu*) was an admission of bankruptcy in the pursuit of *wen*. Consequently it should be a last resort."¹⁵ When the use of force becomes inevitable, it is *famou* (attack strategy) rather than *fabing* (actual fighting), defensive rather than offensive, that should be preferred. "As the *Sun-tze* makes plain, violence is only one part of warfare and not even the preferred part. The aim of war is to subdue an opponent, in fine, to change his attitude and induce his compliance."¹⁶ Hence the idiom: *buzhan er qurenzhibing* (subduing the enemy without fighting).

The Parabellum Perspective

This predominantly non-realpolitik and non-violent characterization of Chinese strategic culture has been challenged by scholars arguing that such interpretations, deriving either from the classic texts or from thousands of years of dynastic chronicles, reveal only its epiphenomenal and ideational dimensions. It has been suggested that contrary to conventionally held views, there is a deep-rooted realpolitik hard-core in Chinese strategic culture that not only can be detected in these same texts but actually has prevailed in dynastic practices as well. This Chinese realism reflects the *yang* approach to external relations that

¹² Iriye, "Culture and Power," 119.

¹³ Chih-yu Shih, *China's Just World: The Morality of Chinese Foreign Policy* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 2, 30-32.

¹⁴ Chong-pin Lin, *China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1988), 23.

¹⁵ John K. Fairbank, "Introduction: Varieties of the Chinese Military Experience," in Frank A. Kierman, Jr. and John K. Fairbank, eds., *Chinese Ways in Warfare* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), 7.

¹⁶ Fairbank, "Introduction: Varieties of the Chinese Military Experience," 11.

emphasizes diversity over uniformity, conflicts over harmony, and economic/ military power over moral persuasion.¹⁷ This Johnston refers to as the *parabellum*

or hard realpolitik strategic culture that, in essence, argues that the best way of dealing with security threats is to eliminate them through the use of force. This preference is tempered by an explicit sensitivity to one's relative capacity to do this...this is consistent with what Vasquez calls an "opportunity model" of realpolitik behaviour, where "states need no special motivation to threaten or use force; rather they are always predisposed to do so, unless restrained by contextual variables."¹⁸

The *parabellum* perspective of Chinese strategic culture view the world as conflictual rather than harmonious. Conflicts are a constant phenomenon of human life and interstate conflicts are zero-sum in nature. Peaceful environments are but a temporal hiatus during which time potential adversaries are planning for future attacks. This sense of insecurity is captured in the Chinese idiom: *ju'an siwei; youbei wuhuan* (think about dangers while residing in peace; sound preparation enables one to withstand calamity). The use of force is not a choice but rather an imperative for the advancement of state interests and indeed, sometimes state survival. The best way to ensuring security is through the elimination of the sources of insecurity which, in most cases, are potential as well as actual adversaries. Since the use of force is inevitable, its offensive use rather than defensive application becomes paramount. Order is to be achieved not by virtue and moral persuasion but through legalistic, stringent, and inflexible measures.¹⁹

For most Chinese dynasties, though, the historical record seems to show that ideational, non-violent strategies were favoured over realpolitik, violent ones. This Confucian-Mencian paradigm of placing virtue, benevolence and accommodation over coercion, violence and confrontation was underlined by a world view that placed the Middle Kingdom at the centre of the universe and was rendered possible by the possession of (and a superior capacity in generating) the materials for both welfare and warfare.²⁰ The *parabellum* paradigm, had it been adopted as the preferred strategic thought and operational code by Chinese rulers, would have seen Chinese empires more inclined to the use of force. This apparently was not the case. Indeed, even at the height of Chinese empires, as represented by the Han and Tang dynasties, no concerted efforts were expended to eradicate actual and potential adversaries (the nomads in the north and northwest); rather, efforts were made to subdue and pacify them through moral persuasion, sinicization, and occasionally accommodation, not through the use of sheer force, of which the empires had plenty. One might sense the confidence and pride in ancient Chinese dynasties that the peripheries, and the far-away "barbarians" need not be conquered; they themselves would readily succumb to, and eagerly emulate the virtues and exemplars of the Middle Kingdom, not to mention envy the latter's profuse wealth. The tribute system emphasized the symbolism of peripheral states paying homage to the centre. This contentment with status quo rather than ambition to forever expand (as

¹⁷ Wang, "Chinese Culture and Multilateralism," 3-4.

¹⁸ Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), x.

¹⁹ Wang, "Chinese Culture and Multilateralism," 5.

²⁰ Mark Mancall, *China at the Center: 300 Years of Foreign Policy* (New York: Free Press, 1984).

structural realists would expect²¹) may largely be accounted for by the persistence and pervasiveness of Chinese strategic culture.²²

Ironically, it is the decline of the Qing Dynasty and the onset of "a hundred years of humiliation" that provoked the crisis and failure of the Confucian-Mencian world order and revived the *parabellum* paradigm of Chinese strategic culture as the preferred set of strategies. Since 1840 when Western cannons opened China's door, arrogance and resistance to accepting things foreign quickly rendered the country from a Middle Kingdom to a semi-feudal and semi-colonial vassal state whose very survival was on the line. This shift of status and the consecutive struggles for its restoration have created a strong sentiment for and sensitivity to independence and sovereignty, and suspicions of power politics behind multilateral diplomacy. The sudden transition from an unchallenged hegemon to an almost defenceless peripheral appendage to major Western powers²³ in effect deprived China of undergoing an important phase of state-building in the Westphalian sense where interstate relations through diplomacy, balance of power, and, however imperfect, multilateralism, have been the normal practices.

The historical roots of China's foreign relations are thus multifaceted and display a multiplicity of traditions. As Michael Hunt observed,

They show a Chinese people who have known the best as well as the worst: virtual political hegemony and cultural supremacy over much of Asia as well as repeated subjugation and internecine strife. They hold up many models of statecraft, from the lofty imperial style to shrewd Machiavellian cunning. They teach the use of brute force, of trade and cultural exchange, of secret diplomacy and alliances, of compromise and even collaboration with conquerors.²⁴

These experiences would have important impacts on the development of modern China's perceptions of security. The question is, as raised again by Michael Hunt, which part of the past two thousand years is likely to be remembered? The answer: "the only past that was meaningful was the recent one, defined...in

²¹ See, for example, Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). For two recent treatises, see Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," *International Security* 17:4 (Spring 1993), 5-51; and Peter Liberman, "The Spoils of Conquest," *International Security* 18:2 (Fall 1993), 125-153.

²² One may suggest that China's decline in the 19th century can be attributed to the rigidity of a strategic culture that failed to adapt to changing circumstances. The Chinese order was only symbolically maintained and hence superficial; under such superficiality of omnipotence was concealed Chinese military weakness, in particular toward the 19th century. This would cost the Qing dynasty dearly. Fairbank, "A Preliminary Framework." See also Jonathan D. Spence, *The Search for Modern China* (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990); June Grasso, Jay Corrin, and Michael Kort, *Modernization and Revolution in China* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1991).

²³ See, for example, Zhang Yongjin, *China in the International System, 1918-20: The Middle Kingdom at the Periphery* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991).

²⁴ Michael H. Hunt, "Chinese Foreign Relations in Historical Perspective," in Harry Harding, ed., *China's Foreign Relations in the 1980s* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1984), 10.

terms of oppression and struggle over the last century and a half."²⁵ Indeed, it can be suggested that the Chinese since the early 20th century seem to have been transfixed by a mission to redress past humiliation and wrongs. And the sense of shame and humiliation has been used as a rallying call to nurture, mobilize, and promote Chinese nationalism and patriotism.²⁶ In short, China has sought to recover its political independence and territorial integrity, to secure its rightful place in the international system of nation-states (*liyu shijie menzu zhilin*), and to restore its past grandeur by building a rich country and strong army (*fuguo qiangbing*). As suggested by Rosita Dellios:

China's strategic philosophy, past and present, may be interpreted to address two essential needs. One is *inviolability* and the other is the attainment of China's *rightful place under heaven* - the closest approximation in Western understanding being "destiny" or "proper place." The first, inviolability, has a defensive orientation and the second, "rightful place," an expansive one. They are not opposed but interrelated.²⁷

Chinese Strategic Culture and Contemporary Practice in the People's Republic of China (PRC)

The crisis of the Qing Dynasty brought home the reality that cultural supremacy and moral persuasion alone were hardly sufficient in dealing with the materially stronger foreign powers. The constant threats to the nation's security and indeed its very survival, the zero-sum nature of interstate conflicts, and the necessary use of force in defending oneself have had significant influence on contemporary Chinese statesmen and strategists alike.

Maoist Strategic Thinking and Chinese Conflict Behaviour

Mao Zedong, the leader of Chinese revolution and founder of the People's Republic of China, took to heart the *parabellum* or the realpolitik paradigm of Chinese strategic culture. For Mao, the constancy of conflicts was the nature of human history and only through conflicts, in which the progressive or the righteous prevail over the decadent and the evil, can history move forward. The struggle against the enemy must be zero-sum, and the use of force is not just necessary, it is imperative.²⁸ Since the enemy can never be expected to *fangxia tudao, lidi chengfu* (lay down arms and become pacifist monks), the possession of force and a readiness in its execution are the only insurance for self-preservation. Mao insisted: "Whoever wants to seize state power and intends to preserve it must have a strong military... We

²⁵ Michael H. Hunt, *The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 26.

²⁶ Frank Dikotter, "Culture, 'Race' and Nation: The Formation of National Identity in Twentieth Century China," *Journal of International Affairs* 49:2 (Winter 1996), 590-605.

²⁷ Rosita Dellios, *Chinese Strategic Culture: Part 1 - The Heritage from the Past*. Research Paper No.1 (The Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies, Bond University, April 1994), 6.

²⁸ Alastair Iain Johnston, "Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China," in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norm and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 216-268.

are for the abolition of war, we do not want war. But only through war can we abolish war, and if we want to get rid of the gun we must take up the gun."²⁹

This threat perception underlined Mao's preoccupation with security, defined predominantly in terms of territorial integrity and political sovereignty. For this reason, China entered the Korean War in 1950 and provided significant assistance to the North Vietnamese during the 1960s in response to perceived U.S. threats, which were reinforced by an American military presence closer to Chinese borders.³⁰ In the late 1960s, the Soviet Union replaced the United States as the preeminent threat to China's security and Mao anticipated and called for preparation for "an early, major, and nuclear war" with its erstwhile ally. The perils to national security presented by these constant threats necessitated resorting to the age-old strategy of *yi yi zhi yi* (pitting barbarians against barbarians) and hence the "lean-to-one-side" policy in the early 1950s (against the U.S.) and a united-front quasi-alliance with the United States, Japan, and Western Europe in the 1970s and 1980s (against the Soviet Union). The expedient nature of Chinese cooperative behaviour, only reflected Mao's deeper philosophical views of the world; for him, attention always had to be paid to the constantly changing circumstances and hence the need to differentiate between principal and subsidiary contradictions.³¹

This probably explains that while at the perceptual level Mao's strategic thinking was clearly steeped in the *parabellum* paradigm, at the operational level, it demonstrated sufficient flexibility. There was no clear *a priori* order of ranked strategies and certainly no rigid preference of offensive over defensive strategies. The offense-defense dichotomy was treated more in a dialectic sense in that the two sets of strategies complement or reinforce rather than exclude and separate each other. Indeed, sometimes defense as a tactic is a necessary prelude to offense and a protracted struggle can be expected before the launch of a strategic offensive and final victory.³² It is a matter of timing as much as it is of choice. Here Mao was acutely sensitive to shifts in relative capabilities. Consequently, "[t]he more this balance [of relative capabilities] is favourable, the more advantageous it is to adopt offensive coercive strategies; the less favourable, the more advantageous it is to adopt defensive or accommodationist strategies to buy time until the balance shifts again."³³ And such shifts toward one's advantage seldom present themselves but

²⁹ Mao Zedong, "Zhanzheng he zhanlue wenti" [Problems of war and strategy][1938], in *Mao Zedong xuanji* (Beijing: People's Press, 1967), 512, quoted in Johnston, "Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China," 246-47.

³⁰ Shu Guang Zhang, *Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949-1958* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1992).

³¹ Harry Harding, "China's Co-operative Behaviour," in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh, eds., *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 375-400.

³² Scott A. Boorman, *The Protracted Game: A Wei-Ch'i Interpretation of Maoist Revolutionary Strategy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969).

³³ Johnston, "Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China," 219-220.

must be worked upon. One consequence was the effort at building the state's heavy industries and atomic weapons.³⁴

The dialectic approach to relative capabilities manifested itself in the concepts of "people's war" and a strategy of *jiji fangyu* (active defence), the latter blending both defensive and offensive elements of warfare. The exact application of one or the other depended on both the relative balance of capabilities and the circumstances. The essence of people's war was to redress an unfavourable balance of capabilities through the mobilization of both the standing army and masses and by luring the enemy deep into China's interior. Under such circumstances, familiarity with geography, sheer numbers of mobilized troops and masses, and high morale would compensate China for its inferior equipment and force structure, and predictably warfare would be fought on China's terms, namely its better chance for surviving attrition and endurance. It was through such tactics that the enemy was to be worn out and eventually eradicated. This may be the *yin-yang* orientation in modern application where passivity and yielding during the early stage of military encounters would prepare for later initiatives and offensive actions against a worn-out and weakened enemy.³⁵ Hence active defence must be seen as a continuum of defensive-offensive strategies closely following shifting military balances.

China's post-1949 conflict behaviours have been variously described as defensive, deterrent, and constrained.³⁶ Almost all crises and conflicts involved territorial issues and most if not all were initiated by other countries than China.³⁷ While Beijing in the 1950s and 1960s conveyed an image of a highly ideological revolutionary power believing in the inevitability of war and aggressively promoting the morality of struggle and violence and wars of national liberation, empirical studies have shown that the connection between domestic factional struggle and more hostile external behaviours is weak if not altogether non-existent.³⁸ Indeed, in most cases, China's use of force was mainly for defensive and/or deterrent purposes, including occasional offensive attacks and/or incursions beyond its borders.³⁹ The standard patterns during these crises have been warnings of serious consequences, escalation of rhetoric, mobilization and troop movements, surprise offensives with limited goals in space and time (only to voluntarily retreat to defensive positions), and efforts for negotiated settlements. Most conflicts took place

³⁴ John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, *China Builds the Bomb* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988); Lewis and Xue, *China's Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993).

³⁵ Dellios, *Chinese Strategic Culture: Part I*, 10.

³⁶ Steve Chan, "Chinese Conflict Calculus and Behaviour: Assessment from a Perspective of Conflict Management," *World Politics* 30:3 (April 1978), 391-410; Allen S. Whiting, *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975), and Allen S. Whiting, "The Use of Force in Foreign Policy by the People's Republic of China," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 402 (July 1972), 55-66.

³⁷ Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Michael Brecher, and Sheila Moser, *Crises in the Twentieth Century. vol.2: Handbook of Foreign Policy Crises* (New York, 1988), 160-164.

³⁸ Andres D. Onate, "The Conflict Interactions of the People's Republic of China, 1950-1970," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 18:4 (December 1974), 578-594.

³⁹ Whiting, "The Use of Force."

within the Chinese territories proper (at least what Beijing believes to be its "motherland"). Two features are readily identifiable in Chinese conflict behaviours. One is that China has been very sensitive to the issue of territorial integrity; the use of force to protect its territories remains a prominent policy option. The other is the measured manner in which force is applied. Contrary to the *parabellum* paradigm emphasizing the eradication of the adversary, contemporary Chinese military actions have more closely followed the traditional Confucian-Mencian paradigm of strategic culture that prefers the exemplar of morality and virtue and calls for ending the conflicts once the political goals have been met.⁴⁰ The adversaries are to be taught "lessons" rather than eliminated once and for all.

Chinese Realism: In Search of Post-Cold War Policy

With the end of the Cold War, China now faces a drastically changed strategic environment that presents new challenges for the management of security problems. To what extent Chinese strategic culture continues to guide the making of Chinese security policy has important policy implications. How does China perceive threats now that the Soviet Union has become history and the country enjoys the most secure international environment since 1949? What is the nature of the adversary or adversaries and indeed, who are the adversaries? How efficacious is the use of force in resolving conflicts and eliminating threats? The answers to these key questions provide important insights in understanding the orientation and objectives of Chinese security policy.

The realpolitik theme of Chinese strategic culture continues to inform Beijing's post-Cold War threat perceptions and guide its security policy. Notwithstanding the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the fact that China's security environment for the first time since 1949 has been marked by the absence of any serious threat, Chinese decision makers have not come around to viewing the world as conflict-free. While the Soviet threat is receding, new challenges to China's security interests are emerging and have to be dealt with. These include sovereignty issues in territorial waters as well as residual border disputes with countries like India and Russia; the Taiwan issue and China's ultimate objective of national unification; the rise of Japan as a political and military power; U.S. hegemonism and power politics; and ethnic/religious unrest in China's peripheral regions.

Two considerations affect the use of force in managing China's security problems. On the one hand, growing interdependence in inter-state relations both opens up more avenues for resolving disputes/conflicts and by extension, renders the use of force only one, and not even the preferred one among many options. Increasingly, policy makers have to consider any fallout from the use of force that may affect the likelihood of achieving other objectives. In other words, issues can no longer be demarcated and separated. On the other hand, Desert Storm clearly demonstrates the efficacy of the use of force (the lesson: diplomacy alone is hardly sufficient in resolving territorial disputes) and in particular the importance of initiatives which, in military parlance, mean the offensive use of force.

China's external relations, which for most of the dynastic past can be characterized as largely a tribute system where peripheral states and faraway countries paid homage to the Middle Kingdom, along with the unhappy experiences with the League of Nations in the 1930s and in the Soviet-led socialist camp in the 1950s, predispose Beijing to bilateral rather than multilateral ways of handling interstate relations. Indeed, one can describe the essence of Chinese attitudes toward multilateralism and regionalism as "thinking unilaterally, pursuing issues bilaterally, and posturing multilaterally." As Samuel Kim suggests,

⁴⁰ Edward S. Boylan, "The Chinese Cultural Style of Warfare," *Comparative Strategy* 3:4 (1982), 341-364.

Chinese policy "in most domains seems to be propelled by unilateralism in bilateral clothing with a little Asian multilateral regionalism."⁴¹

That underpins China's evolving positions on Asia-Pacific security, which can be characterized by what I call "conditional multilateralism." Its essence is to present China as a supporter of the emerging regional security dialogue while at the same time to avoid committing itself to a more institutionalized arrangement whose norms and rules may constrain Beijing's freedom of action. Conditional multilateralism allows China to be part of the process of building regional security, influence its agenda and have a voice in its pace and direction; selective involvement accrues experience in dealing with issues cooperatively while preconditions for its participation allow Beijing to retain the ability to manoeuvre. Such posturing has as much to do with Beijing's inherent suspicion about the effectiveness of multilateral approaches in handling regional security, as with its concern that multilateral forums may be used for "China bashing."⁴²

There are a number of distinct features of China's conditional multilateralism:

- **a multi-channel approach.** Regional security issues should be dealt with through a variety of channels, including bilateral, multilateral, and sometimes unilateral approaches at governmental and non-governmental levels. Indeed, China's approach to regional security issues can be seen as distinctly bilateral;
- **a minilateral approach.** Beijing continues to emphasize the importance of major powers in managing regional security issues;
- **a gradualist approach.** The regional security building process should begin with bilateral dialogues, moving to sub-regional, and then region-wide ones. Issues should be dealt with from an order of ascendance (i.e., from the relatively easy to the more difficult);
- **an Asia-Pacific approach of consensus building.** The region, because of its special characteristics -- history, culture, economic development, political systems, religion, etc., should not blindly copy the CSCE model; substance is more important than form. Dialogues and confidence-building measures should serve to enhance political trust, which is the basis of stable security relationships.⁴³

⁴¹ Samuel S. Kim, "China's Pacific Policy: Reconciling the Irreconcilable," *International Journal* 50:3 (Summer 1995), 469.

⁴² Jing-dong Yuan, *Conditional Multilateralism: Chinese Views on Order and Regional Security*. CANCAPS Paper 9 (Toronto: Canadian Consortium on Asia Pacific Security, March 1996).

⁴³ Guo Zhenyuan, "The Main Problems Affecting the Security in Asia-Pacific & The Principles Governing the Establishment of a Security Mechanism in the Region," *CCIS International Review* 1 (August 1994), 53-54; Zhu Chun, "A Probe into the Question of Security and New Order in the Asia-Pacific Region," *International Strategic Studies* (Beijing), 1 (March 1991), 15.

Traits of Chinese Strategic Culture: The Policymaking Structure/Process and Negotiating Styles

Traits of Chinese Strategic Culture

Over the millennia of evolution and development, and especially its more recent applications and adaptations in contemporary international relations, Chinese strategic culture has demonstrated as well as nurtured a number of distinct traits or features. These in turn (and under different circumstances) variously guide, influence, and shape the ways in which Chinese state managers, strategists, and negotiators approach security-related issues. The following introduces only the most common and recognizable among a rich reservoir of Chinese strategic cultural traditions.

Holistic Approach. The first can be called a holistic approach to national security conception, policy formulation, and practice, which places a strong emphasis on the overall political, economic and psychological aspects of interstate relations than on purely military considerations.⁴⁴ This is related to the dialectic whole-part relationship As Mao advocated, "An understanding of the whole facilitates the handling of the part -- and the part is subordinate to the whole."⁴⁵ To a certain extent, this reflects the essence of an ancient Chinese game: wei-qi, with its characteristics being a protracted game; a "war of jigsaw pattern"; one in which victory and defeat are relative phenomena, and one that favours the player who can grasp the "whole" rather than being preoccupied with the "parts."⁴⁶

Principles and Flexibility. Related to this is the dichotomy of principles and flexibility. "Principle means no undertaking should harm China's fundamental interests, while flexibility means adopting a flexible attitude to finding solutions."⁴⁷ That is, abiding by principles does not mean that there is no flexibility. But flexibility and any more "realistic" specific positions will be dressed up in a way that it is consistent with announced principles rather in contradiction with them. Sometimes this requires a balancing between different principles in order to come out preserving key interests without tarnishing its image. Examples include Chinese abstention on UN Security Council Resolution 678 on Iraq and on the establishment of a UN Arms Registry.⁴⁸ Flexibility, sometimes in the form of technical concessions (for example, particular wording in the negotiated text) or non-substantive concessions can be presented as gesture of Chinese good will and commitment to a successful conclusion of negotiation.

⁴⁴ Dellios, *Chinese Strategic Culture: Part 1*, 14; David L. Shambaugh, "China's National Security Research Bureaucracy," *The China Quarterly* 110 (June 1987), 277.

⁴⁵ Mao Zedong, *Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung* (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1969), p.79; cited in Lin, *China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy*, 24.

⁴⁶ Boorman, *The Protracted Game*, 22.

⁴⁷ Wu Yun, "China's Policies toward Arms Control and Disarmament: From Passive Responding to Active Leading," *The Pacific Review* 9:4 (1996), 590.

⁴⁸ Paul H. Kreisberg, "China's Negotiating Behaviour," in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh, eds., *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 462-463; personal interview with Chinese diplomat, Ottawa, March 1996.

Undefeatable versus Winning. A third feature is the emphasis on not viewing outcomes of conflictual situations as a win-or-lose dichotomy but rather a tripartite framework: victory, defeat, neither. The most important thing is not necessarily winning, but "occupying an undefeatable position" (*liyu bubai zhi di*). The rationale? As Chong-pin Lin suggests, "Winning depends on the enemy making mistakes, while undefeatability lies solely within one's own prudence and power."⁴⁹ This can easily translate into negotiation practices. "The Chinese do not practice an 'all-or-nothing' type of diplomacy but recognize the efficacy of a 'step-by-step' approach."⁵⁰

Qi-Zheng. And then there is the so-called *Qi-Zheng* conceptualization. The former refers to surprise, the unconventional and deception, while the latter to consistency and propriety. The two can be applied in an integrated fashion to achieve maximum effect.⁵¹ Deception in warfare is a major characteristic in Chinese strategic culture. Again, Chong-pin Lin observes:

What underlies the particular Chinese style of deception is the art of ambiguity (*guidao*): the marginal manipulation of the enemy's perception through a combination of massive secretiveness, concealment, and cryptic or redundant revelation. As perception, based on a core of reality, contains a margin of uncertainty, the latter is susceptible to manipulation. Containing yet transcending deception, the art of ambiguity in Chinese strategic tradition is the ultimate form of psychological warfare.⁵²

Western analysts have often complained that one difficulty in exploring the linkage between Chinese nuclear strategy and its arms control posture is the virtue absence or non-existence of the former. Indeed, "China has never clearly enunciated a well-defined nuclear strategy comparable to Western strategic doctrine."⁵³ However, this in fact may reflect a deep-rooted tradition of deception and manipulation of ambiguity in Chinese strategic culture. Taken in this light, China's declared nuclear principles (prominent among which is the no-first-use position) are left for interpretations by others; this increases indeterminance and ambiguity, which in turn serve the purpose of deterrence. Hence ambiguity, another feature of Chinese strategic culture.

Flux and Fluidity. Finally, there is the conception of flux and fluidity. The former involves the art of waiting "to frustrate the enemy's morale during its upsurge by disengagement and patient avoidance of confrontation until its decline, and only then to launch an offensive." The latter refers to the art of

⁴⁹ Lin, *China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy*, 20.

⁵⁰ Alfred D. Wilhelm, Jr., *The Chinese at the Negotiating Table: Style and Characteristics* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994), 213. For an argument along this line, see Liu Huaqiu, "Step-By-Step Confidence and Security Building for the Asian Region: A Chinese Perspective," in Ralph A. Cossa, ed., *Asia Pacific Confidence and Security Building Measures* (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995), 119-136.

⁵¹ Lin, *China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy*, 26.

⁵² Lin, *China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy*, 21.

⁵³ Lin, *China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy*, 1.

yielding, with two dimensions: "one is the strategic retreat, the other is leapfrogging or advancing around the strong resistance."⁵⁴

Chinese Policymaking Structure and Process

Policymaking structures and processes in China have deep-rooted historical and cultural traditions. It can best be described as a closed, secretive, and highly-concentrated system. Indeed, the Confucian-Mencian teaching of rule by virtuous and wise rulers basically discourage open debate on matters regarded as the domain of the rulers. The PRC continues the tradition. Notwithstanding economic reforms of the past two decades resulting in substantive decentralization of *economic* decision making power from the centre to the localities, national security policy decision making remains highly concentrated.⁵⁵ The base of authority comes from the power and influence of particular individuals rather than the positions they hold (Deng and other elders). Clear lines of authority and command exist (the late Premier Zhou Enlai said that "in foreign affairs, there is no small matter"), which means Chinese negotiators have less room for manoeuvre and which also means China prefers to hold negotiations at home so that negotiators can have ready access to instructions as well as background information. The intervention of particular leader(s) sometimes either speeds up negotiations and bring them to a conclusion or changes the course of negotiations. Implementation of agreements is best achieved through observation of the spirit rather than rigid compliance with the legal texts of the agreements/treaties in question.

Institutional arrangement regarding national security matters are such that only a handful of people are privy to the debates, deliberations, and formulation of policies. This reflects the cultural tradition of power bestowed to an idealized, benevolent and authoritarian leadership, with little open debate or broad channels of participation in the policymaking process.⁵⁶ This being the case, Chinese national security perspectives must be significantly influenced by the world-views held by key decision makers. This in turn affects their degree of receptivity toward multilateral security-building processes and measures in several ways. One is that the current leadership almost all underwent the formative years of their world-views in the 1950s and 1960s when China had just gone through the negative experiences of a multilateral (not in the strict sense of the word) security arrangement within the Soviet-led collective security alliance; hence the importance of political sovereignty and independence. Second, the current leadership faces the post-Deng power transition and great uncertainty in its outcome; consequently, conservative ideological views tend to dominate the political discourse. If the "leap-of-faith" phenomenon can explain dramatic changes in Soviet security policies under Gorbachev, such a development is unlikely in China today.⁵⁷ Historically, multilateral security measures either were alien to Chinese rulers (they were more accustomed to bilateral, tribute-system ways of dealing with foreign states) or failed to protect

⁵⁴ Wu, "China's Policies towards Arms Control and Disarmament," 28-31.

⁵⁵ Yang, "Mechanisms of Foreign Policy-Making and Implementation," 91.

⁵⁶ See Lucian W. Pye, "China: The Illusion of Omnipotence," in his *Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions of Authority* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), esp. 183-187; Fritz Gaenslen, "Culture and Decision Making in China, Japan, Russia, and the United States," *World Politics* 39:1 (October 1986), 78-103.

⁵⁷ Janice Gross Stein, "Political Learning by Doing: Gorbachev as Uncommitted Thinker and Motivated Learner," in Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds., *International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 223-258.

Chinese security interests (the League of Nations and the 1931 Japanese invasion). Nor is the current authoritarian structure conducive to or facilitating transparency and rule compliance.

Neither the Chinese cultural tradition nor the centralized institutional arrangement facilitate, let alone encourage, learning, and indeed it actually constrains the process of learning. Ever since the mid-19th century when imperial China in the wake of the humiliating defeat in the Opium War began to show a reluctant inclination toward learning Western things or concepts, there have been continuing debates over the relationship between *ti* (essence) and *yong* (usage). In effect, Chinese rulers have adopted the principle of *zhongxue weiti, xixue weiyong*, which literally means keeping fundamental Chinese values (Confucianism) while learning and utilizing Western technology and knowledge. Western technology and knowledge are borrowed to maintain regime rule, not to change and transform Chinese world views.⁵⁸ In addition, the age-old exam system which provided the state with the mandarins or bureaucrats also reinforces conformity to established official views rather than seeking independent thinking. This means that adaptation, rather than learning, will be the likely outcome of increasing contacts between Chinese and foreign (Western) arms control and disarmament (ACD) experts.

The institutional constraints are obvious. For East-West ACD experiences and the norms and practices developed to be "imported" to China, several conditions must present themselves. One is that there must be a (growing) ACD community whose members have frequent interactions with their counterparts abroad and become, in some sense, part of the international epistemic community of ACD and non-proliferation.⁵⁹ However, one must be aware of the general environment under which such a community can nurture itself and grow. One characteristic is that Chinese analysts of different generations strongly espoused the principles of state sovereignty, national interests, and political independence. This in large part reflects a consensus that the wrongs inflicted upon China during "a hundred years of humiliation" must be corrected and that the only route to this is the pursuit of power and wealth.⁶⁰ This sentiment in part represents a recognition that cultural superiority and morality alone cannot serve national interests; material wellbeing and physical power must also be present.

Second, members of this Chinese community must be able to pass on their views to the policymaking elites and in the process change the latter's conception of national interests. Unlike the Western in-and-out system which provides the opportunity for academia and intelligentsia to bring their outlooks to bear on the policymaking processes, the Chinese system is more closed and therefore less receptive to "new" ideas other than the official line. At a more technical level, China still lacks the necessary expertise and bureaucratic procedure and personnel required for both negotiation and treaty implementation and

⁵⁸ Pye, "China: The Illusion of Omnipotence."

⁵⁹ On the development of an epistemic community in nuclear arms control, see Emanuel Adler, "The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control," *International Organization* 46:1 (Winter 1992), 101-145. On the emergence of a Chinese epistemic community in international security studies in general and in arm control in particular, see Shambaugh, "China's National Security Research Bureaucracy," 283-284; Alastair Iain Johnston, "Learning versus Adaptation: Explaining Change in Chinese Arms Control Policy in the 1980s and 1990s," *The China Journal* 35 (January 1996), 27-61.

⁶⁰ Shambaugh, "China's National Security Research Bureaucracy," 287.

enforcement.⁶¹ While there has been increasing evidence that Chinese international relations specialists, presumably arms control experts amongst them, have been courted by the leadership for their views on a wide range of international issues,⁶² the extent of their influence on the conceptualization of national interests and in policy making remains to be seen. At the same time, one must also notice the increasing role of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in arms control related issues. In particular, the growing role of the PLA in decision making affecting China's commitments to arms control and disarmament negotiations will likely affect Chinese policies concerning issues such as transparency, CSBMs and verification.⁶³

Negotiating Styles

Related to the above traits of Chinese strategic culture, and conditioned by the decision making structure and processes are a number of negotiating styles, whose application depends on who China's counterparts are (great powers like the U.S., or small neighbours such as the Philippines), the settings (bilateral or multilateral), issues (security, trade, investment, etc.), and the circumstances (importance of negotiations to China and the broader international geopolitical context).⁶⁴

Moralizing. One characteristic of Chinese negotiating behaviour is its proclivity for high-sounding principles, moralizing, and rhetoric. It has been suggested Chinese political culture is manifest in an inclination toward moralizing and rhetoric. While this tendency belies the fact that Chinese foreign policy is increasingly based on practical considerations, this may also reflect more China's recognition of its own limitation rather than an unwillingness to carry through what it preaches.⁶⁵ In other words, limited means constrains the scope and achievability of ends that fit Chinese views of world order. Following the strategic cultural tradition, the act of moralizing serves to compensate for the lack of actual capabilities to achieve certain goals.

Commitment to Principles. Another important characteristic is a strong emphasis on principles and less on technicalities.⁶⁶ The announcement of and commitment to principles at the beginning of negotiations serve two purposes. One is for bargaining. The other is to allow counterparts to get into details (technicalities) first, and hence the commitment to "principles" serves to establish ground rules. Domestic

⁶¹ Wendy Frieman, "New Members of the Club: Chinese Participation in Arms Control Regimes 1980-1995," *The Nonproliferation Review* 3:3 (Spring-Summer 1996), 16; Zachary S. Davis, "China's Nonproliferation and Export Control Policies: Boom or Bust for the NPT Regime?" *Asian Survey* 35:6 (June 1995), 595-600.

⁶² Shambaugh, "China's National Security Research Bureaucracy," 282.

⁶³ Frieman, "New Members of the Club," 17.

⁶⁴ Kreisberg, "China's Negotiating Behaviour," 469; Wilhelm, Jr., *The Chinese at the Negotiating Table*, 203.

⁶⁵ George Yang, "Mechanisms of Foreign Policy-Making and Implementation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs," in Carol Lee Hamrin and Suisheng Zhao, eds., *Decision-Making in Deng's China: Perspectives from Insiders* (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 92.

⁶⁶ Shambaugh, "China's National Security Research Bureaucracy," 277-278.

politics can also have strong influence on both the substance and process of negotiation. Observes an old China hand: "as a general rule, it can be assumed that the more rigid and posturing a Chinese negotiator or the more 'irrational' a PRC negotiating position seems to be, the more factional political pressures are influencing the negotiating process."⁶⁷ Sometimes, principles would be repeated and empirical evidence shown or demonstrated to indicate seriousness of commitment. Chinese negotiators do not seek to trade-off short-term benefits for long-term disadvantages; this was amply demonstrated during the early Reagan administration, when Washington sought to lure Beijing into acquiescing in allowing arms sales to Taiwan by offering relaxation of export controls. Beijing refused.⁶⁸ Other tactics often resorted to by the Chinese include a united front strategy; playing bureaucratic politics (for instance, exploiting differences between the State Department and the National Security Council during the Nixon and Carter administrations); allowing face-saving measures for one's opponent; and making certain concessions at the eleventh hour.⁶⁹

Swaying Tactics. Yet another set of Chinese negotiating tactics is what Ogura Kazuo termed "swaying tactics." "These are not directly related to the substance of the negotiations nor are they intended to draw more concessions from the other side. Rather, they aim to undermine the position and prestige of the other negotiators and in some cases to influence and modify their outlook."⁷⁰ These can include: testifying friendship and loyalty; making use of the other's faults and errors; and making appeals to seek sympathy from "friendly elements" on the other side.⁷¹ Indeed, interpersonal relationships are an important element of Chinese culture to get things done.⁷² Additional tactics include:

- agenda-setting to exclude one's own weak points (since the Chinese have a strong view that the agenda can prejudice the substance and nature of a negotiation);
- presenting a hypothetical historical trend or course of history;
- concentrating the attack on the opponent's weak points by finding faults and errors and contradictions in the other's logic and arguments and exploiting them to the fullest extent;
- letting the other speak first;
- calling the other's concessions an indication of "progress" and seeking more concessions;

⁶⁷ Richard H. Solomon, "Friendship and Obligation in Chinese Negotiating Style," in Hans Binnendijk, ed., *National Negotiating Styles* (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, 1987), 3-4, quote on 3.

⁶⁸ A. Doak Barnett, *U.S. Arms Sales: The China-Taiwan Tangle* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1982).

⁶⁹ Jaw-ling Joanne Chang, "Negotiation of the 17 August 1982 U.S.-PRC Arms Communiqué: Beijing's Negotiating Tactics," *The China Quarterly* 125 (March 1991), 33-54.

⁷⁰ Ogura Kazuo, "How the 'Inscrutables' Negotiate with the 'Inscrutables': Chinese Negotiating Tactics vis-à-vis the Japanese," *The China Quarterly* 79 (September 1979), 530.

⁷¹ Kazuo, "How the 'Inscrutables' Negotiate with the 'Inscrutables'," 530-535.

⁷² Kreisberg, "China's Negotiating Behaviour," 458-459.

- insisting on setting up certain principles, which in turn define the rules of the game favourably to the Chinese.⁷³

The Evolution of Chinese Policies on Arms Control and Disarmament

Chinese positions on arms control and disarmament issues have changed over the years. During the 1960s and 1970s, Beijing was highly critical of U.S./Soviet arms control and disarmament activities, regarding them as nothing more than schemes of superpower collusion aimed at maintaining their nuclear monopoly. Consequently, Beijing categorically rejected superpower ACD proposals and refused to accept any constraint on its own weapons development programs. For instance, China argued that the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) was meant to freeze the monopoly of nuclear weapons by a few powers, while condemning others to nuclear threats. The treaty would still allow nuclear weapons states (NWS) to use nuclear weapons, conduct underground tests, and continue to produce, store and even transfer nuclear weapons and technology to their respective allies. In this regard, the PTBT was highly discriminatory and could not be accepted.⁷⁴ Beijing maintained that genuine ACD measures should include the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs), a complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, the withdrawal of all troops and nuclear weapons from foreign soils, a prohibition of nuclear exports and imports in any form, and a complete halt to all nuclear tests, including underground tests.⁷⁵ Throughout the 1970s, the Chinese continued to view superpower arms control negotiations (SALT, ABM) as mere window dressing behind which the two were actually engaged in fiercer arms competition in qualitative as well as quantitative terms.⁷⁶ Only after the signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) did Chinese views shift to guarded approval⁷⁷; within the inner circle, Chinese analysts have acknowledged that superpower ACD negotiations to some extent contributed to the reduction of East-West tensions and stabilized the European continent. However, Beijing remains suspicious about the desirability and feasibility of introducing CSBM and transparency concepts and mechanisms into multilateral negotiations where China has greater stakes.

Since the early 1980s, Chinese positions have shifted from outright rejection of ACD measures to partial and guarded endorsement of selected ACD activities that would constrain superpower arms races. Beijing began to participate in UN-based arms control fora, in particular the Conference on Disarmament (CD)

⁷³ Kazuo, "How the 'Inscrutables' Negotiate with the 'Inscrutables'," 535-545.

⁷⁴ Zhou Enlai, "Wumen Weishenmu Fandui Sanguo Bufen Jinzhi Heshiyan Tiaoyue [Why Do We Oppose the Partial Test Ban Treaty]," *Zhou Enlai Waijiao Wenxuan* [Selected Works of Zhou Enlai on Diplomacy] (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe (Beijing: Government Document Press, 1990), 335-39.

⁷⁵ Zhou Enlai, "Changyi Jianli Lading Meizhou Wuhewuqiqu [Proposing A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Latin America]," *Zhou Enlai Waijiao Wenxuan*, 330-34; "Why Do We Oppose the Partial Test Ban Treaty," 338.

⁷⁶ Wu, "China's Policies towards Arms Control and Disarmament," 579-581.

⁷⁷ See J Mohan Malik, "China and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Talks," *Arms Control* 10:3 (December 1989), 235-274.

in Geneva.⁷⁸ However, during most of the 1980s, China's ACD activities focused on issues important to its security interests such as chemical weapons, space weapons, and superpower nuclear disarmament while continuing put forth high-principled proposals at various international fora.⁷⁹ It is only since the end of the Cold War that Beijing began considering arms control and disarmament not just a game for scoring political points but an important policy area in which to balance a number of national security interests.

Beijing's Principles

China's ACD policies have been guided by a number of principles persistently stipulated over the years. First and foremost is the argument that since the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia possess the largest nuclear and conventional arsenals in the world, they bear a primary and unshirkable responsibility in disarmament. Second, all ACD measures are but steps toward the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all nuclear weapons. In other words, nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear test bans, fissile material production cut-offs, etc., are not the goals themselves, but are specific measures and steps toward the ultimate objective of eliminating all nuclear weapons. In addition, China insists that ACD will not succeed unless the root causes of global/regional conflicts are addressed. This involves economic, political, as well as military and ACD measures. Third, as the danger of nuclear war threatens the entire human race, every country has the equal right to participate in the discussion and settlement of the question of nuclear disarmament.⁸⁰

That the superpowers bear primary responsibility in reducing their arsenals has been the most consistent theme in Chinese positions on ACD. China maintained that as the two superpowers hold the largest nuclear and conventional arsenals, they should take the lead in halting the testing, production and deployment of all types of nuclear weapons, drastically reducing and destroying such weapons deployed at home and abroad. Indeed, Beijing laid out specific targets as preconditions for itself and other medium-sized NWS to participate in nuclear disarmament. In June 1982, China first spelled out a "50-percent reduction" as such a precondition.⁸¹ This position was later amended to an unspecified "substantial reduction" as the superpowers appeared to be approaching and even bypassing this target. Recent Chinese positions have implied that "substantial reduction" means the U.S. and Russia should reduce their nuclear

⁷⁸ Wu, "China's Policies towards Arms Control and Disarmament."

⁷⁹ Alastair I. Johnston, *China and Arms Control: Emerging Issues and Interests in the 1980s*. Aurora Papers 3 (Ottawa: The Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, 1986); Alastair I. Johnston, "China and Arms Control in the Asia-Pacific Region," in Frank C. Langdon and Douglas A. Ross, eds., *Superpower Maritime Strategy in the Pacific* (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), 176.

⁸⁰ Statement of Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian at the Conference on Disarmament, CD/PV.400, 2-7. See also, "Basic Positions of the Chinese Delegation on the Prevention of Nuclear War," Working Paper submitted to CD, CD/691; "Working Paper on Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Realization of Nuclear Disarmament," CD/767; Chinese Ambassador Qian Jiadong at CD, CD/PV 330, 31-34; Chinese Ambassador Li Luye at CD, CD/PV 215.

⁸¹ Liu Huaqiu, "Evaluation and Analysis of China's Nuclear Arms Control Policy," *Xiandai Junshi [Commilit]*, 226 (11 November 1995), *FBIS-CHI*, 22 December 1995, 7.

arsenals to a level comparable to that of the medium-size NWS, which would require a cut-down of 95 percent or more in their arsenals.⁸²

China has long insisted on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons as the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament and the only effective way to prevent nuclear war. Until such goals are attained, specific measures such as no-first-use (NFU) and negative security assurances (NSA) by all NWS, as well as negotiations on a CTBT and fissile materials production cut-off, will contribute to nuclear disarmament.⁸³ Moreover, China holds that effective ACD must go hand-in-hand with measures to deal with the source of arms races and weapons proliferation. For this purpose, efforts must be exerted to address the root causes of global and regional conflicts. China has been critical of the policies of certain powers which transfer large amounts of advanced conventional weaponry to regions of tensions while at the same time calling for arms control and non-proliferation. These are considered as highly contradictory and are seen as an exercise of hypocrisy and double standard in dealing with security issues. Middle Eastern arms control has been cited as such an example.⁸⁴

Equal participation in global ACD activities by all countries is another principle. Obviously, Beijing is sensitive about being seen as sharing the concerns of the "have-nots" while being one of the nuclear "club." This obliges Beijing to state as one of the principles the unalienable right of non-nuclear weapons states to discuss and settle nuclear issues.⁸⁵ Pushing for equal participation and decision-making serves Beijing's interests in at least two ways. It demonstrates China's solidarity with Third World countries and hence partially dilutes any negative connotation of being one of the nuclear powers. At the same time, the democratization of global arms control and disarmament processes reduces superpower domination in agenda setting. One Chinese analyst suggests that while China has a strong inclination toward bilateralism in dealing with security issues in general, in arms control and disarmament, China seems to favour multilateralism.⁸⁶ In practice, though, this has not been easy, since China must carefully balance between the need to protect its fundamental security interests and the need to maintain its image as a peace-loving, responsible power. China's last-minute drop of the demand for peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) in the CTBT may be an illustration. Although China had insisted on the inclusion of PNEs, continued hold-out with this position became increasingly untenable politically; Beijing's demand was seen as undermining the zero-yield principle of the treaty, which did not look good for China since this contradicted its declared commitment to nuclear disarmament.

Several observations can be made about these principles as they relate to the influence of Chinese strategic culture and negotiating tactics. First, Beijing's suspicion of arms control and disarmament initiatives, especially in the early phase, reflects the *parabellum* conception of threats, the nature of inter-state

⁸² J. Mohan Malik, "China's Unprincipled Stand on Nuclear Disarmament," *Pacific Research* (November 1994), 7.

⁸³ "Qian Qichen on Chinese Position on Nuclear Disarmament," *Renmin Ribao* [People's Daily], overseas edition, 20 April 1995, 6.

⁸⁴ See, for example, Dong Manyuan, "Haiwan zhanzheng houde zhongdong junkong wenti [Arms Control in the Middle East after the Gulf War]," *Guoji Wenti Yanjiu* [International Studies], 1 (January 1992), 29-34.

⁸⁵ Ambassador Hou, CD/PV.694, 8.

⁸⁶ Wu, "China's Policies towards Arms Control and Disarmament," 583.

conflicts, and national security. Clearly, the historical experience of humiliation (late Qing) informs the conceptualization of national security interests: one must be strong enough to be reckoned with. The superpower call for arms control and disarmament was taken as a scheme to subject China forever to an inferior position through the freezing of the development and improvement of China's own nuclear weapons. Second, Chinese policies are strongly influenced by the holistic approach to security and ACD negotiations. This whole-part dialectic explains why Beijing is more interested in the overall (positive) impacts of ACD agreements on its security than on the specifics and details. It has been observed that the Chinese can be worked with in tackling the technical issues such as the language and scope of particular texts.⁸⁷ However, this may belie that fact that this only occurs when the "whole" is not negatively affected. Indeed, one can also point to the occasional Chinese insistence on technical details to the point of holding up the entire negotiation process. Ready examples would include the issue of who should be responsible for removing the chemical agents in China left by Japan during the Second World War and, more generally, Chinese approaches to verification mechanisms.

A third cultural element may be the emphasis on securing the undefeatable position. China is hardly in a position to compete with the superpowers in the arms race; however, it must make sure that its ACD commitment or even participation will not compromise its maintaining an undefeatable position. This, in nuclear jargon, means to maintain the capacity for deterrence. China's strong reaction to the proposed Japan-U.S. theatre missile defence (TMD) system is a good example. Yet another feature is an aversion to formality and a high sensitivity about sovereignty. This is clearly reflected in China's insistence on a slow approach to institution-building in the Asia Pacific, and particularly concerning the scope and methods of verification in arms control and disarmament treaties. Interestingly, contrary to the conventional wisdom that China is more interested in principles than in technicalities, recent Chinese negotiating tactics have focused exactly on the technicalities to either advance its broad interests or at least prevent developments that could affect these interests negatively. Chinese positions on the use of national-technical means (NTMs) or on-site inspections (OSIs) in verification, for example, reflect this consideration. At the same time, a holistic approach (assessing the whole situation instead of its constituent parts) has also resulted in China's eleventh-hour concession dressed up as a voluntary act conducive to the achievement of common goals (for example, China's dropping of the PNE clause in the CTBT talks).

And finally, seeking the moral high ground and a united front with most non-aligned movement (NAM) countries (at least in rhetoric) both aims at promoting Chian's "just world"⁸⁸ and separates it from the "haves." Obviously, the proposal for the complete prohibition and destruction of all nuclear weapons would have the best of both worlds. Should the proposal be realized, that would enhance China's security as well as realize its notion of world order. Should it not be taken seriously (which is expected) then China wins a moral battle without committing itself to anything other than rhetoric. In both cases, an "undefeatable" position is sought.

⁸⁷ Interview with Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) official, Ottawa, June 1996.

⁸⁸ I borrow this phrase from Chih-yu Shih, *China's Just World: The Morality of Chinese Foreign Policy* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1993).

Principles and Flexibility: Chinese Policies on Display

While the Chinese have persistently enunciated their principles over the years, in handling specific ACD negotiations and dealing particular issues, they have managed to present policy positions in ways that both preserve (if not advance) core national security interests and appear in conformity with declared principled stance. "Elements derived from the *yin* approach tended to characterise the declaratory policies, while those from the *yang* approach guided the practical policy operations,"⁸⁹ A few examples follow.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). China acceded to the NPT in 1992 and has supported the three major objectives of the treaty -- the promotion of nuclear disarmament, the prevention of nuclear proliferation and the enhancement of international cooperation for peaceful uses of nuclear energy.⁹⁰ At the same time, it also demonstrates its shared concerns with NAM regarding a number of defects in the NPT, especially on Articles IV and VI. However, while appearing sympathetic with the positions of non-nuclear weapons states, and proposing specific measures to address their concerns, China's positions during the NPT extension conference seemed ambivalent except for a repetition of its well-known principles.⁹¹ Its nuclear testing two days after the indefinite extension of the treaty highlights the conflict between principles and actual behaviour, however the latter has always been described by the Chinese government as in conformity with the long-standing pursuit of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.⁹²

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). China's positions during the CTBT negotiations revolved around two issues: the inclusion of a clause on peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) in the CTBT, which it proposed in August 1994; and the question of verification. Regarding the former, China's view was that only nuclear explosions with an overt military purpose should be prohibited. Beijing argued that PNEs could have potential civilian benefits for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.⁹³ On verification, China opposed the use of national-technical means (NTMs) and proposed an international monitoring system (IMS) instead. It has been suggested that China's PNE proposal was nothing but a standard negotiating tactic. As Rebecca Johnson argued: "China's argument on PNEs was initially viewed as little more than a delaying tactic. Then it was judged to be a bargaining chip, for which Beijing might demand a high price elsewhere. However, as China continued to hold stubbornly to this demand, the fear [grew] that it could be 'treaty breaker' unless some face-saving compromise were found."⁹⁴ Indeed, this explanation was reinforced by Ambassador Sha's suggestion that "China is willing to make compromises on some

⁸⁹ Wang, "Chinese Culture and Multilateralism," 7.

⁹⁰ "China Supports Extension," *FBIS-CHI*, 19 April 1995, 1.

⁹¹ Du Gengqi, "NPT Treaty at Crossroads," *BR*, 24-30 April 1995, 19; Fan Guoxiang, "INF Negotiations and Nuclear Disarmament," *Disarmament* 11:1 (Winter 1987/1988), 23. See also, "Heated Exchanges on NPT Extension," *RMRB*, 27 April 1995, 6; Huang Qing, "A Step of Great Significance," *RMRB*, 18 May 1995, 6.

⁹² "Statement by the Government of China on the Question of Nuclear Testing," 5 October 1993. A/C 1/48/3.

⁹³ "CTBT article on 'Peaceful uses of nuclear energy and peaceful nuclear explosions'," Chinese working paper. CD/NTB/WP.167. 23 August 1994.

⁹⁴ "Endgame Issues in Geneva," *Arms Control Today* (April 1996), 13.

issues, but that cannot be done on a unilateral basis. No country can impose its will on China under any circumstances."⁹⁵ China eventually dropped its demand for the PNE exemption clause on the condition that the treaty would undergo review after ten years.⁹⁶ One of the reasons for this last-minute "softening" of position may be the political cost of holding out to the PNE demand and potentially wrecking the treaty, especially given the fact that China's position was not supported by the developing countries.⁹⁷

CTBT Verification: IMS, NTM, and OSI. Chinese positions on verification issues are that any verification clauses and arrangements should be strict, effective, fair and reasonable, and provide equal rights and obligations to all treaty members. Fair verification should accord each party equal access to verification-related information, resources, and technology. For this purpose, China reportedly has suggested (in the UN expert group study on verification) that countries with advanced national-technical means (NTMs) transfer them to those that do not possess such capabilities and equipment to ensure equal access. An international monitoring system (IMS) would presumably serve this purpose, since it would not only embody the principle of equality amongst all states parties, but also prevent inequality and discrimination resulting from disparities due to their different levels of technical capacities.⁹⁸ Out of concern over potential abuse, China is strongly opposed to the use of NTMs in CTBT verification and has made it clear that it "will not accept the integration of NTM into the CTBT verification regime and will not accept the triggering of an OSI by NTM data or 'any other information.'"⁹⁹ Finally, China has proposed a number of principles for on-site inspections (OSIs) ranging from the objective, the triggering procedure, and the limits of such inspections.¹⁰⁰ OSIs should be minimally intrusive and applied only as a last resort after all other means of verification have been exhausted.

Fissile Materials Production Cut-off. On 4 October 1994, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher signed the "Joint Declaration on the Cessation of Production of Fission Materials Used in Nuclear Weapons." The two countries pledged that

to promote common interests in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the PRC and the USA agree to make common efforts to push for an early conclusion of a multilateral and nondiscriminatory convention on banning the production of fission

⁹⁵ Statement by Ambassador Sha Zukang, mimeo, 3.

⁹⁶ Robert Karniol, "China to sign pact after one more nuclear test," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 19 June 1996, 25.

⁹⁷ Johnson, "Endgame Issues in Geneva," 15.

⁹⁸ Interviews with DFAIT officials. Ottawa, June 1996; Ambassador Sha, CD/PV. 717, 6; CD/NTB/WP.266, 1.

⁹⁹ Ambassador Sha, CD/PV.717, 7.

¹⁰⁰ "China's position on CTBT on-site inspection." Working Paper, CD/NTB/WP.266, 5 September 1995, 1; Ambassador Sha, CD/PV.717, 7.

materials used in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, a convention that can be effectively checked.¹⁰¹

Apart from this Sino-U.S. joint declaration, China has said little about its positions on the cut-off issue but has reiterated the importance of measures such as NFU in contributing to disarmament. China has been unwilling to commit itself to a moratorium on production although reportedly it has long stopped production of fissile materials. A number of factors will likely affect Chinese positions on the cut-off issue. These include the development of TMD/BMD; current size of Chinese stocks; current and future nuclear weapons programs; Japan's and India's nuclear developments; and domestic politics.¹⁰²

Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). China was most concerned with the issues of abandoned chemical weapons on its territories and verification. There are indications that should the issue be settled properly, that is, should Japan carry through its pledge to remove them, it may improve the chance of China's ratifying the CWC. On the whole, the Chinese approach to the convention has been serious. The military (represented by the Ministry of National Defence) clearly had a strong role in China's Preparatory Committee participation. Meanwhile, the timing of ratification by the U.S., Russia, India, Japan will also have an important impact on China's decision. With regard to verification, China favoured a limited scope of on-site inspections (OSIs), and emphasized the need to maximize predictability and avoid abuse. Hence, China insisted that effective, reasonable, and feasible monitoring and verification measures should be established to ensure the non-production of chemical weapons by the civil chemical industry while at the same time allowing legitimate production for civilian uses. It particularly warned against the tendency to broaden the scope of verification and place excessive emphasis on intrusive challenge inspections, with possible abuses of the verification process.¹⁰³

Conventional Arms Restraints. China appeared willing to join other major suppliers in discussing mechanisms to stem the flow of conventional weapons. It participated in the first three rounds of the P-5 talks on conventional arms transfers held in Paris, London, and Washington in 1991-92. While passive and reactive most of the time, Chinese officials at these talks were characterized as showing increasing reluctance as discussions became more specific. In particular, China opposed making the MTCR guidelines part of the P-5 regulations and favoured post-sale notification and information exchanges.¹⁰⁴ China holds that countries have legitimate rights for self-defence, and therefore that any measures designed to control arms sales must be fair, reasonable, comprehensive and balanced.¹⁰⁵ In other words,

¹⁰¹ "Accords on Nuclear Weapons," Xinhua Domestic Service, 4 October 1994, in *FBIS-CHI*, 5 October 1994, 8-9.

¹⁰² Liu, "Evaluation and Analysis," 10-11; R. Bates Gill, "Report on the Mission to the People's Republic of China," *Research Project: Nuclear Proliferation and World Order* (University of Leiden & Netherlands Atlantic commission, May 1995), 10; Lisbeth Gronlund, David Wright and Yong Liu, "China and a Fissile Material Production Cut-Off," *Survival* 37:4 (Winter 1995-96), 147-167.

¹⁰³ CD/PV. 406, 17-19; Ambassador Hou, CD/PV. 551, 4-5; CD/PV. 635, 29.

¹⁰⁴ Lee Feinstein, "Big Five Accomplish Little During Washington Talks," *Arms Control Today* (March 1992), 23.

¹⁰⁵ "Chinese Ambassador on Chinese Positions on Nuclear Disarmament and Other Issues," *RMRB*, 17 May 1995, 6.

arms restraining measures should not undermine countries' security interests. China is particular keen on seeing restraint measures apply to all types of weapons and cover all regions. China withdrew from the P-5 talks in protest of U.S. decision to sell 150 F-16 fighters to Taiwan in the fall of 1992.

China also continues to look at the issue of landmines from a security rather than humanitarian perspective, although the latter is increasingly becoming the dominant rationale for prohibition.¹⁰⁶ China's behaviour at the CCW, and in particular on the landmine issue, was characterized as non-cooperative to obstructionist. There is a strong (and probably inaccurate) impression that the Chinese position is influenced by its relations with the Khmer Rouge and other liberation movements, and highly ideological. The objection to banning landmines is that these are seen as legitimate weapons in the people's war and in rebellions against imperialists and the capitalist world. Keeping landmines out of the hands of non-state actors is the West's agenda, not China's. The essence here is that on matters of principle: China is not to let Western countries dictate the terms of negotiations. While China prefers not to be identified as a spoiler, it is prepared to stand alone to protect its vital interests. Indeed, China has so far refused to compromise on such issues as the use of identifiers to make mines detectable and a global ban on anti-personnel mines, which would force China to replace them with less cost-effective alternatives.¹⁰⁷

Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures. For the Chinese, the purpose of transparency is to enhance confidence and trust, not to obtain unavailable information. In other words, the aim of increasing transparency should be to enhance security rather than undermine it. There must be a differentiation between strong and weak states. Rather than carry out transparency across the board in the whole region, it might be more helpful if such measures could be first carried out within border areas between countries where traditionally there have been confrontations or too close military contacts.¹⁰⁸ There is also the consideration that through transparency China's weakness will be revealed, which would undermine its deterrence.¹⁰⁹ Meanwhile, China's approach to CBMs reveals a degree of caution. For Beijing, CBMs should not be confined to military sphere only. Instead, a more useful way of conducting CBMs is to begin with non-military issues. Once confidence and trust have been established in political, diplomatic, and economic spheres, it then can be voluntary for countries concerned to set up CBMs in military areas (exchange of military information, observing military exercises, transparency in defence doctrines and weapons acquisitions, etc.).¹¹⁰ The recently concluded Shanghai Agreement involving China, Russia, and the three Central Asian republics is a good example of this approach, since it was the improvement of political relationship that provided the environment for serious negotiations on military CBMs.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁶ I am indebted to Andrew Latham for calling my attention to this point.

¹⁰⁷ Interviews with DFAIT officials. June 1996.

¹⁰⁸ Luo Renshi, "On the Ways of and China's Efforts in Increasing Transparency in the Asia-Pacific Region," *International Strategic Studies* 4 (1995), 11-12.

¹⁰⁹ Susan L. Shirk, *Chinese Views on Asia-Pacific Regional Security Cooperation*, NBR Analysis 5:5 (December 1994), 11.

¹¹⁰ Si Chu, "Confidence-Building in Asia-Pacific," *Beijing Review* 34:9 (March 4-10, 1991), 15-16.

¹¹¹ This impression was gained from discussion with Chinese and Russian participants during the Canada/Korea arms control workshop held in Victoria, BC, 10-13 June 1996.

The Anatomy of Chinese Policies: The Cultural Dimensions

How are China's national/security interests constructed? What influence does culture have on the conceptualization of Chinese security policy? Before proceeding, it is necessary first to recount and explore a bit more what may be called "realism with Chinese characteristics." In general, this realism derives from China's unique cultural and historical roots and thus seems less likely to adapt to the changed and changing international security environment. In this sense, Chinese realism looks anachronistic and unlike the realism of the West, which allows a degree of complex learning and adaptation,¹¹² one outcome thus being the pursuit of security with rather than against potential adversaries. Chinese realism developed from a cultural hegemony that was sino-centric and continues to reflect a tension between the belief in (and the desire to return to and restore) its supremacy and the recognition of the limitation (and indeed weakness) of its material base. The need to balance the *ti* and *yong* and how best to combine the two in protecting national security interests generates a version of realism that is at once power-sensitive and moralistic. The fact that fundamental Chinese values will remain the core of *ti* means that complex learning will not likely take place for some time to come, and that adaptation, i.e., *yong*, may be the practice. Chinese discourses on human rights, as well as increasingly sophisticated perspectives on NACD issues, reflect not so much the signs that fundamental changes are in the wing as specific tactics adopted to address the issue of image. In sum, if the Chinese version of realism is any different, it is because of its different and unique cultural/historical underpinning. It is a realism with the Confucian-Mencian values as the *ti* and the *parabellum*, realpolitik as the *yong*.

Parabellum and Chinese Realism

Chinese policies on arms control and disarmament, and its positions on security, stability and peace in general are influenced by the cultural roots which inform and shape its political elites' perception of threat and their approaches to national security issues. A number of culture-relevant features can be identified. The first is a strong belief in self-help as the only reliable assurance for the nation's fundamental security interests. Despite the fact that China's security environment has drastically improved since the late 1980s, the *parabellum* or realpolitik theme continues to reinforce the imperative of self-help in an international system of anarchy, which in turn cautions against endorsing arms control and disarmament measures that would constrain China's ability to realize its various national security goals. Chinese approaches to arms control and disarmament reflect these fundamental considerations of threat, security, stability, and peace. In other words, international structural changes beneficial to Chinese security (the virtual absence of physical threat) have not brought about attendant adjustment or change in the thinking and making of security policy. If anything, China perceives threats in new and even more unpredictable forms.¹¹³

Since parabellum thinking remains a guiding principle for Chinese security policy in the post-Cold War era, its arms control policy of necessity must be based on self-help, balance-of-power, and free-riding

¹¹² I would contend that the two are separate concepts. The former may connote changes in fundamental values, beliefs, and conceptions may take as a result of the process while the latter refers more to tactics, or learning the "trick", not as a prelude to essential value changes, but as devising more effective tactics to protect core values. The different reform paths that the former Soviet Union under Gorbachev and China under Deng Xiaoping illustrate this important distinction.

¹¹³ David Shambaugh, "The Insecurity of Security: The PLA's Evolving Doctrine and Threat Perceptions Towards 2000," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies* 13:1 (Spring 1994), 3-25.

rather than security interdependence. This being the case, Chinese participation in various international ACD fora largely reflects a political concern that China not look isolated rather than a sincere belief that arms control and disarmament advances national security interests. At the same time, a multilateral forum on arms control and disarmament would normally focus on the superpowers' nuclear arsenal and may force the two to reduce their arsenals in ways that China in bilateral contexts would not get without some constraints on itself in return.¹¹⁴ Reservations about the utility of arms control and disarmament are also reflected in efforts to modernize China's nuclear arsenal, which in turn affects China's willingness to conclude arms control and disarmament treaties. In particular the PLA's change in nuclear doctrine from one relying on minimum deterrence to one of limited deterrence, will probably stand in the way of a CTBT and fissile material cut-off.¹¹⁵

The way in which Chinese decision makers define their national security interests remains strongly influenced by a deep-rooted cultural, historical, and social experience. This in turn guides the formulation of Chinese arms control and disarmament policies. Alastair Johnston once observed that "China's ACD behaviour appears to be influenced by two basic concerns -- the degree to which ACD threatens or benefits Chinese conceptions of military security, and the degree to which ACD affects China's international image."¹¹⁶ However, what needs to be further elaborated is that the conception of military security is a function of strategic culture, while concern over image reflects traits of such a culture (for example, symbolism or morality). To argue that security concerns remain the guiding principle for Chinese ACD policies begs additional questions since the current international environment should present less of a security threat to China and therefore provide for the prospect of advancing the broader NACD agenda. The reason this has not been the case is due in large measure to the recent humiliating experience. This may explain why the Chinese have continued to regard sufficient defence capabilities as the only reliable means to guarantee their security.¹¹⁷ This also means that Chinese ACD policies must be selective, conditional, evasive, and subordinate to security considerations.

Security concerns would explain why China has been wary about arms control processes in certain areas. Both a CTBT and fissile materials production cut-off could seriously affect China's current and future nuclear weapons modernization programs. As China has conducted the fewest nuclear tests among the NWS, it has a greater need for the kinds of data derived from testing with regard to the preparedness, survivability and penetrating capability of its limited nuclear force. A CTBT "will probably freeze the

¹¹⁴ Banning N. Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser, "Chinese Perspectives on Nuclear Arms Control," *International Security* 20:3 (Winter 1995/96), 43-78.

¹¹⁵ Alastair Iain Johnston, "China's New 'Old Thinking': The Concept of Limited Deterrence," *International Security* 20:3 (Winter 1995/96), 5-42; Alastair Iain Johnston, "Prospects for Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization: Limited Deterrence versus Multilateral Arms Control," *The China Quarterly* 146 (June 1996), 548-576.

¹¹⁶ Johnston, "China and Arms Control in the Asia-Pacific Region," 175.

¹¹⁷ Tai Ming Cheung, "Emerging Chinese Perspectives on Naval Arms Control and Confidence-building Measures," in Andrew Mack, ed., *A Peaceful Ocean? Maritime Security in the Pacific in the Post-Cold War Era* (Canberra: Allen & Unwin in association with the Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australia National University, 1993), 113.

gap of nuclear warhead design and testing between China and the other nuclear weapon states."¹¹⁸ Taken in this light, Beijing's efforts to try as much as possible to exclude its core security interests from ACD processes reflect its needs to be concerned with potential nuclear attacks on itself now that it is surrounded by declared, de facto, and potential nuclear weapons states. One need not look far and hard to realize the magnitude of the concern. China faces at least six neighbouring states that are either nuclear or can go nuclear at short notice: Russia, Kazakhstan, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Japan, and the U.S.

China has also been averse to regional ACD that may place undue constraints on its defence modernization programs. In the Asia-Pacific context, China likely will be the focus of any multilateral ACD process. Its image as a weaker, militarily inferior, and largely defensive country would not play well in a regional context; instead, China will be seen as a strong, superior, and sometimes aggressive power. Electing to be constrained by regional ACD measures may harm its military and security interests (it prefers to think globally in calculating the forces it needs to maintain a strategic balance); on the other hand, refusing to participate in the regional ACD processes will tarnish China's image as a major force for global/regional peace and stability.¹¹⁹

This explains why free-riding has been a key characteristic of Chinese ACD behaviour. Such behaviour is not determined by a cynicism of ACD in general, but rather reflects Beijing's belief that a level playing field must precede any meaningful disarmament negotiation. In this spirit, China has raised the price tag of its participation in nuclear disarmament negotiations from the 50-percent reduction of superpower arsenals to a "substantial reduction" in both quantitative and qualitative terms. Proportional reduction of arms is not what China has in mind. To the extent that superpower arms control benefits Chinese security (for example, the "double zero" in the INF treaty), Beijing will support it. Another characteristic is that China tends to support those ACD-related endeavours that place the least responsibility on itself. For example, it supports the idea of NWFZs in Latin America and the South Pacific, although it remains non-committal, if not openly opposed, to the SEANWFZ.¹²⁰

Image and Rhetoric

A second feature is China's proclivity for high-sounding rhetoric and moral preaching. China has persistently held to a number of highly unrealistic principles it has proposed over the years. This serves to boost its own image in the international community as a responsible power. Indeed, image consideration has been an important factor in Beijing's formulation and proclamation of arms control and disarmament policies. It explains why, for a long time, China refused to accede to the NPT while quickly signing on to regional NWFZs. The former demonstrates that China was not part of "them" (nuclear monopolists) but a representative of the "have nots," despite the fact that China has possessed nuclear weapons since 1964. The latter would reinforce the former as it shows that China did not exploit its

¹¹⁸ Dingli Shen, "China," in Eric Arnett, ed., *After the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty* (Oxford: Oxford University Press for SIPRI, 1995), 25-26.

¹¹⁹ Johnston, "China and Arms Control," 184-185.

¹²⁰ J. Mohan Malik, "China's Policy Toward Nuclear Arms Control in the Post-Cold War Era," *Contemporary Security Policy* 16:2 (August 1995), 1-43.

"have" position but rather acted as a more responsible power by indicating its support of the concerns of the "have nots."¹²¹

Image consideration also explains China's persistent advocacy of NFU and NSA, and how Beijing tries to use these to dispel concerns of Third World and NAM countries over such Chinese activities as continued nuclear testing. One Chinese analyst acknowledges that "it is reasonable for non-nuclear weapon states to believe that it is unfair that nuclear bombs be tested at all -- even for safety and reliability -- while other countries are asked to keep their status as nuclear 'have-nots.'"¹²² It has been suggested that apart from a commitment to NFU and NSA, an additional way of assuring the non-nuclear weapons states should be a move by China to make it clear that its tests are first and foremost for the purposes of safety and reliability.¹²³

Samuel Kim points out the gap between declared Chinese principles and actual policies. They result from a tendency to "declare policy beyond its capability and willingness to implement." This imbalance is addressed through excessive moralizing, "as if its repeated claims of having a 'principled stand' would somehow work toward the establishment of a closer theory/praxis concordance."¹²⁴ In other words, "The moral conviction to which leaders have presumably committed China can only be dramatized by issuing strong statements so that there will be no confusion about China's principled standing."¹²⁵ There is an inherent contradiction or conflict between normative and geostrategic concerns. The former can be regarded as image while the latter security considerations. This is clearly reflected in China's attitudes towards, and participation in, ACD activities. Normative considerations would have China announce all ACD activities short of complete and thorough disarmament as "sham disarmament" (*jia caijun*). It was only in the early 1980s that Beijing moved toward embracing partial disarmament measures. What followed has been the practice of maxi/mino principle, that is, "the maximization of security benefits and the minimization of normative costs." Observed Kim, "Chinese ACD behaviour is thus marked by selective activism on global ACD issues and selective aloofness on Asia-Pacific regional ACD issues."¹²⁶

While the gap remains between policy declarations and practical behaviour, this does not mean that the Chinese are resigned to their inability to translate their moral preaching into adopted norms on the international stage. Indeed, one can argue that via different channels, using different methods, the Chinese want their voice heard, in particular regarding those issues that affect China's security interests. NACD issues are high among them. At the same time, there is the recognition that non-participation creates a negative image, and that free-riding seems to be less effective in the post-Cold War environment, especially as the U.S. and Russia move forward with drastic nuclear weapons reductions. If a holistic

¹²¹ Johnston, "China and Arms Control," 176.

¹²² Dingli Shen, "Toward a Nuclear Weapons Free World," *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* (April 1994), 52.

¹²³ Shen, "Toward a Nuclear Weapons Free World," 53.

¹²⁴ Samuel S. Kim, "China's International Organizational Behaviour," in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh, eds., *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 402.

¹²⁵ Shih, *China's Just World*, 34.

¹²⁶ Kim, "China's International Organizational Behaviour," 418-421.

approach is the trademark of China's involvement in the NACD arena, then one would suspect that the degree of China's commitment depends to a large extent on the balance between the perceived and actual benefits of participation and the associated costs.¹²⁷

Image concerns, interestingly, can sometimes render Chinese opposition to certain ACD initiatives difficult, if these are supported by a large number of NAM countries. Recognizing that voting against or being an uncompromising hold-out can do serious damage to its preferred image of a responsible power, China occasionally drops its original positions; other times, China simply chooses not to participate in voting. China's unexplained absence in two important votes (the one setting up the UN Register of Conventional Arms and the other approving the UN expert group study on verification) may be largely driven by such considerations.¹²⁸

Conclusion

Cultural elements obviously influence China's approaches to ACD issues. Given the changing international environment since late 1989, one would expect that China should feel more secure than at any time since 1949. At the same time, growing economic interdependence and China's increasing participation in various international organizations at the global and regional levels would both raise the cost of using force and provide more avenues and options for handling inter-state conflicts. However, the realpolitik conceptualization of international relations as conflictual, zero-sum, and ultimately self-help seems to underline Beijing's overall views of security, peace, and stability. While in an increasingly interdependent world the use of force can be costly and may not always be efficient, this has not deterred China's pursuit of building a rich country with a strong army (*fuguo qiangbing*) and eventually restoring its past grandeur. Arms control, in particular with regard to such issue areas as the CTBT and fissile material cut-off, directly affects the means with which China seeks to defend its national security interests. Consequently, nuclear arms control and disarmament must be assessed in the broader context of both the structural constraints (anarchy, other nuclear weapons states, and an indeterminant number of threshold states, many of which are on China's periphery) and ideational and cultural aspects. If China's development of nuclear weapons were largely driven by structural considerations and national security interests (U.S. nuclear coercion, the untrustworthiness of the Sino-Soviet alliance, the need to pursue an independent security policy),¹²⁹ one has to ask whether these conditions have changed and if so, why China still considers nuclear weapons an important instrument for national defence, or (as Chinese Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen recently suggested) it is of the highest national interest that China possess and ensure its nuclear weapons are safe, reliable, effective, and non-negotiable until and unless the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all nuclear weapons is achieved.¹³⁰

¹²⁷ Frieman, "New Members of the Club," 26-29.

¹²⁸ Interviews with Chinese diplomat and DFAIT officials, Ottawa, March and June, 1996.

¹²⁹ See, for example, Avery Goldstein, "Understanding Nuclear Proliferation: Theoretical Explanation and China's Nuclear Experience," *Security Studies* (1993), 213-255.

¹³⁰ "Qian Qichen on CTBT and Nuclear Disarmament," *Renmin Ribao* (overseas edition), 26 September 1996, 4.

If *parabellum* or realpolitik thinking remains the core of Chinese conceptions of threat and security, then changes (if any) in China's positions on arms control and disarmament issues should be taken as tactical in nature, or adaptation rather than learning, with the latter representing a fundamental change in the conception of security, threat, and the most appropriate methods of achieving strategic ends. Active and constructive participation in international arms control and disarmament fora on the part of China may demonstrate a seasoning of diplomatic experience rather than changes in the internal conceptualization of "security."¹³¹

Indeed, as Johnston points out, to assess the learning versus adaptation dichotomy it is useful to observe these four indicators: the establishment within China of an arms control and disarmament community and the transnational linkages with the outside world (that is, the large epistemic communities); the transmission and exchange of ideas and information about arms control and disarmament via these linkages; a shift in the central paradigm; and finally, changes in specific arms control and disarmament policies.¹³² Space does not allow an elaborate content analysis, but a summary of China's ACD positions over the past three decades indicate that the fundamentals have largely remained intact while the tactics have been much more multifarious and sophisticated, thanks to China's exposure to international diplomatic experiences. If anything, one observable consistency remains what Johnston calls the *realpolitik* calculus and free-riding and what Samuel Kim refers to as the division between superpower responsibilities and others' rights in global arms control and disarmament endeavours.¹³³

As national interests are constructed more than they are objective, the institutional arrangements whereby ideas, information, and decision making processes interact are important inputs into how and why certain national security policies are formulated. Given China's particular cultural dimension of elite politics and elusive power sharing, one must recognize the ascendance of the military in Chinese decision-making leading up to the post-Deng power transition, and the PLA's continued emphasis on modernizing its nuclear force by improving weapons systems and debating nuclear fighting strategies. These factors likely will influence Chinese attitudes toward various arms control and disarmament issues (including CTBT ratification and implementation, negotiations on a fissile material production cut-off, and nuclear weapons development).

What are the implications for the prospects of advancing the broader NACD agenda? There remain serious obstacles. One is that Chinese realism is rigid and uncompromising. Past experience has left an indelible imprint on the Chinese mind-set: that is, only the strong will be heard. If structural realism denotes change as circumstances change and therefore allows for complex learning and adaptation (and even toward adopting cooperative behaviour) that obviously cannot explain China's steadfastly anachronistic attachment to security and sovereignty in the traditional sense. A second obstacle is related to the first and somehow contradictory. The recognition that it remains less than a global power in material terms (here I refer to military prowess) means that an exhorting morality and rhetoric must compensate as an important feature of declared Chinese NACD policy. However, if moral and cultural supremacy remains something the current Chinese leadership strongly believes in, then it would be

¹³¹ Johnston, "Learning versus Adaptation."

¹³² Johnston, "Learning versus Adaptation," 35.

¹³³ Johnston, *China and Arms Control*; Samuel S. Kim, "Whither post-Mao Chinese Global Policy?" *International Organization* 35:3 (Summer 1981), 442-446.

difficult to see China yielding or becoming flexible, as sticking to moral principles can be highly uncompromising. The fact that Chinese proposals are not given any serious attention reinforces the view that one must become strong to be heard. This is inimical to advancing NACD issues. For instance, if China's suggestion that conventional arms restraints should be balanced and comprehensive were adopted, even with modification, this could demonstrate the utility of give-and-take and move the Chinese toward more positive attitudes toward the processes and substance.

There are institutional constraints as well. A limited, small NACD community with limited access to central leadership, and the almost total absence of open debates and the exchange of ideas, make learning highly problematic. What has evolved, if anything, is adaptation more than learning, in which the Chinese appear to move in the direction of greater acceptance of Western NACD ideas without their conceptions of security, stability and peace actually undergoing fundamental change.

V. The Role of Culture and Identity in Indian Arms Control and Disarmament Policy

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Introduction

This study is about the way in which culturally-conditioned ideas and images shape India's contemporary international security policy. In the extant literature, Indian foreign and defence policy has been explained in one of three ways. First, it is assumed simply to reflect the state's pursuit of the "national interest" in an anarchic international system. Alternatively, it is often described as the outcome of bureaucratic "pulling and hauling" among key government figures or between the parochial organisations that comprise the state. Finally, it is sometimes explained as the product of self-interested political activity by either interest groups (liberal theories) or classes (Marxist theories) seeking to control or influence state institutions in order to advance their own factional interests. All three types of explanation -- realist, bureaucratic and liberal/Marxian -- assume rational, purposeful, and interest-driven behaviour. As a result, they all argue that international security policy choices can be understood in terms of the objective interests of, and the distribution of power among, the relevant actors. They differ primarily in terms of the actors they assume to be most relevant: the state as a unitary actor, bureaucratic units within the state, or interest-based social groupings within the nation as a whole. All three ignore the role of discursive, symbolic and ideational forces in the shaping of India's international security policy.

The goal of this chapter is to redress this weakness by outlining the various ways in which culture (understood in terms of enduring and widely-shared beliefs, traditions, attitudes and symbols) and identity (understood in terms of the self-representation of the nation and its "proper" role in regional and global politics) inform Indian approaches to non-proliferation, arms control, disarmament and security-building issues. A fundamental assumption adopted here is that political and military elites socialised in different cultural contexts may behave in different ways and make different choices, even when placed in similar situations. Members of different societies understand security and security-building issues in very different ways because their assumptions about the world and themselves vary greatly. Cultural values, in sometimes very subtle ways, exercise a powerful influence on these assumptions, shaping not only perceptions of interest and threat (what might be called substantive issues) but also beliefs regarding form and method (what might be called stylistic issues). As a consequence, in order to grasp fully a state's approach to international security it is necessary to examine the often hidden cultural premises upon which that policy rests. This chapter presents a preliminary assessment of the role of culture and identity in Indian international security policy, paying particular attention to the self-representations, symbols, myths, icons and archetypes that structure Indian approaches to international security. It begins by tracing the basic contours of the dominant security culture in India, and then proceeds to develop the following propositions:

- that Indian approaches to security-building are structured to a significant degree by enduring and widely-shared beliefs, traditions, attitudes and symbols that inform the ways in which diplomats and policy-makers perceive interests and values with respect to security, stability and peace;

- that these "cultural" factors affect both the style and substance of Indian security-building policy, broadly defined; and
- that, more specifically, these cultural factors exercise significant influence on Indian approaches to non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament issues.

None of this, of course, is to argue that "the pursuit of interests" is unimportant to understanding Indian foreign and security policy. Rather it is to suggest that rather than focusing exclusively on "needs, interests and objectives," attention should also be paid to "norms accounts and social definitions."¹ In other words, in addition to "explaining *why* particular decisions resulting in specific courses of action were made," we need to pay close attention to understanding "*how* the subjects, objects, and interpretive dispositions were socially constructed such that certain practices were made possible."² As Keith Krause has argued in a slightly different context:

"How" questions are in some senses prior to "why" questions: before particular courses of action can be selected (and thus explained), the range of possible or plausible options has to be constructed, and scholars have to understand the way in which certain options acquire meaning or value. In security studies, this involves precisely the concern with how the nature (and source) of threats is constructed, the "object" being secured, and the possibilities for reinforcing, ameliorating or even overcoming "security dilemmas."³

This, and not some naive "idealism," underpins this exploration of the role of culture and identity in the shaping India's international security policy.

Culture, Identity and Indian Approaches to Security-Building

The relationship between culture, identity and international security policy is far from obvious, and debate and terminological confusion are pervasive in both the theoretical and descriptive literatures. This chapter will not try to resolve all these academic debates. Instead, its more modest goal is to provide a coherent and sensible account of the role of "security culture" in the formulation and implementation of Indian policy in the realm of non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament. In this context, it is assumed that security culture (as a sub-set of political, diplomatic and strategic culture) consists of widely-held empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, self-understandings and values that inform the way in which a state's interests with respect to security, stability and peace are constructed and articulated. Security culture also defines a range of appropriate or acceptable behaviours; provides a corpus of widely shared but often tacit social conventions regarding approaches to security-building; generates a set of intersubjective constraints which limit consideration of alternative behaviours to less than the full range of possible options; establishes norms of diplomacy and statecraft; and defines problems and their solutions in ways that might seem irrational, counter-productive or simply cynical to observers from other

¹ Mark C. Suchman and Dana P. Eyre, "Military Procurement as Rational Myth: Notes on the Social Construction of Weapons Proliferation," *Sociological Forum*, 7:1 (1992), 148.

² Roxanne Doty, "Foreign Policy as a Social Construction: A Post-positivist Analysis of US Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines," *International Studies Quarterly*, 37:3 (September 1993), 298.

³ Keith Krause, *Critical Theory and Security Studies*, YCISS Occasional Paper #33, February 1996, 6.

societies. Understood in this way, it is clear that security culture can be expected to exercise a powerful influence on a state's non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament policies and practices.

Indian Security Culture: Substance and Style

Both the substantive and stylistic elements of Indian security culture are rooted in, and refracted through, India's concrete historical experiences and the self-perceptions of its dominant political class. With respect to the first of these, it is clear that Indian security culture has been structured to a large extent by the experiences of several armed conflicts with Pakistan and China, as well as a much longer history of foreign intervention, invasion and conquest. These experiences have placed an enduring imprint on the collective consciousness of the Indian political class -- an imprint which has moulded the basic contours of Indian strategic thinking and which is unlikely to be erased any time soon.

Perhaps even more importantly than the external strategic environment, however, India's dominant strategic culture has its roots in the aspirations, shared beliefs and self-representations of the Indian political class. Over the past several decades, this class has come to view India as a regional (and potentially global) power. To some extent, this view has always informed post-independence self-understandings of India -- a fact attested to by the numerous references to India's special role in the policy pronouncements of India's first prime minister Pandit Nehru and his Congress successors. More recently, however, as an increasingly militant sense of Hindu pride (*Hindutva*) has begun to develop among the Indian political class, the belief that India is a special nation with a glorious past and a vocation for future greatness has become more and more pervasive. An auxiliary proposition associated with this belief in Hindu greatness is that, historically, India's Hindu civilisation was defeated and subjugated only when India was divided and weak. These self-perceptions support a powerful consensus that India must be a military great power -- one that is dominant regionally and influential globally. Increasingly, this set of beliefs, refracted through the policy lenses of the Indian political and security establishment, defines the basic contours of Indian strategic thinking.

India's security culture, then, must be understood as a set of widely-shared ideas that have evolved out of a long historical experience and that are deeply rooted in the shared consciousness of the Indian political class. None of this, of course, should be taken to mean that the concrete strategic realities of the South Asian regional security complex are unimportant. Quite apart from the impact of India's *longue durée* historical experience and the lessons that have been derived from it (especially that internal division and weakness lead to invasion and conquest), Indian strategic culture continues to be shaped by the concrete military-strategic realities of the subcontinent. For most of the post-independence era, these realities were structured by the dynamics of the East-West conflict as well as more profound tensions arising out of an inherently unstable and contested post-colonial political settlement in South Asia. Given the nature of this latter set of tensions, it should not be surprising that the end of the Cold War has not ushered in a new era of peace and stability in the region. Indeed, as one might well expect, the "turbulence" resulting from the post-colonial political settlement remains one of the defining characteristics of the subcontinent. For the purposes of this chapter, the important point to all this is that the objective, external political environment which has sustained and nourished India's dominant security culture remains largely intact, and that as a result little pressure has been generated from this quarter to reconceptualise either the threat environment faced by India or the Indian state's repertory of policy responses.

Having said all this, it is important to recognise that India's security culture is not transhistorical, either in the sense that it can be traced back to some "authentic" precolonial tradition or that it is timeless,

immutable and unchanging. In the Indian context, security culture is a contested discourse, embattled, on the one hand by transnational cultural and political forces and, on the other hand, by indigenous critiques of the security policies of the Indian state. Both of these forces continuously challenge the dominant security-related representations and practices of the Indian state, opening up at least the possibility of "progressive" political change (i.e. wider adherence to agreed global non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament norms). Thus, while observers need to be cognisant of the powerful cultural forces shaping Indian approaches to security-building, it is important not to reify these forces. Cultures - even "security cultures" -- can, and do, change over time. This is not to argue, of course, that Indian security culture is infinitely malleable or open to direct international influence. Rather, it is to point out that as Indian "national" culture continues to evolve (as a result of globalisation and indigenous forces), it is likely that Indian security culture will also change. The global community should be prepared to support these changes when the opportunity arises.

At the current historical juncture, Indian security culture can be said to comprises four distinct elements. The first of these is a powerfully resonating set of beliefs about the nature of the interstate system. The second is cluster of enduring conventions regarding the nature of the threats faced by the Indian state; the third is a collection of deeply-held convictions regarding India's natural vocation in the international system; and the fourth is a set of beliefs regarding the proper conduct of Indian diplomats and practitioners of statecraft. All four of these clusters of beliefs are deeply rooted in Indian history, culture and politics. As a result, although they are by no means immutable, these beliefs are likely to be highly resistant to externally-directed efforts to affect change.

The Cultural Mainsprings of Indian Foreign and Security Policy: Religion and Myth

Before addressing these topics directly, it is perhaps useful to explore the role of myth -- and especially religious myth -- in the shaping of Indian foreign and security policy. The Indian state, like most contemporary states, invokes powerful myths and narratives which provide an historically-derived sense of identity for members of "the nation." The symbolic and ritualistic reiterations of these myths helps forge the national "imagined community" by appealing to some foundational event in the nation's pre-history which established its origins and (mythic) nature.⁴ But while these myths clearly play an important role in constituting the nation, they also provide a powerful guide to contemporary social and political conduct. As Mircea Eliade has argued:

Myth is thought to express the absolute truth because it narrates a sacred history; that is, a trans-human revelation which took place in the holy time of the beginning...Myth becomes exemplary and consequently *repeatable*, thus serving as a model and justification for all human actions...By *imitating* the exemplary acts of mythic deities and heroes, man detaches himself from profane time and magically re-enters the Great Time, the Sacred Time.⁵

⁴ As Timothy Brennan put it: "Nations... are imaginary constructs that depend for their existence on an apparatus of cultural fictions in which imaginative literature plays a decisive role." See Timothy Brennan, *The National Longing for Form*, in Homi K. Bhabha, ed., *Nation and Narration* (London: Routledge, 1990), 49.

⁵ Mircea Eliade, *Myths, Dreams and Mysteries* (London: Fontana, 1968).

When it comes to myth, then, history is never entirely in the past. Such potent narratives connect the past to the present, not only helping create a sense of shared (national) identity but also providing examples of proper, acceptable or ideal conduct.

Looking for clues to the sources of a state's foreign and security policy in the dominant religio-mythic framework may not be common practice in the contemporary social sciences. But in India, where the touchstone myths and legends of Hinduism are so pervasive and powerful, this context simply cannot be ignored. As Sudhir Kakar, author of the path-breaking study of the Hindu consciousness, has argued "the role of myths, especially those of religious derivation, in defining and integrating the traditional elements and common features of identity and society in Hindu India -- certainly in the past, and in most parts of the community today -- cannot be overestimated."⁶ Kakar goes on to argue that social and political conduct in India today is shaped to a significant degree by the "dense, defiant overgrowth of myths" contained in the religious epics and legends. He concludes that the messages and role models contained in these myths often run counter to the expectations of rationality dominant in the "modern" West.

Specifically, then, what role does myth and legend play in the foreign and security practices of the Indian state? The working premise of this study is that the cultural and political *imaginary* (set of mythical narratives) of a society plays an important role in shaping the external political practices of the state. One convenient way of developing this argument is to argue that myths provide an important wellspring of images, mythic deities and heroes that define (and embody) moral values and proper modes of conduct, while generating an interpretive "framing regimes" through which the social world is rendered intelligible. Viewed in this way, myths can be said to help shape the "common sense" and "collective self-imagination" of a society.

In the Indian case, this foundational *imaginary* is powerfully conditioned by Hindu religious myths, and especially by the epics known as the *Mahabharata* (the mythical saga of the confrontation between the virtuous Pandavas and the immoral Kauravas) and the *Ramayana* (the legend of the god-king who was wronged).⁷ But if these traditional narratives are an important aspect of Indian culture and identity, the modern Indian *imaginary* is also shaped by an additional, and more contemporary, mythical narrative: that of Gandhi and the struggle for Indian independence. This "myth," in which Gandhi figures as both prophet and heroic martyr, has, of course, a clear basis in historical fact. Gandhi *did* mobilise the people of the subcontinent in ways that ultimately forced the British to quit India. But in a sense this is beside the point. In the public imagination, Gandhi is more than simply a political leader; he is also a condensational symbol embodying certain qualities and characteristics that define virtue and proper conduct for Indians of all classes and castes. This is not to suggest, of course, that *all* Indians view Gandhi in such a positive light. Rather, it is to argue that the mythic or "imagined Gandhi" is still widely

⁶ See Sudhir Kakar, *The Inner World: A Psychoanalytic Study of Childhood and Society in India* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978).

⁷ Various described as the "grand epic" or "founding text" of Indian culture, the *Mahabharata* -- which is passed on in oral narratives through generations of Hindu families so that in some form "every Hindu child receives it, and knows its genealogy by heart" -- is about power, politics and the proper conduct of princes and statesmen. The *Ramayana*, on the other hand, is an allegorical narrative dealing with the origins of Hinduism, the ideal of the Hindu family, and traditional conceptions of masculine and feminine. To underscore the continuing resonance (and relevance) of these mythical narratives it is worth noting that the two most popular television programmes in India during the late 1980s and early 1990s were new serial productions of the *Mahabharata* and *Ramayana*.

perceived to be a powerful exemplar, and that the qualities he personifies are generally regarded as being worthy of emulation and imitation. It is worth noting in this context that Gandhi himself drew heavily on the religio-mythic framework of Hinduism, legitimating what was essentially a "modernist" political project in terms of India's imagined or mythical past.

Taken together, these mythic narratives provide a particularly rich lode of condensational symbols, icons, mythic deities, and heroes that are constantly mined in ways that both reflect and contribute to the public consciousness of Indian society. This, of course, is not to suggest that myths are simply social resources that are tapped by political entrepreneurs in order to advance their "real" interests. Nor is it to suggest that Indian security policy is directly reducible to such narratives. Rather, it is to argue that, to the degree that so-called "real" interests are in fact socially constructed, myths can play an important role in framing those interests. It is also to make the point that mythic deities and heroes often constitute powerful exemplars of proper conduct in the social (and hence international) realm.

Beliefs Regarding the Nature of Inter-State Politics: The "Kautilyan" and "Gandhian" Traditions

In a somewhat more direct way, contemporary Indian security culture can trace its roots back to two interwoven "mythical" traditions. First, there is the "Kautilyan tradition," expressed most completely in the classic politico-diplomatic treatise *Arthashastra* by Kautilya.⁸ This treatise -- which took four centuries to complete and thus can be viewed as a kind of sedimentary accumulation of political, diplomatic and military wisdom -- portrayed the politico-strategic system of the subcontinent in the following terms:

That which encircles [the King] on all sides and prevails in the territory immediately adjacent to his [domain] is the constituent of the circle of states known as the enemy. Similarly, that which prevails in the territory which is separated from the [King's] territory by [the enemy] is the constituent known as friend.⁹

Thus, the *Arthashastra* represented the "international" domain as being an inherently violent place where conflict and violent competition was the rule, and where peace and stability were the (rare) exception. In the pre-colonial period, this tradition engendered a deep-rooted sense of insecurity that inclined Indian rulers to attempt to eliminate those states that appeared as rivals and potential adversaries, while treating those smaller kingdoms and principalities that posed no threat to the dominant power as tributary or vassal states. In this system, the expectation was that minor kingdoms would subordinate themselves to the interests of their more powerful neighbours. As the *Arthashastra* advised, "in the absence of an [ally], one should ingratiate oneself with one's neighbouring enemy...A powerless king should act as a conquered king toward his enemy."

⁸ Kautilya was Chief Minister of an extensive South Asian empire ruled by Chandragupta Maurya during the fifth century BCE. For a discussion see S. Mahmud Ali, *The Fearful State: Power, People and Internal War in South Asia* (London: Zed Books, 1993), 13-15; N.P. Unni, *Kautilya Arthashastra* (Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1983); and Aradhana Parmar, *Techniques of Statecraft: A Study of Kautilya's Arthashastra* (Delhi: A. Ram, 1987).

⁹ Kautilya, *Arthashastra*, translation by R. Shamashastry (Mysore: 1923), vi, 2.

Thus the Kautilyan paradigm created a powerful cultural expectation that small states should subordinate themselves to the interests of larger powers. This world-view was powerfully reinforced by the British colonial experience, which understood security in terms of the defending the "natural" frontiers of the Indian subcontinent against the predations of both other great powers and number of frontier tribes and nations. Against this backdrop, efforts on the part of weaker powers to balance the stronger by forging external linkages (viewed as normal and legitimate in the European experience) came to be viewed as illegitimate in the South Asian context. Given this cultural predisposition, such balancing strategies often had the effect not of stabilising the system but of amplifying the ever-present anxieties and insecurities of the preponderant state.

Often counter-posed to this *parabellum* or hard *realpolitik* tradition, is the Gandhian tradition of non-violence and *satyagraha* or "truth-force."¹⁰ Elements of this tradition, which derive largely from the myth of Gandhian teachings, include a commitment to peaceful change, non-violent inter-state relations and pacific conflict resolution through negotiation. It is important to note, however, that, contrary to Western notions of passive resistance, *satyagraha* is a philosophy that assumes that those engaged in resistance do so from a position of moral and political power.¹¹ In the mythology of the Indian independence struggle, Gandhi is represented as a heroic figure pursuing idealistic goals, but always from a position of overwhelming strength (or at least from a very strong bargaining position). In other words, Gandhi is a "hero" in the Indian mythico-historical context not simply because of his commitment to "Truth" and his mastery of the techniques of moral suasion, but because of his ability to mobilise overwhelming social and political (and even implicit "military") resources and to use these in a "cunning" fashion to compel the British to quit India. Understood in this way, the Gandhian tradition can be said to reinforce rather than contradict the Kautilyan paradigm; for in both traditions, the successful pursuit of one's interests is seen not as a function of compromise and concession but of *preponderant power*.

Constructing Threats: Prevailing Representations of the International Security Order

Against this backdrop, the Indian political class has developed a number of enduring beliefs regarding the nature of the threats faced by India. It is important to note that these threats are not simply "read off" the material capabilities of potential adversaries (ie. they are not objectively specifiable), but are defined and articulated through a complex process involving historical, social, political, material and ideational dimensions. As contemporary scholarship has persuasively demonstrated, security is not an objective condition and threats are not simply objective or unmediated perceptions of danger. Rather, what gets put under the "sign of security" is preeminently a social (and hence a cultural) issue. Thus, threats must be understood as a particular set of historical discourses and practices that rest upon institutionalized shared understandings.

In the Indian case, this socially-constructed (and hence culturally-conditioned) "threat discourse" comprises a number of powerfully resonating and widely-shared beliefs regarding the sources of danger and menace in the global security environment. In the absence of "objective" knowledge about this environment, these threats are constructed through a series of discursive claims about the nature of the

¹⁰ For a discussion of *satyagraha* see S.R. Bakshi, *Gandhi and His Techniques of Satyagraha* (London: Oriental University Press, 1987); and Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse?* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 85-130.

¹¹ Chatterjee, *Nationalist thought and the Colonial World*, 103.

neighbouring states (especially China and Pakistan) and about the implacable hegemonic or neocolonial purposes of the West. The first element of the Indian threat discourse may be labelled the fear of great power intervention in the subcontinent. This has both distant and more recent historical roots. On the one hand, there are traditional "memories" of the Moghul, and to a lesser extent Greek, invasions of the subcontinent. On the other hand, there are the more immediate and concrete memories of the British conquest of India. Taken together, these historical narratives create an always acute sense of vulnerability to foreign intervention.

Although a widely resonating sense of vulnerability to foreign intervention may be traced to the experience of the British and earlier Moghul conquests, its more immediate roots can be found in the entry of Superpower navies into the Indian Ocean following Britain's withdrawal from east of Suez in 1968. Of particular significance in this respect was the deployment of the American aircraft carrier *Enterprise* to the Bay of Bengal as a demonstration of support for Pakistan during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War. Although the U.S. intended this deployment to be a show of strength that would intimidate India into moderating its strategic conduct, New Delhi learned from the experience a rather different lesson. To the Indians, the fact that a Western naval force could be deployed to the region with impunity, and that such a force could be used to apply pressure to the Indian government, strongly suggested that India needed to develop a stronger navy of its own. New Delhi, of course, was never under the illusion that even a much expanded Indian naval force could engage and defeat the U.S. navy. It was believed, however, that such a force could dramatically raise the threshold for naval deployment to the Indian Ocean and would therefore act as a deterrent to Western intervention in the region.

In a real sense, the reaction to the *Enterprise* incident stems from deeply-felt Indian concerns that the West, and particularly the United States, can and will use its military might to compel "second-class" regional powers to modify their domestic and foreign policies to suit American interests.¹² As far as the Indian government is concerned, the recent experience of the Gulf War has simply reinforced this concern. It is widely believed in among the Indian political class that the West was able to intervene against Iraq precisely because it was able to dominate at every rung on the escalation ladder. To put it another way, many Indians believe that Iraq was unable to deter the West from intervening in the Gulf because it lacked the conventional -- and unconventional -- military forces needed to inflict unacceptable casualties on the Coalition. The most important lesson learned, of course, is that nuclear weapons are the only really effective deterrent to Western intervention on the scale involved in the Second Gulf War. An important auxiliary lesson, however, (and one that continues to resonate powerfully among Indian defence and foreign policy elites) is that a strong conventional force is both necessary and sufficient to deter smaller scale interventions and demonstrations of force.

A second element of the Indian threat discourse, and one that is seldom as pressing in the developed Western world, derives from domestic communities involved in secessionist movements, religious conflicts and inter-communal strife. Reflecting a particular interpretation and representation of the history of the subcontinent, Indian political and military leaders place a very heavy emphasis on containing these movements; for, in their eyes, such movements undermine the secular, nationalist ideology which has bound together the Indian nation (or at least its elites) since 1947, and hence constitute a real threat to the long-term survival of the Indian nation. Maintaining the integrity of the nation, of course, is a concern of all states. In the Indian case, however, both distant and contemporary history serve to reinforce the

¹² See, for example, Ambassador A. Ghose, "Negotiating the CTBT: India's Security Concerns and Nuclear Disarmament," 4.

drive to prevent fragmentation. This, coupled with the rise of challenges to the unifying ideology of secularism, and the explosion of violence that at least in part derives from these challenges, has meant that internal security and peacekeeping have become an important element of the Indian security culture.

Third, partly reflecting the legacy of the British colonial tradition, the Indian government continues to assert what it considers to be a legitimate *droit de regard* with respect to countries falling within the "natural" frontiers of the subcontinent. Put simply, the Indian government is, and always has been, concerned that the intrinsically unstable post-independence settlement in South Asia poses a threat to Indian security. Indian policy-makers have always believed, as did their colonial predecessors, that trouble in neighbouring countries (particularly ethnic or sectarian conflict) could well spill over the frontier and affect India's domestic politics. Accordingly, the government in New Delhi has reserved for itself the right to intervene in the affairs of those countries -- by any means it considers necessary. On the basis of this doctrine of Pax India, in recent years New Delhi has intervened in the internal affairs of a number of its neighbours, sometimes through the use of economic sanctions (eg. the partial economic blockade of Nepal in 1989) and sometimes through the use of military force (as in Sri Lanka in the mid-1980s and the Maldives in 1988).

Fourth, within the Indian political class there is a widespread belief that India's unique position in the Indian Ocean means that it has a range of maritime interests that it must protect.¹³ Quite apart from concerns regarding Western encroachment and intervention, these beliefs are largely related to a desire to secure India's expanding maritime trade routes through the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal. These interests are likely to become even more important as India accelerates the exploitation of its 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone, its continental shelf and the adjoining deep sea-bed. Current Indian thinking, tempered somewhat by resource constraints, is that these interests can only be protected by a blue water navy capable of demonstrating sea power from the Horn of Africa to the Straits of Malacca.

Fifth, it is widely believed in India that Pakistan continues to pose a threat to Indian security. This powerfully resonating sense of threat is to some extent a function of Pakistan's resistance to India's vision of itself as the dominant actor in the region. Ever since independence and partition, India has pursued a policy of "manifest destiny" within the natural frontiers of the subcontinent, arrogating to itself the role of regional hegemon. Perhaps not surprisingly, Pakistan has rejected the second-class role which this policy has implied, and has taken great efforts to assert its status as an equal, sovereign neighbour. This basic structural conflict has been compounded and exacerbated by mutual animosity generated by conflicting nation-building ideologies (Indian secularism vs. Pakistani Islamicism), by unresolved border disputes, by trans-border communal and sectarian conflicts, by powerful Indian historical memories of

¹³ For a discussion see George Tanham, "Indian Strategic Culture," *Washington Quarterly*, 15:1 (Winter 1992), 136-139.

invasion from the northwest (the invasion route of the Greeks, Kushans, Huns and Mongols), and by widely-held Indian perceptions that Pakistan is supporting Kashmiri separatists.¹⁴

And finally, there is a widely-held (and still powerfully resonating) belief that China also poses a military threat to Indian security. China continues to lay claim to Indian territory, and to deploy the conventional military forces required to press this claim should the need and/or opportunity arise. Although tensions are relatively low at the moment, memories of the 1962 defeat at the hand of China continue to resonate in the collective consciousness of the Indian national security community.¹⁵ As a result, despite the recent rapprochement between Beijing and New Delhi, India continues to deploy a large number of troops on the Chinese frontier and is doctrinally committed to preparing for a limited land-based border war in response to any future Chinese aggression.

Imagining "India": Enduring Beliefs Regarding India's Identity and International Vocation

Given that states operate in a global political order in which intangibles such as prestige and stature can materially affect a state's ability to thrive in such a system, it is hardly surprising to find that many states acquire arms not for military-strategic reasons but to achieve the essentially political goal of enhancing their international status. This seems to be particularly true of those states hoping to maintain their great power status (France and Great Britain) as well as those aspiring to or attempting to assert their regional great power rank (Brazil, Nigeria). For powers such as these, the acquisition of arms and the development of indigenous arms production capabilities is not driven solely or even primarily by military-strategic considerations, but by the belief that they must have certain military capabilities (for example, aircraft carriers) if they are to be able to advance their claims to (regional) great power status. In other words, states sometimes acquire "symbolically-laden" weapons to advance their rational instrumental goals.¹⁶

¹⁴ Against this backdrop, Pakistan is habitually represented as a multi-faceted military threat. In the first place, there is a widespread and enduring belief in India that the Pakistani military is overtly supporting secessionist movements in India -- particularly in Kashmir (the predominantly Muslim Indian state claimed by Pakistan) and that this constitutes a threat to the Indian national project. Additionally, it believes that Pakistan might attempt to grab Kashmir in a short, sharp conventional military campaign. In Indian strategic thinking, the qualitative conventional superiority enjoyed by Pakistan more than offsets India's quantitative edge, particularly in a war of short duration, making a Pakistani invasion of Kashmir a very real and pressing threat. And third, India believes that Pakistan's latent nuclear capability, which could be used for compellence and/or deterrence poses a real threat to India. All three of these threats are amplified in the minds of India's policy elite by the fact that Pakistan has forged extensive security ties with other members of the Muslim world, including Saudi Arabia, as well as more limited ties with China.

¹⁵ In fact, they may be growing. In its 1996/97 national security report, India's defense ministry for the first time expressed explicit concerns over China's development of nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities. See "New Delhi Puts its China Cards on the Table," *Asia Times*, 29 April 1997, 3. On the other hand, the two countries have recently signed an agreement to cut troop levels along the disputed border.

¹⁶ For an interesting discussion of the symbolic content of various weapons see Scott D. Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb," *International Security*, 21:3 (Winter 1996/97), 54-86; and Marc C. Suchman and Dana P. Eyre, "Status, Norms and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach," in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 79-113.

In addition to this instrumentalist "pursuit of prestige" imperative, states also pursue international security policies as a consequence of national self-perception. One of the lessons of history is that some nations view themselves as great powers destined by virtue of their size, resources and "national genius" to play a major role in regional and/or global politics. This has certainly been the case in the United States, where self-representations of American greatness gave rise to the doctrine of Manifest Destiny and later inspired the U.S. to assume the leadership of the Western world. Similarly, perceptions of national greatness in Britain and France at least partly informed the acquisition of their respective global empires, and continued to support great power foreign policies in both countries even after the material bases of their claims to this status had been severely eroded. The instrumental imperative is different from what might be called the "identity imperative" in that, whereas in the case of the former prestige is simply another element of power (like military resources) to be deployed in the pursuit of the national interest, in the case of the latter it is a reflection or consequence of national character or self-perception.

It is, of course, difficult to disentangle these two sets of symbolic imperatives; for it is never quite clear where one ends and the other begins. What is clear, however, is that in the Indian case these two imperatives have helped forge a security culture that places considerable emphasis on enhancing India's international prestige generally, and on establishing India's centrality in regional and global affairs more particularly. Put simply, the Indian political class sees India as a past and future great power -- one destined to play a major role not only on the subcontinent, but ultimately in the Indian Ocean and on the world stage as well.

In the context of this study, there are three elements of India's perception of itself that are particularly salient.¹⁷ First, and perhaps most importantly, India sees itself as a secular, democratic state.

Broadly, India sees itself as the only democratic, federal, and secular polity in the region. The smaller states, in varying degrees and at various times, [are represented as having] questioned the appropriateness of democracy, federalism and secularism for their societies. India sees the other states as being ruled by authoritarian and illegitimate governments that remain in power by resorting to fundamentalist (Muslim, buddhist, or Hindu), praetorian, Bonapartist, monarchical or chauvinist appeals and modes of governance and to images of India as a powerful irredentist neighbour.¹⁸

Arguably the most important element of this self-representation is the belief that India is a *secular* nation. On this view, India's identity has three components: territorial, cultural and political. "The territorial notion is that India has a "sacred geography," enclosed between the Indus river, the Himalayas, and the Seas, and emphasised for twenty-five hundred years since the time of the *Mahabharata*."¹⁹ The cultural

¹⁷ For a more extensive discussion see Rajni Kothari, *Politics in India* (Boston: Little Brown, 1970), chapters 2, 7, 8; Ravidner Kumar "India's Secular Culture," in Ravinder Kumar, ed., *The Making of a Nation* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989); and Ainslie Embree, *Imagining India* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989).

¹⁸ Kanti B. Bajpai and Stephen P. Cohen, "Introduction," in Kanti B. Bajpai and Stephen P. Cohen, eds., *South Asia After the Cold War: International Perspectives* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 6.

¹⁹ Ashutosh Varshney, "Contested Meanings: India's National Identity, Hindu Nationalism and the Politics of Anxiety," *Daedalus*, 122:3 (Summer 1993), 232; see also Diana Eck, "The Mythic Construction of the Land of India," paper presented at the South Asia Seminar, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 16

notion is that "ideas of tolerance, pluralism and syncretism define Indian society."²⁰ The political notion is that India is a polity in which, generally speaking, "religion would be left untouched so that religious pluralism in society could exist."²¹ To the extent that the state was required to intervene in religious disputes it would do so with strict neutrality, maintaining a posture of "equidistance."

Perhaps the best articulation of this imagining of India can be found in Jawaharlal Nehru's nationalist text, *The Discovery of India*, which was itself both productive of and produced by mythical notions of India's past. According to Nehru:

Ancient India, like ancient China, was a world in itself, a culture and civilization which gave shape to all things. Foreign influences poured in and often influenced that culture and were absorbed. Disruptive tendencies gave rise immediately to an attempt to find a synthesis. Some kind of a dream of unity has occupied the mind of India since the dawn of civilization. That unity was not conceived as something imposed from outside, a standardization...of beliefs. It was something deeper and, within its fold, the widest tolerance of belief and custom was practised and every variety acknowledged and even encouraged.²²

To some extent, of course, this self-imagining is in tension with an evolving sense of Hindu nationalism.²³ It continues to resonate powerfully within the Indian political elite, however, and in fact can be seen to be at the heart of the apparently intractable clash between India and Pakistan over Kashmir.²⁴ To some extent, it can also be said to underpin (or at least reinforce) India's self-perception as being morally superior to its less democratic and secular neighbours.

Second, on the global stage, India sees itself as both an ancient civilisation and a contemporary great power deserving of "parity of esteem" with other ancient civilisations (such as the Chinese) and great powers (such as the People's Republic of China-PRC).²⁵ While there are difference within the political class regarding modalities, all Indians agree that "India is one of the great nations of the world but are frustrated that they cannot articulate the goal better and that their country is not accepted as a peer by

March 1990.

²⁰ Varshney, "Contested Meanings," 232.

²¹ Varshney, "Contested Meanings," 232.

²² Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989), 62.

²³ For a discussion of this see Varshney, "Contested Meanings," 227-235.

²⁴ The conflict over Kashmir is essentially one in which Pakistan's self-representation as being the "natural home" for the subcontinent's Muslims clashes with India's self-imagining as a polity where all "Indians" can live irrespective of their religious loyalties. Kashmir, an Indian state with a predominantly Muslim population, is crucial to the national projects of both India and Pakistan and hence the site of intense conflict.

²⁵ Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru put it this way: "India is going to be and is bound to be a country that counts in world affairs." See Jawaharlal Nehru, "India's Foreign Policy," in *Selected Speeches, September 1946-April 1961* (Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1983), 47.

other great powers."²⁶ As a result, Indian leaders have always resisted the equation of India with Pakistan, which, they argue, is barely one-fifth the size of India in terms of population and military capabilities, and only about one-eighth its size geographically. In Indian eyes, India is more properly compared to the People's Republic of China, a country with which it is essentially equal in terms of size, population and level of economic development. Given that there are no other powers in the region that can make such a claim, the Indian political class believes that India should be treated as the subcontinent's natural hegemon or predominant power. Reflecting the logic of the Kautilyan tradition, this class generally believes that India's neighbours in the region should accept India's predominance as the foundation of peace and security in South Asia. Among other things, this means that efforts to challenge India's natural role as regional hegemon (for example through the pursuit of power-parity or attempts to resist the evolution of the "natural" balance of power in the region) are widely viewed in India as implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) anti-Indian in nature. This is hardly surprising; for, in effect, such efforts challenge the very core of India's perception of itself as an actor on the global stage.

Third, India sees itself as a moral force in world politics, one committed to looking for and speaking the "truth," even in the face of powerful opposition. This commitment to "truthful method" is partly derived from the Gandhian tradition (Gandhi preached that "there are only two methods [in politics]; one is that of fraud and force, the other is that of non-violence and truth"²⁷) and partly from "a *Mahabharata* story where a special envoy indicated the importance of showing the world the correctness of his position while emphasizing the incorrectness of his opponent."²⁸

Finally, there is a widely-shared belief within the Indian political class that India is an independent nation and that this requires self-reliance and true non-alignment. For many Indians, "non-alignment is only the other side of the medal of independence." India's commitment to self-reliance and non-alignment, then, can be interpreted "as an extension of the nationalist movement on the international plane" and as "the safeguard of an independence obtained at great sacrifice as a struggle that lasted decades."²⁹ This is reinforced by "the lingering legacy of self-reliance and equity demanded by India's heroes," including both Gandhi and the various heroes and deities of the *Mahabharata*.³⁰

Representing India: Enduring Elements of Indian Diplomatic Style

There are two elements of Indian diplomatic style that bear consideration in the context of a discussion of Indian security culture. The first has to do with India's enduring preference for bilateral over

²⁶ Tanham, "Indian Strategic Culture," 129.

²⁷ Gandhi as quoted in Chatterjee, 108.

²⁸ Jocelyn Boryczka, *et al.*, "Cultural and Strategic Factors in South Asian Nuclear Arms Control," paper presented at the 37th Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, California, April 1996, 19; see also A. Appadorai, *Essays in Politics and International Relations* (Bombay: Asia Publishing, 1969), 117.

²⁹ Arthur Rubinoff, "The Multilateral Imperative in India's Foreign Policy," *The Round Table* (1991), 319, 320.

³⁰ Boryczka, *et al.*, "Cultural and Strategic Factors in South Asian Nuclear Arms Control," 21.

multilateral diplomacy; the second has to do with the persistent tendency of Indian diplomats and practitioners of statecraft to adopt a moralistic posture with respect to international security issues; and the third has to do with the influences of Hindu culture on Indian foreign policy practices.

The Preference for Bilateral Diplomacy

Since Independence, Indian security-building policy has reflected an enduring preference for bilateral as opposed to multilateral initiatives, at both the global and regional levels. Indeed, it is not overstating the case to argue that, even as other states in Europe and Asia have accepted the benefits of multilateralism, India "remains chained to the notion" that bilateral advantages outweigh any gains that might be derived from dealing with neighbours on a multilateral basis. Thus, not unlike the PRC, India's attitudes toward multilateralism can be characterised as "thinking unilaterally, pursuing issues bilaterally, and posturing multilaterally."³¹

This preference for bilateralism is rooted in widely-shared interpretations of three historical developments. First, India's aversion to global multilateralism can be traced to its early failure to achieve a leadership role in what eventually became the Non-Aligned Movement (which in turn was a function of the cultural predisposition of Indian diplomats to see India as the natural leader within that movement).³² Second, India's aversion to regional multilateralism can be traced to Indian self-perceptions that India is a global rather than simply a regional power. "Dominant Indian thinking about regional politics remains wedded to the notion that India, as a major power, gains more advantage from participating in developments outside its subsystem than cooperating in the regions."³³ Third, India's uneasiness about multilateral fora can be traced to an enduring and widespread belief that such fora are simply arenas within which India's regional rivals and global adversaries can criticise Indian policies and practices. This perception is clearly rooted in India's Kautilyan tradition of inter-state relations, which emphasises the adversarial nature of politics.

The Ideal Indian Diplomat

Under the powerful conditioning influences of the Gandhian and Hindu religious myths, since independence there has evolved within the Indian foreign ministry a widely-shared image of the "ideal" Indian diplomat. Such a diplomat is "one who looks for and says the truth, is not afraid of speaking up...exercises self-control, seeks solutions that will please all the parties involved, respects the other party, does not use or threaten violence or insults, and appeals to the other parties spiritual identity."³⁴ Of these, perhaps the most salient is the commitment to "principles." Although this often appears to non-Indian observers as moralising and rhetorical posturing, the ideal of adhering to principles, almost regardless of the consequences, is clearly rooted in the Gandhian myth. Gandhi himself articulated this principle in the following terms:

³¹ Jing-dong Yuan, "Culture Matters: Chinese Approaches to Arms Control and Disarmament," 80.

³² For an extended discussion of the "genealogy" of India's aversion to multilateralism see Rubinoff, "The Multilateral Imperative in India's Foreign Policy," 313-334

³³ Rubinoff, "The Multilateral Imperative in India's Foreign Policy," 313.

³⁴ Boryczka, *et al.*, "Cultural and Strategic Factors in South Asian Nuclear Arms Control," 18.

The ideal must be pursued, even if it was a quest that could never end, or end only in death. Those who were convinced of the truth of the ideal must pursue it, alone if necessary. The success of the struggle depended not just crucially but entirely on the selflessness, courage and moral will of the leaders of the people. Firm in its adherence to the principle of a truthful political practice, the Gandhian ideology asserted to the very end its faith in a moral theory of mediation. If the unswerving moral practice of a few did not appear to produce quick results in the broader arena of politics, that was no reason for giving up the quest. Echoing Tolstoy, Gandhi would say, "History provides us with a whole series of miracles of masses of people being converted to a particular view in the twinkling of an eye."³⁵

This may also reflect Indian notions of leadership which are derived in part from the Hindu understanding of Utopia (*Ramarajya*) as "a patriarchy in which the ruler, by his moral quality and habitual adherence to truth, always expresses the collective will."³⁶

The Effects of Hindu Cultural Norms on Foreign Policy Style

Hindu cultural norms also exercise an important influence on the style of substance of Indian diplomacy. This operates in two ways. First, the caste-dominated and highly stratified nature of Hindu society contributes to a shared understanding of global society as being rigidly hierarchical.

The Indians' view of society as a hierarchy serves...as a basis for their view of the world. They see a hierarchical layering of nations according to wealth and power and believe that India should be in the top rank of the world hierarchy -- [this is] a Brahmin idea of the world.³⁷

This culturally-derived world view in large part accounts for the widely-shared belief in India that New Delhi must resist efforts to treat India as a "second-class" country.

Second, the Hindu tendency toward moral relativism, coupled with a culturally-derived disinclination to take a clear and unambiguous stand on issues, can lead to what appear to Western observers to be inconsistent and even contradictory foreign policy initiatives. As Barbara Crossette has argued:

India often produces muddled responses to international issues, as intense national pride and a sense of manifest destiny collide with an unwillingness to make bold policy moves. Wild allegations and abstractions are hurled around and sanctimonious speeches made, but concrete proposals or rational analyses rarely follow.³⁸

³⁵ Chatterjee, 122.

³⁶ Chatterjee, 92.

³⁷ Tanham, "Indian Strategic Culture," 131.

³⁸ Barbara Crossette, *India: Facing the Twenty-First Century* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993),

Finally, Hindu concepts of *Karma* and fate make these inconsistencies and contradictions appear far less problematic than they do to modern Western observers.

The West sees life as a more or less logical process and has an inherently optimistic view that life is continuous, largely predictable, progressive, and manageable. Indians see life as infinitely more complex than merely a rational process. For them it also includes emotions, intuition, and fate. Predestination and fatalism are powerful elements of their beliefs, although Indians do believe that individuals can, up to a point, shape their own destinies. Significantly, they are not disturbed by this apparent contradiction or by many other contradictions that seem illogical to Westerners; to the Indians, they are a natural and acceptable part of life.³⁹

Specific Elements of Indian Security-Building Culture

Against this broad cultural and historical backdrop, India has developed a unique security culture -- comprising a specific set of widely shared beliefs, traditions, attitudes and symbols that inform approaches to security-building -- which is often at odds with the principles and norms underpinning Western approaches to non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament. In addition to the stylistic factors discussed above, the key elements of this culture are:

- a belief in "preponderance" rather than "balance";
- a commitment to "global disarmament" rather than "non-proliferation";
- a belief in equity and non-discrimination;
- an aversion to or scepticism of confidence- and security-building measures.

Preponderance as the Key to Regional Peace and Stability

The central element of Indian security culture is the widely-shared belief that, while other states may resist, India is destined to play the dominant role on the subcontinent and in the Indian Ocean region. Indeed, it is one of the core beliefs of the Indian political class that it is India's "manifest destiny" to be not only a regional hegemon but a global power as well. Several norms or standards of conduct derive from this powerfully-resonating axiom. First, there is a pervasive belief that India must be militarily preponderant in the region. There is no place in Indian security culture for classical (or, more accurately, Western) balance-of-power theory with its emphasis on "essential equivalence" and mutual deterrence. For Indian policy makers, the only acceptable military balance, particularly vis-a-vis Pakistan, is one in which "the weaker state dare not attack, while stronger state need not attack." On the Indian view, it has been Indian military preponderance which has maintained peace on the subcontinent since 1971. Moreover, the pervasive view in India is that it is military preponderance which gives India compellence power over many of its regional neighbours, and which forces other states to take India into account when framing their security policies.

Second, deriving from the belief in India's manifest destiny and related to the state's commitment to preponderance is an enduring commitment to a maximalist military posture. Although there are countervailing pressures, the ongoing secular expansion and qualitative improvement of the Indian

³⁹ Tanham, "Indian Strategic Culture," 131.

military suggests a long-term movement toward achieving a military posture befitting an Asian/global great power. As Raju Thomas has argued, such a posture would entail a three-full-and-three-half-war capability, and would necessitate the continued expansion and modernisation of India's conventional armed forces. Obviously, this has a number of implications for conventional proliferation; for it seems likely, especially once India moves beyond the current resource crunch, that the Indian government will continue to acquire and/or develop any and all weapons which it deems necessary to meet its security and prestige requirements. These are likely to include significant blue water naval capabilities, intermediate-range ballistic missiles, long-range strike aircraft, light combat aircraft, and electronics-based force-multipliers such as AWACS aircraft.

Third, the India-as-a-great-power principle gives rise to the norm of maintaining a decisive military edge over Pakistan. Thus, the basic drive to acquire the military wherewithal to support claims to great power status is exacerbated (though, it must be said, only exacerbated) by Pakistani efforts to achieve essential equivalence with India. Put simply, over the past decade or so Pakistan has made a concerted effort to achieve qualitative superiority over India to offset the latter's quantitative advantage. This has spurred India to improve its numerical advantage while improving the quality of the weapons in its arsenal. At the present juncture, India is unlikely to accept any codification of the existing balance; for it is one in which India does not hold the decisive edge. If the past is any indication, the Indian response to Pakistani efforts to achieve essential equivalence will be met with a disproportionate response intended to restore India's conventional superiority. Naturally, this will require continuing acquisitions of cutting-edge military technologies.

Finally, given the important symbolic connection between weapons and status, which is only partially captured in "rationalist" theories of state behaviour, widely shared beliefs regarding India's natural vocation have resulted in certain types of weapons being invested with enormous cultural capital. As Suchman and Eyre argue, weapons acquisitions are often "structured and driven by institutionalized normative structures that link advanced weaponry with modernization and sovereignty."⁴⁰ Understood in these symbolic terms, the development and/or acquisition of weapons such as aircraft carriers, ballistic missiles, high-performance combat aircraft, main battle tanks and nuclear warheads (all of which are understood as the trappings of great power status⁴¹) must be viewed, at least in part, as an artefact of India's perception of itself as a global power.

A Commitment to "Global Disarmament" Rather than "Regional Arms Control" or "Non-Proliferation"

India has long been an opponent of nuclear weapons and has consistently championed the goal of reducing the threat posed by nuclear weapons. Indian policy makers, however, have always made a clear distinction between "global nuclear disarmament," "regional arms control," and "non-proliferation." "Having identified *horizontal proliferation* (an increase in the number of nuclear-armed states) and *vertical proliferation* (expansion and modernization of existing nuclear arsenals) as two side of the same coin," India has consistently argued that both of the aspects of the nuclear issue must be addressed

⁴⁰ Suchman and Eyre, "Military Procurement as Rational Myth," 137.

⁴¹ George Tanham has argued that great powers have four outstanding military characteristics: a nuclear capability, long-range missiles, a blue water navy, and a technology and industrial base to support these capabilities. See Tanham, "Indian Strategic Culture," 129.

simultaneously. This has led to serious disagreements between India, Pakistan and the U.S. regarding specific non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament (NACD) proposals; for while Pakistan tends to evaluate these instruments in terms of how they might contribute to "regional arms control," and while many Western states judge them in terms of the role they might play in advancing the non-proliferation agenda, India tends to evaluate all proposals related to the management of nuclear weapons against the yardstick of "global disarmament."

Non-Discrimination and Equity

Another important principal of Indian security-building culture is that all NACD arrangements should be agreed and implemented on the basis of the principle of *non-discrimination* (all countries are entitled to participate in NACD negotiations; all countries should be bound in the same way by NACD agreements). Reflecting the historical legacy of both Gandhi and Nehru, India's political elites have demonstrated a consistent and enduring commitment to the principle of global nuclear disarmament. In policy terms, however, this commitment has been tempered by a number of other elements of Indian security culture. Of particular importance in this respect has been the emphasis put on "equity" in the context of nuclear NACD proposals. Historically, India has supported global non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament initiatives that have been non-discriminatory in their application. For example, New Delhi co-sponsored the United Nations resolution endorsing the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention

This aversion to "inequitable" nuclear NACD arrangements has been reinforced by a widely-shared perception that nuclear weapons have a "symbolic throw weight" that automatically places nuclear weapons states in the "superleague" of great powers. Viewed in these terms, there is a widespread consensus among Indian policy-makers that, while global nuclear disarmament is an important value, as long as membership in the great power club is at least partly predicated on possessing nuclear weapons India will not renounce the nuclear option.

An Aversion to Confidence- and Security-Building Measures

Confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) have a long history in Western NACD thinking. Despite the beneficial effects of these types of measures in the East-West context, however, they are not particularly well-regarded in Indian policy-making circles. There are two primarily "cultural" reasons for this. First, CSBMs operate on a premise that is directly contrary to the Kautilyan paradigm. In Indian strategic thinking, which is both adversarial and zero-sum, any measure that benefits Pakistan (in particular) is perceived as being contrary to India's interests. Simply stated, viewing the region through a Kautilyan prism, Indian policy-makers do not perceive that India and Pakistan have even the minimal shared interests necessary to initiate and sustain an authentic confidence-building process.

Second, CSBMs are not well-regarded in Indian policy circles is that they are viewed as a foreign import. Somewhat more specifically, CSBMs are understood in Indian foreign policy circles as a primarily European phenomenon evolving out of the East-West conflict and having meaning and relevance only in that context. As a result, they are naturally suspect. Thus, while a number of Indo-Pakistani and Indo-Chinese CSBMs have been negotiated over the past decade or so, these conflict avoidance measures appear to have been agreed not so much for their intrinsic merit, but because they would do little harm

while satisfying the demands of the U.S., or of other (often well-intentioned) outsiders and international aid-donors.⁴²

Indian Security Culture in Action: The Case of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

Although it would be overstating the case to argue that Indian NACD policies are shaped exclusively by cultural forces, it is clear that such forces play an important role in determining both the form and content of India's approaches to non-proliferation and arms control issues. The example of the comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) negotiations demonstrates the way in which culture and "rational" considerations interact to shape both the form and content of India's NACD diplomacy.

In 1995 India reversed its earlier support for a CTBT, thus denying the Conference on Disarmament the unanimity required to bring the treaty into effect.⁴³ The official reason given for this about-face was that contrary to the explicit intent of the NPT,⁴⁴ the terms of its indefinite extension in May 1995 effectively codified the permanent division of the international community in two tiers: those possessing nuclear arms and those without such weapons. The real reasons, however, are far more complex, having to do primarily with the incompatibility of the extended NPT with a number of the most basic principles underpinning Indian security policy.

The CTBT and India's Commitment to "Disarmament" over "Non-proliferation"

First of all, set against the background of the NPT extension and the failure to make what Delhi viewed as substantial progress to general and complete nuclear disarmament, the CTBT came to be understood in Indian foreign policy circles as an instrument of *non-proliferation* rather than a vehicle for universal nuclear *disarmament*.⁴⁵ In other words, largely as a result of the dynamics of the NPT Review Conference, Delhi came to view the CTBT primarily as a means of advancing what it considered to be the Western goal of preventing the further diffusion of nuclear capabilities, rather than as a means of pursuing the Indian (and NAM) goal of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. This view was reinforced in Delhi when Indian diplomats tried to link Indian support for the CTBT to an agreement on the part of the nuclear weapons states to accept a "time-bound framework" for

⁴² Michael Krepon, "A Time of Trouble, a Time of Need," in Michael Krepon and Amit Sevak, eds., *Crisis Prevention, Confidence Building and Reconciliation in South Asia* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 7-8.

⁴³ In addition to being an early proponent of a test ban treaty in the 1950s, in 1993 India co-sponsored with the U.S. a resolution calling for a ban on nuclear testing. Pravin Sawhney, "Standing Alone: India's Nuclear Imperative," *International Defense Review*, 29:11 (1 November 1996), 25.

⁴⁴ There are three pillars to the NPT: universal nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and sharing technology for peaceful purposes. Indian diplomats argue that, while progress has been made with respect to non-proliferation and technology sharing, little has been done to advance the goal of disarmament.

⁴⁵ Ghose, "Negotiating the CTBT: India's Security Concerns and Nuclear Disarmament," 8.

comprehensive nuclear disarmament.⁴⁶ Negative responses on the part of the nuclear weapons states (in particular) confirmed the view that the CTBT was primarily an instrument of non-proliferation. Once cast in these terms, the Treaty became anathema to the Indian foreign policy establishment as it violated a fundamental tenet of the dominant Indian security culture: the long-standing belief that horizontal and vertical proliferation are two sides of the same coin and that both must be addressed simultaneously.⁴⁷ Simply stated, India refused to endorse the proposed Treaty once Indian foreign policy makers decided that instead of addressing their long-standing goal of universal and comprehensive nuclear disarmament, the treaty would (in conjunction with the extended NPT) legitimize the continuing possession and ongoing development of nuclear weapons by those few states possessing them.

The CTBT and India's Commitment to Equity

Closely related to India's allergy to the non-proliferation project (at least when divorced from the goal of disarmament) is its commitment to "equity" and "non-discrimination" in the international system. From the Indian point of view, the two are related in that a focus on non-proliferation to the exclusion of disarmament necessarily leads to a stratified international polity comprising nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states. Given the prestige and military clout associated with the possession of nuclear weapons, Indian policy-makers have always opposed such a stratification on the grounds that it is inherently unjust and places the non-nuclear states at a political and military disadvantage.⁴⁸ Inasmuch as Indian foreign policy makers came to view the CTBT as an instrument of non-proliferation, they were naturally inclined to view it also as discriminatory and hence inimical to India's vision of a just and desirable international system.

Viewed against the backdrop of India's commitment to equity and non-discrimination in the international system it is perhaps not to surprising to find that the Indian foreign policy establishment opposed the CTBT -- especially in the aftermath of the NPT Review Conference. Indian opposition to the CTBT also

⁴⁶ India attempted this in two ways. First, Indian diplomats joined representatives of other NAM countries in proposing the establishment of a UN ad hoc committee to negotiate a phased programme of nuclear disarmament. Second, India proposed including a preambular paragraph for inclusion in the CTBT that committed the Nuclear Weapons States to achieve the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework. This is entirely consistent with India's traditional approach to non-proliferation. See Ghose, "Negotiating the CTBT: India's Security Concerns and Nuclear Disarmament," 10.

⁴⁷ It is interesting to note in this connection that, according to India's then foreign secretary, India co-sponsored the 1993 resolution calling for a ban on nuclear testing only as a result of assurances from the U.S. government that *disarmament* would be a fundamental goal of the process. See Sawhney, "Standing Alone: India's Nuclear Imperative," 25. It seems that between 1993 and 1995 the conclusion of the NPT Review Conference seriously undermined the credibility of that assurance, at least in the eyes of the Indian foreign policy establishment.

⁴⁸ As India's then prime minister Rajiv Gandhi put it in a speech before the United Nations: "We cannot accept the logic that a few nations have the right to pursue their security by threatening the survival of humankind...Nor is it acceptable that those who possess nuclear weapons are freed from all controls while those without nuclear weapons are policed against their production. History is full of such prejudices paraded as iron laws: that men are superior to women; that white races are superior to the colored; that colonialism is a civilizing mission; and that those who possess nuclear weapons are responsible powers and who do not are not." As quoted in *Dayton Daily News*, 21 September 1996, 13.

derives, however, from two additional equity-related considerations. First, throughout the negotiations Indian diplomats continually decried the fact that the proposed treaty would only ban test *explosions*, not other forms of testing such as computer simulations and sub-critical tests. The argument they repeatedly made in this connection was that, while a ban on test explosions would prevent technologically less-developed nations from developing or improving nuclear weapons, the more technologically-capable nuclear weapons states would be able to use these methods to refine and improve their respective arsenals.⁴⁹ Second, toward the end of the negotiations, when it became clear that Chinese reservations regarding verification were going to be addressed through a compromise, Indian diplomats began to grate at the apparent willingness of the West to accommodate China (a country with which India has always claimed "parity of esteem") but not India. Thus, in its earnest desire to reach an agreement with China, the West inadvertently touched a cultural nerve in India that contributed to that country's opposition to the Treaty.

The CTBT and India's Self-Perception as a "Moral Force"

Despite the fact that a number of factors converged to incline India to oppose the CTBT, it is conceivable that some combination of political pressure and diplomatic encouragement could have resulted in a mutually agreeable accommodation that would have permitted India to have at least passively supported the treaty. That this did not occur can be attributed at least in part to India's self-perception as a "moral force" in international politics. Throughout the negotiation, Indian diplomats consistently expressed the view that given the outcome of the NPT Review Conference, the CTBT was unjust in that it served to codify an inequitable distribution of military and political power in the international system. Given that the cultural legacy of Gandhi and the Hindu religious myths have conditioned Indian foreign policy practitioners to idealize the diplomat who adheres to principles (especially in the face of widespread opposition) it is perhaps not too surprising that the Indian delegation continued its opposition to the point of spoiling the consensus necessary for the proposed treaty to proceed within the CD process. Where other countries might have been inclined to compromise or capitulate, a culturally-derived normative commitment to the pursuit of the ideal (even, or especially, in adversity) made this far less likely in the Indian case.

None of this, of course, should be taken to mean that "rational" military considerations (as well as political dynamics) did not play an important role in shaping India's opposition to the CTBT. Strategic calculations based on national interests obviously inform both the development and articulation of India's NACD policies.⁵⁰ Rather, it is to argue that in addition to these rational considerations, there are enduring

⁴⁹ As India's foreign minister stated before the UN General Assembly in September 1995, "In our view, the CTBT must be an integral step in the process of nuclear disarmament. Developing new warheads or refining existing ones after the CTBT is in place, using innovative technologies, would be as contrary to the spirit of the CTBT as the Non-Proliferation Treaty is to the spirit of non-proliferation." *Dayton Daily News*, 21 September 1996, 13.

⁵⁰ India continues to fear that its actual and potential military adversaries (especially Pakistan and the PRC) have nuclear capabilities and thus insists on maintaining at least some form of "nonweaponized" or "recessed" deterrence. The rub for India in this connection is that in order for it to maintain such a strategic posture it is necessary to stockpile fissile materials (in India's case, plutonium) that can be assembled into weapons "at immediate notice." But India, classified as a non-nuclear state under the NPT, is not supposed to have such stocks of fissile materials and so must resist being drawn into any international agreement (such as the CTBT) that involves intrusive verification. "Thus, the CTBT was acceptable to India as long as detection alone of

and widely-shared beliefs, traditions, attitudes and symbols that also inform Indian approaches to non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament. As India's Ambassador to the United Nations put it in a statement regarding India's decision to oppose the CTBT:

While a country's position in arms control and disarmament is necessarily a product of its political, economic and strategic environment and its national security perceptions, it is equally a product of its unique historical experiences which have determined its fundamental world view.⁵¹

Conclusions

It is clear from the analysis presented in this chapter that the dynamics of Indian security/NACD culture is likely to impede efforts to foster the development of a cooperative security regime in South Asia or to bring India into a number of global NACD arrangements. In the first place, while the preparation for war is recognised as being costly, it is not deemed excessively so. The Indian political class appears willing and able to devote between two and three per cent of GDP to defence in perpetuity. While this is down from the four per cent of the late 1980s, the Indian economy continues to grow so that absolute levels have not declined substantially. As India's economic liberalisation begins to take effect and produce more growth in the economy, absolute levels of military spending can be expected to rise accordingly. Moreover, because India's political culture emphasises the importance of indigenous military research and development and production, and because there exists a network of vested bureaucratic interests supporting the same goal, there is little prospect of substantial political pressure developing in favour of severely constraining defence expenditures. In short, there is no politically-supported consensus that the individualistic pursuit of military security is prohibitively expensive -- either economically or politically.

Second, India has no real interest in being party to a regional cooperative security regime. In other words, it does not accept that unilateral approaches to security can be self-defeating, and that only through cooperation can real security be achieved. Indian security culture emphasises autonomy and self-reliance, and asserts that peace in South Asia has been realised largely through unilateral Indian efforts to maintain preponderance.

And third, India does not subscribe to the assumptions shared by the Western powers regarding the nature of the international security environment. With respect to non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament efforts, India rejects the logic of "essential equivalence" (ie. a broad qualitative/quantitative balance) which stands at the heart of the East-West or Western model of regional arms control. Indian strategic thought emphasises preponderance as the key to regional peace and stability.

The net effect of all this is to render the process of extending existing global non-proliferation regimes significantly more difficult. At the moment, the conditions for Indian accession to many of these regimes simply do not exist. Moreover, because the principal impediment to accession is a powerfully resonating security culture, and because of both the general nature of such cultures and the specific historical,

offenders was sought by the international monitoring system, but it was rejected after the insistence of the U.S. on physical verification." Sawhney, "Standing Alone: India's Nuclear Imperative," 26.

⁵¹ Ghose, "Negotiating the CTBT: India's Security Concerns and Nuclear Disarmament," 2.

cultural and socio-political roots of Indian strategic culture, it is unlikely that these conditions will be brought about easily. It is far more likely that the process will be slow and difficult, and that innovative techniques will have to be developed to alter Indian strategic thinking about non-proliferation arms control and disarmament.

It is important to bear in mind, however, that culture is neither immutable nor self-contained, and that elements of a nation's security culture can and do change over time. Security cultures are constantly being modified, manipulated and adapted, with some traditions being purposefully preserved while others are left to atrophy. To a significant extent then, security culture is not just a product of history and socialisation but of political and social choice. This leaves open the possibility of progressive political change even in those cases -- such as India -- where the currently dominant security culture largely militates against cooperative approaches to conflict resolution and security-building. This being the case, the challenge for those interested in encouraging pacific international relations is to be prepared to support and promote these changes when the opportunity presents itself.

VI. Cross-Cultural Dimensions of the Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Dialogue in Latin America

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This chapter seeks to assess to what degree cultural factors alive in Latin America affect the attitudes of the countries of the region towards the dialogue on non-proliferation and arms control issues. This will be done through a brief discussion of what we mean by Latin America, a look at its historic security picture and the heritage this left in the security field, an overview of recent changes, and an assessment of the degree to which there are differences within Latin America in regard to cultural impacts in the security field. The subsequent main sections of the paper will then deal with styles and attributes of Latin American societies which have an impact on attitudes towards non-proliferation and arms control affairs, and look at key issue areas to see if one can give examples of how this "culture" affects specific matters of discussion within the non-proliferation and arms control agenda.

Introduction: What is Latin America?

The utility and accuracy for analytical purposes of the term *Latin America* is easily exaggerated. Most specialists agree that the expression was invented by French social scientists at the end of the last century as a way the French fact could be retained in discussions of the massively Iberian dominated world found to the south of the United States. This series of republics, which had gained independence in stages from Spain and Portugal over most of the nineteenth century, tended to think of itself as a mix of the Iberian and pre-Colombian societies which had generally speaking come together to form them. The wider *Latin* element, while not denied, was not foremost in their minds when defining themselves.

The term has, however, stuck. It is used to denote all twenty independent republics with Latin-based languages in the Americas and on occasion the U.S. dependency of Puerto Rico as well. Thus the eighteen Spanish-speaking states, stretching from Mexico, Cuba and the Dominican Republic in the north, to Argentina and Chile in the south, are joined with the massive Portuguese-speaking republic of Brazil and the diminutive French and Creole-speaking Haiti, to *form* what is called Latin America. These countries do no doubt have a connection in their Latin-based languages although the degree to which Haiti is truly French-speaking is in great doubt. In fact, however, this link can be exaggerated as well. The countries of Latin America range from tiny to huge, from racially almost completely white to the same degree of native Indian or black and mulatto, from quite rich to desperately poor, and from well along in development terms to very backward indeed.

Some few are long-entrenched democracies in which there is no problem of civil-military relations worthy of the name, while most share deep-seated and long standing difficulties in this area, some of which are still very much with us or just below the surface.¹ And for our purposes it is worth mentioning that some

¹ See the excellent Brian Loveman and Thomas Davies, eds., *The Politics of Antipolitics: the Military in Latin America* (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Press, 1997), and Richard Millett and Michael Gold-Bliss eds., *Beyond Praetorianism: the Latin American Military in Transition* (Miami: North-South Center Press, 1995).

have long traditions of activist foreign policies while others are highly reactive to issues on an "as they come" basis.

Little wonder then that one of the best writers on Latin American affairs has titled his most wide-ranging work on the region *Les Vingt Amériques Latines*, a testimonial to the difficulties of generalizing about this vastly varied region.² Nonetheless, there are of course many elements which these countries have in common and which they discuss as making them unique.

Latin Americans often claim they belong to something of a "Commonwealth," and there is little doubt that this emotional assertion has at least some truth to it. There is a well-entrenched idea of a greater country, a *patria grande*, to which all Latin Americans belong and owe loyalty. Its greatest exponent was of course the Liberator himself, Simón Bolívar, with his dream of a united Latin America capable of resisting European and United States pretensions in the area as well as beating off separatist tendencies.³ There is a generalized feeling that all countries of the region faced colonial tyranny and fought together for the common cause of emancipation against Spain in particular but to some extent even against Portugal. And while this assessment runs very much against the historical record, it is nonetheless accepted as a matter of fact by most Latin Americans and helps create a sense of shared dreams and experience.⁴

Such ideas are of course reinforced by the obvious need in the modern era, especially after the end of the Cold War and the difficult years of the 1980s (termed the *lost decade* in Latin America), to combine efforts if one wishes to gain sufficient clout to be heard by the key decision-makers on the world stage.⁵ Indeed, the debt crisis and other elements of increasing marginalization of the region in the eighties did much to break down resistance to the major attempts at political collaboration and economic integration which the region is now experiencing.

The last point to be made here is to address where the Latin Americans feel they fit in any cultural division of the world one might wish to attempt. Here again a French writer has summed up the matter at hand in the splendidly insightful title to his latest book on the region. Alain Rouquié, with his *L'Amérique latine: introduction à l'Extrême-Occident*, shows the reader how much Latin America is, and feels it is, a part of the West, and that indeed its problems and concerns are often simply the "extreme" of those found elsewhere in the West.⁶

² Marcel Niedergang, *Les Vingt Amériques latines* (Paris: Seuil, 1969).

³ See the chapters on Latin American unity and common citizenship in Charles Minguet et al, *Bolívar y el mundo de los libertadores* (Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1993).

⁴ The common struggle was anything but with Mexico, Peru, Bolivia, Central America, Cuba, Santo Domingo, and many other areas far from united in joining the revolutions of the early 19th century. See, for example, Jorge Domínguez, *Insurrection or Loyalty: the Breakdown of the Spanish American Empire* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980).

⁵ See Abraham Lowenthal and Gregory Treverton, eds., *Latin America in a New World* (Boulder: Westview, 1994); and Alicia Frohmann, *Puentes sobre la turbulencia: la concertación política latinoamericana en los '80* (Santiago: FLACSO, 1990).

⁶ Alain Rouquié, *L'Amérique latine: introduction à l'Extrême-Occident* (Paris: Seuil, 1987).

This is an important point to make. Latin Americans feel themselves to be absolute inheritors of Western traditions, culture and history. While they increasingly acknowledge the contributions made by pre-Colombian civilizations in the making of their own societies, they reject the suggestion that this in any way makes them less Western. The Catholic religion is one sign of this state of affairs. Cultural links to Spain and Portugal are strong and fundamental to their *weltanschauung*, and this is particularly noticeable for the all-important elites of these countries.⁷ At the same time, there is a sense of Pan Americanism, albeit in a much truncated form compared with the effusiveness with which that *ism* was sometimes trumpeted in the past (and at least in some quarters still is). Latin Americans will often acknowledge that there is indeed something special about the hemisphere as a whole and not just for this southern, Latin, portions. But the use to which Pan Americanism was for so long put, a mere cover for, and stimulus to, the furthering of the interests of the United States, has given the idea a bad name in most of the region and this has not much dissipated.⁸ Thus the term is currently little used despite the reality of greater progress for its basic principles at the present time than perhaps ever before.⁹

The Latin American Security Picture Historically

This region, whatever the difficulties with applying rigour to its overall analysis, has known a very particular evolution in the security field that has left deep impressions on its elites and publics where defence issues are concerned. The first region of the Third World to have many of its constituent parts become independent, most Latin American countries have known a long history of international affairs, including often painful experiences in the area of defence.

Despite Bolívar's dream, there was to be no Latin American unity and the small states which were left from the colonial empires after the independence struggles, with the exception of Brazil, were in no position to resist aggression from either Europe or the United States in their first century of existence. Spain's attempts to reimplant its rule in parts of South America did not end until the late 1860s, forty years after most of its colonies had become independent. British incursions in support of trade and investment, or in the suppression of the slave trade, were frequent throughout the nineteenth century. And France intervened directly and dramatically in Mexico with an attempted monarchical restoration in the 1860s. More dramatic still has been the tradition of direct military intervention on the part of the United States, especially visible in Mexico and the Caribbean but with signs of life occasionally elsewhere in the hemisphere as well.¹⁰ Beginning as early as the Latin American revolutions themselves, and in the wake of the defeat of its designs on Canada in the War of 1812, Washington considered Latin America as a legitimate field for territorial and economic expansion.

⁷ There is an interesting discussion of this in Rolando Mellafe Rojas and Lorena Loyola Goich, *La Memoria de América colonial* (Santiago: Universitaria, 1994).

⁸ Arthur P. Whitaker, *The Western Hemisphere Idea* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1954). See also Pierre Queuille, *L'Amérique latine, la doctrine Monroe et le panaméricanisme* (Paris: Payot, 1969).

⁹ Alfred Valladão, *Le Retour du panaméricanisme* (Paris: Crest, 1995).

¹⁰ G. Pope Atkins, *Latin America in the International Political System* (Boulder: Westview, 1995), 107-131; and Lars Schoultz, *National Security and United States Policy toward Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 11-33.

That expansion soon stripped Spain of Florida and Mexico of the northern half of its vast national territory, and launched filibustering attacks on virtually all the Central American states, Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Mexico.¹¹ The war with Spain in 1898 added further to U.S. holdings in Latin America with the cession of Puerto Rico and the temporary but decisive occupation of Cuba. In 1903, Panama became a virtual protectorate of the U.S., which had engineered its independence, and the following decades saw military intervention in the domestic affairs of Central America and the Caribbean become standard fare. After the period of the "Good Neighbour Policy" of Franklin Roosevelt put paid to this policy temporarily from 1933 until 1941, World War II and especially the Cold War ushered it back again in force. And under one guise or another, it has still not ended as part and parcel of U.S. policy in the region.

Thus one sees a region, especially in the weak north, where external aggression from northern powers has been frequent right up to the present. At the same time, the early decades of the rest of Latin America's post-independence period were not peaceful where relations with neighbours were concerned either. The unclear borders of the new states of the region gave ample cause for international conflict between the successor states of the old empires. To some extent, the old rivalry between Spain and Portugal was retained with the new governments of Argentina in particular, and Brazil. The larger states tended to break down altogether. Thus Greater Colombia split into Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela; the River Plate viceroyalty roughly into Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, and the Falklands; and Central America into its five present republics.

The internal situations of the states which emerged from this process were rarely peaceful either. Civil wars and the infamous *caudillo*, or charismatic strongman, phenomenon, abounded throughout the whole of the region and most conflicts were about the naked spoils of power.¹² In societies where the cohesion provided by the monarchy and Spanish institutions was swept aside, there was no obvious source of legitimacy for the regimes that came into office. The wars of national organization lasted in some cases decades and in others well over a century.¹³

Given these circumstances, a complicated system of international relations grew up, not so much in the whole region, the countries of which were far too little connected in these early years of independence, but within sub-regions such as the Southern Cone, the northern tier of South America, and Central America and Mexico. Most of the features of international relations in 19th century Europe were more than visible in Latin America as well where balance of power politics, arms races, alliance systems, inter-

¹¹ See the excellent work by Mexican authors on these subjects such as Juan A. Ortega y Medina, *Destino manifiesto: sus razones históricas y su raíz teológica* (Mexico: Alianza Editorial, 1989); and Angela Moyano Pahissa, *La Resistencia de las Californias a la invasión norteamericana (1846-1848)* (Mexico: Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y las Artes, 1992), 15-27.

¹² Frederick M. Nunn, "The South American Military Tradition: Preprofessional Armies in Argentina, Peru and Brazil," in Linda Alexander Rodríguez, ed., *Rank and Privilege: the Military and Society in Latin America* (Wilmington (Delaware): Scholarly Press, 1994), 71-94.

¹³ See the national introductory sections of Adrian English, *The Armed Forces of Latin America* (London: Jane's, 1984).

state rivalries for influence and prestige, and the like were well known soon after the creation of the independent states of the region.¹⁴

None of this changed entirely with the twentieth century although there was some general progress. Fewer interstate wars were fought, the major exceptions being the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay in the 1930s, the Peru-Ecuador conflict of 1941, the brief Honduras-El Salvador war of 1969, and of course the Falklands War of 1982. On the other hand, smaller level fighting short of open war did occur between some Central American states, between Peru and Colombia, and repeatedly between Peru and Ecuador.

Armed intervention from outside the region did not, however, slacken. Its sources changed, however, dramatically. With the acknowledgement by the United Kingdom of U.S. supremacy in the region through the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901, British intervention slowed and then ended. And after that no other power was willing to risk United States ire with major military adventures in Latin America. On the other hand, this withdrawal of the European powers left the U.S. with virtually no limits on its own interventions.¹⁵

On the internal front, most Latin American countries became more stable overall but this did not mean that the tendency to military coups ended, or that domestic politics was not often marked by violence and extra-constitutional activity. Indeed, the upheavals of the Great Depression of the 1930s were followed soon afterwards by the special nature of the Cold War in the region in ways that changed the face of politics and civil-military relations but not its essence.¹⁶ All in all, this was no zone of peace.

Foundations of the Regional Security "Culture"

This long and defining colonial period, well over three centuries (as opposed, for example, to well less than two for the United States), followed by long and violent revolution and even longer periods of national consolidation, left societies marked by this experience. For the purposes of this study, it is important to cite five major points that will be elaborated upon later.

The first of these is the nearly generalized lack of societies based on the rule of law. Formal constitutions have abounded and they have been masterpieces of contemporary republican and liberal thought. But the realities behind these constitutions have been anything but liberal. While perhaps reflecting the genuine sentiments of their drafters, they were supposedly applicable in societies where massive inequities in social, economic and racial terms meant that elites would not stand for the true acceptance of these rules as applicable to them in real life.

The second is related to this first point. Power, the ability to get things done and be seen to do so, was the central element of society's relationships. As always where the rule of law does not really apply, the

¹⁴ See, for example, Robert N. Burr, *By Reason or Force: Chile and the Balance of Power in South America 1830-1905* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974).

¹⁵ Rouquié, *L'Etat militaire*, 162-3.

¹⁶ Frederick Nunn, *The Time of the Generals: Latin American Professional Militarism in World Perspective* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992).

powerful dominate and the rule of the strongest is the only rule that matters. Latin Americans understand this state of affairs, especially the poor masses who live with its consequences as a matter of course.

Power is in turn closely related to status. As will be discussed later, one's status is vitally important in Latin America. And while this is to a considerable extent true everywhere, in this region it is especially the case. If you have power you will have status. And both come from complex linkages of family, clientelism (*clientelismo*), godfather/godson relationships (*compadrazgo*), friendship, and in the military ties of graduating class from military school and similar connections.¹⁷ What matters here is not only "who you know" but with whom are you related in any of these ways. It will soon be evident for those you wish to impress where you sit in the power and status contexts. And since there is little reality to the idea of equality before the law or equality of opportunity, status became the bedrock of social interaction.

Also left over from the history of the region is an attitude towards violence. This also will be discussed later but here one should underscore the pervasive nature of violence, until recently not so much in the daily life of Latin Americans (most of whose cities were much safer than those of the U.S. or much of Western Europe), but rather in the sense that one does not get in the way of the powerful or one can only expect violence in return for stepping out of turn (or place).

All this is related closely to civil-military relations, which as will be seen is the most pervasive element in the history of politics, and international affairs, in this region, and nowhere more so than in security matters of an interstate kind. The military predate their states in most of Latin America. They tend to see themselves as the moulders, creators, maintainers, saviours, guides, and defenders of those states. And they have historically considered the use of violence in order to correct the errors of governments of their states as absolutely justifiable and indeed worthy of honour. The net has often been cast wide where "opponents" or "enemies" of the state are concerned and historically these have included trade unions, the left in general, politicians of varied stripes, and many others. And while this has changed a great deal in some countries of late, it has not done so in others, and it is important not to be lulled into too great a sense of security as to the permanence of real change in this regard.

The military have tended to be ultranationalist, quick to seize on what they consider insults to the national honour, jealous of their own and their country's prestige, lacking in a sense of compromise, and quite willing, often for institutional purposes, to see international tension, especially with neighbours, remain high. And their position as arbiters of domestic politics has ensured that they have had power, status, the control of the means of violence, and could act under the cover of what they interpreted as "the rule of law." Even under democratic regimes, they have had, virtually without exception in Latin America, a determining role in decisions on foreign policy matters (as well as internal affairs) which affect them directly. There is thus something of a "culture of military power and influence" which is slow to disappear and is nowhere so visible as in decisions on national defence.

Changes in the Latin American Security Picture

The Latin American security picture has changed remarkably with the end of the Cold War and the vast transformations currently occurring in the region. The lost decade of the 1980s has been followed by what Argentines diplomats call "the new realism" which accepts that there is essentially only one possible way forward, and that is one which acknowledges globalization, economic integration, free trade, democracy,

¹⁷ See for the Mexican case Jaime Ramos, *Los de Arriba* (Mexico: Planeta, 1993).

and United States primacy in most political and security fields. This new state of affairs, and *état d'esprit*, have led to enormous changes in the security area. Economic integration and increased political collaboration have brought with them calls for cuts in military spending and the size of armed forces.¹⁸ In the context of generalized democracy in the region, the acceptable role of the military in domestic politics has also been changing in most countries.¹⁹ At the same time, increased regional, sub-regional and bilateral cooperation has led to major declines in levels of threat perception in most, although certainly not all, of the area.²⁰

The decline of the conflict of ideologies as a factor in U.S. policy in the region has opened up the way for major changes in the inter-American security system. There is now a Permanent Committee on Security in the Organization of American States, a development unthinkable in the past. The Inter-American Defence Board and its College have largely abandoned their Cold War role of rallying the troops behind U.S. anti-communist security policy. And while it is true that the dependency of Latin American countries exhibited by these institutions is in many ways still with us, or even enhanced, their recent evolution marks some real improvement in the way the system handles issues of war and peace.²¹

More confidence-building measures, other arms control moves, and significant progress towards the peaceful resolution of some disputes are also present, developing more slowly at the regional level but impressively in many contexts below that. Especially in the Argentine-Chilean, Brazilian-Argentine, Colombian-Venezuelan, and some Central American rivalry contexts, the progress made can be considered dramatic indeed.²² Mercosur, the regional arrangement linking Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, and now bringing in Chile, has brought untold cooperation at any number of levels in the Southern Cone. The Central American integration process seems to have left the years of war and distrust to a large degree behind it.²³

This is not to say that all is rosy. The Peru-Ecuador dispute broke out into open warfare in early 1995 and could do so again if some progress is not made toward settling this long-festering conflict. And the

¹⁸ See the introduction and the national chapters of Francisco Rojas Aravena (Ed), *Gasto militar en América Latina: procesos de decisiones y actores claves* (Santiago: FLACSO, 1994).

¹⁹ Augusto Varas ed., *La Autonomía militar en América Latina* (Caracas: Nueva Sociedad, 1988).

²⁰ Rigoberto Cruz Johnson and Augusto Varas Fernández, eds., *Percepciones de amenaza y políticas de defensa en América Latina* (Santiago: FLACSO, 1993).

²¹ See David Mares, "En attendant Godot: le multilatéralisme a-t-il un avenir en Amérique latine," in Michel Fortmann et al, eds., *Tous pour un chacun pour soi: promesses et limites de la coopération régionale en matière de sécurité* (Québec: Presses de l'Université Laval, 1996), 155-179 especially 169-174.

²² For more on this see Hal Klepak, "From Territorial and Jurisdictional Disputes to Narcotrafficking: the Confidence-Building and Verification Agenda for Latin America," in Marshall Beier and Steven Mataija, eds., *Verification, Compliance and Confidence Building: the Global and Regional Interface* (Toronto: York University, 1996), 105-118.

²³ See the sub-regional and thematic chapters of Augusto Varas and Isaac Caro, eds., *Medidas de confianza mutua en América Latina* (Santiago: FLACSO, 1994); and Francisco Rojas Aravena. ed., *Balance estratégico y medidas de confianza mutua* (Santiago: FLACSO, 1996).

Cuban-U.S. stand-off shows few signs of easing up despite some real confidence-building measures in place.²⁴ In addition, the Peru-Chile, Bolivia-Chile, Guatemala-Belize, Venezuela-Guyana and some other territorial differences are showing impressive capabilities to defeat resolution efforts.²⁵

The situation where internal conflict is concerned is also much more positive than for many decades past. The spread of democracy gives hope for change without violence and, at least for the present, all major political forces appear to accept this state of affairs as the one which promises most. While there is still either insurgency (latent or active) or widespread terrorism in Colombia, Mexico and Peru, and the situation in Guatemala after the 1996 accords is still somewhat uncertain; civil wars have ended in recent years in El Salvador and Nicaragua, and the urban terrorism so present in several other Latin American countries seems clearly on the wane.

Civil-military relations, while far from uniformly sound, have improved immeasurably in most countries of the region. The armed forces are no doubt still extremely powerful near-arbiters of domestic politics in some countries, but in most they have returned to the barracks and are learning to live with their reduced status but more constitutional *modus operandi*.²⁶ And while the 1990s have seen several attempted coups, only one succeeded and it was an *autogolpe*, a "self-coup" where the Peruvian civilian president seized absolute power, of course with the backing of the armed forces.

The key will be of course for democracy to now "deliver the goods." For better or worse, civilian politicians in Latin America promised that the return to democracy would bring improved living conditions and prosperity. The publics of most countries appear to have believed this and are now expecting it from their elected representatives. And while in many countries prosperity does seem to be accompanying the return to civilian rule this is not the case for all of the region. If this problem cannot be addressed, its impact could well do much to overturn the progress made so far and the appeal of more authoritarian solutions could surface anew.²⁷ This point is especially important to make in the context of the exceptional explosion of criminal violence, often linked to the illegal trade in narcotics, which virtually all of Latin America is currently experiencing. In poll after poll in country after country, the public has expressed its view that its most important worry is violence in the streets and general citizen security. The "privatization" of security services, and thus their availability to the rich and their almost total lack for the poor, is of grave concern for the legitimacy of democratic institutions and their widespread appeal to all political forces. Such criminal activities were not as visible, and did not strike

²⁴ Hal Klepak, "Confidence-Building Measures and a Cuba United States Rapprochement," in Archibald Ritter and John Kirk, eds., *Cuba in the International System: Normalization and Integration* (London: Macmillan, 1995), 226-236.

²⁵ See the chapters on Peru, Chile and Central America in Francisco Rojas Aravena, ed., *Medidas de confianza mutua: verificación* (Santiago: FLACSO, 1996).

²⁶ Good analyses of these trends are found in Juan Somavía and José Miguel Insulza, eds., *Seguridad democrática regional: una concepción alternativa* (Caracas: Nueva Sociedad, 1990).

²⁷ This author addresses this subject at some length in "Far from a Sure Thing: Prospects for Democracy in Latin America," *Commentary*, 61 (September 1995), 1-9.

the bulk of the population, in most military dictatorships of the recent past, and this has already caused dissatisfaction with democracy to surface in public outbursts in some countries.²⁸

Most of what has been said before applies not only to the Spanish-speaking countries of the Americas but also to Brazil and Haiti. However, one should not move on without considering in the most cursory fashion noteworthy differences in the experience of those two countries. Brazil's settlement, expansion, and independence occurred in forms which differed markedly from those in Spanish America. The Portuguese political tradition was much less dogmatic, and indeed less bloody, than was that found in its Iberian neighbour. The early separation of Portugal from the Arab Empire, its rapid opening to international trade influences, its seafaring traditions, and its need to mark itself off from the great nation of Spain, all ensured a less self-assured and violent expansion when compared with that of Madrid.

Brazil did not boast great civilizations when the Portuguese arrived and there was little of the wholesale slaughter there witnessed in most of the heavily populated portions of the Spanish conquests. Slavery and exploitation there of course were but there was less brutality to much of it. More dramatic still, Brazil became independent through the transfer of the seat of imperial authority from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro as a result of Napoleon's 1808 occupation of Portugal. The monarchy and royal house soon split into Portuguese and Brazilian branches but virtually without bloodshed and remarkable affection remained between ex-colony and mother country.²⁹

Brazilian political life was also less bloody and divisive for most of the country's independent history than was the case for most of the rest of Latin America. A stable monarchy and empire were not overthrown until 1889, and even then the country experienced until the 1930s little of the miseries of constant disorder so common elsewhere in the region.³⁰ Even the dictatorships of that era and then of the Cold War were less violent than most in the Spanish-speaking parts of the hemisphere. Rather typically, the return to democracy from military dictatorship in 1985 was the result of negotiations between the military and the incoming civilians rather than a forced retirement under duress.³¹ Without wishing to make too much of this history, it is nonetheless true that Brazilians feel they are more apt to compromise, less prone to violence, and less dogmatic than some of their regional cousins.

Regrettably, Haiti offers no such pleasant contrasts. The country has been racked by civil war virtually since independence, after ferocious massacres, at the beginning of the 19th century. Once the jewel in the French Caribbean colonial empire, its decline was swift and massive. There is no tradition of compromise here but rather a small upper class absolutely determined to keep its control over the impoverished masses. Recent attempts to "restore" democracy here of course miss the point that there has never been any such thing in the country and that a tradition of the sort must simply be created if it

²⁸ Rodolfo Cerdas, *El Desencanto democrático: crisis de partidos y transición democrática en Centroamérica y Panamá* (San José: Sanabria, 1992).

²⁹ Maria Candida Proença, *A Independencia do Brasil* (Lisbon: Horizonte, 1987).

³⁰ Hélio Silva, *O Poder civil* (Porto Alegre: L&M Editors, 1985).

³¹ Clovis Brigagão, "Autonomía militar y democracia: el caso brasileño," in Varas, *La Autonomía...*, 147-166.

is to have a chance to endure. Violence has been a key part of the way of life here and shows some signs of remaining so.

Styles and Attributes of Regional Security Dialogues

With this overview of historic and more recent security conditions in Latin America, it should now prove possible to turn to a brief analysis of what might be called the general styles and attributes of the security dialogue in the region. With this one hopes to show how some of the basic approaches to security affairs are informed by the culture of the region. In this section one will dig more deeply into Latin American attitudes to violence, concerns over autonomy and status, preferences for pragmatism versus proceduralism, formal legalist versus informal styles, consensus versus other forms of decision-making, and confrontational versus combative approaches to solving problems.

The general point should, however, be made that Latin Americans, considering themselves part of the Western tradition, and keen to have their *mot à dire* in key forums which affect them, are well disposed to be "joiners" where security arrangements are concerned. They also increasingly understand that it is not in the Group of 77, or other Third World bodies, where they will influence the great, but rather in groupings where they sit *with* the great. The departure from the Group, in the 1980s, of both Mexico and Argentina, was a massive blow for that body and signalled strongly the choices those two countries were now prepared to make. However, it must also be said that such options are complicated by the present situation where interventionist policies by the First World, and especially by the United States, on human rights, democracy, the size and role of armed forces, and indeed arms control itself, make excessive exposure to those powers risky in terms of local civil-military relations, nationalist opinion, and sometimes regime survival.

Attitudes towards Violence

There are many stereotypes about concerning Latin Americans and violence. Some of them no doubt have a kernel of truth to them but others most certainly do not. It is true that much of the region's history has shown shocking use of violence as a means to seize or retain power. Both the Inca and Aztec empires were essentially militaristic and the influence of the military on Mayan society was enormous.³² Indeed, only those peoples who could put effective military forces into the field, such as the Apaches in the north and the Araucanians in the south, could hope to resist these great conquerors. There is little doubt that attitudes to the sacrifice of human beings for religious reasons, frequent wars, and high rates of infant and maternal death during the birth process left traces where the value of human life was concerned.

Spanish occupation, throughout the future empire, was achieved through treachery and ferocious conquest, using the tried and true methods of divide and conquer in order to make up for small numbers of soldiers. The new imperial relationships were born in blood. Spain showed little ability to bring its white subjects, and now local rulers, to heel although the colonial centuries were marked by few serious revolts and relative peace in most of the region, including the Portuguese-occupied zones. Except for Brazil, all movements for independence were violent and extremely bloody affairs. The high degree of

³² See Ross Hassig, *Aztec Warfare* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988); Beatriz Repetto Tío, *Desarrollo militar entre los mayas* (Mexico: Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional, 1993), especially 70-73; and Edmundo Guillen Guillen, *Visión peruana de la conquista* (Lima: Milla Batres, 1979).

loyalist sentiment ensured the wars were long and nasty. Fighting over the spoils was even longer lasting and the tradition of violent change of government became enshrined in much of the region.

At the same time, traditions of *machismo* remain strong and personalist and clientelist arrangements the rule in politics.³³ Personal pride is considered basic to life and a *sin vergüenza* (a person without a developed sense of shame) is as strong an insult as one can imagine. Traditionally, especially in the absence of the state in much of the region, a man is expected to look after his own honour and not have recourse to the judicial or other means made available by society at large.³⁴

Yet it is easy to exaggerate the levels of violence in society as a whole, as opposed to that prevailing for those who vie for power and influence within that society. Latin American visitors to almost any large United States city will tell one how much more exposed to violence they feel in the north than they ever felt in their supposedly violent homelands. Nonetheless, most observers believe that Latin American domestic violence, that is violence in the home, is quite widespread despite the traditional strength of the Roman Catholic family. They also point out that this is most marked where violence in society at large has been widespread and where arms are relatively available.³⁵

In international affairs, while the use of force has been circumscribed by the influence of the regional superpower, the military *reach* of one's own forces, geography, money and other factors; it has rarely proven to be beyond the thinking of statesmen and public opinions facing a major international problem which mattered to them. And the threat of the use of force, demonstrations of force, mobilizations, arms races, border skirmishing, and the like have been frequent indeed.³⁶

Regional armed forces rarely feel they are living in an age of peace, or that such a state of affairs will soon be upon them. They still see a Hobbesian world around them and believe the only way to be prepared for the worst, which is after all their job, is to be armed and ready for whatever the future holds. While the Catholic tradition obviously holds peace in high esteem, Latin America's own history suggests that internal and external peace will again be threatened and that only a fool would entirely let down his guard in these circumstances. Thus the logic behind, and even the legitimacy of, arms control is on occasion lost on the officer corps of regional states.

³³ For the study of a concrete case, see Rocío Tábor, *Masculinidad y violencia en la cultura política hondureña* (Tegucigalpa: CEDOH, 1995).

³⁴ See the seminal Magnus Mörner, *Race and Class in Latin America* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970). For much of the following I have considered of special validity points made in Carlos Moneta, "Pensamiento y acción latinoamericana ante las fuerzas armadas. Percepciones, conductas tradicionales y nuevas alteraciones," in Carlos Moneta, ed., *Civiles y militares: fuerzas armadas y transición democrática* (Caracas: Nueva Sociedad, 1990).

³⁵ Some exceptional work has been done in this regard on the Guatemalan case. See Gabriel Aguilera, ed., *Buscando la seguridad: seguridad ciudadana y consolidación democrática en Guatemala* (Guatemala: FLACSO, 1996); and Santiago Bastos and Manuela Camus, *Sombras de una batalla* (Guatemala: FLACSO, 1994).

³⁶ Mares, "En attendant Godot," 155-164.

Concerns over Autonomy and Status

In societies such as most of those in Latin America, where treatment of the individual *qua* individual, with rights and privileges as well as responsibilities, is relatively underdeveloped; there is great concern about one's status. Titles of all kinds, military, civil, academic, and the like, carry great weight, and rarely will one be introduced as merely *señor* (mister), as that gives the impression that one has no further claim to importance than that basic one. Prestige is *monnaie courante* in these societies and is taken very seriously indeed. It is one's prestige, one's status, which ensures that one is dealt with properly by the state, business, society, and that one's social inferiors accept one's right to command. And all Latin American countries share elites with a fine sense of their own value, history, role, and the need for their continued presence at the helm.

In international relations terms, most traditional rivalries have been sustained without recourse to war, at least in this century. In such circumstances, prestige is vital and this is recognized by all. In addition, public opinion has been little understanding of its leaders when they appear to sacrifice national interests at times of heated debate on international issues of dispute. Foreign ministers have often been fired, or even jailed, for agreeing to accords which were subsequently rejected by governments, public opinions, or both. Latin American foreign ministries know that on most issues that really matter, they will be operating from a position of weakness. It is imperative that they insist on their status and independence if they are to be taken seriously.³⁷

Pragmatism versus Proceduralism and Legalist versus Informal Styles

Latin America in general has inherited a great affection for legalist approaches and styles in societal matters and perhaps especially in international relations. Elites in foreign ministries have very often had an academic and professional preparation in the law and this reinforces the general tendency to look for the written word rather than custom as the key benchmark in human affairs. The development of doctrines, corollaries, and the like has given great prestige to the individual statesmen making them up even if they have enjoyed little writ outside the foreign ministry itself. Nonetheless, a body of inter-American law has developed and it is an expression of a largely Latin American legal tradition and the desire of regional states to limit the scope for independent action on the part of the United States or other great powers.³⁸

Weak states must attempt to use those means available to them to restrain the actions of the great. And nowhere has this been proven more clearly than in the Americas where the United States has assigned itself a special leadership role wherein unilateral intervention has for long found a major place.³⁹ Legalism and proceduralism may be the only means to defend against the power of the strong and Latin America has learned this well. Indeed, the major institutions of the inter-American system reflect this state of affairs. For the U.S., these institutions tend to be means of aligning the Latin Americans more squarely

³⁷ Pope Atkins, *Latin America in the International Political System*, 72.

³⁸ Pope Atkins, *Latin America in the International Political System*, 199.

³⁹ David Haglund, *Latin America and the Transformation of U.S. Strategic Thought* (Albuquerque, New Mexico,: University of New Mexico Press, 1984), 6-8.

behind U.S. initiatives, while for the Latin Americans they tend to be ways, however imperfect, of limiting the freedom of unilateral action enjoyed by the United States.⁴⁰

In reality, both proceduralism and pragmatism are used regularly with some states having a preference for the first and others for the second. It is very much a case of "where you stand depends on where you sit." Mexico, close to the United States and the victim of frequent U.S. harsh handling, fears U.S. whims which have historically cost it dear and therefore tends to emphasize formality, and written agreements, based on high-flown rhetoric and oft-repeated principles of international law. Brazil, far from real competitors and in something of a position of real regional predominance, has few such fears and is often known for very flexible thinking and ad hoc arrangements.⁴¹

Consensus versus Other Forms of Decision-Making

Latin Americans enjoy the idea of reaching conclusions by consensus. Among elites there is a strong sense of *bonhomie* evident to anyone from more northern climes and this is often present among the mass of society as well. Much is done to avoid confrontations among equal partners and the speed at which friendships are seemingly made appears to suggest a strong desire to build close bonds and to exploit them for the common good. Diplomats who are old hands in Latin America, however, often remark on the tendency for these outward shows of affection and accord to mask deep-seated distrust especially when matters of weight are being discussed. The insistence on "motherhood" statements, so frequently the bane of the existence of diplomats dealing with the region, reflects among other things the desire to show harmony even when there is actually remarkably little of it about.

Realities of relative power, and the relationships that state of affairs produce, are rarely far below the surface and it is these which are being hidden (or there is at least an attempt to do so gracefully in order to ensure no one's status is damaged) by the shows of affection referred to above. The elites of Latin America are extremely subtle, sophisticated, and alert to *nuance*.⁴² They are accustomed to giving the impression of consensus even if it is really more a matter of an imposition of the views of the strong than a real convincing of others that he is in the right.

Unless on matters of truly vital interest, there will usually be an unspoken acknowledgement on the part of the weaker party of his relative position, and apparent consensus will thus become more of a means to protect him from questioning than a real effort at convincing.⁴³ If, however, the weaker party is not prepared to play this game, then consensus will rarely be sought and there will be a strong tendency to a mere imposition of the stronger party's view.

⁴⁰ Peter McKenna, *Canada and the OAS* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1995), 16-23; and Germán Arciniegas, *La OEA: la suerte de una organización regional* (Bogotá: Planeta, 1985).

⁴¹ See the interesting studies by Hélio Jaguaribe, *Novo cenário internacional* (Rio de Janeiro: Guanabara, 1986); and José Odelso Schneider et al, eds., *Realidade brasileira* (Porto Alegre: Sulina, 1988), 261-272.

⁴² Seymour M. Lipset and Aldo Solari, eds., *Elites in Latin America* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).

⁴³ For an excellent study of these elites, somewhat dated now but of great value nonetheless, see John J. Johnson, *Continuity and Change in Latin America* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964).

While still avoiding anecdotal temptations, it has been noted by one of the United States' most important Latin Americanists, Richard Millett, that in Spanish there is no word for compromise. And while one can quibble with this when one thinks of the verb *transegrir*, the remark carries some weight. Zero-sum thinking is common in Latin America, not least among the military and the strong geopolitical tradition in the region.

The Centrality of the Civil-Military Dimension

The above elements of style and specific attributes of Latin America on arms control and related issues pale when compared with the already mentioned and all-important matter of civil-military relations. In most countries of the region, the influence of the military on foreign policy, and especially on those policies which touch (often only remotely) the security field, has been enormous and remains considerable. With the exception of Costa Rica, no country in Latin America has known sustained civilian control of government in a fashion which would permanently reduce the role of the military in national affairs to that known in most northern democracies. Although Mexico has had until recently what is undoubtedly the most impressive showing in the area of civilian control of the military, even it has found with the Chiapas and now Guerrero crises that it has had to turn more to the consideration of military views than at any time in the last six decades.⁴⁴

Other countries have not been as fortunate. Chronic instability has led to a role for the military in Latin American countries which has left deep scars on the body politic. Generations of civil servants have learnt to pay particular attention to what the armed forces say, even when they are out of direct power. Many have had armed forces officers as their direct bosses for much of their careers. But if this is noticeable in national administration as a whole, it is especially present in the area of foreign policy, so closely linked to security affairs in general and to military matters in particular.

Diplomats and their activities have been carefully controlled under most military regimes in recent decades. And even when democracy has prevailed, diplomacy and foreign affairs as a whole are scrutinized by the armed forces with concern and with a clear feeling of a well-earned and established *droit de regard*. When foreign ministries become involved in security matters, this role becomes even more obvious and present. Most foreign ministries well know that their *marge de manoeuvre* is highly circumscribed in these fields and that the military often deny not only the legitimacy of diplomats acting in this area but even their ability to understand the complex questions of defence that they, the military, are so accustomed to consider exclusively their purview.⁴⁵

There is also a strong tradition of *acoto pero no cumplo* in Latin American government affairs in general but most especially in those related to military affairs. The idea here is literally that from the perspective of military commanders, "I understand and accept what the authorities have ordered but I simply do not

⁴⁴ Useful thinking on these subjects is provided by the authors in David Ronfeldt's *The Modern Mexican Military: a Reassessment* (La Jolla: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1984). See also Raúl Benítez Manaut, "Sovereignty, Foreign Policy and National Security in Mexico, 1821-1989," in Hal Klepak, ed., *Natural Allies? Canadian and Mexican Views on International Security* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1996), 57-87.

⁴⁵ See most of the chapters in Augusto Varas, ed., *Paz, desarme y desarrollo en América latina* (Buenos Aires: Latinoamericano, 1987), for several treatments of this question, as well as Nunn, *The Time of the Generals*.

choose to comply." This appears unfathomable to most of the military traditions of the North but is anchored in colonial traditions related to being not only far from the metropolitan sources of orders but also of often having one's own power base in the colonial locality.

Thus there is a tradition of simply carrying on as one had done despite orders from above to change what one has been doing. If this occurs between headquarters and local commands, it can be even more noticeable between civilian governments and the armed forces. And this is often dramatically true on issues of security which touch the military directly and often, in their view, produce decisions which could damage the institution. The degree of drag this can produce in the arms control area can be extraordinary given that the armed forces are not necessarily at all convinced of the reasons for engaging in such activities nor of the idea that cooperation will in the long run be of benefit to them as either individuals or an institution. The Peru-Ecuador conflict offers examples of this as do those between Colombia and Venezuela, and El Salvador and Honduras.

Unilateralism-Bilateralism-Multilateralism

There was for many years a marked preference for unilateralism in Latin American foreign and defence policy. Latin American terrain, local politics, communications and other factors tended to make the key relationships those with European powers and the United States. Except when under direct threat going it alone seemed to work reasonably well. Indeed, as mentioned, part of the tragedy of Latin American independent history is the inability of the region to respond to outside pressures in a united way. The armed forces of course reinforced this tradition. The military have seen themselves as the servants of their own countries and have been at least as concerned about threats posed by their neighbours as those posed from outside their region.

The decline of the international division of labour over the last eight decades had of course largely put paid to this tradition, and the lost decade of the eighties gave the *coup de grâce*. Foreign ministries have launched into multilateralism as the only way to be heard at decisive gatherings affecting their countries. Indeed, the "new realism" is acknowledgement of this need for coalescing or perishing through lack of influence. And while the military have proven less rapid in their acceptance of the new rules of the game, even they are more and more often agreed that this is the only possible *realpolitik* reply to the current situation of their countries.

Given the nature of many of the bilateral relationships among Latin American countries, there has been less activity here. On the other hand, most disputes are essentially bilateral. One thinks of El Salvador-Honduras, Guatemala-Belize, Venezuela-Colombia, Chile-Peru, Ecuador-Peru, and several others. Bilateral arrangements are often the only logical way forward but the need for visible give and take and compromise is not always accepted, especially by nationalist and military opinion. Hence multilateral means of moving ahead are again often the best. One thinks of the Central American peace process, Mercosur's CBM potential, and the Ayacucho process.

As one has seen, however, from the CBM discussions at the OAS and other forums in recent years, multilateral does not necessarily mean the Americas as a whole or even Latin America. The security problems of Latin American states are in their vast majority sub-regional: the Andean balance, Central America, the Southern Cone context, and historically the River Plate. Regional progress with arms control may continue to be best made through sub-regional arrangements in a hemispheric context where such accords are encouraged by the wider inter-American community rather than arrived at through discussions in that system's institutions.

Specific Security Issue Areas

It is now possible to turn to specific issue areas in the field of non-proliferation and arms control. Some of the elements discussed above have an impact on the arms control dialogue today or have had such in the past. And while this discussion must to some extent be rather subjective, there are nonetheless likely relationships between the styles and attributes of Latin American culture brought forward and the actual conduct of these countries' diplomacies, especially in security affairs where the consequences of a false move can be so serious.

Underlying Concepts of Security

The history of Latin America is one which has left in most countries a fundamentally high degree of insecurity. While national security in the sense of freedom from concerns of conquest or occupation from abroad is probably higher than in most parts of the world, it is also true that regimes, governments and individuals at the head of them rarely benefit from a highly developed sense of security. No country which existed a century ago has been removed from the map of the continent. On the other hand, coups, pronunciamientos, violent movements or even changes of government have for too long been the norm for leaders to feel any real sense of security even for their persons, and as we have seen the use or threat of use of armed force is not at all rare here.

There is also a strong tradition of getting into government leadership positions in order to "get rich quick" and then getting out before any investigation uncovers excessive wrongdoing. And there is thus a generalized sense of insecurity for leaders which is pervasive indeed. Added to this in many countries is the sense of isolation of the elite. They are often a small, white, upper class group in a vast, mestizo, and poor population and the memory of great slave, native, and lower class revolts is often only too vivid and only too depressing. Thus security, and measures to ensure it, are taken very seriously by Latin American elites. And this is also true for the masses who have rarely known great security either, if only because they have been largely at the mercy of those very elites which in turn fear them.

On the other hand, the way security has for so long been the exclusive preserve of the armed forces means that civilian leaders move with great care in this field. Very few have the slightest experience in the area and the hermetic seal on many regional armed forces has ensured this to be the case. Thus civilian leaders and diplomats share a certain dread of stepping too far into this field, not only because of the fear of military reactions but also through a lack of great knowledge of the issues involved.

Confidence-Building Measures

An area of vast experience for Latin American countries over a long period is that of confidence building. Long before the debate on such measures took flight in Europe with the CSCE negotiations, Latin America had sub-regions where they were alive and well. And in the post-Cold War era, the development of often original CBMs in a number of Latin American contexts has been impressive.

In recent years, the wider scene of cooperation across a wide spectrum, not to mention nearly generalized moves towards economic integration, has helped greatly in producing a favourable context for the development of wider and deeper CBMs. As Canadian specialist on confidence building James Macintosh has pointed out, such a wider picture is enormously helpful in making CBMs possible and is indeed the ideal framework for confidence building in the often higher profile, and usually more sensitive, area of

national security affairs.⁴⁶ It is nonetheless true, however, that for every seeming breakthrough in confidence building between some Latin American countries, there is a still remaining hurdle for CBMs between or among others. The contrast between successful CBM efforts between Argentina and Chile, and Brazil and Argentina, on the one hand, and between Peru and Ecuador and Peru and Chile on the other; could hardly be more stark.

Confidence building is also often seen by the armed forces as essentially a means of reducing their numbers, influence and budgets. Hence, as a process leading somewhere specific, it does not tend to have their confidence. And in the Latin American context, they have some reason for concern on a personal as well as institutional basis. Whereas in most of the Western force reduction programmes recently, there have been generous buy-out packages for retiring personnel, organized pension programmes, functioning training schemes for departing personnel, and follow-up arrangements to ensure things work smoothly; recent Latin American demobilizations have proven disastrous for officers and other ranks, as well as their families.

In Central America the demobilization of half the Salvadorean Army and the whole of the insurgent forces, while overseen by the United Nations (ONUSAL) and helped along by many international institutions and foreign governments, nonetheless was rather a shambles. Alternate employment possibilities proved few and far between despite promises made, land distribution schemes proved unimpressive and exceptionally slow, reductions in the state structures made that avenue of approach unlikely, essential police reform slowed to a snail's pace, and international funding proved much less than foreseen. The result has been to help to increase the ranks of lawless elements of the society to unknown heights and to assist in bringing a current wave of violent crime to the country.⁴⁷

In Nicaragua, success evaded even more effectively the international community and those anxious to anchor peace in that country. The distribution of land to ex-combatants of both the Sandinista Armed Forces and the Contras was slow and shoddy. The land itself was inadequate in quantity and quality. The promised funds to help the demobilized get a start either failed to appear or proved insufficient. The whole programme was plagued by inefficiency from the beginning. This resulted in frustration and poverty among many of the 60,000 demobilized armed forces personnel, including 10,000 officers, and some 20,000 Contras. It also contributed in an important measure to the growth of the crime rate, the return of banditry to sectors of the country, and to the actual reforming of some bands of fighters.⁴⁸

Thus for many Latin American military officers CBMs, and indeed the whole package of tension reduction activities occurring today, are seen as unhelpful or positively dangerous for the military institution. And many officers believe them to be part of a plot to destroy the armed forces and thus ensure U.S. domination of the Latin American world now that Washington can no longer use the

⁴⁶ James Macintosh, *Confidence Building in the Arms Control Process: the Transformation View* (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Arms Control and Disarmament Studies No.2, 1996).

⁴⁷ Gabriel Aguilera Peralta, *Seguridad, función militar y democracia* (Guatemala: FLACSO, 1994), 64-65.

⁴⁸ Peralta, *Seguridad, función militar y democracia*, 61-65. See also the essays on the Nicaraguan demobilization experience in Oscar-René Vargas, ed., *Nicaragua: gobernabilidad democrática y reconversión militar* (Managua: Centro de Estudios Estratégicos, 1996).

communist menace as the organizing principle of its hegemony regionally. It is remarkable how widespread this sort of thinking is in the insecure Latin American armed forces of the late nineties.⁴⁹

Often diplomats make considerable progress with such confidence building but the military are slow or worse at implementing the strictly military elements of them. Attempts to implement mutual "hot pursuit" policies between Colombia and Venezuela where drug traffickers are concerned appear to have foundered on military suspicions. The Ayacucho process on CBMs, dramatic and wide-ranging, has come virtually to naught since its inception in the mid-1970s for largely the same reasons where the armed forces of the Andean countries are concerned. And indeed, the whole web of CBMs set in place between Ecuador and Peru failed miserably even to slow the move to war in early 1995, and this again because at least partially of an unwillingness of armed forces to take them very seriously when questions of real national security were in play.

Although progress has been made, it is also still only too noticeable that Latin American delegations to CBM discussions in a variety of forums often tend to be made up only of diplomats and rarely include military officers. As has often been said in this regard the most important CBMs in Latin America may well prove to be those between defence and foreign ministries within countries.

Transparency

Latin Americans often have considerable difficulty with the concept of transparency. Military thinking in the continent in particular traditionally considers such ideas as closely related to spying. If security is based on secrecy and the avoidance of surprise, then obviously one must keep one's most precious security affairs to oneself. If countries wish to pry into one's information in this sphere, it is, according to this argument, obviously for the purpose of spying. When the United Nations observer mission (ONUCA) was sent to Central America in late 1989, for example, many Central American officers expressed informally their belief that the observation portion of the mission was little more than spying. And since many of them saw the UN as little more than a front for leftist forces generally in the world, this was not difficult for them to place in the world view they had institutionally and individually developed over previous decades.⁵⁰

In addition, as mentioned above, Latin American civilians are not accustomed to discuss security issues. For most of these countries' histories, security affairs were the exclusive preserve of the armed forces. Taking part in such matters was ill advised for civilians, indeed often positively dangerous. Under such circumstances, the concept of transparency in defence activity is one which has been quite foreign to the Latin American mind even though with recent gains in democracy, there has been some forward movement here.

⁴⁹ For an extreme, but widely read, example of this thinking, see Resumen Ejecutivo de EIR, *El Complot para aniquilar a las Fuerzas Armadas y a las naciones de Iberoamérica* (Mexico: Centro de Investigaciones económicas, 1993).

⁵⁰ See this and other issues developed in Pierre Babinsky, "A Military Perspective on UN Operations in Central America," in Hal Klepak, ed., *Canada and Latin American Security* (Montreal: Meridien, 1993), 177-190.

Latin American governments in general are having great difficulty coping with recent demands for them to become more transparent. This is challenging enough for the most developed of democratic systems, as the same process is showing in so much of the rest of the world. But in this region it is truly a long-term goal and must be seen as such. And nowhere is this more true than in the security field where diplomats and security forces meet. Armed forces tend to be extremely uninterested in sharing with their own diplomats, much less foreigners and the United Nations, details of budgets, expenditures, deployments, weapons and equipment purchases, as the UN Arms Register cooperation record by Latin America attests.

On the linguistic side of culture again, it may be worth mentioning here that Spanish has no real word for *accountability*, although the concept can be made clear relatively easily. This does say much, however, about the traditions of Spanish rule and the system so long prevalent in government in much of Latin America.

Arms Control

Much of the above applies as well to discussions of arms control. Latin American countries have discussed issues of arms control off-and-on for virtually the whole of this century. Many accords have been made at the bilateral and sub-regional levels and some even at the hemispheric level. The idea of arms control as a route to better relations and reduced defence budgets has made considerable headway in recent years especially with the recent trend towards democracy.

It is nonetheless true that the armed forces see the danger here too of a reduction in their budgets, establishments, and influence and most particularly at the present time, a direct threat to their modernization programmes. They often join with other nationalist groups to question why the United States is suddenly so keen on them to undertake more in the arms control field when only a few years ago the U.S. was singing a very different tune. Indeed, they note that when the U.S. is anxious to sell new systems, such as fighters during the presidential election year of 1996, such keenness is suddenly lacking yet again. They point to their recent essential role in preserving democracy from insurgency and terrorism from the left, and insist that the present era is insufficiently stable and foreseeable to allow for reductions in forces which are already at levels much lower than in the rest of the world. The residual threat of United States eventual interventions against Latin America, especially related to the drug trade, and more generally of "international" interventions to "save the Amazon" or other ecological *vaches sacrées*, is often trumpeted as a reason why Latin American nations should not disarm further. It must be said that some of these issues do find an echo in civil society as a whole while others are much more likely to be met with little less than public derision.

Finally, the military often claim that there are many national development tasks that cannot be undertaken by anyone else, and that any other approach than their use is wasteful of assets which the country can ill afford to throw away. Their search for new or expanded missions, like forestry protection, health services in the hinterland, border patrols, national parks surveillance, wildlife protection, private security, and the like varies from country to country, but is part of the often near panic some forces feel now that they and their budgets are under scrutiny. Little wonder then that arms control is often seen as yet another threat to the sacred institution.

Diplomats have to work against this backdrop. And while the Argentine foreign ministry appears to have been quite successful in bringing the armed forces on board with the arms control agenda, this is largely as a result of the general trauma of that nation's military and their inability to resist pressure from the

civilian authorities. In most other countries, ways have been found to stop signatures on agreements, to slow down compliance, or to simply not provide compliance with accords.

All of this says something about the negotiating style of many Latin American diplomats and serving officers. As has been mentioned, there is a liking for formalism. One is dealing with a clear elite, more rarely the bourgeois civil servant common in the north. Status matters and prestige counts. Supplier-recipient regimes are thus not very likely to be well seen unless they can be couched in some other terms. Clear asymmetries of power must be masked, at least by polite rhetoric. Countries should be singled out as rarely as possible except, of course, for praise. And while some of this will seem like mere diplomatic process in general, with Latin America it is especially important.

Nuclear Non-proliferation

Latin America is often said to have the only full "success story" in the nuclear non-proliferation field. It is certainly true that the Tlatelolco Treaty is unmatched anywhere else in the world. It is also true that the Argentine and Brazilian *volte face* on their nuclear rivalry now turned collaboration is one of the most remarkable events on the Latin American strategic scene since independence. It is important to realise, however, the extent to which that collaboration, at least at present levels, has been made possible by the return of democratic government to the two countries in the mid-1980s. It is unlikely that anything like the progress made in the bilateral nuclear relationship, or indeed in its impact on the Latin American scene as a whole, could have been made if the nationalist, prestige-oriented, and geopolitically-minded military regimes had still been in power.⁵¹

The democratic revival is of fundamental importance to non-proliferation in the nuclear field. Other "cultural" elements enter into the picture in the fields of chemical and biological non-proliferation. That is, the armed forces of Latin America are extremely traditionalist. They cling to feudal values in ways most armies do not have the means or the stomach to manage. They are anchored in concepts of honour, service, duty, protection of the weak, and the like which, if often forgotten during the "dirty wars" of the ideologically charged times just past, are still the benchmarks of their profession from Mexico to the Southern Cone. While nuclear weapons were at various times seen as the only way to stay abreast in the new post-1945 era where military technology was concerned, as the great equalizer *vis-à-vis* more powerful states (and as a host of other things), chemical and biological weapons have received either scant attention or indeed short shrift in Latin American military journals and officers' messes. In no country has there been a serious debate about their acquisition or use even though of course napalm is in many arsenals.

Non-proliferation of small arms and mines has of course been of great concern of late for a number of countries in the region. Mexico and Central America have been particularly concerned about small arms with Mexican initiatives along a number of lines and cooperation against the illegal small arms trade one of the features of the signed but still not ratified Central American Regional Democratic Security Treaty of December 1995. The recent rapid growth of crime in these countries, where violence is widespread but the increase in small arms holdings has made it particularly vicious and costly, has meant even armed forces have come on board about the great need for control of these weapons.

⁵¹ This requires some *nuance* which the author attempts to provide in his "Le Tango de la dénucléarisation: le duo Argentine et Brésil," Albert Legault and Michel Fortmann, eds., *Prolifération et non-prolifération nucléaires* (Quebec: Centre québécois de relations internationales, 1992).

The landmines issue is of course even more complex. This "poor man's weapon" is seen by much of the military in Latin America as essential for the conduct of modern war, especially in the context of insurgencies in which they tend to find themselves. While Cuba suggests that such weapons are essential to deter the United States from an invasion, Colombia can argue that its vital points protection programme would be worthless without cheap and easily deployable mines. Little wonder then that while Latin America, and indeed the Americas, are in some ways showing the way on the issue of an eventual total ban, feelings can still run high on the question of when and under what circumstances. Military minds and nationalist opinion can meet on this issue and this will require some addressing if one is to have early success in this field.

This leads us to consider proliferation of conventional arms in general. Here one runs head on into the civil-military issues mentioned repeatedly above. Resistance is greatest here because conventional arms have to do with much more than international security affairs. Conventional arms are the military's visible source of prestige. They are the weapons with which guerrilla wars have been fought and won. They are the deterrent against rebellion and terrorism at home. They make public parades possible and ensure the armed forces are taken seriously.

It should also be remembered that strategic balances have worked remarkably well in Latin America historically and for long periods have contributed greatly to regional peace. In the absence of nuclear weapons, or others weapons of mass destruction, conventional weapons are the main means to produce such balances and to provide deterrence *vis-à-vis* potential adversaries. Thus it should not surprise us, even when we attempt to work around this, that Latin American countries find it on occasion difficult to handle this issue.

Monitoring and Verification of Compliance

Given what has been said about transparency in Latin America, it will not be surprising to note that the areas of monitoring and compliance are not without their problems. While Latin America has a less than straightforward view of "a man's word is his bond" as an element of international relations, it is often felt that verification can lead to more distrust than trust. It is difficult enough for Latin American military men to imagine their own parliaments monitoring their activities without being required to make the leap to conjure up the idea of foreign military and diplomatic personnel doing so. Nonetheless, there are elements of these processes present in some Central and South American accords to date.

In general, among the high moral stances taken by Latin American diplomats, but especially military officers, it is difficult to find a space for monitoring and verification of compliance. Academic meetings discussing these issues, to which military officers have been invited, have usually found the armed forces representatives unsure as to how to take talk of monitoring agreements which are themselves sacred and formal undertakings with which they will, *as a matter of course*, abide. As mentioned, Latin America is one of the worst regions of the world where cooperation with something as simple as the UN Arms Register is concerned. This is an expression, as clear as one can get, of the sort of problems being raised here.

Dispute Settlement Procedures

At the risk of being repetitive, one is obliged to say that much of what has been said above applies here again. Latin America has a long and proud record of peaceful settlement of disputes. Full-scale warfare is rarer here than in perhaps any other continent in the world, except for North America in the last

century. Inter-American law, the Treaty of Bogotá of 1948, the Charter of the Organization of American States, and local arrangements all provide a bewildering range of means to settle peacefully disputes which arise between states of the Americas.⁵² In general, this has worked rather well. Although outstanding disputes are of course still there in fairly large numbers, by the standards of most of the world, they are rarely settled by recourse to arms.

Unfortunately, here again the tendency for high-flying and morally perfect declarations of good intentions and brotherhood has often obscured the real need for moving forward with the substantial issues still at hand and standing in the way of definitive settlement of disputes. The Peru-Ecuador dispute, as well as those between Venezuela and Colombia, Peru and Chile, Bolivia and Chile, some Central American states, and others, serve as examples of the problem. Little progress is made but ringing declarations of affection and solidarity most assuredly, and boringly, are. When things get rough, difficult situations can escalate into border incidents of importance or all-out conflict. Not only can this be said of intra-Latin American disputes but even about those between Latin American states and the United States and key European players on the regional security scene. The procedures can prove to be simply sidestepped or ignored as events come upon the diplomats. Part of the problem is often the civil-military relations issue discussed above. In any case, the rhetoric is positively unhelpful in this regard despite its being solidly anchored in the Latin American diplomatic and security tradition.

Peacekeeping and Peace-building

Peacekeeping was far from a positive concept in Latin America before this decade. The United States had repeatedly used the term for its interventions in Latin, especially Central America, and the word had got a very bad press not only from the left but also from the centre and the nationalist right of the political spectrum in most of the region.⁵³ It was considered intrusive and in the service of the regional superpower. Only the experiences of observer missions in Central America, combined with the increasing involvement of Latin American armed forces themselves in worldwide operations of this kind, began slowly to change this fairly generalized perception. Armed forces of countries into which peacekeeping missions were sent tended to resent their presence and consider them too pro-insurgent. And the quite traditionalist forces of the region were sceptical of the training advantages of these "soft" operations which they felt might take away from their troops' preparation for the "real thing," that is: interstate conflict of the traditional kind.

This has now to a great extent changed. Most Latin American countries have taken part in at least one such operation and several have taken part in a number all over the world. The training advantages have been there for all to see and experience. And civilian authorities have often seen the advantages of these operations not only as a way to be seen to be active in efforts for world peace but as a means to keep the military professionally interested in the international arena without becoming either aggressive towards neighbours or overly active internally.

⁵² Pope Atkins, *Latin America in the International Political System*, 298-329; and Héctor Faúndes-Ledesma, "El Marco jurídico-institucional para la solución de conflictos en el sistema interamericano," in José A. Silva Michelena, ed., *Paz, seguridad y desarrollo en América Latina* (Caracas: Nueva Sociedad, 1987), 239-270.

⁵³ Jack Child, *The Central American Peace Process, 1983-1991: Sheathing Swords, Building Confidence* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 3-11; and Hal Klepak, *Canada and Latin America: Strategic Issues for the 1990s* (Ottawa: Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, 1990), 181-184.

There is still the enormous question of the legitimacy of these operations, especially in their most recent form. Some countries still feel they are overly intrusive, have no basis in international law or indeed in the UN Charter, and that there is not the slightest consistency in their launching or terms of reference. Mexico in particular feels they contain the germ of international intervention, in the direct interests essentially of the United States, the world's only superpower, and that therefore they should be eschewed as extremely dangerous for national sovereignty and international law until such time as they have a proper legal basis and issues of intrusiveness and *au service de qui* are addressed.⁵⁴ Mexico is also not as alone on this as sometimes appears. Few Latin American capitals are not at least a bit nervous about the increasingly intrusive nature of many such operations. While several countries wish for a regional or universal organization with more muscle in the realms of human rights, the defence of democratic regimes and the like, Latin American history is long and shows that "northern" interventions always come cloaked in some highly principled garb but often show little of it in practice. Several Latin American states can be expected to resist tendencies to reinforce the scope of peacekeeping operations, especially in the region itself. And while the armed forces of many countries are increasingly willing to get involved in such activities, there is a marked preference for it to take place *outside* the Americas.

Conclusions

This paper has aimed high. The subject of the cultural influences which have an impact on international relations in Latin America is fraught with questions and lacking with respect to answers. There is no real literature on the subject. The above has attempted to suggest some elements of the response to the question of to what extent the cultural dimension has a role to play in the specific area of arms control and disarmament.

That having been said, it is hoped that the above shows that, at least in the author's view, the impact of culture matters, especially in the area of civil-military relations which, as has been suggested, has become an essential part of the cultural preparation of diplomats and military officers alike where Latin American foreign policy, and especially security policy, are concerned. While making no claim to excessive academic rigour in this regard, it is hoped that this survey may be of some help in understanding the features of this debate worth pursuing. Latin Americans, diplomats and military officers involved in international security matters, are the product of a specific culture and experience which imposes considerable restraints on their actions and which guides their thinking on issues of note despite their feeling of complete belonging to the Western cultural tradition. Given their history it is hardly surprising that in the security field the elements of shared culture are less obvious than in some others.

This author would suggest that these conclusions are policy-relevant. Latin America is greatly influenced by the West and particularly by the United States. That cultural influence is growing all the time especially among the elite and it is less diffuse in its origins now given the overwhelmingly powerful cultural influences emanating from the U.S. alone. The most direct influence on the elite is probably its increasing education in the universities of that country. But Latin Americans will remain Latin Americans

⁵⁴ Klepak, *Natural Allies?*..., 177-186; the chapters on security in Olga Pellicer, ed., *Las Naciones Unidas hoy: visión de México* (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1994); and Olga Pellicer and Joel Hernández, "Nuevas tendencias en materia de seguridad colectiva internacional: dudas e incertidumbres," in Olga Pellicer, ed., *La Seguridad internacional en América Latina y el Caribe: el debate contemporáneo* (Mexico: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 1995), 229-247.

and will not soon rid themselves of all the cultural baggage outlined here. And especially in the security area, change will be slow.

Thus one will have to some extent to live with most of what has been underscored here. In many countries the military are losing influence but normally only gradually, and this situation is not everywhere the case. There is a growth in the understanding of the need for security arrangements which underpin the economic and political cooperation whose value is so clear to most decision makers. Those who wish to see greater cooperation from the Latin American states in the non-proliferation and arms control fields should attempt to understand these phenomena and make a greater effort to bring the Latin Americans along.

The north can help a great deal in educating key members of the civilian elites in these countries about defence matters. This would go a long way to easing some of the issues of civil-military relations mentioned. Showing more transparency ourselves in the working of arms control groupings can help to reduce concerns in these countries about their ability to resist excessive northern pressures if they accept the objectives sought by those countries in such groups. Working with nascent but interested elements of civil society, from universities and research centres for example, can help to build the constituency for these objectives in key countries. And efforts to show the military that collaboration does not necessarily mean the end of a legitimate degree of armed forces influence in the security area and more widely in foreign policy, and that arms control does not necessarily imply ruin for them and their families, need to be made and indeed should be more closely studied in order to address these real concerns.

There is thus a good deal which can be done. But culture remains formative and vital to states and individuals. These societies are the result of a lived historic experience and only an understanding of the very real security concerns they have will allow us to obtain more support from them in security fields which are, as in the past, still offering great challenges globally and regionally.

VII. Regional Culture and the NACD in the Middle East

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Introduction: The Web of Conflicts in the Middle East

Cultural¹ factors obviously play a role in issues related to non-proliferation and arms control in the Middle East.² The regional agenda is full of concrete problems related to the non-proliferation and arms control dialogue (NACD), and the specific issues involved in the regional political process cannot be separated from the cultural issues. Although in most cases conflict management and resolution have to do more with the concrete issues than with the cultural background, the two in practice go together and cultural difficulties tend to exacerbate the controversies in the process. Analysis shows that cultural factors, in the majority of the cases, make progress in conflict resolutions more, not less difficult, although the picture is not entirely bleak.

The role of culture in conflict is not, however, easy to diagnose, because the basic attitudes to the conflicts between the various parties in the region and the cultural differences between them (which are often of substantial importance to the understanding of the conflicts themselves³) tend to spill over to NACD issues as well. In other words, the parties take a given stand not necessarily on the merits of the NACD-related issue as such, but on the basis of the perception of that issue within the broader context of the conflict in question.⁴

Although there are many conflicts in the Middle East, the Arab-Israeli conflict has been probably the most salient feature of contemporary Middle East politics. It has been conducted around at least four,

¹ Recently, cultural approaches to the study of world politics have become newly fashionable. See, for instance, Lawrence E. Harrison, *Who Prospers? How Cultural Variables Shape Economic and Political Success* (New York: Free Press, 1995), Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," *Foreign Affairs*, 72 (Summer, 1993); Benjamin Barber, *Jihad Versus McWorld* (New York: Random House, 1995), Thomas Sowell, *Race and Culture: A World View* (New York: Bantam Books, 1994). It is necessary to point out that the definitions of culture in these widely quoted works tends to be very loose and difficult to fit into scientific frameworks. See also "Cultural Explanations," *The Economist*, 9 November 1994.

² For an excellent and annotated bibliography of the literature on non-proliferation and arms control in the Middle East, see Andrew Richter's "Selected Bibliography" in Gabriel Ben-Dor and David B. Dewitt, eds., *Confidence Building Measures in the Middle East* (Boulder: Westview, 1994). The relevant sections in this paper draw to a significant extent on the items in that bibliography.

³ See Gabriel Ben-Dor, *State and Conflict in the Middle East* (New York: Praeger, 19983).

⁴ In other words, NACD becomes part of the conflict management process as such. See Gabriel Ben-Dor and David Dewitt, eds., *Conflict Management in the Middle East* (Lexington: Heath, 1987).

analytically separate axes:⁵ first, the Israeli-Palestinian circle⁶; the second, between Israel and the neighbouring countries over territory, strategy and other tangible foci of controversy; third, the ideological conflict between Zionism and Arab nationalism,⁷ including more remote countries; and finally the clash of Jewish aspirations to nationhood with certain aspects of Islamic political doctrines.⁸ These four separate levels of the Arab-Israeli conflict can be regarded as four concentric circles which in some way feed on one another.⁹ In recent years, progress for the reduction and partial resolution of the conflict has been discernible both within the state-to-state as well as the Israeli-Palestinian circles, with a long way to go. The ideological-nationalist circle is still very much alive, even in the midst of a considerable decline in Arab nationalist sentiment,¹⁰ and of course the Islamic-Jewish religious circle is more alive and relevant than ever.¹¹ In general, the more ideological and civilizational the circle, as in the case of the third and fourth circles, the more cultural elements tend to predominate.¹²

In addition to the Arab-Israeli conflict, many other conflicts have existed in recent Middle Eastern history, some of them extremely violent and of long duration. For instance, the war between Iran and Iraq in 1980-1988, an example of the conflicts between Arabs and non-Arabs in the region, claimed more victims than a whole century of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Such conflicts involve both non-Arab states such as Turkey and Iran, as well as non-state forces and actors such as the Kurds or the Africans in Southern Sudan. An equally important type of conflict is the inter-Arab variety, over hegemony, ideology, geostrategic and economic assets. Inter-Arab conflict has been widespread, with some of its patterns reflecting traditional and historical rivalries in the region, in evidence literally since time immemorial.¹³ Among these are the rivalry between Iraq and Syria over hegemony in the Fertile Crescent, between Egypt and the Sudan over the waters of the Nile, or between Morocco and Algeria over the Sahara. At

⁵ See the expansion of this framework in Gabriel Ben-Dor, "Inter-Arab Relations and the Arab-Israeli Conflict," *The Jerusalem Journal of International Affairs*, 1:4 (Summer, 1976).

⁶ See Gabriel Ben-Dor, ed., *The Palestinians and the Middle East Conflict* (Ramat Gan: Turtledove Press, 1978).

⁷ See Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (2nd edition, New York: St. Martin's, 1992).

⁸ This was developed in great detail in Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Arab Approaches and Israeli Responses* (New York: Free Press, 1976).

⁹ Ben-Dor, *State and Conflict in the Middle East* and "Inter-Arab Relations and the Arab-Israeli Conflict."

¹⁰ See the argument of Fouad Ajami, *The Arab Predicament*, new edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) and Elie Kedourie, *Politics in the Middle East* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).

¹¹ The literature on this is so voluminous that there is no possibility even to start listing it systematically within the parameters of this paper. However, I would like to mention the interesting background analysis to this in Hassan Bakr A. Hassan, "Islamic Revivalism and Its Impact on the Middle East and the Superpowers," in Junsuk Chay, ed., *Culture and International Relations* (New York: Praeger, 1990), 207-223.

¹² And this is also the view of Huntington in his often quoted "Clash of Civilizations."

¹³ See the literature quoted in Ben-Dor, "Inter-Arab Relations and the Arab-Israeli Conflict."

times, this type of conflict "sucks in" outside Arab forces (as in the case of Egypt in the Yemen in the early 1960s, or Syria in Lebanon since the mid-1970s). And, of course, the hugely influential example of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the resulting Gulf War demonstrate the extreme consequences of existential conflict on the inter-Arab scene, one that in this particular case spilled over into a form of global violence.

While these diverse conflicts can be perceived and analyzed as if they were distinct and separate, in practice they tend not only to overlap but also to interlock. Arab attitudes to Israel are to a significant extent contingent on inter-Arab politics: Arab powers often oppose the moves of an Arab actor toward Israel because of what they mean in the inter-Arab context. For example, an Arab state may oppose the *rapprochement* between an Arab country or a group of Arab countries on the one hand, and Israel on the other, not because it has any problems with Israel as such at the moment, but rather because the *rapprochement* would create problems for that state in the given region. This has been seen in the Egyptian reactions to the development of relations between Israel and the small states in the Gulf.

Conversely, an Arab state may enter various forms of cooperative relations with Israel, not because of changes in its attitudes toward Israel as such, but because this supplies it with significant, if not decisive, assets in its dealings with other Arab forces that threaten it even more than any perceived danger from Israel. Such has been the case in the relations between Jordan and Israel for decades, also between Lebanon and Israel in various periods of recent history; less well-known examples involve Yemen, Morocco and other Arab countries. Perhaps the most extreme example was the forceful Israeli act of deterrence against Syria in September 1970, an act which was designed, (after an appropriate set of understandings between Israel and the United States), to rescue the Jordanian regime from the pressure of Syria.

Obviously, then, when we equate the Arab-Israeli conflict with "conflict in the Middle East" we are committing not only a theoretical mistake, but one which also has far-reaching practical applications, simply because in the real world of the rough-and-tumble Middle East, the various conflicts spill over, overlap and at times grow into a kind of symbiosis that has to be perceived and analyzed as one coherent whole, albeit containing many disparate sources and elements. The complexity of this system of interrelated conflict is one primary reason why the depths of the violent world of Middle East politics are so difficult to fathom. We can ignore this fact of life only at the peril of serious and profound analysis which is congruent with the real world of regional political life.¹⁴

However, it is not practical to try and analyze the cultural factors that impinge on NACD related issues within the broad context of all, or even most conflicts in the Middle East. Hence, while the analysis in this chapter will concentrate on the Arab-Israeli conflict,¹⁵ one should note that this is by no means the only conflict (or even the most volatile or violent one) in the area, and that the various conflicts interact in a dynamic and highly fluid way over time. Even then, to concentrate on the "Arab-Israeli conflict" begs the question of which particular Arab-Israeli conflict, and in which particular period. It is evident

¹⁴ See Bernard Lewis, *The Middle East* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995).

¹⁵ For an earlier attempt to work out a scheme for studying political culture in a similar context, see William Gamson, "The Political Culture of the Arab-Israeli Conflict," *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 5:2 (Spring 1981). Gamson's analysis is schematic, and he works with eight categories: metaphors, exemplars, catch-phrases, depictions, visual images, roots, consequences and appeals to principle.

that the recent stages of the conflict have been concerned with the possibilities of accommodation and peace as one primary focus of the various activities of the parties, and therefore, the implications for the entire ambience of NACD related issues are entirely different from periods of more or less pure confrontation in the more remote past. Second, the various conflict circles within the Arab-Israeli conflict themselves are full of cases which are substantially at variance, for a variety of reasons.

One reason is that the Arab countries in question differ substantially, both in terms of their interests in regional politics as well as within the political cultures in the given entities.¹⁶ For example, the Israeli-Egyptian conflict has been very different than the one between Israel and Syria, another key Arab state; between Israel and the PLO, a non-state actor; or between Israel, a state, and the Palestinians, a society without a state. Note that the differences *between* the various Arab countries are perceived to a large extent in terms of culture, rather than in terms of a concept labelled "Arab mentality," a peculiarly Arab way of thinking or doing things, politically and otherwise.¹⁷ Clearly, this concept is most inadequate, since the cultural differences between the various Arab countries are large enough to justify making distinctions between them, so that the entire idea of "mentality" as a useful generalization may be faulty.¹⁸

The distinctions made in Israel between the cultures of the various Arab countries are partly a matter of mere impressionism. For instance, Israelis involved in Arab affairs generally argue that Egyptians tend to be tolerant, relatively non-violent and with a good sense of humour, whereas Syrians, on the other hand, tend to be dry, without a sense of humour, volatile and more prone to violence. Scholars account for these differences by the different history and geopolitical positions of both countries. Thus, they observe the existence of Egypt as a well-defined entity that has existed as such almost without interruption for some six thousand years, in more or less obvious boundaries, with a tradition of very strong central rule, due also to the existence of an irrigation system that is controlled from the capital, a river civilization of long-standing, the strength of a Pharaonic culture that existed long before Islam or Arabdom, and the geo-strategic unity and coherence of the country.¹⁹ By contrast, Syria is considered in

¹⁶ Historically, what used to be referred to as "Middle Eastern Studies" tended to overgeneralize about the countries of the region and often failed to make the necessary distinctions between them, especially when it came to issues of political behaviour. See Manfred Halpern, "Middle Eastern Studies: A Review of the State of the Field with a Few Examples," *World Politics*, 15 (October 1962), 108-122 and Manfred Halpern, *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

¹⁷ Some of the generalizations about Arab "mentality" in Israel stem from the work of the late anthropologist Rafael Patai, who used to speak of the "Arab mind" in the various works cited here, and who also wrote a book by that title.

¹⁸ See the detailed argument on this in Gabriel Ben-Dor, "Political Culture Approach to Middle East Politics," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 8:1 (January 1976); Lisa Anderson, "Democracy in the Arab World: A Critique of the Political Culture Approach," in Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany and Paul Noble, eds., *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World*, vol. 1, *Theoretical Perspectives* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 77-92, as opposed to Michael C. Hudson, "The Political Culture Approach to Arab Democratization: The Case for Bringing it Back in, Carefully," in Brynen, Korany and Noble, *Political Liberalization*, 61-76.

¹⁹ See the argument in Gabriel Ben-Dor, "Stateness and Ideology in Contemporary Middle Eastern Politics," *The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, 9:3 (1987) and Ben-Dor, "The Continuity of the Egyptian State and the Ambiguity of the Revolution," in Shimon Shamir, ed., *Egypt From Monarchy To Republic: A*

Israel as a more or less artificial country, or at least one with artificial boundaries, the result of imperialist manipulations which do not reflect historical or demographic realities.²⁰ Hence the country suffers from endemic problems of self-definition and political identity, which in turn throw the country into endless outside adventures, (as the one in Lebanon²¹) trying to define its boundaries and spheres of influence by overzealous foreign intervention. Syria's lack of clear identity, according to this view, is compensated for by an extreme ideology of Arab nationalism and unity, which in turn puts it in the position of a natural leader of the Arab cause, for reasons which have little to do with the Arab cause, and everything to do with the problems of Syria as a not quite natural entity.

Moreover, while Egypt has a long tradition of a central role that is relatively easily imposed and highly respected, Syria is a very centrifugal country, which is most difficult to control from the center. Indeed, it may even lack a center altogether, due to the geographic as well as ethnic-demographic structure of the country, with its numerous sects, minorities, regional and tribal sub-centers, regions and peripheries. To rule such a country, a good deal of violence is needed, in both capturing and maintaining power, which necessarily in turn creates a violent political culture, although primarily on the level of Syrians toward one another rather than of political forces toward one another. Not surprisingly, in the light of all this, there is much willingness to employ violence toward outsiders who are not members of the Syrian political community.

Culture, Conflict and Security in the Region

These two stereotypes in Israel of two Arab countries may or may not correspond to objective realities, but that is hardly the point. The point is that Israelis act on the basis of these perceptions, stereotypes which surprisingly enough, also exist in wide strata of the Arab population. On the other hand, various Arab forces (as we shall see) also adopt cultural stereotypes of the Jews in Israel, and of Israeli society and the Jewish state, some of which are very far from any reality as perceived by the Israelis themselves, or even by the vast majority of the outside world. So just like Israeli perceptions of a general "Arab mentality" are mostly faulty, so are Arab perceptions of a "Jewish mentality" or an "Israeli mentality" or a "Jewish Israeli mentality" and the like. We would do well to guard against such unwarranted generalizations.

However, the risk of overgeneralization should not blind us to the fact that there are numerous cases of cultural factors playing an important role in the Arab-Israeli conflict,²² and we must not ignore these as we try to tackle various options and prospects of conflict management and conflict resolution within the

Reassessment of Revolution and Change (Boulder: Westview, 1995).

²⁰ See Moshe Maoz and Avner Yaniv, eds., *Syria Under Assad* (London: Croom and Helm, 1986).

²¹ Lebanon is referred to as a "non-state" in the theoretical argument in Ben-Dor, "Stateness and Ideology in Contemporary Middle East Politics."

²² Gamson's eight categories are quite convincing on this point. Even if one discounts two or three of them as more structural than cultural, enough remains to make a strong case. See Gamson, "The Political Culture of the Arab-Israeli Conflict," in conjunction with Ben-Dor, "Political Culture Approach to Middle East Politics."

various stages of the ongoing peace process.²³ Previous experience and existing literature can teach us something about cultural factors in such situations, which is to say situations of negotiations between states and international forces.²⁴ The emphasis is on *negotiations*, since we should realize that the very willingness to enter processes of negotiations with adverse parties signifies, in acute conflicts, a significant deviation from perceptions of "pure conflict," and introduces more and more substantial elements of cooperation into the relationship.²⁵ Let us keep in mind some of the more relevant observations and generalizations of the negotiations literature when we come to consider cultural factors in Arab-Israeli negotiations on issues which basically revolve around negotiations on strategic understanding and even cooperation.²⁶ These general points are the conclusions of scholars from other cases in the world, and they need to be tested as hypotheses in the case of the Middle East.

First, we are told that cultural factors are more important in terms of process than outcome. From this view we can deduce that the most important precondition of strategic negotiations is the fundamental decision that it is in one's interest to join in the process and to try and reach a positive result.²⁷ Without the basic political will, no favourable outcome is possible.²⁸ Where there is a will, there is a way, so the outcome primarily depends on understanding and articulation of self-interest. On the other hand, *how* a given party will try to reach that hoped for end result is very much a matter of culture; that is, how the parties will travel the road to negotiations is indeed culturally determined. Hence culture is very relevant to process.

Second, in a similar vein, it appears that in almost all cases studied, culture is more relevant to style than substance. In other words, culture determines how we say what we say more than it determines what we say. Style has to do with communications and with the transmission of messages as well as images, so

²³ See the various studies in Ben-Dor and Dewitt, *Conflict Management in the Middle East*.

²⁴ On the state of the study of culture in international relations literature in general see R.B.J. Walker, "The Concept of Culture in the Theory of International Relations," in Chay, *Culture and International Relations*, 3-17. For an earlier and very comprehensive survey see Adda Bozeman, *Politics and Culture in International History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960). On negotiation see Joshua Weiss, *Culture and Negotiation: A Bibliography* (Harvard University Program on Negotiation, Working Draft, 1996) which has sections on both general theoretical concerns as well as several regions of the world, including the Middle East.

²⁵ See Gabriel Ben-Dor and David B. Dewitt, "Confidence Building and the Peace Process in the Middle East" in Ben-Dor and Dewitt, *Confidence Building Measures in the Middle East*, 333-362.

²⁶ Most of these observations are based on lessons of the Jeffrey Z. Rubin Memorial Conference, October 17-19, Harvard University Law School, Program on Negotiation, which had a special panel on culture and negotiations.

²⁷ Ole Elgstrom, "The Role of Culture: A Discussion and Case Study," and Derong Chen, "The Complexity of Chinese Negotiation Rationales," papers delivered at the Rubin Memorial Conference. See also Guy O. Faure and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, eds., *Culture and Negotiation* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1993) and Raymond Cohen, *Negotiations Across Cultures: Communication Obstacles in International Diplomacy* (Washington: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1991).

²⁸ See Raymond Cohen, *Culture and Conflict in Egyptian-Israeli Relations: A Dialogue of the Deaf* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990).

that even when the messages are basically harmless or outright positive, they may be misperceived and misunderstood. So stylistic differences may not predominate, but they do matter and in some cases they even make a major difference, certainly so when the distance between the parties is great, and little experience exists with contacts between them.

Third, culture matters more when the parties negotiate via relatively low level delegations, and less when the negotiations are conducted on very high or the highest levels. This difference is apparently due to the fact that high level officials and leaders are able to meet in small forums, where there is not only a level of intimacy, but also the probability of the existence of a common global culture of world leaders, who respond to similar stimuli and who are then able to use a common language derived from global concepts and ideas, and to use a set of terms, concepts and values which evoke a similar response in the members of the other side.

Fourth, it appears that culture matters more where the meetings or negotiations are face to face or in bilateral forums, and less when the negotiations are multilateral. The possible reasons for this distinction are not difficult to understand. The problem is of a directness that could deteriorate to bluntness or abruptness in the face of a negotiating partner who is also an opponent or adversary, when there is no mechanism to soften the blow of accusations or demands made in a language that may not be comprehensible to the other side, or which may be easily misunderstood with no one present to make sure that things do not go astray or awry. On the other hand, in multilateral forums there are ample mediating mechanisms and forces that help overcome such cultural gaps. The existence of such forces and the need to appeal to them, and the necessity to speak their language and to make sure that they are included in some understanding favourable to one's side, force a cultural modification in language and behaviour which soften and cushion the possible blows that stem from cultural gaps.

We would do well to bear in mind such qualifications and reservations, not that they make culture less important, but they make it more relevant *in given, specified situations*. In other words, this kind of theoretical orientations shifts the argument from blanket generalizations such as "culture matters" or "culture does not matter" to concrete arguments as to the conditions under which culture matters more or less. Indeed, in the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict we can utilize the concept of culture with greater effect if we reserve its uses mostly to the cases in which it is likely to play a significant role (in view of theoretical findings), and on the other hand, we may refine and develop further these findings in the light of the specifics of the Arab-Israeli case.

Since the Arab-Israeli conflict does abound in instances in which there are bilateral negotiations in which the parties may have made a basic decision to try and make progress, but find it difficult to do so in the light of stylistic differences, particularly when relatively low level delegations are involved, it makes ample sense to study cultural factors and to try and find ways out of impasse situations in which such factors play an obviously salient role.

Theoretically, it makes sense to think of culture in negotiations as language. Language, like culture, is seemingly a way of articulating ideas and concepts.²⁹ However, we know that language is much more than that. It is also way of conceptualizing our own ideas and insights, that not only reflects them but also

²⁹ See the many examples in Faure and Rubin, *Culture and Negotiation* and also in Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Rubin, eds., *Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management* (New York: St. Martin's, 1992).

shapes them to a very significant extent. In other words, it is a vehicle of communication which is the demonstration, *par excellence*, of the profound idea that in many cases "the medium is the message." So, culture shapes but does not determine many political interactions, just as language shapes, if does not necessarily determine, many social and interpersonal interactions. This caveat should help us to be on guard against the fallacies of political determinism, while at the same time alerting us to the need to think positively and creatively not only about the core of politics (which is the struggle for the realization of political interests), but also about the forms that the understanding, articulation and communication of such definitions of interests take, and the impact these forms have on political processes. We should always keep in mind that culture is not one "variable" of several, but that it is the general set of attitudes in the mind of the actors which gives meaning to the "variables" we use so frequently in modern social science. In particular, in the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict the meaning of the most basic words used in the dialogue, such as peace, is entirely different in the minds of the two parties,³⁰ and when the Israeli Prime Minister Begin called the Egyptian Foreign Minister "a young man," he intended a compliment that was perceived as a mortal insult. "Settlements" to the Arabs mean colonialism and imperialism, to many Israelis they merely refer to the heroic pioneering effort of the Zionist revolution.

Hence, culture really refers, or should refer, to sets of attitudes, symbols, habits, customs and beliefs that inform the decision makers in the various areas of social activity. Within this framework, political culture³¹ refers to those components of culture that affect the attitudes, symbols, habits, customs and beliefs which have to do with the political system and the role of the individual in it. Political culture has to do with many different areas of political life,³² so that many subcultures exist. Some of these may have to do with various facets of domestic political life, others with international issues and problems, among these are the ones that are more or less directly related to non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament in general, as well as the process of negotiating about them in particular.

It is important to think about subcultures, because political units are at times large, and in almost all cases diverse and versatile.³³ Hence subsets of attitudes, and beliefs within them may differ considerably along many different lines or dimensions of variance, among them geographic regions, class or strata in society,

³⁰ A huge literature exists on the various shades of the meaning of peace in Arabic, ranging from cease-fire to temporary cessation of hostilities to armistice, non-belligerency and so on. This is best brought out, from the Israeli point of view, in Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Arab Attitudes to Israel* (Jerusalem: Keter, 1976).

³¹ The classic conceptions of political culture -- since then heavily criticized and modified -- are to be found and Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, eds., *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963) and Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., *Political Culture and Political Development*.

³² As mentioned before, the political culture approach used to be prominent in the early and mid-1960s and then fell into a disrepute of sorts for some two decades. In the late 1980s and early 1990s it experienced a modest, but significant comeback. See on this Alan Kornbers, *Politics and Culture in Canada* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Center for Political Studies, 1988), Ronald Inglehart, "The Renaissance of Political Culture," *American Political Science Review*, 82:4 (December, 1988), and Harry Eckstein, "A Culturalist Theory of Political Change," *The American Political Science Review*, 82:3 (September, 1988).

³³ See the critique of the classic approach to political culture and the alternative conceptions of subcultures in Ben-Dor, "Political Culture Approach to Middle East Politics" and also Peter H. Merkl, *Modern Comparative Politics* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970). The latter book has a most useful and succinct survey of the state of the field on political culture, at the height of the popularity of that notion.

religion, or occupation.³⁴ In fact, some of the key problems of political systems are at times explained by differences in political culture within societies. On the other hand, one should keep in mind that while cultures by their very definition are more stable and enduring than the structures or acts that they condition, they are also liable to change. Such changes are complex learning processes, technically called socialization, and of course these processes refer to learning, which is also how cultures in general are acquired.³⁵ This is yet another reason to be wary of deterministic cultural generalizations: cultures can and do change, just as individual attitudes can and do change.³⁶

At the same time, if we take seriously the idea of culture as a major tool of explaining complex political and strategic conflict, we should not treat it as a residual category: as a conceptual trash can in which everything that cannot be explained is attributed to a vague notion of culture, if subject to change. While cultures, as mentioned before, can and do change, they do so more slowly than the transformation of behaviour and structure: it is in the nature of things for underlying beliefs and attitudes to endure for longer periods of time than the acts and patterns than they influence. In fact, to attribute to culture a rate of change that is too quick will explain little or nothing, and its entire existence as a noticeable and perhaps measurable concept will be at stake. Hence we need to look in our analysis at the more persistent and enduring components of cultural systems, and less at those ideas and values that indeed do change quickly in response to the events of the day.

Political and Strategic Culture in the Middle East: Patterns and Problems

Political cultures, and their subcultures, such as the ones that refer to strategic issues, can be at times derivatives of the general culture, but they need not be directly so.³⁷ They may also be the product of the particular and peculiar political history and memories of the people in the given system or society.³⁸ While there may be substantial differences between these sources and their general orientations, it is hard

³⁴ See the classic Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan, eds., *Comparing Nations* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), especially the article by Juan J. Linz and Amando de Miguel, "Within-Nation Differences and Comparisons: The Eight Spains."

³⁵ Indeed, in addition to the literature on political culture, there is a parallel one on political socialization, which, however, is much too voluminous to refer to here. For some representative works from the height of the popularity of that concept, see Herbert Hyman, *Political Socialization* (New York: Free Press, 1969), Kenneth P. Langton, *Political Socialization* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964) and Richard E. Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt, *Political Socialization* (Boston: Little Brown, 1969).

³⁶ Ole Elgstrom, "National Culture and International Negotiations," *Cooperation and Conflict* 29:3, (1994), 289-301.

³⁷ See the recent works dedicated to the connection between culture and strategy, as in Peter Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996) and Robert A. Rubinstein, "Cultural Aspects of Peacekeeping: Notes on the Substance of Symbols," *Millennium*, 22:3 (Winter 1991), 547-562. Compare with the now classic formulation (from 1990!) by Cohen in his *Negotiations Across Cultures*, which, of course, derives from the Israeli-Egyptian experience.

³⁸ See Michael Mazaar, "Culture and International Relations: A Review Essay," *Washington Quarterly*, 19:2, (1996), 177-197.

to believe that a subculture related to strategic issues could be entirely different from, or contradictory to, other principal components of the political culture in general, although, of course, the distance between the two in the concrete case in question has to be determined within the specifics of the situation.³⁹

So the "NACD" culture we are interested in may be the more or less exact duplicate of the general political question of society, but it is also the product of a "conflict culture," meaning the set of attitudes and beliefs that relate to the way the society in question regards the conflict it conducts with the societies with which it conducts a strategic dialogue (in which case the proper term would be "strategic culture").⁴⁰ Finally, the "NACD" culture may also be the product of more specific NACD issues in that these are often the product of long experience with negotiations about them, and with their effect on practical policies. So the analysis of "NACD cultures" could take place on four levels: culture in general, political culture broadly defined, the culture of the relevant conflicts, and the culture of the specific issues in question. It is not yet established in theoretical literature how these various levels interact, but clearly there should be some interrelationship between them, and such an interrelationship will differ from one case to another. Certainly this issue is worthy of further theoretical attention and investigation.

In the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict, we do have a substantial literature about political culture in the Middle East. Although it is not clear to what extent the conflict has been about culture, scholars do tend to agree that it has contained many important cultural elements. They also agree, as a rule, on the maxim that once the parties make a decision to change the patterns of conflict, they are able to overcome, one way or another, cultural obstacles and inhibitions. One important example is that of the late President Sadat of Egypt, who in the 1973 war used various Islamic cultural elements to increase the fervour of Egyptian soldiers in the fight against Israel; but when he decided to make peace in 1977, he made use of Islamic cultural themes and motifs to stress the need for peace, in the spirit of brotherhood between Muslims and Jews and with an orientation toward peaceful coexistence rather than the sharpening of cultural and religious differences between the parties. This example is of major importance in analysing the role of culture in the twists and turns of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In analysing NACD-related cultural issues, it is important, first of all, to list the cultural factors that contribute to the creation or maintenance of the conflict over the past century or so, for two reasons. First, this is the background against which the NACD in the Middle East has to be understood: unlike in other areas of the world, we are speaking of a region which has suffered until recently a lot of active warfare, and in which, therefore, the strategic dialogue is an integral part of conflict transformation, and the two cannot be understood properly in isolation. Second, as mentioned before, over time the cultural issues in a conflict tend to spill over into the strategic realm, and the two cannot always be analytically or empirically separated. So, simply to set the necessary background, without detailed analysis, what follows presents a succinct list of cultural factors in the Arab-Israeli conflict, as seen at times by one of the parties. The factors are listed as clusters, to make them easier to comprehend by analytical categories.

³⁹ As was done in relationship to Spain in the classic analysis by Linz and de Miguel.

⁴⁰ See Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security*.

Religion

Israel is a Jewish state, and of course the vast majority of the Arab states are populated by Muslims. However, this statement may not make sufficient sense without the point that both Judaism and Islam are behavioral religions, based on massive and comprehensive demands made on the believers in all walks of life. Both are total civilizations rather than religious in the more narrow sense of the term, as it is often understood in the contemporary West. Both Judaism and Islam speak about states and politics and warfare. While it is possible to argue that the majority in both societies is far from believing in all these commandments in everyday life, it is impossible to ignore the cultural residues of such huge civilizations on the lives of the people, whether or not they are believers in the strict sense of the term.⁴¹

History

The history of the Arab states has been, at least recently, one of colonization and imperialism, physically as well as ideologically and culturally.⁴² Hence their political culture has been one of total negation of that kind of imperialism, with which many of them identify Israel as an "agent" or "extension."⁴³ On the other hand, Jewish history has been full of persecution, oppression and physical massacres to the point of genocide. In the minds of many Israelis, all political conflicts involving the interest of the Jewish state are perceived in terms of fighting for survival, whether or not the given country or political force has been part of the historical baggage of persecution. In a sense, the Israelis are blaming the Muslims for the sins of the Christians, while the Arabs are blaming the Israelis for the sins of the British and the French.

Global Orientations

While about half of the Jewish population in Israel hails from Middle Eastern countries, and a substantial proportion has immigrated from Eastern Europe, in many ways Israel is a thoroughly Western country. Its social structure, political ideologies, constitutional structure, as well as literature, art and music reflect the culture of the West very closely. Its economy, science and technology clearly are part and parcel of the global market of the West. In terms of political orientation, Israel has maintained a "special relationship" with the United States, which is short of a formal treaty, but is nevertheless an enduring partnership of gigantic importance in the life of the Middle East. On the other hand, the Arab countries have an ambivalent relationship with the West, due not only to the sensitivities of history already alluded to, but also to present-day realities.

⁴¹ For the comparative analysis of the similarities in the problematique facing the Jewish and Muslim states in coming to terms with the dictates of behavioral religions facing the practical difficulties of modern statecraft see the appropriate chapters in Ben-Dor, *State and Conflict in the Middle East*. See also Michael Curtis, ed., *Politics and Religion in the Middle East* (Boulder: Westview, 1981) and Rael J. Isaac, *Israel Divided: Ideological Politics in the Jewish State* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976).

⁴² Bernard Lewis, *The Middle East and the West* (New York: Harper, 1971).

⁴³ See P.J. Vatikiotis, *Conflict in the Middle East* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1971).

The Arab states have had a long and difficult set of experiments with partial Westernization, which is one of the main themes in the art and literature of those countries.⁴⁴ Yet the results of this process are far from clear. In any case, by no stretch of the imagination can they be called Western countries in any meaningful sense of the term, even though the degrees of Westernization between them differ.⁴⁵ In addition, in the recent past several key Arab states had a long and intensive relationship with the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries, which had an impact on the culture of many leading figures in the political and military establishments of the Arab states. The present-day relationship with the United States and the West is characterized also by a feeling that the latter have a pro-Israel bias, and that they do not treat the Arab world with sufficient understanding and dignity.

Size and Numbers

Israelis feel that they are a small state, surrounded by numerous enemies and few, if any, friends to rely on -- a somewhat paradoxical feeling in the light of the record of the special relationship with the United States.⁴⁶ At the same time, Israelis are also obsessed by the fact they have a very small state by way of both territory and population, so that a sudden attack or an unsuccessful war in general might lead to the destruction of the entire Jewish state, unlike the other side which has a huge territory, large numbers and endless natural resources such as oil, and other Islamic countries automatically backing them (plus other such advantages).⁴⁷ In the light of this differentiation, many Israelis, on the one hand, are reluctant to take any chances for peace or conflict resolution; and on the other hand when the Arab side insists on territory and land to the last inch, Israelis regard this demand as proof of their greed and fanaticism, as they do not appear to be short of land, while for the Jews land limitation is seen as a question of life and death. This emphasis on the disparity in size and numbers used to be the general picture, before the distinction between the Palestinian problem and the general Arab cause became more evident, but even today this orientation prevails widely and is likely to endure for a long time to come.

One State Against the Many

Because Israel is one, but there are many Arab states with large differences in the way they act on their interests,⁴⁸ Israelis assume that internal squabbles and quarrels are par for the course for Arabs, a part of Arab culture, which is something that can and should be exploited for Israel's advantage. Arabs on

⁴⁴ See Lewis, *The Middle East*, and Kedourie, *Politics in the Middle East*.

⁴⁵ See the brilliant analysis in Martin Kramer, "Arab Nationalism: Mistaken Identity," *Daedalus*, 122:3 (Summer 1993), special issue on "Reconstructing Nations and States," and Ajami's by now classic and still provocative *The Arab Predicament*.

⁴⁶ See the classic theoretical background in David Vital, *The Survival of Small States* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971).

⁴⁷ See the detailed description and analysis of this perception in Avner Yaniv, *Politics and Strategy in Israel* (Hebrew) (Tel-Aviv: Sifriat Hapoalim, 1994); Israel Tal, *National Security: The Few Against the Many* (Hebrew) (Tel-Aviv: Dvir, 1996); Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Arab Strategies and Israel's Response* (New York: Free Press, 1977).

⁴⁸ See Ben-Dor, "Inter-Arab Relations and the Arab-Israeli Conflict" and Yair Evron and Yaakov Bar-Simantov, "Coalitions in the Arab World," *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations*, 1:2 (Winter 1995).

the other hand find that the existence of Israel, a small and aggressive island in the ocean of the Arab Middle East, is a major impediment on the road to Arab unity, solidarity and cooperation. The very existence of Arab disunity in the face of Israel is considered, at times, not a proof of the differences in the state interests of the various countries, but as evidence of the evil impact of Israel on the political life and coherence of the Arab world in general. When Israel makes alliances with non-Arab actors in the region as, at different times, with Turkey, Iran or the Kurds, this is considered by the Arabs as proof of the devious and treacherous nature of the Jewish entity, indeed of the Jewish political mind, rather than as a natural strategy of survival for the small and the weak, as seen by Israel itself. In a somewhat similar vein, the striving for Arab unity, which is a natural component of the political culture of the region, is often perceived by Israel as a threat to its very existence. The duality of an Arab world (which exists partly in politics, but partly only in the political mind of Arabs) and the multiplicity of Arab states, with different interests, is hard for the Israeli mind to grasp, so different is the political culture of Israel.

Political Structure

Israel maintains something close to a Western parliamentary democracy, with many parties, fiercely contested elections, a free and aggressive press, and an extremely critical public opinion.⁴⁹ The Arab countries have a very different political culture, be it one of monarchic dynasties or else one of military autocracies.⁵⁰ Although it is clear that the vast majority of the Arab states have recently undertaken attempts to introduce a measure of democratization -- a difficult undertaking in any case, and particularly in the face of the radical Islamic challenge in contemporary Islamic politics -- Israelis regard Arab politics as violent and volatile, inherently unstable, with the resulting regimes illegitimate, somehow thus proving the primitive character of the Arab societies that Israel has to deal with.

In the past, the argument was made that Arabs who murder each other cannot be trusted not to murder Jews, and those who are unable to maintain a stable regime at home will not be able to keep their word in international commitments. Interestingly, the peace with Egypt has survived the assassination of President Sadat without too much difficulty, whereas, on the other hand, there is a case to be made that the assassination of Israel Prime Minister Rabin has dealt the peace process with the Palestinians and the Syrians a grave, maybe mortal blow, which would put the shoe on the other foot. In any case, the differences between the basic political structures of the two sides make for many cultural incompatibilities, and also for difficulties in communicating credible images of coexistence and abiding by commitments.

Language

The modern Hebrew language was invented with several social objectives in mind, among them the liberation of the Jews from the enslavement to the norms of European civilization where they had been subservient to the rich heritage of the local populations, and instead the stress was on making the Jews direct, courageous, self-sufficient and in unhindered relationship to the conquest of the land, tilling it with

⁴⁹ See Asher Arian, *Politics in Israel: The Second Generation* (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1985) and the numerous sources there listed.

⁵⁰ See the numerous sources quoted in Ben-Dor, "Political Culture Approach to Middle East Politics" and *State and Conflict in the Middle East*. This point is not disputed by Arab scholars either, and writings of scholars such as Edward Said, George Haddad, and H. Sharabi clearly demonstrate this.

hard physical labour. As a result, the Hebrew of modern Israel is not a particularly rich language in terms of nuances or subtleties, and Israelis tend to speak in short, sharp, terse sentences. In fact, their speech patterns tend to create an impression of abruptness, impatience, even rudeness. Arab culture, on the other hand, puts a premium on patience, courtesy and endless attention to nuances and subtleties of verbal and non-verbal communications, all which are reflected in the rich language of a culture which is essentially oral in its heritage, and which therefore stresses the importance of language as a fundamental vehicle of social interaction, which at the same times reflects faithfully the values of society.⁵¹

When communication between such sharply different societies takes place, many misunderstandings and suspicions result.⁵² In the beginning, Arabs regarded Israelis as uncivilized, due to their intense, overactive, abrupt way with language and their obsessive needs to answer every point, win every debate and score in each verbal contest, without regard to the sensitivities of the other party.⁵³ On the other hand, Israelis regarded the Arabs as hopelessly primitive, due to their need to chat endlessly about irrelevant matters, their casual attitude to wasting time (a resource which is considered most precious in Israeli culture), and their obsession with words at the expense of substance. Over time, a somewhat different process took place, and now the catch is almost of the opposite variety: because Israelis know about the language differences, they tend to look for hidden meanings in everything that Arab leaders say, and they do not believe that Arabs mean what they say and say what they mean.

Mentality⁵⁴

As a result of the accumulation of these many serious elements of culture in conflict, various stereotypes came into being. In Israel, it is often argued that Arabs cannot be understood like other people, because there is a distinctive "Arab mentality" which characterizes this part of the world, with everything that this concept implies in terms of violence, anti-Western and anti-Jewish attitudes, lack of stability, obsession with language, lack of truthfulness and so on. So Israeli leaders have often appointed "Arab experts," be they Jews from Arab countries or academic experts on Arab language, society and history, to supply knowledge about this so-called "mentality," and to interpret the political conflict according to what it has

⁵¹ See the brilliant analysis in E. Shouby, "The Influence of the Arabic Language on the Psychology of the Arabs," *Middle East Journal*, 5 (Summer, 1951). For a modern, very different interpretation of the influence of political rhetoric in the Arab world see the fine review article by Clement Henry Moore, "On Theory and Practice Among Arabs," *World Politics*, 24 (October, 1971). See also Rafael Patai, *Golden River to Golden Road* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1967) and Carleton Coon, *Caravan: The Story of the Middle East* (New York: Holt, 1951).

⁵² See the detailed demonstration of this in Gabriel Ben-Dor, "Miscommunication and Fallacies in the Arab-Israeli Conflict," paper delivered at the workshop on comparative political cultures, York University, Toronto, October, 1992.

⁵³ This has amounted, in the words of Gil Carl Alroy, to an entire "other Arab-Israeli conflict." See his *Between Arab and Jew* (New York: 1971).

⁵⁴ On the history of this approach and the dangers involved in using it in modern social science, see "National Character in the Perspective of the Social Sciences," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 370 (March, 1967) and Alex Inkeles "National Character and Modern Political Systems" in Francis L. Hsu, ed., *Psychological Anthropology: Approaches to Culture and Personality* (Homewood, Ill: 1961), 72-208. The notion of "mentality" is tied strongly in the literature to that of "national character."

entailed. Similarly, Arab leaders and intellectuals have argued all too often that the political behaviour of the state of Israel reflects some specially devious and treacherous characteristics of some mythical Jewish mentality, at times going as far as the racistly flavoured argument that these traits made it all too easy to understand why Jews have been despised and expelled throughout the ages. This type of racism on both sides of the divide in the conflict may be regarded as an unfortunate outcome of the conflict itself,⁵⁵ but of course at one point such cultural factors also become impediments in their own right to conflict resolution.⁵⁶

Mediterranean Culture of Honour and Shame

The Middle East shares many of the characteristics of the general Mediterranean culture,⁵⁷ which exhibits an extreme preoccupation with honour and shame, and which finds it difficult to concentrate on rational accommodations to end conflict without the satisfaction of revenge.⁵⁸ At times, the entire Arab-Israeli conflict appears as a gigantic blood feud in a play by some great Spanish or Italian playwright, and as is all too well-known, these plays tend to have tragic endings. Because Israel is far more Westernized, it has had less of this, but it has not been free of this kind of cultural impact -- after all, it is in the Middle East, and half of its population has immigrated to it from Arab countries. In the Arab world, this kind of cultural legacy is still more powerful: when Israelis see how Iraq treats Kuwait, the Kurds and its own Arab citizens, they see no hope of coexistence in the near future.

Some analysts speak of this as a "macho" culture, in which the manhood of the individual is intimately intertwined with the prestige of the extended family or the tribe, and in which the leader is able, to a

⁵⁵ For an earlier interpretation of political culture in the midst of massive international and inter-civilizational conflict, see the interesting article by Arthur Jeffery, "The Political Importance of Islam," *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, 1 (October, 1942). Jeffery's analysis reflects, to a large extent, the interpretation of the realities of the Hindu-Muslim conflict in India at the time.

⁵⁶ The classic analysis of all this can be evidence in the work of the late Yehoshafat Harkabi, a former Chief of Military Intelligence and then the leading Israeli scholar on the Arab-Israeli conflict. He devoted much of his early career to depicting the Arab stereotypes of Israel, calling his books by titles such as *Arab Attitudes to Israel*, later trying to show that despite the ugly stereotypes [*Israel and Palestine* (Tel-Aviv: Keter, 1974)] mistakes by generalization are not the preserve of the Arab side only, and that in fact increasingly it was Israel the lost some of its ability to make sound political decisions, due to the inability to diagnose change amidst strongly held stereotypes [*Arab Strategies and Israel's Response*]. While Harkabi's work was obviously controversial, due both to the changes in his political conclusions as well as to the bluntness of his style, the documentation of the use of stereotypes in the Arab-Israeli conflict is by far the most comprehensive and hence its value is beyond question.

⁵⁷ The macho personality of the Mediterranean is reflected to a large extent in the work of the Egyptian anthropologist Hammed Ammar, as in his books *Growing Up In An Egyptian Village* (London: 1954) and *On Building Human Beings: Studies in Cultural Change and Educational Thought* (Arabic, Beirut, first edition 1964, second edition 1971). Ammar speaks about the *fahlawi* personality. For an Israeli interpretation of this, see Nissim Rejwan, "Culture and Personality: Building the New Egyptian Man," *The New Middle East*, 41 (February, 1972).

⁵⁸ See the references to this type of cultural thinking in Edward C. Banfield, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (New York: Free Press, 1958) and J.G. Peristiany, ed., *Honor and Shame: The Values of a Mediterranean Society* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965).

large extent, to legitimize himself by defending the honor of the tribe, rather than by looking for accommodations with the enemy who is perceived to have brought shame on the collective. This perception is clearly relevant to the strategic dialogue in the Middle East, and it demonstrates, once again, the link between domestic political traditions on the one hand, and the conduct of external strategic relations on the other.

These are the main cultural elements in the Arab-Israeli conflict. While the conflict is obviously *not* about culture, but about land, peoplehood and statehood, a great many cultural variables do play a role in different periods of the conflict, so that culture, to repeat, may be considered an important complicating factor. Some pundits tend to attribute an overwhelming importance to culture in this conflict, as if there were no possibility of change in the patterns of the conflict until massive cultural transformation occurs in the region. Yet the conflict has already undergone dramatic transformations. The Sadat visit in Jerusalem in 1977 and the ensuing Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in 1979, the Oslo agreement between Israel and the PLO in 1993, the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan in 1994, are only a few of the most salient diplomatic landmarks of the process of transformation which clearly indicate that the old conceptions of conflict without peace are dead, at least in the case of several key protagonists. The conflict is still there, but it is more fluid, more pliant, more versatile, and it contains elements of both peace and potential war, a peace process as well as violent currents on both the state and the sub-state levels. Within the peace process, issues of non-proliferation and arms control have come up time and again, some of them within the bilateral peace negotiations, and many more in the multilateral forums initiated by the Madrid conference in 1991.

Cultural Issues and the NACD in the Middle East

In what follows, an attempt will be made to assess the importance and impact of cultural factors within the framework of the main NACD issues in the Middle East, issues which include non-proliferation, transparency, verification and monitoring, as well as confidence-building measures, and also confidence- and security-building measures. In each case, the analysis will try not only to identify the cultural issues present, but also their relative importance when compared to the substantive and structural issues involved.

A general preliminary comment is also necessary. NACD issues and negotiations in the Middle East are vastly different from most other regions in the world, simply because the dialogue takes place in the wake of a violent period of an ongoing conflict, with acute and imminent danger of active warfare still very much within sight. Hence, the entire context of the negotiations is very different from that of low-intensity conflict areas.⁵⁹ This situation also means that the NACD itself makes sense in terms of political logic only when it takes place within the context of the attempts to settle the major ongoing political differences between the parties, because without such a process, the will to find solutions to NACD issues does not exist; in fact, the formal frameworks of the NACD are based on the assumption that there is an ongoing political peace process. When the two are divorced, the results tend to be debilitating, as in the case of the ongoing talks within the multilateral regional arms control and regional security forum

⁵⁹ See the analysis and sources in Efraim Inbar, "Contours of Israel's New Strategic Thinking," *Political Science Quarterly*, 111:1 (Spring, 1966), 41-64.

(ACRS).⁶⁰ ACRS today makes little sense because it lacks the participation of key actors such as Syria, whereas Syrian participation would make sense to the Syrians themselves only within the framework of the negotiations between Israel and Syria on the major issues separating the two countries.⁶¹ This is a pity, because ACRS is a potent idea, and its potential is not being realized. One major reason for this is that the structure of its agenda is faulty: it divorces a routine of general negotiations from the concrete issues that divide the main protagonists, and thereby produces a double agenda, in which the multilateral component is a ritual investment in a putative future, while the ongoing bilateral talks deal with the more pressing concerns of the parties. Even so, more careful attention to the cultural components of the routine in ACRS may help revive the process.

This is an important caveat, because it depicts the proper context for the analysis of NACD issues in the Middle East in a comparative perspective. The caveat is important also in the sense that it helps set the stage for a difficult type of analysis: given the intensity of the ongoing conflict and the centrality of arms control in the process of attempting to reach various settlements in the process of conflict reduction and resolution, it is very hard to separate the structural issues from the cultural ones. Yet clearly the cultural components of the conflict do spill over to the arms control dialogue as well.

Nuclear Nonproliferation⁶²

This is a huge issue, but also an extremely asymmetrical one in every way. In other words, the structure of the problem is unique. In other parts of the world, we are used to dyads: normally there is some nuclear balance of terror either between two global superpowers, or else between competing regional actors, as in the case of South Asia. Yet in the Middle East there is only one actor at this time, Israel, which is commonly assumed to have an operational nuclear capability.⁶³ Still, Israel has an official policy of nuclear ambiguity: it refuses to acknowledge the possession of a nuclear capability, while at the same time it also has an explicit doctrine of not allowing any Arab rival to possess one, even at the cost of unilateral attacks on the facilities of the given Arab state, as in the case of the air raid to destroy the Iraqi

⁶⁰ See Efraim Inbar, "Israel and Arms Control," *Arms Control*, 13 (September, 1992), Gerald M. Steinberg, "Middle East Arms Control and Regional Security," *Survival*, 36 (Spring 1994), 126-131, Shai Feldman, "Progress Toward Middle East Arms Control," in *The Middle East Military Balance 1993-1994* (Tel-Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1994), 182-210.

⁶¹ For the discussion of some of these issues, see Alan Platt, ed., *Arms Control and Confidence Building in the Middle East* (Washington: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1992), Joel Peters, *Pathways to Peace: The Multilateral Arab-Israeli Talks* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996), Steven Spiegel and David Pervin., eds., *Practical Peacemaking in the Middle East, vol. 1, Arms Control and Regional Security* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1995).

⁶² Israelis like to think of this issue as one of deterrence. See Aharon Klieman and Ariel Levite, eds., *Deterrence in the Middle East: Where Theory and Practice Converge* (Boulder: Westview, 1993) and Avner Yaniv, *Deterrence Without the Bomb: The Politics of Israeli Security* (Lexington: Heath, 1987).

⁶³ See Avner Cohen, *The Nuclear Issue and the Peace Process* (Hebrew, Tel-Aviv: Yad Tabenkin, 1995) for a thorough survey of the nuclear issues as they are now reflected at the present stage of the peace process. See also Shai Feldman, *Israeli Nuclear Deterrence* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982) and Yair Evron, *Israel's Nuclear Dilemma* (Hebrew, Tel-Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuhad, 1987).

nuclear reactor in 1981.⁶⁴ All the while, Israel refuses to join the non-proliferation treaty or to allow any kind of international supervision.⁶⁵

This asymmetry makes for a strange context for negotiations. It is not possible to negotiate about mutual nonproliferation, because evidently one country has the nuclear weapons already, while the others do not. At the same time, the Israeli understanding of this nuclear capability is that it is a "doomsday weapon": an insurance policy for a contingency when the extreme asymmetry in resources in favour of the Arab countries may allow the latter one day to overrun Israeli conventional forces, hence threatening Israel with imminent annihilation.⁶⁶ In that eventuality, the Israeli nuclear deterrent might play an important role in allowing the country to survive, even in the face of the worst case scenario. This view is subscribed to more or less by consensus, with little public debate and less dissent.

One might argue that this nuclear calculus makes good mathematical or strategic sense and that there are no obvious cultural factors involved at all. Up to a point, pure rational analysis for the understanding of this policy applies, but clearly, when this policy becomes a national credo or ethos, it is also part of the culture of the country. One cultural facet is the memory of the Holocaust, which is often cited to stress that the Jewish state will not allow the kind of unopposed slaughter of Jews that took place half a century ago. Another cultural element at work is the culture of the small and isolated country, feeling surrounded by human waves of large countries intent on destroying it, which must be opposed and contained at any cost. Finally, there is the conviction that the Jews have no real allies in this world and that they cannot, therefore, rely on international guarantees or agreements, and that they should not expose their ultimate weapon to international supervision or even inspection. And of course, the entire issue is also tied to the profound cultural conviction that the Arabs cannot and should not be trusted on issues of an existential nature.

On the Arab side there are also important cultural issues at work,⁶⁷ which can be followed from many public pronouncements and also from numerous press reports and commentaries, because the issue flares up every once in a while, as in the case of the period just prior to the renewal of the non-proliferation treaty in 1995.⁶⁸ At that time, the first Arab country to have made peace with Israel, Egypt, capitalized

⁶⁴ This is formulated in an explicit and sophisticated form in a recent work by one of the most influential strategic thinkers in Israel, retired General Israel Tal, a key figure in the Israeli Ministry of Defence. See his *National Security: The Few Against the Many*. See also Shai Feldman, "The Bombing of Osiraq Revisited," *International Security*, 7 (1983), 114-142.

⁶⁵ See the survey and the sources quoted in Gerald M. Steinberg, "Middle East Peace and the NPT Extension Decision," *The Non-Proliferation Review* (Fall 1996), 17-29; Avner Yaniv, *Dilemmas of Security: Politics, Strategy and the Israeli Experience in Lebanon* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).

⁶⁶ See Yaniv, *Politics and Strategy in Israel*.

⁶⁷ See the survey (as Israelis see it!) of how Arabs regard the Israeli nuclear posture in Ariel Levite and Emily Landau, *In the Eyes of the Arabs: Israel's Nuclear Image* (Hebrew) (Tel-Aviv: Tel-Aviv University Press, 1994).

⁶⁸ See the detailed survey of that process, with numerous specific references to the concrete chain of events at the time in Steinberg, "Middle East Peace and the NPT Extension Decision," and also John Simpson and Darryl Howlett, "The NPT Renewal Conference: Stumbling Toward 1995," *International Security* 19 (Summer,

the most on the nuclear issue to score points and settle accounts, although eventually its efforts to embarrass Israel over the sensitivities of the situation yielded only meagre results.⁶⁹

For many Arabs, the Israeli nuclear deterrent proves once again the inherently aggressive nature of the Jewish state which threatens, in their view, the security of its Arab neighbours, without really enhancing Israel's own, as its security problems in the foreseeable future have little or nothing to do with its nuclear deterrent. At the same time, this Israeli nuclear monopoly demonstrates to Arab pundits and politicians the nature of Israel as an alien entity, planted in the middle of the Arab homeland, which uses its Western technology (the prize it receives for being the agent of Western imperialism) to strike at all parts of the Arab world, while at the same time playing devious games of treachery to deny or disguise its possession of the weapon so as to prevent the legitimate Arab claim to acquire it as well, in the name of fairness and balance.

Of course, it is not so easy to acquire these weapons, whether or not the Israeli nuclear deterrent exists (at least as long as the issue is in official doubt) which is one strong reason for the Israeli policy of ambiguity. Instead, several Arab countries have built up a substantial capability in the field of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, among them Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Libya. For some analysts, this amounts to a "poor man's nuclear weapon," allowing the Arabs not only to maintain their self-respect, but also to create a balance of sorts, by deterring a possible Israeli threat or use of its own assumed unconventional capabilities. In turn, for many Israelis the possession of such weapons in Arab hands is proof of the inhuman and inhumane attitude they have to the conflict and to human values, particularly in the light of the fact that such weapons are widely reported to have been used in domestic or inter-Arab conflicts, as in the case of the Kurdish township Khalabja in Iraq, or in the case of the Egyptian troops in the Yemen in the 1960s. And the 39 long range surface to surface missiles sent by Iraq deep to the heartland of Israel during the Gulf War in 1991 demonstrated to Israelis the Arab resolve to use strategic weapons, and when these salvos were hailed by Palestinian masses, the stereotypes of an "Arab mentality" were enhanced and reinforced.

Transparency

The entire concept of transparency has to do with the transition from a preoccupation with surprise attacks and the need to hide one's capabilities and intentions to a willingness to expose much of one's military activity to outside inspection, even by one's own assumed worst enemies.⁷⁰ This transition was made possible by the sensible conviction that the two superpowers possessed the capacity for mutual destruction and that in the light of this simple, but overwhelming fact, it made no sense at all to prepare for surprise attacks, or to allow the other side to worry about one. Moreover, in the case of striving for overwhelming

1994) 56-59.

⁶⁹ For some of the background to all this see Yahya M. Sadowski, *Scuds or Butter: The Political Economy of Arms Control in the Middle East* (Washington: Brookings, 1993) and for an earlier period, William B. Quandt, *Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics* (Washington: Brookings, 1986). Already in the 1970s references to this issues were made by thoughtful Arab political and strategic analysts in various sophisticated works, most notably those of Fuad (Paul) Jabber.

⁷⁰ See James Goodby, "Transparency in the Middle East," *Arms Control Today*, 21:4 (May 1991); Shai Feldman, *Arms Control and the New Middle East Security Environment* (Tel-Aviv: Tel-Aviv University Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1994).

conventional superiority it might make sense to try and hide one's capabilities, so as not to provoke the other side to make greater efforts to catch up and develop counter-capabilities. But when the main strategic issue is nuclear deterrence, it makes at least as much sense to expose one's abilities to outside eyes, if for no better reason than to convince the other side that its ability to deter is indeed there.

In addition, the idea of transparency is also part of the introduction of confidence building, and confidence- and security-building measures into the mutual relationship. These measures are intended to improve the quality of the relationship between the parties in general, and to allow the building of good working habits and eventually a measure of trust, which in turn might make possible further progress in conflict resolution. While some disagree, by now a substantial literature has demonstrated the usefulness of this concept in analysing the process of which transparency has been such an important ingredient.

In the Middle East, however, the situation is entirely different from the superpower confrontation: again, the basic structure of the issue is in a vastly different category than that of the original concept. The fundamental strategic context in the region is still that of possible conventional warfare on a large scale: memories of recent examples of that kind of event are still very much alive, and the capabilities to engage in it again in the near future are there for all to see. In the light of this huge difference, there is little motivation to use the concept of transparency as a key notion of confidence building, particularly in the light of the fact that there are real fears as to the possible damage of transparency.⁷¹

The reluctance has to do with the technological race involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the different wars, the parties managed to surprise one another either with new technological devices, or with a more efficient way of utilizing known technologies. Hence, in 1967 Israel made devastating use of the capabilities of the tank combined with the jet fighter bomber. The edge of both of these was blunted by the Egyptian-Syrian utilization of Soviet missile technology in the 1969-70 and even more in the 1973 wars. In 1982, in Lebanon, it was again Israel which managed to surprise the Syrian air defences and annihilated them in a matter of hours, by using surprise technologies of anti-missile countermeasures.⁷² However, once these were exposed, they lost much of their value for a future war.

We may conclude, therefore, that neither the structure of the conflict in the region, nor the cultural legacies that have accumulated on both sides are favourable to transparency. This does not mean that the idea of transparency as such is hopeless, but clearly the starting point is not favourable, and major changes will have to be introduced in order to create a more favourable climate in the future.

Monitoring and Verification⁷³

Here the situation is similar, if not entirely analogous to that of transparency, but additional complicating factors are also present. Arms control agreements need to be overseen in a way that allows the parties to be reasonably certain that agreements are adhered to, because the price of being deceived may be high,

⁷¹ See the various examples in Ben-Dor and Dewitt, *Confidence Building Measures in the Middle East*.

⁷² See the analysis in Yaniv, *Dilemmas of Security*.

⁷³ See Shai Feldman, *Confidence Building and Verification: Prospects in the Middle East* (Tel-Aviv: Tel-Aviv University Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1994).

whereas the temptation to defect and cheat is proportionately great.⁷⁴ The history of such agreements in the Middle East is not very encouraging, and in fact it has become part of the cultural animosities between the parties.⁷⁵

For instance, in the wake of the 1970 cease-fire agreement between Israel and Egypt, Israel understood that the anti-aircraft missiles in Egypt would stay in place, that is, they would not be allowed to advance to the Suez Canal zone where they would play a decisive role in neutralizing the Israeli superiority in the air and thereby change the entire strategic balance. Much of the bloody War of Attrition was about that particular issue, and Israel felt that the advantage it had been able to maintain should not have been allowed to slip away. Yet during the first nights of the cease-fire the Egyptians did move the missiles up to the Canal. Israel complained to the United States, which had brokered the agreement, but eventually it was decided that even this blatant and major violation should not be allowed to upset the ceasefire, so Israel was compensated by some form of additional American aid, but the missiles remained in the Canal zone in violation of the agreement. It remains to add that in 1973 they played a huge role in allowing the Egyptians to cross the Canal quickly and with relatively few casualties.

This story (which is an Israeli version of the events), has become part of the cultural legacy of the conflict.⁷⁶ According to this legacy, the Arab side cannot be trusted, and it will violate agreements whenever it can and whenever it feels that it cannot be punished. Also, given that agreements are normally brokered by third parties, Israelis feel that Arab culture is better suited to dealing with mediation and arbitration, so that Israel will always be at a disadvantage and hence monitoring and verification of such agreements will be uncertain and unreliable.⁷⁷ Moreover, as we have seen, Israeli culture basically mistrusts those outside powers that are involved in the Middle East, despite the close relationship between Israel and the United States. The feeling is that vital security interests of Israel should not be entrusted even to close friends, because the lesson of Jewish history is that only Jews care enough about their own existence and security to be entrusted with something that makes a vital difference. Hence agreements where monitoring and verification are entrusted to outside parties are better than those where the cooperation and the good will of the Arabs are taken as the basis, but not much better. Once again, the basic cultural attitudes to monitoring and verification are not favourable to begin with.

⁷⁴ See Dore Gold, ed., *Arms Control in the Middle East* (Boulder: Westview, 1991); Geoffrey Kemp, *The Control of the Middle East Arms Race* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1991).

⁷⁵ Yair Evron, "Arms Races in the Middle East and Some Arms Control Measures Related to Them," in Gabriel Sheffer, ed., *Dynamics of a Conflict* (New York: Humanities Press, 1975), Ben-Dor and Dewitt, *Confidence Building Measures in the Middle East*.

⁷⁶ See Lawrence Wetten, *The Canal War* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1974); Yaniv, *Deterrence Without the Bomb*; Shlomo Aronson, *Conflict and Bargaining in the Middle East* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1978).

⁷⁷ Of course, the case of Israel, while unique in many respects, is not really in a category of its own. Many of its dilemmas in this respect are reflected in the general literature on "security regimes," as in Janice Gross Stein, "Detection and Defection: Security Regimes and the Management of International Conflict," *International Journal*, 40:4 (Autumn 1985). See also more cases and theories in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., *International Regimes* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983) and Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30:2 (January 1978).

In addition to the cultural factors that stem from the conflict as such, there are further cultural elements present when we come to monitoring and verification. As noted above, the Middle East is part and parcel of the "macho" culture of the Mediterranean, and as such it exhibits an extreme sensitivity to honor and shame. One part of this sensitivity is that people hate to have their word doubted, even indirectly or implicitly. Reaching an agreement, according to this cultural tradition, is very much the name of the game, so that hard bargains can and should be driven, because men of honor insist on the interests of their families and nations, but once the agreement is concluded, a lot of concern with monitoring and verification implies basically that the word of the parties is in doubt, by definition, because if it were not, there would be no need to think so much about how to make sure that their word is kept.

This orientation to honor in itself creates an inhospitable climate for the processes of monitoring and verification. However, even that is not all. There is the added element that practically all arrangements of monitoring and verification imply some inspection on the site of the party signing the agreement, hence there is the implication of some infraction or infringement on the sovereignty of the party and there is the uncomfortable feeling of imposing on it something that is distinctly alien to the local tradition. In ancient Middle Eastern traditions, the duties of hospitality were practically inviolable, but the need to impose that kind of hospitality by international agreement is much too painful to countenance.

Confidence Building, and Confidence- and Security-Building Measures

These concepts were born during the final stages of the Cold War in Europe and are part and parcel of the effort to reduce and contain international conflict by working on the relationship between the parties to get them to make some mutual concessions in order to improve the relationship and to generate a measure of trust which in turn will allow further progress toward cooperation in the future. While these notions were born within the specific context of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe over the past two decades or so, the theoretical reasoning behind them appears to have a universal application. Indeed, there exists a literature that tries to assess the usefulness of this approach to the concrete case of the Middle East conflict.⁷⁸

No consensus in the scholarly community exist as to the results of this attempt, but interestingly, in the vocabulary of the peace process, the term confidence building has already appeared in a variety of ways, among them via the existence of a joint Israeli-Palestinian confidence-building committee. The interpretation of the mandate of that committee has been at times very narrow, as in the case when the Palestinians merely expected Israel to release prisoners in order to generate a better atmosphere for the future of the process. However, the fact that the concept of confidence building is extensively used means that it has been accepted with relatively little resentment or alienation toward an alien notion, and indeed it appears that this notion raises fewer cultural obstacles than the others surveyed so far.

However, even this concept, the least objectionable of the four key ones surveyed in this analysis, is not entirely free of negative cultural connotations. While the concept has been used, and by and large has been considered an acceptable and current one in much of the region, some have, once again, drawn on the tradition that confidence building implies a lack of confidence in one's own trustworthiness at the

⁷⁸ See Ben-Dor and Dewitt, *Confidence Building Measures in the Middle East*, Feldman, *Confidence Building and Verification: Prospects in the Middle East*; Gabriel Ben-Dor, "Confidence Building and the Peace Process," in Barry Rubin, Joseph Ginat and Moshe Maoz, eds., *From War to Peace: Arab-Israeli Relations, 1973-1993* (New York: New York University Press, 1994), 61-77.

present time, as if one's word was not to be taken at face value just yet. Of course, given the difficult connotations that such a feeling evokes in the peoples of the area, this is a major obstacle to overcome, and not all the parties in the Middle East, therefore, are eager to participate in such confidence-building undertakings, not only because they do not seem to fit the policies of the moment, but also because of the negative cultural interpretations attached to it or evoked by it.

Finally, the very notion of confidence building is culturally alien and strange. There is nothing like it in the history of the Middle East. Clearly, the notion is associated not only with something alien to the region, but also, more particularly, with the legacy of imperialism, in the form of massive mutual threats between the two superpowers at the time when the peak of the tension between them had been reached and been found too risky for both. Also, there had not been between the United States and the Soviet Union a real existential conflict, so that institutionalizing the right to exist and sanctifying the territorial status quo (which are a key part of the confidence-building concept), are not so easy to come to terms with in the Middle East, where the structure of the conflict is vastly and dramatically different.

In other words, one argument is that there is little point in trying to create confidence between parties which have not yet settled their most basic differences, and where basic motivations, intentions and policies are indeed still very much in doubt by the other party. The culture of the conflict (which is to say, also the strategic conflict), is just not stable enough, the situation on the ground is not final enough, to try and build around it the culture of trust and confidence that is so difficult to come by even in conflicts where the existential issues are much less threatening. The argument that confidence building between the superpowers began while their basic differences had not yet been settled is a faulty analogy, because the superpower rivalry at the time involved neither challenges to the existence of the two parties, nor major territorial disputes impinging on the existential security conceptions of the two. In addition, the nuclear stalemate between the two superpowers was such an overwhelming factor in creating points of common interest that nothing even approximating it can be found in the Middle East today. So other foundations for a confidence-building dialogue have to be found, and when these are less solid, the cultural factors involved become that much more troublesome.

Of course, there is also the problem of what is actually meant by confidence building.⁷⁹ While some cultural objections to the notion and process are less natural and vociferous than toward the other components of the NACD, once a process does get under way, it often turns out that the core of it is not that much different than the other core issues of the NACD. It is possible to join the confidence-building process with alacrity, only to find that fairly early in the process problematic issue areas such as transparency and verification arise as the most salient features of the progress contemplated. At that time, the parties find that while they do not object to the process of confidence building as such, they do object to the concrete features of the specific proposals on the table, once again (among other reasons), because of the cultural inhibitions that these evoke. When that is the case, the confidence-building process quickly becomes totally devoid of meaning and substance, because agreeing to build confidence makes no sense when the major ways of doing so in the world are rejected here as culturally objectionable. Yet in theory, creative ideas that reflect accurately regional realities should be possible to further confidence building.

⁷⁹ A broad view is taken by Ben-Dor and Dewitt in *Confidence Building Measures in the Middle East*, and a much narrower one in the works of Feldman quoted in this paper. An "in-between" approach is found in Platt, *Arms Control and Confidence Building in the Middle East*.

Conclusion: The Need for a Balanced Perspective

The concluding picture is far from rosy. To the extent that there is a possibility of depicting the regional political culture -- and its strategic derivations -- with any degree of confidence, it does not support the classic ideas and components of the NACD to any extent worth counting on. If anything, there are many ingredients in the cultural traditions of the area that inhibit the further development of NACD-based agreements and settlements. Most of the NACD process is regarded as fundamentally alien to the region, and hence it is neither held in high regard nor given much benefit of the doubt. Worse, in most cases the relevant NACD issues have not become integrated into the authentic regional cultural frameworks of the various parties.

On the other hand, the picture is not all bleak, for several reasons. The first is that regional culture is changing, due to the pressures of economic and social development. Most of this development is based along Western lines, which obviously provokes a great deal of indigenous protest and gives rise to battle cries such as those of the Islamic fundamentalists who would rather reject the essence of anything that is Western. Nevertheless, many of the norms and values of the world economic system, and the now-dominant Western ideal of democracy and free markets, are invading the local market of ideas with great effect. This penetration is reinforced by the huge expansion of the means of mass communication, among them cable and satellite television, which depict the good life of the West with irresistible effect. This may raise defensive concerns and reactions, but the long term effect of such a ubiquitous presence of other forms of cultural attraction -- for they really promote an alternative way of life -- must not be underestimated. We do not know how long this process of change will take, or indeed whether it will end up with results more congruent with NACD processes, but the question is open and there is hope.

Second, and this is of utmost importance, the NACD in the Middle East is fundamentally an elite based process. Much of what we are able to analyze as "regional culture" is really a tradition shared by the masses of the people across the area, but there is a large gap between these traditions on the one hand and the norms and the values of the elites on the other. It may be unfortunate that the entire peace process in the Middle East is an elite endeavour, because it does not yet make for peace between peoples, but only between governments, or at best regimes. However, the fact is that the big decisions on peace have been made by enterprising and innovative individuals like Sadat, Begin, Hussein, Arafat, Rabin and Peres, who have often had the greatest difficulty in communicating, let alone "selling" their ideas to the peoples concerned, as the recent defeat of Shimon Peres in the 1996 Israeli elections vividly demonstrates. Still, this gap has its positive side as well.

This positive side involves the strange but striking fact that the elites often have a lot more in common with each other than with the peoples they are supposed to lead and represent. Such elites tend to be Western-educated, and their commitment to the peace process and the entire notion of the NACD stems from their involvement with the world community of political leadership and the tangential system of global mass communications, which are their primary constituency, apart from their own peoples. Indeed, their problem, to a large extent, lies in the fact that they have to answer to two constituencies, more or less simultaneously.⁸⁰

All leaders, by definition, answer to their own peoples, and certainly so in the Middle East, where local emotions about leadership being in the image of the indigenous traditions and will of the people run

⁸⁰ This is argued most emphatically and provocatively in Barber, *Jihad Versus McWorld*.

strong, even if in most cases outside the democratic framework. Still, leaders have to satisfy the military, the other security forces, the intellectuals, skilled professionals and other elements of the growing middle class, as well as the masses of the people, if for no better reason than at least to deny their accessibility to opposition leaders, movements and ideas. At the same time, the interests of the state dictate an increasing accommodation with the world community which is part of the global economy, organized in formal international institutional frameworks, and of course tied to the resolutions and decisions of world bodies and forums.

Beyond that, the elites and leaders have cultures of their own. Increasingly, leaders in the Middle East speak English, read the *New York Times*, *Time*, and *Newsweek*, watch CNN and SKY, talk to American leaders on the lawn of the White House, and think about their place in world history, where they will be judged by more universal norms and standards, such as contributions to world peace and the real well-being of their peoples.⁸¹ Such leaders use a language, indeed a whole world of images and symbols which are more and more universal and less and less authentically local. In this sense, they find it easier and easier to talk to leaders on the other side, hence overcoming many major cultural inhibitions of communications.

The problem is that these "universal" ideas and notions are not easy to communicate to the masses of the people, who do not yet share the same world of images and symbols. At times it appears that the more a leader is able to communicate with the erstwhile enemy, the more he is distrusted by his own people, as examples such as those of Peres and to some extent King Hussein of Jordan demonstrate. This differentiation may be tragic, but at the same time there is no stopping the clock: the patterns of development in the great majority of the countries of the region have produced the ability to communicate with everyone on either side within the paradigm of a world culture of norms and symbols, and that will not fade away. Indeed, an encouraging lesson can be learned from the way in which the idea of the territorial state,⁸² a structure basically alien to the cultural traditions of the area, became (albeit only after decades of anguish), the most important single organizing concept, as well as the most practical mechanism for running the affairs of Middle Eastern political communities. It may well be that the notions of the NACD will enjoy a similar fate, a protracted historical process.

Finally, we should recall that other research has shown that culture matters less when the encounters occur on the highest levels, which is often the case in the Middle East, and when the forums are multilateral, which again is widely prevalent. Hence the interests of the state, the structural transformation of the conflict and the cultural evolution in the region itself make NACD issues a viable component of the peace process, as long as we recognize that they are spoken in a different language, the inevitable difference caused by the differing cultural influences.⁸³

⁸¹ In other words, leaders in the Middle East increasingly subscribe to a variation of the increasingly universal values as described in Barber, *Jihad versus Macworld*. Not everyone, of course, agrees, and in fact challenging this thesis is a part of the intellectual effort in Huntington's now famous "Clash of Civilizations" argument.

⁸² See the detailed arguments on this in Ben-Dor, *State and Conflict in the Middle East*, and "Stateness and Ideology in the Middle East."

⁸³ Beyond all this, it is also possible to make the argument -- which indeed has been made repeatedly, since the 1950s -- that beyond the universal solvent of modernization, as argued in Marion J. Levy Jr, *Modernization and the Structure of Societies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966) -- the cultural similarities in the

The fallacy of treating conflict and strategy in purely universal-rational terms as if there were no cultural factors involved is a real danger. However, even more dangerous is the fallacy of cultural determinism, which denies the possibility of positive change in the future on account of culturally based generalizations. Against this, it is well to bear in mind that Middle Eastern culture is in transition, that imaginative and creative leaders like Sadat have managed to utilize and manipulate culture for positive purposes, that worldwide trends and developments impinge not only on the political or economic structure of the region but also on attitudes, and above all, that responsible elites which consider themselves part of worldwide constituency sharing many of the prevailing attitudes of the conflict resolution orientation necessary for a successful strategic dialogue are political as well as cultural vanguards. To some extent they are captive in the hands of existing cultural constraints, but they may also reshape them and help create a slow, but meaningful process of cultural transformation. Hence, an analysis of the prevailing strategic culture in the Middle East, while not particularly encouraging for conflict resolution, should not lead to an exaggerated pessimism. Rather, it should help the creative integration of positive cultural themes into the strategic dialogue.

Middle East as a whole are in fact so great as to make the differences but variations on the same theme, and that Israel, too, with the passing of time will be part of this culture, which would then allow conflict reduction to proceed without cultural inhibitions. For some background theories to all this, see Rafael Patai, "The Middle East as a Culture Area," *Middle East Journal*, 6 (Winter 1952), and the more recent Patai, *Israel Between East and West* (Westport: Greenwood, 1970).

VIII. Cross-Cultural Dimensions of the Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Dialogue in the Middle East: An Egyptian Perspective

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Introduction: Some Personal Observations

To begin with, I should say that it was very difficult for me to tackle the topic of this research: "Cross-Cultural Dimension of the Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Dialogue," for several different reasons. First, I belong to a culture that is mainly concerned with the results, outcome and the product, not with the process in itself or by itself. Yet this project deals with the on-going process of the Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Dialogue (NACD), in the Middle East and elsewhere. Since 1974, however, Egyptians can point to an Egyptian-Iranian initiative that was presented to the UN General Assembly to establish a zone free from nuclear weapons in the Middle East. This initiative was accepted by the state of Israel in 1988, on the condition that it conducts direct negotiations with the Arab countries. Yet this process has been going on in the General Assembly in New York for the last twenty-three years with no results, no outcome and no product!

In the early 1990s, the NACD process in the Middle East was injected with two additional changes. The first was the initiative by Egyptian President Mubarak in 1991 to establish a Middle East free from all mass destruction weapons (nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their delivery systems). The initiative was widely supported and accepted but it never moved from being a starting point of a process to presenting an outcome, a result or a product. Again, we have some sixteen years of a process! The second was the multilateral peace talks which were derived from the Madrid peace conference and which started on 29-30 January 1992 in Moscow. These talks have been ongoing -- with ups and downs -- for the last five years. Yet the basket of Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) is another example of a process without any results, outcome or product, except that the process itself is not dead!

This dilemma between the relative importance of process over product can lead one (and did lead me) to question the seriousness of the impact of a research project that concentrates on process elements? Would such research add a new element to the process rather than to the product? Will this research project help in enhancing the peace process towards achieving a result, or does it simply try to assure the survival of the process in spite of its negative results?

Similarly, coming from a military background, I have concerns about the terminology that is being studied in this project. As many have noted, terms such as non-proliferation, arms control, arms reductions, arms limitations, conflict, crisis, problem, and culture do not have the same meaning for everybody. Second, and perhaps more importantly, all these definitions (and many others such as transparency, verification and disarmament) are the offspring of the Cold War, bipolarity, and the struggle between two opposing superpowers, as is noted elsewhere in this collection. But during this same time the region I come from was living the culture of wars, conflicts and violence. Just when practitioners in the Middle East started dealing with the definitions and concepts of established arms control, a new world appeared, and new terminology was introduced, around such concepts as peace-making, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and implementation, conflict prevention and conflict resolution. Are we then behind events? Perhaps it would be more appropriate to deal with the new terminology of conflict

and security, rather than to address the impact of the regional culture on some of out-of-fashion concepts associated with the traditional NACD.

As a final difficulty, but not the least one, I personally faced an intellectual problem. There is a continuous debate in Egypt and in the region about the roots and development of the prevailing culture: do its widely shared beliefs, traditions, attitudes and perceptions originate from outside the region or do they originate from inside the region itself? Some authors insist that our culture originated and developed from within the region but in phases. We may relate its beginning to the Greco-Roman culture before Christianity, with it then developing through the impact of Christianity, Islam, colonialism, from war to war and then from wars to peace. Others argue that a Middle Eastern man in a coffee house, sitting in a French-style chair, by an Italian table, reading an English newspaper full of articles about security, stability and peace, encapsulates the extra-regional changes that have transformed his life -- how he looks, how he dresses, what he is, and how he perceives war and peace -- which symbolize the immense and devastating changes that, coming out of the West, have affected the Middle East in modern times.

Added to these factors is another more general factor: the international public has little first-hand knowledge of the Middle East and its people, particularly Muslims and Arabs, and most of the print and media information about us is often greatly distorted. Unfortunately, the electronic and print-media helped created in the minds of the West a "We-They" dichotomy which columnist Richard Cohen called a sort of "group-think." But despite these caveats and factors, at the end I accepted the adventure and the challenge to present my thoughts on Middle-Eastern/Egyptian/Arab culture and its impact on non-proliferation and arms control issues.

Egyptian Perspectives on Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Issues

General Principles

The Middle East is a religious region. We witness today in the region two different phenomena related to this: increasing religiosity on one hand and extremism on the other hand. One can find both phenomena among Muslims, Arabs, Jews and Christians. They are not mutually exclusive, and on the contrary they contradict each other. But both of them have an impact on the elite and the common people on issues related to the prospects for a non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament dialogue.

For example, religious Muslims and Arabs consider "justice" the overwhelming value in Islam. There is even a popular saying among families, government, elites, common people, the military and business that "equality in injustice is justice!" This is one element of how Arabs and Muslims look at war, peace, stability and other arms control and non-proliferation issues. They see complete injustice in one party possessing a nuclear monopoly and a qualitative military edge, which is not bound to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, is occupying territories by force, and is all the while talking about peace, stability and mutual equal security.

Islam educated the peoples of the region and responded to the challenges of security modernization in consonance with two main philosophies. First, Islam believes in deterrence not aggression:

Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into (the hearts of) the enemies of God and your enemies. And others besides, whom ye may not know but whom God doth know. Whatever ye shall spend in

the cause of God shall be repaid unto you, and ye shall nor be treated unjustly (Sura Anfal (60)).

Second, it believes in responding to peace: *"But if the enemy incline towards peace, do thou (also) incline towards peace, and trust in God for he is the one that heareth and knoweth (all things)" (Sura Anfal (61)).*

Yet extremists, Muslim or other, believe in and try to act on the opposite: believing in violence, instability and a minimum level of security for the governing bodies and their political systems. Extremists are small isolated groups but with continued proliferation they could become more dangerous. The problem is that today we are all focusing on those types of terrorist threats that have already been proven to exist. But we should imagine that there are -- at least minor -- attempts by extremists and terrorists to acquire and use new techniques and technologies derived from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical, and biological technologies, and some sophisticated ultra-conventional weapons systems. This could lead us not to superpower status, or to the emergence of regional military superpowers, but to the danger of "super-terrorism." If we consider the possibilities of exploding a jumbo jet, blowing up a crowded bus station, destroying an occupied water supply, using gas in an underground tunnel, or other such things, as terrorist activities that have already been proven to exist, then non-proliferation circles should think about the possible terrorist use of sarin nerve gas or biologically limited quantities of anthrax spores; cyberterrorism and attacks on security data systems, intelligence and computer networks (C⁴I); and/or attacks on highly sensitive Muslim, Christian and Jewish places and symbols in the Middle East.

It should be noted, however, that most of the frustrations that motivate extremists to become violent and to seek new means of terrorism derive from their perception of injustice. Extremists on one side claim historical, religious or security injustices, others live with injustices in human rights violations, deportation from their own houses and land and an international double standard in dealing with their cases.

In general, both the elites and common people feel that the superpowers and major powers dealing with arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation issues in the Middle East are prejudiced against Muslims and Arabs. To us this prejudice stems from the superpowers' "mental package" or the stereotypes that they hold. For example, the superpowers (or superpower) insist that all Arab countries must sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but do not pressure Israel to do likewise. Strangely enough, during the debate on NPT extension, U.S. Secretary of Defence William Perry visited several countries (including India and Egypt); during his visit to India (which is assumed to be a nuclear threshold state) the NPT issue was not raised. But during his visit to Egypt the issue of the NPT was on the top of his agenda, while Egypt is not a nuclear, or a threshold nuclear, country!

The Relevance of the East-West Arms Control and Disarmament Experience

The representatives of fourteen Arab countries and Israel who attended the first multilateral activity concerning Arms Control and Regional Security on 29-30 January 1992 in Moscow were exposed to various presentations concerning the East-West arms control experience. Because of the different levels of regional parties' knowledge about ACD issues, all parties agreed to begin the dialogue with a phase called "Arms Control Mutual Familiarization." Culture-wise, it was considered by the various Middle East parties as a success. But there were still several problems with it.

First, it was educational and informative, but did not present an analytical view. It dealt with what happened, but not why this happened when it happened. With suspicious people -- like those in the Middle Eastern -- you need the *what* and *why*! Between peoples who have no normal relations, no diplomatic and political relations, one needs to link the *when* with the *what*, that is, one must draw a linkage or create a relationship between positive changes in the political environment and constructive developments in arms control. Second, delegations were like students being treated to a lecture by their teacher. A culture whose core is a strong sense of dignity cannot be comfortable with that.

There were also some clear structural differences that were obscured. The East-West experience was based on a nuclear culture, with deterrence and a nuclear balance at its heart. It also included, as a result, nuclear transparency. But the Middle East region lives with nuclear ambiguity, not nuclear transparency. Likewise, the East-West political and security culture -- built on the accumulation of fifty years of political understanding -- gave both Eastern and Western participants many opportunities for direct talks and negotiations. But the political and security culture of the parties in the Middle East, based on their own fifty years of bloody experience, illustrated rather the importance of a non-biased, honest third party in order for fruitful talks or negotiations to occur. Finally, both the East and the West in their respective ACD experience knew what they wanted and what they needed for security. In short, they had to avoid a nuclear confrontation. We in the Middle East do not face this (and perhaps did not always know what was wanted or needed). We instead, in the ACD dialogue, talked about a political issue called peace.

Of course there are other cultural reasons that hindered the success of this mutual familiarization phase in addition to the ones mentioned above. One astonishing outcome of this phase (which perhaps has cultural roots), was that among almost one hundred regional participants, very few of them knew even each other's names after more than a year of meetings!

The Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Culture in the Middle East: From War to War

The Influence of the Ottoman Empire and British Colonization

For more than a century before its final dissolution, the Ottoman Empire was engaged in almost continuous warfare against both internal and external enemies. Most of the wars were fought in the interest of gaining regional hegemony, against brothers, fellow Muslims, neighbours and loyal subordinates who became enemies. Some of these wars and/or struggles were conducted exclusively inside the region (such as the Ottoman-Iranian contest of 1821-3); others were conducted against parties outside the region. Eventually, the wars conducted by Ottoman forces against other regional forces were replaced by those fought against an external power, or were fought by three participants (for example, the Gulf area was disputed between Ottoman, Iranian and British power).

Under the growing influence of British military predominance, the region also started to reexamine its understanding of regional security matters. The importation of Western military forms also had an impact on civil-military relations, which reached its climax with the Arab-Israeli wars and the military revolutions in Syria, Egypt, Yemen, Iraq and other Arab countries. Overall, the continuous warfare in which the Ottoman Empire was engaged against its external enemies brought home the importance of security, ahead of economic welfare and social affairs in general. This also fed the general attitude towards violence in the region, exaggerated concerns over security, and killed any prospects for security-building measures.

In the contemporary period the third party (or what is perceived as the third rivalry) has usually been an external force in a struggle between two countries in the region (the First and Second Gulf Wars), or in a civil war (Lebanon since 1975). The third party usually challenges the legitimacy of one or both of the regional countries, often because the third party has been able to turn the rivalries in one particular country to its advantage or to secure a large measure of autonomy of action (such as the Kurds have done in Iraq).

Overall, how was the Middle East influenced by the Ottoman Empire (colonization) and British colonization? It is possible at this stage to offer tentative answers to this question. On the whole the most positive results were probably in relation to those objectives to which at that time the least importance was given: the economic and practical factor. There can surely be no doubt that for most people in the Middle East life had improved by 1939 over that of the first decade of the twentieth century. The standard of living was higher for most, if not all, sectors of the population. The amenities were greater and more numerous, and the prospects of living to a ripe old age better than they had ever been before. A new infrastructure had been built and all kinds of services provided. These benefits were less noticeable in the territories of the Middle East than in those directly administrated by an imperial power (such as British India or French North Africa). In this respect, Middle Easterners were unfortunate in that they suffered from most of the drawbacks of imperialism but missed its main advantages, or received them only in an attenuated form. But even this attenuated benefit was not negligible and by 1939, the peoples of the region were better off in most material respects.

They had also gained another very important benefit, that of language. English and French were previously known to very few people in the region outside Egypt and Lebanon, but with these languages came access to the modern world, its culture and its science. The introduction of Western, or more precisely modern, science is generally recognized as a gain for the people of the region. Western culture and especially its social consequences, evoked, however, a more varied response. While some embraced it with enthusiasm, others saw it as at best mixed blessing, while still others denounced it as an unmitigated curse.

Anglo-French domination also gave the Middle East an interlude of a liberal economy and relative political freedom. The freedom was always limited and sometimes suspended, but in spite of these limitations and suspensions it was on the whole more extensive than anything Middle Easterners had experienced before. Most of the Western-style institutions have, however, now disappeared, having been abandoned or even condemned. It is only recently that there has been a new beginning, or a reawakening of interest in liberal ideas and practices, for which the changing circumstances in some of the countries of the region may at least provide a more favourable setting. For Middle Easterners themselves the most positive result of the period of Anglo-French domination was probably the attainment of the status of a primary strategic goal, as can be seen in the role of the Middle East during the Second World War. The good service the Middle East rendered to the West was the provision of base and support facilities for the war against the Axis powers.

But these somewhat positive results also had a negative impact on the cultural dimensions within each country of the Middle East, and among/between the countries of the region. One of the cultural dimensions affected was the way in which the people of the region perceived war. One can say that the concept of "war" witnessed a dramatic transformation in its purpose, from fighting for more territory over natural resources to gaining competence to defend a country's boundaries. It also assumed both formal and informal forms.

Over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Arab Middle Eastern states faced Russian military pressure, and military interventions from the French, Germans, Italians and British. Some of these interventions were transformed into longer-lasting occupations. All of these activities had enormous socio-cultural effects. To try to deal with or face these pressures from the perspective of the weaker party, regional actors started to adopt in their struggle a limited confrontational style and a less limited formal combative procedure. This era was full of informal styles of struggle versus what is considered today formal legal warfare. And the informal struggles were often important: we should remember that the Ayatollah Khomeini's orations were secretly distributed on audio cassettes (which can be surely considered a non-confrontational, illegal, informal style), and that they helped produce the first electronically-driven revolution in world history. The Iranian revolution represents an example of the use of available technology to establish consensus support for a religious revolution without a direct confrontation with the regime, and immediate combative actions against it.

Overall, the region witnessed and is still witnessing, due in part to this cultural-military heritage, the involvement of other external powers, whether Europeans (the French in Algeria) or Americans (in the Gulf), who are concerned with stabilizing ruling elites or taking advantages of the opportunities that circumstances offer to support political or social movements to destabilize an existing government (such as in Sudan since the El-Bashir government came to power). To a lesser extent these external powers also pressured existing governments to abide by foreign interests and resolutions. The ways and means of pressure, involvement and infiltration that were adopted were not only economic and military, and they were often marked by a series of actions in contemporary political and military affairs that also affected one country's claims against other rivalry countries.

The Arab-Israeli Conflict

At the end of 1916, a new era in regional arms racing and weapons proliferation, and new cultural dimensions of conflict, appeared when the British forces began to advance from Egypt into Ottoman Palestine. Until the termination of the British Mandate and its withdrawal from Palestine (which was set for 15 May 1948), and without going in detailed history, the arms and security issue was dealt with mainly in the context of fighting against British occupation. But since that date the struggle for Palestine (which is often simply called "the Middle East problem") became an Arab-Israeli issue.

The first Arab-Israeli war continued for several months, after which an armistice agreement was reached that remained for decades the only formal legal umbrella for Arab-Israeli regulated relations. This first war had different culture impacts. Some of them were later implemented, while others remained only rhetorical and theoretical. In general, a culture of war prevailed. In practice this meant that the idea of defensive sufficiency was replaced by all parties acquiring as many weapons and weapons systems as they possibly could. The region entered a phase of arms racing, which increased both the quantity and quality of weapons systems until the region lived with surface-to-surface missile proliferation and the more dangerous proliferation which the nuclear monopoly represents.

The 1948-49 war was only the first of a series, to be followed by the Suez war in 1956, the 1967 war, and the 1970-71 war of attrition. Preparations for and the conduct of these wars established new concepts of ambiguity instead of transparency, deception instead of predictability, arms racing with a complete absence of the concept of arms control, and attempts towards nuclear, biological and chemical proliferation. But those wars also introduced new experiences into the region. Among these were the concepts of negotiations or talks, the monitoring or verification of agreements, and temporary dispute settlement through one or more third parties. The understanding of bilateralism and/or multilateralism

did not become related to violence or wars only but grew to cover also peace-building, peace-making, and confidence- and security-building measures.

It should also be noted that the Arab Middle East was exposed not only to the cultural impact of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The region lived with the bitterness and increased security needs that resulted from a range of other wars, including the Yemen war, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the Iraqi-Iranian war, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the UN coalition warfare of the Second Gulf War to liberate Kuwait. *"Fight in the cause of God those who fight you but do not transgress limits, for God, loveth not transgressors"* (Sura Baqara (190)).

The issues at stake in these wars were very complex, and hence their cultural dimension and impact was different but enormous. Among the various different aspects of these wars were personal clashes that made issues seem unilateral rather than bilateral or multilateral, and confrontations between charismatic leaders that made the cross-cultural dimension more emotional rather than rational. This made even the arms racing behaviour of states irrational. Other aspects of regional wars included: ethnic cleavages, ideological differences, extremist revivalism, sectarian conflicts, economic confrontations over oil and territory, and/or bids for regional hegemony. With all these different aspects the wars of the region became patriotic spectacles, and participants demonstrated their loyalty to perceptions of differences, whether or not those perceptions were real or fake! That is why the culture of planning for war, being prepared for violence, and not having trust or confidence in the other side's military capabilities or intentions, prevailed. The educational system was devoted to bringing up children and students with the fact that they would be forced to go into combat in the future. Songs were written to prove that force was the solution, not negotiation or peaceful dispute settlement, and that security comes before anything. And security was interpreted as success in arms racing, in acquiring more lethal weapons of mass destruction before the adversary, and in ignoring completely attitudes like mutual confidence or peaceful security problem-solving.

But the consequences of the 1973 war changed profoundly the strategic and cultural dimensions related to the arms control issues. First, it convinced all parties, Arabs and Israelis, to start a new process towards peace on equal basis. The results of the 1973 war opened the door to progress in creating a new security culture. Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreements in January 1974 and September 1975, and the Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement of May 1974, led to a new shared attitude of mutual security. It introduced into the region's political and military culture terms and actions related to confidence- and security-building measures, monitoring and verification, and peacekeeping mechanisms. But it also reasserted the need for a third party either during the negotiation of those agreements or during their implementation. These measures often represent a forgotten success story: since 1974 there have been no Syrian-Israeli violations of the agreement and minor, but not serious, violations between Egypt and Israel.

The 1973 war also led eventually to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979, which resulted in a majority of public opinion condemning violence, talking about sufficiency in security matters (not arms racing), and exploring peaceful and diplomatic dispute-settlement procedures and pragmatism. But in the meantime, the winds of peace brought to the surface the issue of the regional nuclear monopoly and proliferation. This issue turned out to be the pivotal problem of regional arms control, a problem which is destroying so many hopes for arms control.

The Egyptian commitment to peace was steadfast from 1979 until 1991, in spite of the high price that Egypt paid. This commitment brought into reality the 1991 Madrid Peace conference. *"But if the enemy*

incline towards peace, do thou (also) incline towards peace, and trust in God for he is the one that heareth and knoweth (all things) (Sura Anfal (61))." This Egyptian commitment, coupled with the double-barrelled effect of the end of the Cold War and the UN-coalition victory in the 1990-91 Gulf War created an unprecedented opportunity that was seized in the Madrid Peace conference for launching a Middle East arms control and regional security working group. This was an historic step in the arms control area. But by 1997, after five years of discussions, one can draw mixed conclusions about the process and the outcome of ACRS efforts.

ACRS and the Middle East Peace Process

When the Madrid peace conference was held on 30-31 October 1991, fourteen Arab countries and Israel participated. Everyone received the impression that three questions were answered during this conference. But because of the problem of different understandings of key strategic definitions and terms, different interpretations were advanced which threw their shadows on the various bilateral and multilateral negotiations or talks.

The first question was: "How are we going to solve the Middle East problem?" The answer was through negotiations, talks and diplomatic venues and contacts. Unfortunately, with increasing difficulties in the peace process, the drums of a coming war can be heard!

The second question was: "On what basis shall we solve the problem?" The answer was "on the basis of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338." Again unfortunately, different interpretations were offered, according to the existing formulations. One interpretation was "all land for all peace," according to the Arabic, French, and Russian versions of the UN Resolutions. The second interpretation was "partial withdrawal for comprehensive peace." The third interpretation was "land and security for peace." All these different interpretations had some passive impact on the activities of the arms control and regional security working group. Because language is a major element of culture, this appears to be a specifically cultural dimension of arms control.

The third question was: "By which ways are we going to proceed to solve the problem?" The ways that were presented were bilateral negotiations and multilateral talks. Unfortunately, for the third time the process illustrated cultural differences in understanding the objective of those two ways to solve the problem. The Arabs understood that bilateral negotiations were created to solve the various bilateral problems between the concerned parties that which have existed in the past and are still alive at present. The multilateral talks were designed to solve the regional problems of the future, after the achievement of peace in the new Middle East. Unfortunately the Americans and the Israelis defined the value of the multilaterals differently: they were to facilitate the work of the bilateral negotiations. This created serious cultural problems, especially when it came to setting priorities for issues, and to the possibility of implementing any agreements that might emerge.

After the Madrid conference, five working groups were formulated in Moscow in early 1992 to implement the process of the multilateral talks. The five topical baskets were: water, the environment, economic cooperation, refugees, and arms control and regional security arrangements (ACRS). The ACRS working group held six plenary meetings and seventeen conceptual and operational meetings between January 1992 and September 1995. The ACRS process developed in four phases: establishing the ACRS process; defining an ACRS work agenda (which resulted in limited success); negotiating and

discussing regional agreements (which resulted in successful discussions and poor implementation); and the breaking down of the process in 1995-96.

The general outcome of ACRS can be summarized with four points. First, a substantial cultural difference existed over whether ACRS should simply be a means of improving the political environment for the bilateral negotiations, or whether it should be a means of optimizing the use of time and discussing and agreeing upon future security steps that would be shelved until acceptable results had been achieved at the bilateral level. Second, there was a substantial cultural difference in how one should define the region from the security point of view. The Arabs argued that it was enough (for the time being) to tackle security issues among the invited participants to the Madrid peace process. But the Arabs also understood that the Israelis preferred to expand the security issues discussed to cover other potential threats (from their perspective), which would mean adding non-participant parties such as Iraq, Iran, Libya and others. Third, there was another cultural differences in how the work agenda should be defined (between ACRS and other forums), because during the ACRS process Jordan and the Palestinian Authority reached agreements with Israel that included some regional security issues that were not only bilateral ones. Finally, the underlying cultural difference in how the parties defined the most devastating and dangerous weapons in the region made ACRS pay a high price, especially with respect to the issue of weapons of mass destruction.

The above-mentioned problems (and others) kept the cultural elements of multilateral regional security arrangements in the Middle East from being placed on a positive or sound basis. As a result there has been an increasing attitude that ACRS cannot encompass all the required elements of regional multilateral security cooperation. For that reason many parties took "track two" initiatives, with the result that a variety of regional and international non-governmental organizations and think-tanks are continuing to create their own agenda to assist the official track. It seems to me, however, that the duplication and repetition of track two activities, with the various participants having different cultural backgrounds and no previous experience of coordination, is confusing rather than helping the official track.

Overall, the fourteen Arab countries and Israel rarely reached a clear consensus on the regional arms control issues that were raised during the talks. There are a variety of different cultural reasons for this:

- the failure in implementing transparency in the nuclear, chemical, biological and defence expenditure fields. One side believes in nuclear deterrence through ambiguity, the other side finds it impossible to have mutuality given the strategic nuclear asymmetries.
- the failure to adopt the concept of defensive sufficiency. The parties' military doctrines vary between offensive and defensive, and the threat assessment culture is still based on mistrust and general non-confidence.
- the mistrust increased the concerns of all the parties about their autonomy and status. Worries about military dominance, nuclear superiority, a technological edge and large quantitative means of defence threatened the promotion of peace assurance, given these military factors.

Likewise, during the talks and negotiations some elements that ran against the nature of positive negotiations appeared. The parties often confused a good negotiating environment with approval by the other side of their opinion. Occasionally, parties that did share several values and peaceful arms control experiences did not draw great benefits from them, and did not place enough stress on them. Sometimes parties lost the balance between reason and emotion. One side found it essential to start with discussions

of the problem of nuclear proliferation, the other side found this a non-starter. Finally, the parties stressed direct tactical arms control reciprocity, which made the tactical process more important than the strategic outcome.

Beside these setbacks and failures, ACRS did, however, succeeded in assuring the condemnation of violence. It also tried to shift the parties from talking about wars and combat to instead searching for non-confrontational approaches to security problems. There was also a procedural success in continuing the arms control process as a multilateral one, with limited bilateral implementation. ACRS also got the parties to agree on modest steps towards confidence-building measures, and helped to create new relations between the various militaries. Finally, it showed the need for informal tracks to help the formal one, when this was needed (although as noted above this was not always necessary or desirable).

The Specific Issue of Monitoring and Verification

Before the Arab-Israeli conflict we did not think or use the word verification, because it was taken for granted (and was already inherited in Arabic culture) that the Arabs relied on their "word of honour" with their neighbours and adversaries. The concept of "verification" only appeared in Arabic discourse after the eruption of four wars between the two parties. For my purposes, verification is defined as a process that establishes whether or not the states parties are complying with their obligations to an agreement. The primary aim of verification is to increase the level of transparency in relation to relevant activities to a point where a determination regarding compliance can be reliably made.

The process of verification includes several aspects that were relevant to the ACRS process. One of these was the collection of information relevant to obligations under arms control agreements. ACRS did not achieve a lot in this respect, because all the agreements reached during the various ACRS meetings were voluntary and not obligatory. This prevented each party from initiating the presentation of the necessary information, as they waited for the other party to begin. A similar issue arose with the analysis of the information in ACRS meetings: there was a good opportunity for the mutual analysis of the information that was available. But the problem here was that the lack of confidence between the parties meant that there were always doubts about the reliability of those analyses. Finally, how to reach a judgement as to whether or not the specific terms of an agreement are being met remained a confusing issue within ACRS. There were, however, some voluntary agreements concerning issues like the establishment of a regional communication center for information exchange and pre-notification, for search and rescue in maritime activities, and for the avoidance of naval accidents.

But the changes in the political environment, which went from good to bad, from bad to worse, and from worse to the breakdown of the process, prevented serious participation and the implementation of those voluntary agreements to the extent that the parties did not reach a judgment about whether or not these specific voluntary agreements were considered to be obligatory.

Despite the poor results in ACRS, Egypt and Israel have had a very successful experience in Sinai since the Sinai I agreement 1974/1976 which institutionalized risk reduction measures. To overcome the cultural differences related to confidence-building, the verification issue for these measures was put in the hands of a third party, firstly the UN and later the Multi-National Force. Of course, the two parties concerned, Egypt and Israel, contributed alongside the third party to accumulate confidence in each other; this resulted in no serious violations of the terms of agreement between Egypt and Israel occurring in the Sinai. But this successful experience brought to both cultures some basic lessons:

- the Sinai verification process assisted in managing the short-term risks associated with agreements.
- confidence-building proved to be a function of verification, because all parties were convinced that non-compliance with the verification process could result in the use of force. And this is what is facing the peace process in 1997 with the understanding among the Arabs that the state of Israel is not complying with what was agreed upon in Madrid 1991 and in Oslo 1 and Oslo 2.
- The cultural differences proved that a third party offering military, national-technical means (NTM), with the non-asymmetry between Egypt and Israel in NTM, and offering diplomatic and financial support and guarantees, is essential in verification. One of the problems facing ACRS is that the Israel side today is more developed than the Arabs in national-technical means either with ground verification technologies or with space satellites.

As noted above, confidence-building measures (CBMs) are in part a function of verification. Normally, the confidence-building process is divided into three phases. The first is the development phase, a period during which the confidence-building approach is explored by concerned members. The problem with ACRS is that this exploration has been undertaken by the formal members of the ACRS groups, as well as by tens of research centers and think tanks informally in different gatherings with different cultures; this brought the outcome of this phase to at least a contradictory situation where everyone was talking about different priorities and different measures. The second phase is the negotiation phase to enter into a formal stage of negotiating the confidence-building process. The Egyptians focused on confidence-building verification of the substance of arms control (such as a ceiling on certain weapon systems, the pre-notification of certain military activities, the quantity of lethal weapons, and the quality of weaponry). The Israelis adopted a wider range with the objective of building a peace culture, not confidence-building measures in ACRS. They suggested exchanges of information on civil defence, cooperation in dealing with natural disasters, exchanging the CVs of military leaders, a mutual acknowledgement of the curricula of military institutions and so on. As a result, the ACRS process cannot be seen having succeeded in producing serious negotiation of confidence-building measures as a function of verification.

The third phase is the implementation phase. Here also, because of cultural differences the parties did not help enough in the implementation phase. The Western cultural orientation was predominantly educational, as the co-sponsors invited representatives of the concerned parties to visit an air-base, to attend a NATO exercise as observers, to participate in a maritime demonstration exercise, to hold conceptual and operational seminars and symposiums towards long-term ACRS objectives, to hold senior naval symposiums and other such things. These steps were all useful and fruitful but they did not satisfy the third phase of the implementation as it is understood: that a negotiated confidence-building measure or a verification agreement should enter into force and begins to produce tangible results.

We would note here that the cultural differences of the parties brought the process to these results, but this is not the only reason for the general lack of success. Domestic cultural factors within Israeli society and in the Egyptian Arab communities has had a very serious impact on the activities of their representatives in ACRS. These domestic factors include such things as the state of current public opinion, the interests of the military-industrial complex, and the activities of political parties, syndicates and NGOs, all of which have their own political perception about the development of peace and their own military understanding about defence requirements and arms control and verification issues.

Some Illustrations from Negotiations

There were several examples of how misunderstandings that may have had cultural roots affected the tactics and unfolding of the ACRS negotiations. One of the principles of negotiation, for example, is "testing the waters" as a means for one party to determine in a non-confrontational way what the other party will object to, and hence to learn how to handle the situation. The co-sponsors of the ACRS process thought that the mutual familiarization phase, which drew upon past East-West experiences in arms control and CSBMs, would help regional parties to test the waters for future negotiations. What really happened during ACRS, however, was that the parties made minimal efforts to test the waters, instead sometimes using surprise tactics (and unfortunately not at the right moment), as happened with most of the proposals for CSBMs that were presented.

Another problem that occurred during negotiations was that the parties faced (and also used) "smoke screens." I mean by this making offers that seemed too good to be true, in order to win public relations points and conceal real intentions. There were some offers from both sides that seemed to be too good to be believed, at least while the parties had such a low level of mutual confidence between them. The Israeli offer for regional military personnel to visit some of their military factories, and the Egyptian offer to deal with all weapon systems (conventional, nuclear, chemical, biological, surface-to-surface missiles and the use of space for military purposes), were both treated as "too good to be true," and illustrated some of the smoke screens deployed during the negotiations.

Negotiations also lacked to a great extent shared (or correct) perceptions about how tactically to proceed. In most meetings, for example, the parties failed to find out how to get the most value out of the various offers that were presented. For example, when the question of verification was raised and created a problem between the Arabs and the Israelis, the Canadian mentor suggested as an informal solution holding a seminar about verification issues. Although this was a serious and a helpful proposal, all the parties perceived it as a waste of time and money, because they did not believe that they could abide by the outcomes of such a seminar. There was no underlying agreement on how best to move forward. The fact that participants in most of the delegations did not participate in a continuous and permanent manner amplified this problem. There was a high turnover and rotation in representation, which brought new faces to every meeting.

The Israelis were also fond of "surprise tactics" when it came to CSBMs. The Egyptian side always thought of CSBMs as functionally-oriented, which meant (as noted above) that the CSBMs that were suggested should help to deal with the concrete objectives of arms control. They thus always focused on the types of CSBMs that could help in increasing military transparency, stability and predictability, or in reducing the consequences of war and enhancing crisis management. On the other hand, the Israelis surprised the parties by proposing a wide range of CSBMs, highly diversified and not directly related to the priorities of arms control, but rather to their priority of improving political relations between the parties. For example, they suggested exchanging the CVs of military commanders (as noted above), exchanging non-classified defense materials, information on civil-defense measures, and other such things.

In the negotiations the participants also use the method of "saying no without saying no," which means declining the offer but still keeping the door open for discussions in order to avoid putting the other side off. But because Israel adopts from her security point of view the philosophy of ambiguity for her nuclear strategy, and Egypt insists that nuclear weapons are the most devastating weapon systems in the region, both sides ended up saying "no" to such an extent that the door was actually shut to fruitful negotiations.

It is generally understood that negotiations should be seen by both parties as a "win-win" process in order for them to succeed, but what really happened in ACRS was that parties were following something similar to the logic of a "zero-sum game." Whenever one party perceived or presented the results of the meetings as a gain, the other party automatically considered it as a loss. As a result, new terminology was invented to try to smooth the process: the parties described some meetings as simply "talks," others as "discussions," still others as "negotiating meetings." But these efforts to smooth the process only created confusion and detracted from the seriousness of any of the results that were reached. The real problem, however, was the underlying "zero-sum" rather than "win-win" logic that the parties adopted.

In principal, arms control negotiations should fill the vacuum between the parties and not widen it. But the entire atmosphere of the ACRS discussions was not conducive to this, in part due to various misunderstandings or mistakes. Most of the parties did not ask the right questions at the right time, or did not get the timing right in their presentation of an offer, or took the lead in asking questions but did not give the other side sufficient time to frame a response. As a result, the meetings increasingly assumed the image of one party in an upper position and someone else in a lower position, which increased rather than filled the vacuum between the parties.

Conclusion

Through all the various cultural dimensions that concern the non-proliferation and arms control issues that this essay has attempted to incorporate, Islam and its teachings, directions and apprenticeship remain the hard core of Arabic cultural life. As the paper has presented it, some of the historical experiences and cultural heritage occasionally contradicted Islam. Most of the experiences the region witnessed were due to the fact that the Middle East was exposed for many centuries to invaders (Muslims or non-Muslims), invaders who had their own aspirations and motives for conquering the resource-rich and culturally-rich region. The result was that the people of the region could not escape the influence of various invasions, most recently expressed in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the wars that have been caused by it. These wars have left an atmosphere of tension and mistrust, and a culture of aggression that prevails throughout the region in spite of the efforts toward peace that have been undertaken in the past few years. These efforts are still not sufficient to divert the culture of aggression into a culture of justice and mutual respect.

States, like the ones in the Middle East, are aware that the peace process makes their domestic policies affected by "everything that happens" outside, and are not content merely to observe one another at a distance. They feel the need to enter a dialogue with one another. Today we have mainly a diplomatic dialogue. In fact, participants are trying to explore the fundamentals of a cross-cultural dialogue. But the essential conditions that must be fulfilled are: to find the mutuality in different cultures, especially in area of arms control and non-proliferation, and to gain the acceptance of the plurality of the people, networks and institutions involved for an accepted code of conduct. The modern and recent history of the region, which has moved from wars to wars and then from wars to peace, makes it a long and hard road. But the journey must begin.

IX. Conclusions: Security Culture and the Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Agenda

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Introduction¹

This project began from the observation, made by a wide range of practitioners, that the new, multilateral, arena of non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament (NACD) had been complicated by several elements that had not been part of the European or East-West arms control process. From both an academic and a policy perspective, this raised some interesting questions, such as:

- will future NACD agreements include things like quantitative or qualitative ceilings, formal verification measures, legally-binding treaties, confidence- and security-building measures, openness and transparency, or are these notions peculiar to the Western strategic tradition?
- will the *process* of security-building and arms control differ radically from the East-West experience in different regional contexts?
- will concepts and underlying ideas such as trust, prestige, parity, mutual deterrence and crisis stability translate differently among different groups of states or regions?
- are some of these basic concepts invested with different meanings in different cultures and civilizational traditions?

There are a whole host of reasons why the transition to more multilateral (global or regional), arms control processes is difficult: there are more actors whose conflicting interests must be accommodated; the regional conflict contexts vary widely and are seldom dominated by an equal bilateral relationship or a hegemonic actor; large differences in wealth result in great disparities in states' levels of military development and in the size and sophistication of their military establishments; and much less consensus exists on the nature of security challenges in the post-Cold War world. This project focused on one aspect of this transformation in security relations: the impact of "culture" on multilateral security-building processes, particularly those associated with NACD issues. In doing so, the various authors do not claim that it is the most important explanatory element, but merely that cultural elements shaped (often unconsciously) the East-West arms control process, that cross-cultural factor cannot be ignored in other contexts and processes, and that different sets of beliefs and traditions may prove to be crucial factors in some of the contemporary multilateral security building processes that are unfolding around the world.

Focusing on the cultural dimension of any social phenomenon presents special difficulties, all of which are present in the international security arena. "Culture" is often deployed in a casual manner to explain all residual phenomenon that do not seem at first glance to have a "rational" explanation. Culture is also often used to amplify differences, or (by participants themselves) as a form of resistance to pressures from stronger actors or from "outsiders." Finally, culture is often used confusingly to cover phenomena that range from micro-interactions between individuals, to macro-level "clashes of civilizations." In order

¹ I am grateful to Alan Crawford for his comments on this chapter.

to make any analysis of culture useful to issues of security and strategy, four key distinctions that emerged from this work should be kept in mind.²

First, cultural elements have to be seen as distinct from both "structures" and "behaviours," and must be more enduring than the latter, since issues that are transient are more likely to reflect tactical manipulations by political elites than the influence of deeply-held beliefs. Although they are not permanent and unchanging, cultural factors must persist or recur over a protracted period of time, or at least not change without major upheaval.³ Hence it may make sense to speak of persistent Confucian cultural elements in Chinese foreign policy, or of a cultural prohibition in the West against chemical weapons (even though these may be overridden by other structural factors at any given time), but it likely does not make sense to deploy a cultural explanation for American resistance to a treaty against anti-personnel land mines, or Indian resistance to signing the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT).

Second, one must recognize that cultures are often fragmented, with many sub-cultures intersecting and clashing. There are often considerable differences between elite and mass culture, between different social classes, and between elites within one society. A shared security culture may develop among diplomats and negotiators (and their foreign counterparts), for example, but this may not be rooted in or based upon authentic cultural traditions (of trust, honour, and face, for example), or in accordance with the constraints of domestic political culture. "Fair" or even "beneficial" deals may be rejected simply because sometimes no deal with (for example) former colonial powers could be sold to a sceptical public. More will be said about this problem below.

Third, security culture is a subset of broader political, strategic and diplomatic cultures. It is also not often useful to draw sharp distinctions between political, strategic and diplomatic cultures, since all share overlapping elements, and draw upon similar sources in "culture writ large." On the one hand, security culture is in some sense the "flip side" of strategic culture; concerned not simply with issues of war, the use of force and military institutions, but with issues of peace, NACD, security, and conflict management. On the other hand, the parameters of a security culture are often drawn by domestic political cultural factors, since strategic negotiations between states are always political, as part of foreign policy. And at a third level, most international negotiators share a common diplomatic culture that facilitates and channels their interactions into predictable and manageable forms; this diplomatic culture is part of an expanding elite "global culture" that shares common symbols, aspirations and referents. In the security arena, members of this global elite culture speak a similar language of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation (although they may not *mean* the same thing!), and elites across countries may communicate more easily among one another than they do with non-elites within their own states. This, however, creates special problems when the security-building measures under consideration implicate other groups (such as the military) or issues (sensitive political issues such as "land for peace") that resonate far beyond the elites themselves.

Finally, the concept of security culture is less useful for understanding how rational calculation of interests are made than for understanding the backdrop of restraints and constraints against which policies

² These four points were advanced by Gabriel Ben-Dor at the group's November 1996 meeting.

³ One example of change would be the disappearance of Soviet strategic culture. The fact that the Soviet Union has disappeared does not invalidate the idea that there were some specific "cultural" elements to Soviet military/strategic thinking that influenced the behaviour of its elites during the Cold War.

are formulated or pursued. In other words, the idea of distinct security cultures helps make sense of the limits to what leaders and elites can or cannot do. It also seems to be the case (as various examples from the case studies show) that cultural factors explain more of the *process* than the outcome, or more of the *style* than the substance. This is not to trivialize cultural factors, however, since in certain regions (such as Southeast Asia) the process and style (of, for example, negotiation) might be as (or even more) significant than the outcome at this stage in the development of multilateral security arrangements. Likewise, although cultural differences may be manifested by different styles (for example, Israeli abruptness or Southeast Asian obliqueness), these differences can affect the *substance* of negotiating positions, the way in which these are presented or responded to, the prospects for achieving agreement, and ultimately the way in which states and political elites define their interests.

The various case studies above attempted to keep these considerations in mind, and to work within a common definition that captured the concept of a security culture. As presented in the introductory Overview, the concept of a security culture, as it refers to NACD and security-building:

consists of those enduring and widely-shared beliefs, traditions, attitudes, and symbols that inform the ways in which a state's/society's interests and values with respect to security, stability and peace are perceived, articulated and advanced by political actors and elites.

From this common definition, the various authors attempted to explore, in specific regional or national contexts, how cultural factors might shape the development of the non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament agenda. This conclusion will not repeat their insights, since an attempt to summarize their findings risks trivializing them, or turning them into a collection of anecdotal observations. The various specific issues that were addressed can be compared and contrasted though, with respect to five central issues:

- the minimal explanatory role of "culture writ large";
- perceptions and the legacy of conflict;
- orientations towards regional and extra-regional relations;
- cultural elements of diplomacy and negotiation; and
- influences derived from domestic political culture.

The Minimal Explanatory Role of "Culture Writ Large"

On the most general level, most of the contributors concluded that cultural factors "writ large" did not carry much explanatory weight. They did warrant some attention, however, because in some cases basic "perceptual factors" seemed to set the parameters for security debates. For example, J.D. Yuan's study of the Chinese case (which draws on recent scholarship in this area), sketched the two radically different Chinese views of war and peace: the Confucian-Mencian view, which views the world as a harmonious order in which conflicts are deviant phenomena that must be managed through means other than brute force (and when force is inevitable, violence is not considered even the most important element of strategy and action), and the *parabellum* or *realpolitik* view, which argues that the world is not harmonious, that conflicts are zero-sum and constant, and that the best way to deal with security threats is to eliminate them through the use of force. Although there is strong evidence that the Confucian/Mencian view has been predominant at particular periods in China's history (especially given the limited expansionist tendencies of Chinese empires), it is not clear which influence is dominant today.

Somewhat analogously, Andrew Latham's case study of Indian security policy points to its opposing tendencies: the Kautilyan tradition, which portrays the "external" domain "as being an inherently violent place where conflict and violent competition was the rule, and where peace and stability were the (rare) exception," and the Gandhian tradition, which includes "a commitment to peaceful change, non-violent inter-state relations, and pacific conflict resolution through negotiation."⁴

This notion of binary (or dialectical) strands in security policy is paralleled in the West, and in particular in the United States, where scholars have drawn attention to the two strands of American foreign policy: the "Wilsonian liberal internationalist" vision, and the realist (occasionally isolationist) strand associated with Henry Kissinger, George Kennan, Hans Morgenthau, and a host of other figures.⁵ But there are three things to note about these binary oppositions. First, they do not appear in all cultural contexts, and in particular do not appear to be part of the European, Latin American, or Southeast Asian experiences. Second, these binary oppositions are not identical in all cases, although they do share certain overlapping "family resemblances." Chinese *realpolitik* (which is combined with a hegemonic world view) is *not* the same as American realism (which is admixed with an isolationist, "city on a hill" tendency), nor is it the same as the Indian combination of Kautilyan and Gandhian traditions (with associated moral with political power). To reduce these all to some sort of universal "realism" is a reductionist error that conceals more than it reveals.

Most importantly, the existence of different strands of thought in broad socio-cultural contexts alerts us to the fact that cultures are not monolithic, and thus to the two-way relationship between "cultures" and "actors." The consensus among the various authors of these case studies seems to be that these sorts of broad cultural ideas, derived from ethical traditions, religion or philosophy, are often used instrumentally by different political entrepreneurs, depending on their circumstances and the challenges they face. But the fact that political leaders and elites can deliberately manipulate and use cultural referents in order to achieve specific ends in the security-building and arms control field does not mean that it is purely instrumental (and hence has no explanatory value): it can only be used in certain ways, and its broad parameters must be respected. Moreover, understanding these cultural "buttons" (and how they can be pushed) may have important practical value for policy makers/diplomats on the other side of a negotiation.

An excellent example of this is provided by the Middle Eastern experience. As various analysts have pointed out, Islamic references could be (and were used) to denounce Israel prior to Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, but were also used to justify the peace initiative that he undertook. A simplistic reading would see Egyptian/Islamic political culture as completely pliable or neutral in this case. However, as Ahmed Fakhr emphasizes in his contribution, the pervasive sense of injustice and unequal treatment that has informed Egyptian political discourse since the colonial period, has meant that "both the elites and common people feel that the superpowers and major powers dealing with arms control, disarmament and

⁴ Andrew Latham, "The Role of Culture and Identity in Indian Arms Control and Disarmament Policy," 108-109.

⁵ See Michael Joseph Smith, *Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986); David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992); and in the discipline of International Relations, David Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

non-proliferation issues in the Middle East are prejudiced against Muslims and Arabs."⁶ Thus although Islamic (or other cultural) references could be used by political entrepreneurs in different ways, some uses "resonated" better with other prevailing beliefs than others. This entire matrix of beliefs has played an important role in the post-1978 "cold peace" between Egypt and Israel, in perceptions of the motives and commitments of outsider powers in the region, and in the approach of Arab states (in particular Egypt) to specific issues such as nuclear non-proliferation.

Despite these general limitations, cultural influences on the NACD agenda become more interesting when examined in light of more concrete manifestations of political, diplomatic and strategic culture, and the prisms through which these are projected.

Perceptions and the Legacy of Conflict

It is not surprising that the historical legacy of conflict, and the specific nature of the security challenges faced, affect the underlying concepts of security and national interest that states, peoples and elites hold, and hence their orientation towards specific elements of the NACD agenda. In the Middle East, for example, the bitterness of the conflict, the fifty-year legacy of war, and the high levels of distrust have made third-party intervention an almost indispensable requirement for progress, to the point where the need for external "good offices" is almost a cultural aspect of the conflict. All parties (but today in particular Egypt and Israel) often frame their offers and demands in terms that are meant to attract the attention and increase the involvement of the United States in the conflict resolution process. By contrast, third-party intervention in Latin America is seen as paternalistic and interventionary -- to be tolerated if necessary, used to one's advantage if unavoidable, but never to be seen as disinterested or neutral. The roots of this view are easy to discern. A similar issue is raised in South Asia, where the Indian desire for regional hegemony leads to a near-total exclusion of outsiders from regional debates over security issues.

Perhaps the most profound legacy with which Western leaders and promoters of the NACD agenda have to deal, however, is that of colonialism and the perception (or fact) of discrimination, enveloped in the historical North-South relationship of dependence and subordination. In all of the non-Northern regions and countries studied -- China, India, Latin America, Southeast Asia and the Middle East -- the "sense of inadequacy or powerlessness about periods of oppression, colonialism, defeat, or even slippage from previous status," is strong, and creates countless difficulties for efforts to advance the NACD agenda.⁷ It is obvious that global initiatives that preserve or rest upon this hierarchy (such as in the nuclear arena) are almost doomed to fail, while regional initiatives that are seen as serving the interest of the great powers are similarly difficult to promote, whatever their other merits.

Such legacies can often be so powerful as to "drown out" other more subtle cultural influences that do, however, manifest themselves at other stages in a security-building process. In the Middle East, there is a clear understanding by all parties that the differences between them are not stylistic or concern solely matters of "process," but rather that they stem from incompatible political goals that have yet to be

⁶ Ahmed Fakhr, "Cross-Cultural Dimensions of the Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Dialogue in the Middle East: An Egyptian Perspective," 179.

⁷ Noel Kaplowitz, "National Self-Images, Perception of Enemies, and Conflict Strategies: Psychopolitical Dimensions of International Relations," *Political Psychology*, 11:1 (1990), 51.

reconceived completely in non-zero-sum or cooperative terms. When such reconceptualizations have occurred, however (such as in the Camp David peace process, or in post-Cold War Southeast Asia), cultural differences are not far from the surface and their potential as obstacles to progress cannot be underestimated. In Southeast Asia or Latin America, where the legacy of war and violence between states is somewhat less, issues of style and process still remain extremely important elements in efforts to construct a stable regional order.

Finally, one of the most important aspects of these cases is the attention they draw to how different the security concerns of various regions really are. This is again well understood by regional specialists, but much less often acknowledged by security or arms control specialists. Hence, in Southeast Asia for example, the main concerns that drove the ASEAN members to cooperate have been related to internal security, and the conceptual "glue" for cooperation has been (as Amitav Acharya points out) a more comprehensive vision of security that is tied closely to ideas of regime (and social) stability, nation-building and economic progress. In Latin America, internal security is also vastly more important than inter-state conflicts, although the nature of the internal security concerns have been very different than in the Southeast Asian case. In the Middle East, by contrast, classic inter-state issues are intertwined with fundamental questions of regime security or survival. All of these differences affect how important (or not) classical NACD issues are considered, relative to other kinds of threats and challenges.

Orientations towards Regional Relations

Underlying images of the region and regional security (who is "in," who is "out" and who poses the greatest threats), and of the nature of cooperation between states, also often affect orientations towards NACD issues. These mental maps often have a cultural dimension, both in how they define the boundaries of the region (is Australia an Asian state; are Poland and Romania part of the "West"?), and in how they define the relations among the members of the region. Thus, for example, in Southeast Asia the "ASEAN way" is seen as emerging from a common cultural heritage (derived from, but not exclusive to, Indonesian cultural traditions of consensus decision-making and a blend of an Islamic and Confucian heritage). But it is also driven by the explicit goal of political elites of coping with diversity and preserving some "corporate" harmony among themselves, while managing conflicts between them often by sweeping them under the carpet. This leads, as Amitav Acharya points out, to a tendency to "think multilaterally, but act bilaterally," and to keep regional cooperation within a flexible framework that facilitates a form of bilateral relations that is nested in, compatible with, and constrained by, the overarching framework of multilateral norms.

In Latin America, on the other hand (and as Hal Klepak points out), the sense of regionalism is relatively weak, despite the occasional pan-American rhetoric. The region is better understood as a patchwork of sub-regions, characterized by a great deal of competition between major states (Brazil, Argentina, Mexico), and a political heritage of authoritarianism. As a result, the overall framework of multilateral norms in Latin America is relatively weak, and does not englobe bilateral relationships very tightly. By contrast, China may be described as "thinking unilaterally, pursuing issues bilaterally, and posturing multilaterally," in part because "historically, multilateral security measures either were alien to Chinese rulers (they were more accustomed to bilateral, tribute-system ways of dealing with foreign states) or failed to protect Chinese security interests."⁸ The Chinese stance towards multilateralism is mirrored by

⁸ Jing-Dong Yuan, "Culture Matters: Chinese Approaches to Arms Control and Disarmament," 84-85.

the Indian position, which in both cases perhaps reflects their sensitivity to issues of status and subordination (a legacy of colonialism), and their relative regional importance. Not surprisingly, one element that drives the more multilateral impulses of the ASEAN states is precisely their orientation towards China, the "natural" regional hegemon.

These kinds of orientations, derived from respective historical experiences in different regions, have a direct impact on how states approach NACD issues, and how they prefer to tackle them. In China's case, it appears willing to discuss security issues in the Asia-Pacific only so as not to be left out or isolated; it exhibits a powerful preference, however, for bilateral "hub-and-spoke" arrangements with its neighbours that keep Chinese policy at the center. (This may also be a real motivation behind Chinese participation in global multilateral forums.) In India's case, its security policy "remains chained to the notion that bilateral advantages outweigh any gains that might be derived from dealing with neighbours on a multilateral basis."⁹ And as noted above, the Middle Eastern region witnesses all parties to the conflict relying strongly on ties with external parties to reinforce their conflicting claims or buttress their legitimacy.

Cultural Elements of Diplomacy and Negotiation

The specific cultural elements that appear in the context of diplomacy and negotiation are more difficult to untangle, for it is easy to conclude from a *prima facie* examination of the various cases that these cultural elements were purely stylistic, and not at all substantial. There are three reasons for this. First, cultural elements that would otherwise affect negotiation can be (as noted above) "drowned out" when the legacy of the conflict, or other historical perceptions, prevent the parties from engaging in a positive-sum dialogue. In other words, when negotiations are not "real," cultural factors are irrelevant. Second, the existence of a "common professional culture of diplomacy" may mute the influences of deeper cultural elements.¹⁰ Finally, when these factors do come into play, they are notoriously difficult to pin down with any precision. The literature is full of stories about how to serve tea, when not to refuse gifts, which doors not to walk through, and what colours to wear, but these are usually unrelated to the substance of what is under discussion in any international negotiation.¹¹ Few studies, however, have attempted to show

⁹ Latham, 116.

¹⁰ See Edmund Glenn, D. Wikmeyer, and K. Stevenson, "Cultural Styles of Persuasion," *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 1:3 (1977), 52-65; Geert Hofstede, "Cultural Predictors of National Negotiating Styles," in Frances Mautner-Markhof, ed., *Processes of International Negotiations*, (Boulder: Westview, 1989), 193-201.

¹¹ Although there is a substantial literature in other areas, such as business or sociology, where the interpersonal dimension of negotiations perhaps matters much more. See, for example, Stephen E. Weiss and William Stripp, "Negotiating with Foreign Businesspersons: An Introduction for Americans," *Business Negotiations Across Cultures*, working paper 1 (New York: New York University Graduate School of Business Administration, 1985). See also the *Journal of International Business Studies* or *The International Journal of Intercultural Relations*.

systematically that these factors make a difference in outcomes, although there is plenty of anecdotal evidence that they do, especially in creating misunderstandings or roadblocks to progress.¹²

On closer scrutiny, however, there are some points where these kinds of issues matter more. In particular, many scholars argue that in addition to affecting processual and stylistic elements, cultural factors in negotiation are more important when negotiators are lower-level rather than senior officials, and when negotiations are direct and bilateral rather than multilateral.¹³ International negotiators may be in some sense "expatriates," but it is important to note that today "fewer international negotiations are carried out by diplomats residing abroad; more international agreements are negotiated by experts coming from the respective capitals."¹⁴ In addition, rapid communication with capitals may mean diplomats in face-to-face negotiations are more constrained than in the past, and have fewer opportunities to smooth out the cross-cultural frictions that can emerge in a reciprocal negotiation conducted anonymously between capitals. This, coupled with the dramatic increase in the number of lower-level contacts between officials concerned with security policy (whether these are inspection visits for the verification of arms control treaties, joint operations in a multinational force, participation in training courses, or conferences of experts), multiplies the opportunities for cultural elements to surface in security-building dialogues.

This has some obvious implications for efforts to advance the NACD agenda in various regions. As Gabriel Ben-Dor notes in his case study of the Middle East (and he is echoed by Ahmed Fakhr): in the absence of the most important precondition (a decision that it is in one's interest to join a particular process and achieve a positive result), the cultural factors that might be associated with the *process* of achieving that outcome are irrelevant. If, however, there is a base commitment to a negotiated, positive-sum, solution, it might be hugely important that negotiations are conducted at the highest levels possible, that they not be exclusively bilateral (or be somehow nested within a multilateral process), and that participants are conscious of the role these cultural factors might play. Ben-Dor also points out that there are, in fact, many examples in the Arab-Israeli relationship where bilateral discussions were conducted at low levels, after a basic decision to make progress had been reached, and that these have been repeatedly frustrated, in part because of a lack of awareness of these issues. By contrast, the apparent Asian penchant to focus on process as opposed to outcomes, might actually facilitate the achievement of specific bilateral (or even multilateral) security-building efforts over the longer term.

Influences Derived from Domestic Political Culture

The impact of cultural influences that have their roots in domestic political cultures is perhaps the most important aspect of the cross-cultural dimensions of the security-building agenda. All contributors could

¹² Several examples are offered Raymond Cohen, *Negotiating Across Cultures* (Washington: United States Institute for Peace, 1991); Michael Blaker, "Probe, Push and Panic: The Japanese Tactical Style in International Negotiations," in Robert Scalapino, ed., *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 55-101; and Glen Fisher, *International Negotiation: A Cross-Cultural Perspective* (Chicago: Intercultural Press, 1980).

¹³ See Gabriel Ben-Dor, "Regional Culture and the NACD in the Middle East," 157.

¹⁴ Winfried Lang, "A Professional's View," in Guy Olivier Faure and Jeffrey Rubin, *Culture and Negotiation* (London: Sage, 1993), 40.

find specific issues -- ranging from concepts of "honour" and "face," to styles of decision-making, to attitudes towards conflict and violence -- that projected themselves "upwards" from the society to the international arena. This is not surprising, since culture has to be rooted ultimately in the lived experiences of people and groups. Four distinct clusters of issues seemed to emerge as important, in an ascending (and often nested) order from the micro to the macro-social level:

- personal or individual social stances;
- collective decision-making and implementation styles;
- socio-cultural attitudes; and
- concrete institutional expressions of the above.

Before addressing them, however, it must be noted that the interface between domestic and "international" cultures (or elite versus mass/popular culture) is also the most subject to instrumental manipulation and entrepreneurial political leadership. By definition, if a security culture includes those enduring characteristics that influence the behaviour and thinking of political elites, these characteristics must have *some* foundation in the broader "popular" culture from which they arise. But this does not mean that popular or domestic political cultural factors should be understood as a straitjacket that imprisons political leaders. Instead, they should be seen as forming the "language" of security politics in which all new proposals (and opposition to them) must be expressed. While domestic cultural factors thus set the broad parameters of what can and cannot be accomplished, the language can also be used more or less "fluently" (or authentically) by different political elites or leaders. One prominent example often cited is the different public perceptions of the Israeli Labour Party leaders Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin. As Gabriel Ben-Dor (and others) have pointed out, although Peres often presented himself a diplomatic visionary for peace, in contrast to the gruff ex-soldier Rabin, this stance did not resonate nearly as well with the Israeli public. Their policies may have been similar, but in the election battle against Benjamin Netanyahu, Peres did not "speak the language" of contemporary Israeli politics.¹⁵

The first cluster of issues, which implicate the individual's place and standing in society, included issues of face and honour, questions of prestige and status, and specific roles (such as a "macho" orientation of confrontation). In Latin America, for example, great emphasis is placed on issues of personal standing and "face," and this is tied up with a masculine and status-oriented political culture. In the Middle East, "an extreme preoccupation with honour and shame [makes]...it difficult to concentrate on rational accommodations to end conflict without the satisfaction of revenge."¹⁶ Similar issues of "face" are important in Asia, where no agreement is often better than one in which face has been compromised. By contrast, it is worth underlining that "American negotiators [and Westerners more generally] do not display the obsession with face so characteristic of collectivist cultures, and hence often follow "the maxim that any agreement is better than no agreement."¹⁷ Not surprisingly, these sorts of micro-level issues translate into particular styles of decision-making and the exercise of authority. In Latin America, for example:

¹⁵ Gabriel Ben-Dor, personal communication.

¹⁶ Ben-Dor, 165.

¹⁷ Cohen, 132. See also Stella Ting-Toomey and Mark Cole, "Intergroup Diplomatic Communication: A Face Negotiation Perspective," in Felipe Korzeny and Stella Ting-Toomey, eds., *Communicating for Peace: Diplomacy and Negotiation* (London: Sage, 1990), 77-95.

authority tends to reside somewhat more in the person than in the position, and an organization chart does little to tell the outsider just what leverage -- *palanca* -- the incumbent has...an image of being a forceful personal decision-maker is part of the cultural basis for holding authority.¹⁸

This kind of orientation makes the achievement of multilateral agreements in which everyone must share the responsibility (and the "glory") much less likely, and makes jockeying for position omnipresent. (Parenthetically, similar patterns are also manifest in the Middle East.)

A second manifestation in decision-making styles is the recourse of weaker parties to formal/legalistic formulas that appear to outsiders as designed to obstruct progress. In fact, such orientations are often effective weapons of the weak, since rhetoric and formalism can also serve to obscure a relatively weak or low status in an international negotiation. No agreement is better than one in which weakness has been openly conceded. Chinese negotiators, for example, tend to begin discussions and negotiations with an attempt to secure agreement on a statement of broad and high-sounding principles rather than on practical or small concrete measures. These principles create a form of "protection" for the negotiator, since the subsequent degree of rigidity or flexibility on specific issues is determined by the degree of factionalism or consensus that lies behind the broad principles.¹⁹ Such an approach can, however, generate difficulties when confronted with a more "problem solving" or pragmatic orientation to negotiation, in which the overarching principles are seen as one of the *products* of the negotiation, rather than as a pre-negotiated (or first negotiated) item.

A completely different style of decision-making is generated in the Southeast Asian context, in which the most oft-cited example is the role of consensus, which is usually traced to the decision making style of traditional Javanese village society. Consensus of course does not equate with *unanimity*, and in the Javanese village is actually quite elitist, hegemonic, and even authoritarian. This might make its projection onto the international level seem problematic, until one notes that the consensual *modus operandi* of ASEAN is based on some sort of hegemonic legitimacy that conceded Indonesia's predominant role, in return for its commitment to exercise restraint in its regional behaviour).²⁰ Similarly, in Southeast Asia informal methods and procedures most often carry the day. However, this decision-making style might prove to be less functional in the broader context of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

The third cluster of issues can be located in socio-cultural attitudes towards territorial, cultural and political identity, including specific issues related to the societal role of violence, conflict, and conflict resolution mechanisms. This issue received considerably less attention in the various case studies, perhaps in part because it is closely entangled with the second and fourth issues. Nevertheless, Latham's study of India, for example, notes that "ideas of tolerance, pluralism and syncretism define Indian society," and

¹⁸ Fisher, *International Negotiation*, 29.

¹⁹ This "protection" of general principles is not unique to China, as American negotiator Paul Nitze discovered after his infamous "walk in the woods" discussions with his Russian counterpart. This story is well told in Strobe Talbott, *Deadly Gambits* (London: Pan Books, 1985).

²⁰ Amitav Acharya, "Culture and Security: Achieving Regional Security in the 'ASEAN Way'," 57.

are based on its self-definition as a secular democratic state.²¹ By contrast, Ben-Dor notes that there is a great difference in perceptions of (and the importance of) socio-political violence in different Middle Eastern states, with countries such as Syria being regarded as more "violence-prone" (in the sense of a willingness to resort to force to resolve disputes) than Egypt, in part because of their different state-building experiences. Virtually throughout the Middle East, however, a:

culture of planning for war, being prepared for violence, and not having trust or confidence in the other side's military capabilities or intentions, prevailed...The educational system was devoted to bringing up children and students with the fact that they would be forced to go into combat in the future.²²

Finally, several cases highlighted the concrete institutional expressions of these various cultural elements. In Latin America, for example, the relatively weak traditions of accountability and compromise that emerge from this cultural matrix exert a strong influence on the NACD agenda, and make Western notions such as transparency, compliance monitoring or verification, extremely difficult to translate into practice. In China, the closed, secretive and highly-concentrated policy-making system reflects not only the practices of the Chinese Communist Party, but a "cultural tradition of power bestowed to an idealized, benevolent and authoritarian leadership, with little open debate or broad channels of participation in the policymaking process."²³ In this case, it makes the evolution of NACD policy particularly dependent on changes in the world-views held by a small core leadership. It should be noted, however, that sometimes this might actually facilitate agreement, since the Western tradition of democratic openness can often lead to political immobilism, and the capture of policy processes by special interests.²⁴ Nonetheless, similar weak traditions of transparency also create difficulties throughout Southeast Asia, where the lack of openness means that in most states in the region very little information is available on military spending, and tough restrictions exist on investigating national security issues. In the Middle East, the question of transparency is also amplified by the traditional need for military secrecy in circumstances of war and conflict.

Probably the most important element of domestic political culture is the nature of civil-military relations, and again the case of Latin America highlights clearly that the particular configuration of civil-military relations can create serious difficulties for advancing the NACD agenda. For Hal Klepak, it represents the overwhelming factor, since despite the transition to democracy, the armed forces retain a powerful *droit de regard* over all aspects of foreign and security policy, and have great influence over budgetary matters. As he notes, the oft-cited expression -- *acoto pero no cumpro* -- which translates loosely as: "I understand and accept what the authorities have ordered but I simply choose not to comply," creates serious obstacles for transparency, or for compliance monitoring of NACD agreements. It also makes it

²¹ Latham, 114.

²² Fakhr, 183.

²³ Yuan, 84.

²⁴ Steven Miller and Michael Krepon, for example, have argued that the system often permits defence "hawks" to block arms control progress - an argument that could be made about the failure of the U.S. to sign on to the recent anti-personnel land mines treaty. Steven Miller, "Politics over Promise: Domestic Impediments to Arms Control," *International Security*, 8:4 (Spring 1984); Michael Krepon, *Strategic Stalemate: Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in American Politics* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), 108-145.

difficult to move from political agreements to practical implementation (for example, in the case of the Argentina-Brazil nuclear transparency and non-proliferation accords).

Implications for the Multilateral Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Agenda

These case studies taken together underline some of the difficulties of exporting or translating the fundamental concepts of the Western non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament experience to different regional contexts. If one looks at this in simple terms, many of these difficulties are tied to different definitions of "national interests" -- if not losing face or making deals with former colonial powers is more important than reaching a security-building agreement, this is *by definition* how interests are defined. Yet behind this simple (and rationalist) vision lies the deeper cultural content: it is precisely the different impact of "cultural sources" (diplomatic, political or strategic) that leads to definitions of national interests that pose problems for the easy translation of Western NACD concepts.

These studies also put into stark relief the distinctiveness of the East-West (or more generally Western) experience with NACD issues, and illuminate some of the cultural underpinnings of those developments. Stepping back from the East-West experience, one can see that arms control (and the development of an NACD agenda in general) was part of a tightly-knit conceptual package, a technocratic, step-by-step, and status-quo oriented approach to managing the superpower confrontation and to guaranteeing minimal stability in a nuclear world. It was also relatively successful in achieving its goals, albeit with an enormous amount of effort and resources. But the studies above suggest that in most, if not all, cases significant obstacles, some of which can be called "cultural," stand in the way of easy acceptance of the basic parameters of the NACD agenda when these are exported beyond Western or Northern frontiers. As a perhaps rather negative observation, it would be a mistake to assume that the near future will witness the easy unfolding of wholehearted multilateral security cooperation, at least in such regions as Latin America, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and perhaps Africa.

This can be illustrated with various examples of specific concepts current in Western NACD vocabulary and practice. Ideas such as openness and transparency, for example, are regarded in most other regions as completely alien -- and not just because of conventional ideas of military secrecy, but because there is no "fulcrum" to set against military secrecy as leverage that could be used by other political actors. There are, in other words, few domestic political traditions in which the idea of transparency could resonate as a positive social and political goal, to be set against the security need for some level of secrecy.²⁵ In some cases (such as the South Korean) where there has been a certain acceptance of the need for verification and transparency, one can argue that these ideas have been accepted as part of a broader process of incorporation into Western security structures, and in response to perceived regional threats.²⁶

²⁵ It should also be noted, of course, that few other states approach the American level of domestic transparency (via, for example, Freedom of (or Access to) Information legislation).

²⁶ One could attribute this evolution of the South Korean security culture to a number of factors: its close alliance with the United States, its need for information concerning North Korea, its process of democratization, or the fact that it is not really a "Confucian" culture. Obviously, further work would be needed to untangle these threads. I am indebted to Alan Crawford for this example.

In a closely related way, the notion that robust and effective verification is needed for successful arms control, non-proliferation or confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) runs up not only against cultural traditions about secrecy, but broader issues of trust and "honour." This is an important example of the interface between domestic "political cultural" and diplomatic or international norms: since such things as monitoring and verification of compliance (including "challenge inspections," "intrusive verification," and so forth) require the goodwill and cooperation of a very large number of members of the military and civilian security establishment, they cannot be undertaken without due attention to the political sensitivities of inviting one's neighbours (and possibly erstwhile enemies) "into the tent." In more prosaic terms, many wonder "how can you sign an agreement with us while at the same time insisting that you do not trust us to implement it, and therefore must verify it?" The slogan "trust but verify" makes little sense in many cultural contexts.

Likewise, the particular Western meaning attached to CSBMs, and arms control efforts in general, are regarded, in regions such as Latin America at least, as a means by which to reduce the power and size of the military, and hence they are resisted by this group. This is especially important in any context (not just Latin American) where reductions in military spending, or the consequent demobilization of soldiers, can mean impoverishment for many soldiers and officers. It has to be remembered that until recently, Western arms control measures (especially nuclear ones) had little impact on military budgets or personnel, or they may have met similar resistance there as well!

Finally, it is the case that *proliferation* is not seen as a problem in many regions, for example in Southeast Asia or the Asia-Pacific region more generally. States in the region speak of military modernization programs, or of responding to new security challenges, and they often see talk of arms control as a means for the West to entrench its dominance in the global military order. Underpinning this is an absence of a concept of "mutual" (as opposed to unilateral) security that accepts the idea that one way to manage the risk of armed conflict is to control the nature of military forces (particularly types and quantities of arms), and that sees one's own fate and fortune as inextricably tied up with regional relations. A sense of mutual security is absolutely essential in order to break out of the security dilemma, and to begin to develop notions of "sufficiency" and relative security. Without a clear (and shared) sense in the region that there are security gains to be made by all members from cooperative security dialogues, it is extremely difficult to get an NACD agenda launched.

However (and this is a crucial point), a whole host of NACD concepts and practices that are different from their Western counterparts can be seen to be emerging indigenously in many places, and are based on regional concepts or experiences that shape ideas of peace and security in different regional and cultural contexts. In Southeast Asia, for example, there is a fairly extensive web of confidence-building measures under discussion, which include such things as exchanges of military information, regular dialogues among military personnel, exchanges of information on intelligence matters, and so forth.²⁷ These are not always designed on the European model: they are less formal, they are less "obligatory" or "constraining" and they are not always explicitly part of broader security-building processes. But they are recognizable as CBMs in some form. In the Middle East, the current impasse in the peace process has made any progress in security-building impossible. Nevertheless, the case studies in this volume point out that there is already a limited experience with cooperative measures (such as ceasefires), in particular the Syrian-Israeli and Israeli-Egyptian accords after the 1973 war, and that Egypt and Israel have

²⁷ *The ASEAN Regional Forum: Confidence-Building*, report prepared for the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Ottawa, February 1997.

managed to negotiate their way through a series of small disputes connected with their peace treaty. In Latin America, specific sub-regional concerns with the cross-border consequences of the drug trade or the damaging effects of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons have given rise to sub-regional initiatives (none of which have advanced very far yet), but all of which address issues that are not part of the traditional "Northern" agenda. These experiences, limited though they may be, suggest that regional actors are quite capable of developing security-building measures that respond to their needs, even if various regional and domestic constraints prevent these (for the moment) from evolving further.

Conclusion

In light of these reflections, it is possible to make four overarching observations or "recommendations" for efforts to advance the NACD agenda in different regions. The first would be that *the potential for progress is enhanced when one finds "points of resonance" or indigenous cultural expressions or experiences to build upon*. Proposals that situate genuine policy departures in a longer tradition of multilateralism in which many or all states (usually within a region) have participated enjoy a greater chance of success than those that are cast as attempts to "export" the Western experience. For example, efforts to promote what some carelessly called a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia (CSCA), or to "teach" (and preach) the lessons of Western arms control to the Middle Eastern participants in the Arms Control and Regional Security process were seen as patronizing or insensitive to local circumstances. On the other hand, when local leaders could promote the ASEAN Regional Forum as a genuine expression of an "ASEAN way," that incorporated some of the traditions it had developed, it was more successful (however strained the analogy might have been).²⁸ Sometimes (such as in the CSCA case) this is merely a question of terminology; other times, however, the basic *modus operandi* of security-building processes may also differ.

For example, the move towards consensus methods of decision-making in a wide range of multilateral forums can be presented as a generalized influence from other cultures on Western diplomatic practices. Of course, its use in such things as the Non-Proliferation Treaty extension process was certainly not neutral, but it was a departure from a Western majoritarian impulse. Likewise, the Ottawa Process (and coalition) from which the international treaty banning anti-personnel land mines emerged illustrates a principle of open participation for "like-minded" states via a non-hierarchical process that sidestepped consensus, while still maximizing opportunities for participation and including a great deal of input from civil society. Abandoning a strict preference for formal treaty-based mechanisms, or for comprehensively verifiable arrangements, might be the best starting point for NACD processes in some regional/cultural contexts, and be in the best interests of states that would otherwise insist on such measures. An over-obsession with transparency and certainty, amplified by the nuclear weapons control experience, is a particularly Western trait that may hinder the realization of real improvements in regional security in different parts of the world.²⁹

²⁸ See, for details, Michael Leifer, *The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending ASEAN's Model of Regional Security*, Adelphi Paper 302 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996).

²⁹ Of course, there is also the risk that such agreements might give rise to future compliance disputes, depending on the nature of the measure agreed upon.

A second observation would be that *security-building processes ought to be made as multilateral as possible*, although they do not necessarily need to be global. This requires a simultaneous move "upwards" from bilateral to regional multilateral processes, and downward from global to regional efforts. Moving from bilateral to regional processes (within the most sensible inclusive limits of a region) can mute cultural specificities and minimize the ability of actors to magnify differences that might exist among subsets of them. It might also enhance the influence of (or help catalyze the development of) a shared regional diplomatic/security culture (ie: arms control experts, etc.), and lower, to some extent, the potentially disruptive role of actors (such as the armed forces) by bringing a larger set of interests (economic, societal) to bear on a security-building process. Moving from the global to the regional level, on the other hand, mutes the "inter-civilizational" and North-South rhetoric that has crippled such forums as the Conference on Disarmament, and allows regional participants to focus on their security concerns (and hence to influence the process) without feeling that they were being forced to deal with an imposed agenda.

Of course, as the stalled Middle East Peace Process illustrates, a multilateral process (such as in the Arms Control and Regional Security working group) cannot substitute for the engagement of the parties to the conflict. In fact, it also illustrates that the relationship between multilateral and bilateral or minilateral processes is a complex one that can itself trigger disagreements. As Ahmed Fakhri points out:

The Arabs understood that bilateral negotiations were created to solve the various bilateral problems between the concerned parties...[and] the multilateral talks were designed to solve the regional problems of the future, after the achievement of peace in the new Middle East. Unfortunately the Americans and the Israelis defined the value of the multilaterals differently: they were to facilitate the work of the bilateral negotiations.³⁰

A third conclusion would be that policy-makers should *seek out regional entrepreneurial leaders* as linchpins for efforts to break out of established patterns and to move forward on a concrete security-building agenda. Entrepreneurial leaders are those individuals who grasp the janus-faced nature of a security culture: who can understand that cultural factors shape decision-makers' perceptions of a situation and limit their freedom of action, while at the same time they can be used by creative leaders to legitimize new policy departures. Of course, policy departures must be presented in an authentic "voice" that reduces the risks associated with any security-building process, and hence one should beware of the partner who may have lost (from the point of view of his/her compatriots) this authentic voice. This is especially a problem in diplomatic culture, where a great premium is placed on dealing with individuals (in foreign policy elites) who can respond in familiar ways that may well be at odds with whatever cultural tradition from which they may have emerged. Hence in Latin America, for example (as Hal Klepak points out), although diplomats often make pleasant interlocutors, they seldom have real power on security issues, and their adeptness at the diplomatic game helps conceal this weakness. On the other side of the coin, a failure to understand the domestic political imperatives leaders face (such as a need, for example, in Arab cultures to engage in occasionally florid or aggressive rhetoric) can lead outsiders to ignore possibly valuable interlocutors.

A final point would be that in the absence of such entrepreneurial leaders, policies should probably attempt a two-pronged strategy to *encourage a normative transformation* in domestic politics and policies. At the international level, case studies from a variety of issue areas (security and other) confirm the

³⁰ Fakhri, 184.

importance of creating and fostering a transnational policy community whose interaction can crystallize and shape agreement around various norms, thus making possible policy change.³¹ But the creation of a transnational community of experts sharing a common "security culture" would by itself be insufficient, since policy change must ultimately occur at the domestic level. Hence one must also engage domestic "forces of change," whether these are non-governmental or civic groups within society, military establishments, alternative political formations, religious elites, or so forth.³² The transnational and national mobilization of non-governmental organizations on the land mines issue (in conjunction with key political actors, states and inter-governmental organizations) is a crystal-clear illustration of this. Obviously, whatever incentives might be provided, or processes of "cognitive learning" unleashed (through training courses, multilateral aid policies, etc.), when issues of power, prestige and budgets are at stake, the potential gains from such efforts might be low. But as the American-Soviet relationship well illustrates, change from within is possible, and efforts to foster it are almost always better than no dialogue at all.³³

Ultimately, any attempt to frame general conclusions runs into the basic point about security culture (and cultural influences in general): all achievements in NACD and security-building are contextual, and all policy initiatives must be tailored to local circumstances and requirements. When well framed, such initiatives will not rest upon crude assessments of what are and are not the "real interests" or "bottom lines" of particular states and parties, but will attempt to see how these are arrived at, and how interests and "bottom lines" are embedded in a broader socio-cultural context that can be used to facilitate (or impede) progress. In other words, any policy relevant conclusions must assume that policy-makers *to some extent* stand outside a specific cultural context, and attempt to determine (when framing policies) when elements of a security culture pose greater or lesser barriers to cooperation, or when particular "openings" can be found to advance a security-building project.

It remains, however, (at least in studies of this size and scope) difficult to disentangle and trace the broad and subtle impact of "security cultures," or to uncover their influence in particular NACD issues areas in different regions. Strong anecdotal evidence and plausible arguments abound, but a more systematic

³¹ Some formulations of this call it an "epistemic community," and a whole host of studies on this exist. See *inter alia*, Peter Haas, Peter Haas, "Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control," *International Organization*, 43:3 (1989), 377-405; Audie Klotz, *Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995); Martha Finnemore, *National Interests in International Society* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).

³² In the security realm, see Matthew Evangelista, "The Paradox of State Strength: Transnational Relations, Domestic Structures, and Security Policy in Russia and the Soviet Union," *International Organization*, 49:1 (Winter 1995), 1-38. In the human rights area see Alison Brysk, "Social Movements, The International System, and Human Rights in Argentina," *Comparative Political Studies*, 26:3 (1993), 259-285.

³³ An example of change can be offered from the American-Soviet relationship for just about every obstacle noted above. For example, arguments about "honour" and "trust" as obstacles to verification were put forward by the Soviets, before they grew to accept the mutual benefits of compliance monitoring. In general, see Keith Krause and Andrew Latham, "Constructing the Practice of Arms Control and Disarmament: Cultural Dimensions of the Western Experience," unpublished paper, 1997; Evangelista, "The Paradox of State Strength"; Emanuel Adler, "The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control," *International Organization*, 46:1 (Winter 1992), 101-46.

examination of these issues would require a great deal more work. Analysts are still some distance from a coherent framework for understanding security cultures that would link positions concerning NACD issues with particular diplomatic, historical, strategic or political cultural orientations. Further research on security cultures could thus concentrate on the following issues:

- tracing different cultural influences on the development (and implementation) of global NACD norms in areas such as transparency, verification or confidence-building;
- focusing on the different cultural mainsprings of national security policies in specific regional environments (such as Southeast Asia or the Middle East) in order to catalyze regional "track-two" dialogues on these issues;
- analysing the security cultures of regional "outlier" states (such as South Korea, France, Israel or South Africa) to determine how and why they share or diverge from regional norms; and
- studying the role of transnational actors and forces as "transmission mechanisms" for domestic norm change in particular states or issue areas.

In the end, all of these case studies illustrate that "culture matters" in the formulation of national interests towards non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament policies, and in the stances decision-makers take towards participation in multilateral security-building processes. Instead of the crude question "does culture matter?" these authors have attempted to treat cultural factors not as one more variable in a causal process, but to examine the way in which widely-shared beliefs, traditions, attitudes, and symbols form an inescapable backdrop or framework of meaning for political actors, policy-makers, and ordinary citizens. Elements of this framework manifest themselves all the way from micro-level (in negotiating behaviour, perceptions of "the other") to macro-level (socio-cultural attitudes towards violence, visions of one's place in the world) processes. Although the influence of these cultural elements may often seem elusive or intangible, there is little doubt that they can (and will) exercise a powerful influence on the prospects for security-building in various states and regions.

ABOUT THE VERIFICATION RESEARCH PROGRAM

The Verification Research Program constitutes a focal point within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade for research and analysis relevant to verification and confidence-building within the context of non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament (NACD). Its general objective is to contribute to the process of achieving verifiable NACD agreements that will serve to improve the security of Canada and its Allies. The Program undertakes research and provides specialist support to Canadian missions abroad dealing with the NACD agenda. This is achieved through the fusion of an in-house research capability with resources made available by other relevant Departments of government, as well as through contacts with the academic community, the private sector and knowledgeable individuals. It fosters an understanding of strategic issues and the quest for peace and security as well as the role that verification and confidence-building can play in that process.

SELECTED VERIFICATION RESEARCH PROGRAM PUBLICATIONS

The following list covers the period 1995 through 1997. A complete list is available from: Verification Research Program, Non-proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Division (IDA), Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 125 Sussex Drive, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, K1A 0G2

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